2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/objects.h>
18 #include <openssl/evp.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
23 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
25 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
30 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
31 s
->init_num
, &written
);
34 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
36 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
37 * ignore the result anyway
39 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
40 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
44 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
46 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
47 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
51 s
->init_off
+= written
;
52 s
->init_num
-= written
;
56 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
60 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
61 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
64 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
70 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
72 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
75 /* Reset any extension flags */
76 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
79 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
80 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
83 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
84 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
87 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
88 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
89 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
92 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
93 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
96 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
97 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
99 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
107 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
109 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
112 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
113 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
114 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
115 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
116 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
118 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
120 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
122 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
123 * support secure renegotiation.
125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
126 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
127 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
130 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
132 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
135 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
136 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
138 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
140 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
141 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
144 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
147 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
154 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
155 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
157 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
158 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
160 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
161 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
163 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
164 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
166 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
169 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
170 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
171 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
172 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
173 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
174 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
176 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
179 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
180 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
181 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
183 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
184 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
185 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
186 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
187 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
188 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
189 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
194 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
198 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
207 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
209 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
210 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
211 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
212 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
213 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
215 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
216 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
217 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
219 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
223 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
225 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
230 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
236 /* Get the data to be signed */
237 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
242 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
246 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
247 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
253 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
258 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
259 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
260 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
261 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
266 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
267 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
268 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
269 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
270 s
->session
->master_key
)
271 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
276 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
283 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
285 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
286 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
287 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
288 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
292 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
297 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
298 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
302 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
311 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
313 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
314 const unsigned char *data
;
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
316 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
318 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
322 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
325 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
326 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
327 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
334 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
335 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
339 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
341 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
343 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
344 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
348 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
352 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
353 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
356 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
359 } else if (rv
== 0) {
360 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
364 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
366 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
367 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
371 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
373 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
377 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
379 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
380 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
383 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
384 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
385 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
386 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
387 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
388 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
389 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
394 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
398 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
399 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
400 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
402 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
405 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
407 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
411 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
417 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
419 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
425 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
426 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
427 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
428 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
429 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
433 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
439 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
440 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
441 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
442 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
447 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
448 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
449 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
450 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
451 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
455 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
456 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
461 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
466 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
472 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
475 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
476 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
478 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
479 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
480 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
482 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
487 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
489 size_t finish_md_len
;
493 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
495 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
498 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
503 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
504 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
505 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
511 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
512 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
514 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
515 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
518 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
520 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
521 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
526 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
528 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
534 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
535 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
537 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
538 s
->session
->master_key
,
539 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
545 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
547 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
552 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
554 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
556 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
558 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
563 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
567 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
569 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
574 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
578 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
582 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
585 unsigned int updatetype
;
587 s
->key_update_count
++;
588 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
589 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
595 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
596 * be on a record boundary.
598 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
599 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
604 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
605 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
606 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
612 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
615 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
616 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
617 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
623 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
624 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
625 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
627 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
628 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
630 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
631 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
636 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
638 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
639 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
640 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
645 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
648 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
653 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
654 * the appropriate error.
656 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
659 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
660 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
662 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
663 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
669 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
673 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
678 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
680 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
681 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
682 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
685 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
686 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
687 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
688 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
689 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
691 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
696 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
698 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
703 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
704 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
705 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
710 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
711 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
712 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
718 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
720 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
721 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
725 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
726 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
729 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
735 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
736 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
737 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
740 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
742 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
746 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
748 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
751 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
752 * message must be on a record boundary.
754 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
755 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
760 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
761 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
762 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
766 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
768 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
770 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
771 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
776 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
778 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
784 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
786 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
787 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
792 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
794 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
796 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
798 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
802 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
803 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
805 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
807 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
808 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
813 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
814 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
815 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
819 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
820 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
824 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
829 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
831 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
832 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
836 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
838 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
840 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
847 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
848 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
852 unsigned char *outbytes
;
854 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
857 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
860 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
861 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
863 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
868 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
875 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
876 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
880 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
881 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
882 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
883 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
885 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
891 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
893 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
894 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
896 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
898 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
900 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
901 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
903 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
905 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
906 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
908 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
912 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
913 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
918 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
919 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
920 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
921 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
923 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
924 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
926 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
927 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
930 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
935 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
939 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
940 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
941 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
943 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
944 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
948 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
950 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
955 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
957 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
958 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
959 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
970 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
973 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
975 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
976 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
977 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
986 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
987 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
990 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
992 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
995 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
997 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
998 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
1004 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1006 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1007 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1009 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1012 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
))
1017 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1018 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1021 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1023 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1026 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1028 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
1029 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1031 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1033 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
1035 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1036 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
1039 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1040 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1041 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1042 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1045 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1047 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1048 /* done with handshaking */
1049 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1050 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1051 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1052 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1057 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1061 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1063 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1064 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1067 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1069 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1070 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
1072 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1074 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1077 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1078 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1080 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1083 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1086 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1088 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1089 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1091 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1092 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1094 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1097 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1098 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1099 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1100 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1102 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1103 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1107 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1112 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1113 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1115 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1116 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1117 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1120 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1124 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1125 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1126 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1127 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1129 } while (skip_message
);
1130 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1133 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1135 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1137 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1140 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1141 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1143 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1144 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1145 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1147 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1148 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1151 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1152 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1153 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1157 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1159 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1165 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1169 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1171 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1175 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1176 /* We've already read everything in */
1177 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1182 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1184 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1185 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1187 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1191 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1197 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1198 * Finished verification.
