2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
82 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
83 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
85 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
86 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
89 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
91 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
92 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
109 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
111 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
114 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
116 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
141 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
142 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
144 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
145 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
148 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
151 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
155 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
160 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
162 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
163 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
164 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
166 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
167 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
168 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
169 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
170 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
171 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
173 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
178 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
180 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
185 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
186 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
187 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
192 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
193 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
194 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
199 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
200 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
202 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
203 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
207 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
208 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
211 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
215 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
217 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
218 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
219 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
222 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
224 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
227 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
228 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
229 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
233 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
235 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
237 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
238 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
243 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
245 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
251 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
254 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
255 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
257 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
259 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
260 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
262 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
266 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
267 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
269 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
271 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
272 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
277 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
278 s
->session
->master_key
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
279 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
283 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
284 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
288 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
293 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
295 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
296 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
300 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
304 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
311 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
313 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
314 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
315 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
322 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
324 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
327 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
329 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
330 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
335 /* clean a few things up */
336 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
338 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
340 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
341 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
343 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
347 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
351 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
352 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
357 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
359 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
360 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
362 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
364 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
366 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
367 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
370 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
371 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
372 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
373 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
376 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
378 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
379 /* done with handshaking */
380 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
381 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
382 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
383 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
387 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
390 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
392 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
393 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
397 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
400 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
401 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
403 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
406 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
409 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
411 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
412 * in the middle of a handshake message.
414 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
415 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
417 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
420 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
421 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
422 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
423 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
425 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
426 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
430 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
435 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
437 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
438 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
439 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
442 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
447 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
448 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
449 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
451 } while (skip_message
);
452 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
455 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
457 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
459 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
462 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
463 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
465 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
466 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
467 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
469 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
470 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
473 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
474 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
475 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
479 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
481 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
487 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
491 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
497 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
498 /* We've already read everything in */
499 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
504 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
506 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
507 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
509 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
513 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
519 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
520 * Finished verification.
522 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
526 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
527 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
528 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
531 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
536 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
537 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
539 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
540 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
542 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
547 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
548 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
549 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
556 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
558 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
561 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
565 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
567 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
573 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
574 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
575 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
576 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
577 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
578 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
583 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
588 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
589 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
590 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
591 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
593 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
594 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
595 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
596 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
597 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
598 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
599 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
600 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
601 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
602 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
603 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
604 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
605 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
606 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
607 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
608 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
609 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
610 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
611 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
613 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
614 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
615 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
617 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
618 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
619 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
621 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
622 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
624 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
625 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
626 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
627 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
628 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
630 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
631 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
632 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
633 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
634 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
635 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
636 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
637 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
639 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
640 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
642 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
643 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
646 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
652 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
654 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
656 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
659 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
661 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
666 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
667 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
672 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
673 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
676 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
677 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
680 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
682 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
684 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
687 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
689 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
692 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
694 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
697 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
699 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
702 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
704 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
709 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
710 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
713 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
715 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
717 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
720 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
721 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
723 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
724 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
730 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
732 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
733 * @method: the intended method.
735 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
737 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
739 int version
= method
->version
;
741 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
742 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
743 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
744 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
746 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
747 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
748 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
750 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
751 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
752 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
753 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
754 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
755 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
761 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
764 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
765 * @version: Protocol version to test against
767 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
769 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
771 const version_info
*vent
;
772 const version_info
*table
;
774 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
776 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
777 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
778 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
779 table
= tls_version_table
;
781 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
782 table
= dtls_version_table
;
787 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
789 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
790 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
791 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
799 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
800 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
801 * supported protocol version.
803 * @s server SSL handle.
805 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
807 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
809 const version_info
*vent
;
810 const version_info
*table
;
813 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
814 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
817 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
821 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
822 * highest protocol version).
824 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
825 table
= tls_version_table
;
826 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
827 table
= dtls_version_table
;
829 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
833 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
834 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
835 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
841 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
842 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
843 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
844 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
846 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
847 * @version: the intended limit.
848 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
850 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
852 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
860 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
861 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
862 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
864 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
865 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
866 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
867 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
868 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
870 switch (method_version
) {
873 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
874 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
875 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
876 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
881 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
882 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
886 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
887 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
888 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
898 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
899 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
900 * the version specific method.
902 * @s: server SSL handle.
904 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
906 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
909 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
911 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
912 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
914 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
917 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
918 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
919 const version_info
*vent
;
920 const version_info
*table
;
922 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
924 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
926 switch (server_version
) {
929 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
930 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
931 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
933 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
934 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
936 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
937 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
938 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
939 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
940 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
943 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
944 table
= tls_version_table
;
946 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
947 table
= dtls_version_table
;
951 suppversions
= tls_get_extension_by_type(hello
->pre_proc_exts
,
952 hello
->num_extensions
,
953 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
);
955 if (suppversions
!= NULL
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
956 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
957 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
958 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
961 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
963 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
964 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
965 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
968 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
969 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
970 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
971 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
973 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
974 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
975 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
977 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
980 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
983 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
984 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
986 method
= vent
->smeth();
987 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
988 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
989 best_method
= method
;
993 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
995 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
999 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1000 s
->method
= best_method
;
1003 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1007 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1008 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1010 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1011 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1014 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1017 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1018 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1020 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1021 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1023 method
= vent
->smeth();
1024 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1025 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1031 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1035 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1036 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1037 * the version specific method.
1039 * @s: client SSL handle.
1040 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1042 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1044 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1046 const version_info
*vent
;
1047 const version_info
*table
;
1049 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1050 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1051 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1053 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1055 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1056 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1058 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1059 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1060 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1061 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1062 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1065 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1066 table
= tls_version_table
;
1068 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1069 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1073 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1074 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1077 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1079 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1081 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1082 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1086 s
->version
= version
;
1090 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1094 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1095 * @s: The SSL connection
1096 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1097 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1099 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1100 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1101 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1102 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1103 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1105 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1106 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1107 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1109 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1110 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1112 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1117 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1118 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1119 const version_info
*table
;
1120 const version_info
*vent
;
1122 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1125 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1126 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1127 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1128 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1129 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1131 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1133 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1134 table
= tls_version_table
;
1136 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1137 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1142 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1143 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1144 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1145 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1147 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1148 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1149 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1151 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1152 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1153 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1155 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1156 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1157 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1158 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1159 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1160 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1162 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1164 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1166 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1167 * "version capability" vector.
1169 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1173 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1174 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1178 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1180 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1181 *min_version
= version
;
1186 *max_version
= version
;
1188 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1190 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1196 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1197 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1199 * @s: client SSL handle.
1201 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1203 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1205 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1207 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1212 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1214 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1215 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1216 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1218 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;