2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/objects.h>
18 #include <openssl/evp.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
23 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
25 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
30 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
31 s
->init_num
, &written
);
34 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
36 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
37 * ignore the result anyway
39 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
40 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
44 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
46 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
47 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
51 s
->init_off
+= written
;
52 s
->init_num
-= written
;
56 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
60 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
61 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
64 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
70 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
72 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
75 /* Reset any extension flags */
76 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
79 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
80 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
83 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
84 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
87 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
88 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
89 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
92 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
93 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
96 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
97 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
99 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
107 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
109 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
112 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
113 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
114 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
115 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
116 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
118 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
120 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
122 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
123 * support secure renegotiation.
125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
126 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
127 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
130 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
132 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
135 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
136 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
138 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
140 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
141 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
144 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
147 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
154 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
155 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
157 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
158 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
160 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
161 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
163 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
164 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
166 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
169 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
170 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
171 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
172 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
173 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
174 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
176 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
179 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
180 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
181 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
183 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
184 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
185 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
186 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
187 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
188 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
189 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
194 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
198 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
207 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
209 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
210 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
211 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
212 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
213 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
215 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
216 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
217 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
219 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
223 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
224 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
226 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
231 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
237 /* Get the data to be signed */
238 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
243 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
247 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
248 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
254 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
259 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
260 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
261 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
262 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
267 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
268 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
269 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
270 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
271 s
->session
->master_key
)
272 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
277 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
284 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
286 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
287 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
288 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
289 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
293 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
298 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
299 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
303 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
307 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
308 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
312 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
314 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
315 const unsigned char *data
;
316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
317 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
319 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
323 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
326 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
327 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
328 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
335 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
336 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
340 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
342 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
344 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
345 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
349 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
353 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
354 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
357 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
360 } else if (rv
== 0) {
361 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
365 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
367 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
368 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
372 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
374 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
376 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
377 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
380 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
381 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
382 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
383 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
384 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
385 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
386 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
389 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
391 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
395 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
396 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
397 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
399 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
402 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
404 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
408 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
414 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
416 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
422 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
423 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
424 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
425 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
426 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
430 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
436 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
437 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
438 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
439 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
444 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
445 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
446 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
447 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
448 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
452 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
453 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
458 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
463 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
469 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
472 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
473 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
475 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
476 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
477 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
479 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
484 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
486 size_t finish_md_len
;
490 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
492 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
495 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
500 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
501 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
502 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
508 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
509 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
511 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
512 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
515 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
517 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
518 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
523 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
525 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
531 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
532 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
534 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
535 s
->session
->master_key
,
536 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
542 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
544 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
549 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
551 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
553 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
555 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
560 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
564 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
566 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
571 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
575 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
579 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
582 unsigned int updatetype
;
584 s
->key_update_count
++;
585 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
586 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
592 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
593 * be on a record boundary.
595 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
596 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
601 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
602 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
603 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
609 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
612 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
613 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
614 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
620 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
621 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
622 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
624 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
625 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
627 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
628 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
633 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
635 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
636 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
637 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
642 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
645 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
650 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
651 * the appropriate error.
653 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
656 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
657 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
659 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
660 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
663 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
670 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
675 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
677 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
678 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
679 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
681 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
682 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
683 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
684 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
685 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
686 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
688 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
693 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
695 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
700 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
701 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
702 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
707 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
708 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
709 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
714 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
715 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
717 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
718 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
722 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
723 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
726 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
730 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
732 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
733 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
734 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
737 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
739 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
743 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
745 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
748 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
749 * message must be on a record boundary.
751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
752 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
757 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
758 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
759 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
763 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
765 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
767 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
768 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
773 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
775 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
781 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
783 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
784 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
789 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
791 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
793 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
795 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
799 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
800 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
802 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
804 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
805 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
810 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
811 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
812 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
816 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
817 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
821 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
826 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
828 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
829 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
833 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
835 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
837 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
844 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
845 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
849 unsigned char *outbytes
;
851 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
854 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
857 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
858 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
860 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
865 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
872 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
873 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
877 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
878 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
879 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
880 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
882 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
888 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
890 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
891 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
893 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
895 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
897 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
898 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
900 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
902 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
903 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
905 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
909 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
910 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
915 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
916 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
917 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
918 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
920 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
921 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
923 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
924 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
927 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
932 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
936 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
937 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
938 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
940 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
941 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
945 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
947 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
952 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
954 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
955 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
956 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
967 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
970 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
972 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
973 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
974 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
983 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
984 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
987 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
989 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
992 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
994 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
995 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
1001 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1003 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1004 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1006 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1009 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
))
1014 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1015 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1018 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1020 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1023 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1025 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
1026 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1028 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1030 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
1032 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1033 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
1036 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1037 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1038 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1039 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1042 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1044 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1045 /* done with handshaking */
1046 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1047 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1048 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1049 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1054 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1058 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1060 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1061 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1064 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1066 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1067 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
1069 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1071 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1074 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1075 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1077 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1080 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1083 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1085 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1086 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1088 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1089 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1091 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1094 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1095 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1096 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1097 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1099 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1100 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1104 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1109 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1110 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1112 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1113 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1114 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1117 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1121 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1122 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1123 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1124 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1126 } while (skip_message
);
1127 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1130 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1132 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1134 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1137 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1138 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1140 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1141 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1142 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1144 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1145 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1148 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1149 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1150 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1154 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1156 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1162 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1166 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1168 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1172 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1173 /* We've already read everything in */
1174 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1179 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1181 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1182 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1184 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1188 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1194 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1195 * Finished verification.
1197 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1201 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1202 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1203 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1206 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1210 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1211 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1212 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1215 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1216 * processing the message
1218 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1219 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1220 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1222 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1226 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1227 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1228 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1229 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1236 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1238 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1241 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1245 return SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
1247 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1250 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1252 return SSL_PKEY_ED25519
;
1254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1255 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1256 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1257 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1258 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1259 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1260 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1265 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1270 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1273 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1275 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1277 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1285 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1286 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1290 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1291 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1293 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1297 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1299 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1300 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1301 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1303 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1304 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1306 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1308 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1310 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1312 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1313 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1314 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1315 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1316 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1317 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1318 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1319 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1321 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1322 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1324 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1325 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1328 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1334 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1336 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1338 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1341 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1343 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1348 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1349 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1354 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1355 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1358 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1359 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1362 /* Must be in order high to low */
1363 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1365 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1367 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1370 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1372 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1375 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1377 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1380 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1382 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1385 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1387 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1392 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1393 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1396 /* Must be in order high to low */
1397 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1399 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1401 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1404 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1405 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1407 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1408 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1414 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1416 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1417 * @method: the intended method.
1419 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1421 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1423 int version
= method
->version
;
1425 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1426 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1427 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1428 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1430 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1431 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1432 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1434 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1435 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1436 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1437 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1443 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1446 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1447 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1449 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1451 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1453 const version_info
*vent
;
1454 const version_info
*table
;
1456 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1458 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1459 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1460 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1461 table
= tls_version_table
;
1463 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1464 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1469 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1471 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1472 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1473 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1481 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1482 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1483 * supported protocol version.
1485 * @s server SSL handle.
1487 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1489 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1491 const version_info
*vent
;
1492 const version_info
*table
;
1495 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1496 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1499 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1503 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1504 * highest protocol version).
1506 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1507 table
= tls_version_table
;
1508 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1509 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1511 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1515 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1516 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1517 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1523 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1524 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1525 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1526 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1528 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1529 * @version: the intended limit.
1530 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1532 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1534 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1542 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1543 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1544 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1546 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1547 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1548 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1549 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1550 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1552 switch (method_version
) {
1555 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1556 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1557 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1558 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1563 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1564 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1568 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1569 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1570 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1579 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1581 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1582 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1583 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1584 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1585 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1586 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
1587 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1589 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1594 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1595 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1596 * the version specific method.
1598 * @s: server SSL handle.
1600 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1602 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1605 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1607 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1608 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1610 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1613 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1614 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1615 const version_info
*vent
;
1616 const version_info
*table
;
1618 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1620 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1622 switch (server_version
) {
1624 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1625 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1626 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1627 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1629 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1630 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1631 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1632 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1633 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1638 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1639 * a HelloRetryRequest
1642 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1643 table
= tls_version_table
;
1645 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1646 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1650 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1652 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1653 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1654 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1655 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1656 PACKET versionslist
;
1658 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1660 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1661 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1662 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1665 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1666 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1667 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1668 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1670 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1671 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1672 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1674 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1677 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1680 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1681 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1683 method
= vent
->smeth();
1684 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1685 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1686 best_method
= method
;
1690 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1691 /* Trailing data? */
1692 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1695 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1696 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1698 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1699 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1701 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1702 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1705 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1706 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1707 s
->method
= best_method
;
1710 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1714 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1715 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1717 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1718 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1721 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1724 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1725 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1727 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1728 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1730 method
= vent
->smeth();
1731 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1732 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1733 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1739 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1743 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1744 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1745 * the version specific method.
1747 * @s: client SSL handle.
1748 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1749 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1750 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1752 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1754 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, int checkdgrd
, int *al
)
1756 const version_info
*vent
;
1757 const version_info
*table
;
1760 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1761 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1762 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1764 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1765 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1766 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1769 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1771 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
1772 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1773 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1776 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1777 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1778 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1779 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1780 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1783 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1784 table
= tls_version_table
;
1786 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1787 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1791 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1792 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1795 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1798 if (highver
!= 0 && version
!= vent
->version
)
1801 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1802 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1804 if (version
== vent
->version
) {
1805 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1812 highver
= vent
->version
;
1814 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1818 /* Check for downgrades */
1820 if (version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> version
) {
1821 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1822 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1823 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1824 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1825 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1826 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1828 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1829 && version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1830 && highver
> version
) {
1831 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1832 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1833 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1834 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1835 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1836 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1843 s
->version
= version
;
1847 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1848 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1852 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1853 * @s: The SSL connection
1854 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1855 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1857 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1858 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1859 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1860 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1861 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1863 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1864 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1865 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1867 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1868 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1870 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1874 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1875 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1876 const version_info
*table
;
1877 const version_info
*vent
;
1879 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1882 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1883 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1884 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1885 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1886 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1888 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1890 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1891 table
= tls_version_table
;
1893 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1894 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1899 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1900 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1901 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1902 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1904 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1905 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1906 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1908 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1909 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1910 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1912 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1913 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1914 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1915 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1916 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1917 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1919 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1921 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1923 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1924 * "version capability" vector.
1926 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1930 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1931 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1935 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1937 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1938 *min_version
= version
;
1943 *max_version
= version
;
1945 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1947 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1953 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1954 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1956 * @s: client SSL handle.
1958 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1960 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1962 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1964 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1969 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1971 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1972 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1973 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1975 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1980 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1981 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1982 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1983 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1986 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, unsigned int group_id
, const unsigned char *groups
,
1987 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1991 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1994 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++, groups
+= 2) {
1995 if (group_id
== GET_GROUP_ID(groups
, 0)
1997 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, groups
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2006 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2007 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
)
2009 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2011 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2013 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2015 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2016 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2017 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2022 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2023 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
2026 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2027 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2028 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = hashlen
;
2029 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2030 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2038 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2040 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2043 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2045 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2046 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2049 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2053 /* get the CA RDNs */
2054 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2055 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2060 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2061 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2062 unsigned int name_len
;
2064 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2065 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2070 namestart
= namebytes
;
2071 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2075 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2082 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2088 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2089 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2094 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2096 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2101 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2103 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2105 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2106 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
))
2109 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2112 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2113 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2114 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2118 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2119 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2121 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2127 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
))