1200 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1204 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1205 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1206 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1209 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1213 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1214 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1215 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1218 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1219 * processing the message
1221 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1222 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1223 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1225 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1229 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1230 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1231 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1232 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1239 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1241 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1244 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1248 return SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
1250 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1253 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1255 return SSL_PKEY_ED25519
;
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1258 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1259 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1260 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1261 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1262 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1263 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1268 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1273 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1276 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1278 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1285 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1286 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1290 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1291 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1294 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1296 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1298 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1299 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1300 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1302 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1303 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1304 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1306 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1307 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1309 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1311 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1312 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1313 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1315 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1316 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1317 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1318 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1319 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1320 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1321 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1322 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1324 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1325 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1327 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1328 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1331 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1337 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1339 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1341 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1344 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1346 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1351 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1352 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1357 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1358 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1361 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1362 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1365 /* Must be in order high to low */
1366 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1368 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1370 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1373 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1375 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1378 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1380 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1383 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1385 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1388 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1390 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1395 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1396 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1399 /* Must be in order high to low */
1400 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1402 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1404 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1407 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1408 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1410 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1411 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1417 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1419 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1420 * @method: the intended method.
1422 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1424 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1426 int version
= method
->version
;
1428 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1429 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1430 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1431 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1433 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1434 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1435 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1437 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1438 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1439 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1440 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1446 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1449 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1450 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1452 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1454 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1456 const version_info
*vent
;
1457 const version_info
*table
;
1459 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1461 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1462 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1463 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1464 table
= tls_version_table
;
1466 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1467 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1472 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1474 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1475 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1476 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1484 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1485 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1486 * supported protocol version.
1488 * @s server SSL handle.
1490 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1492 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1494 const version_info
*vent
;
1495 const version_info
*table
;
1498 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1499 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1502 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1506 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1507 * highest protocol version).
1509 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1510 table
= tls_version_table
;
1511 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1512 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1514 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1518 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1519 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1520 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1526 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1527 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1528 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1529 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1531 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1532 * @version: the intended limit.
1533 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1535 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1537 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1545 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1546 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1547 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1549 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1550 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1551 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1552 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1553 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1555 switch (method_version
) {
1558 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1559 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1560 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1561 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1566 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1567 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1571 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1572 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1573 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1582 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1584 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1585 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1586 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1587 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1588 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1589 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
1590 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1592 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1597 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1598 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1599 * the version specific method.
1601 * @s: server SSL handle.
1603 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1605 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1608 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1610 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1611 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1613 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1616 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1617 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1618 const version_info
*vent
;
1619 const version_info
*table
;
1621 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1623 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1625 switch (server_version
) {
1627 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1628 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1629 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1630 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1632 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1633 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1634 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1635 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1636 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1641 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1642 * a HelloRetryRequest
1645 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1646 table
= tls_version_table
;
1648 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1649 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1653 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1655 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1656 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1657 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1658 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1659 PACKET versionslist
;
1661 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1663 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1664 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1665 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1668 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1669 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1670 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1671 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1673 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1674 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1675 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1677 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1680 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1683 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1684 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1686 method
= vent
->smeth();
1687 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1688 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1689 best_method
= method
;
1693 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1694 /* Trailing data? */
1695 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1698 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1699 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1701 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1702 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1704 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1705 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1708 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1709 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1710 s
->method
= best_method
;
1713 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1717 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1718 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1720 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1721 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1724 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1727 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1728 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1730 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1731 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1733 method
= vent
->smeth();
1734 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1735 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1736 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1742 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1746 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1747 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1748 * the version specific method.
1750 * @s: client SSL handle.
1751 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1752 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1753 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1755 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1757 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, int checkdgrd
, int *al
)
1759 const version_info
*vent
;
1760 const version_info
*table
;
1763 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1764 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1765 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1767 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1768 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1769 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1772 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1774 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
1775 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1776 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1779 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1780 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1781 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1782 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1783 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1786 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1787 table
= tls_version_table
;
1789 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1790 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1794 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1795 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1798 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1801 if (highver
!= 0 && version
!= vent
->version
)
1804 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1805 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1807 if (version
== vent
->version
) {
1808 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1815 highver
= vent
->version
;
1817 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1821 /* Check for downgrades */
1823 if (version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> version
) {
1824 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1825 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1826 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1827 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1828 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1829 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1831 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1832 && version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1833 && highver
> version
) {
1834 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1835 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1836 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1837 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1838 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1839 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1846 s
->version
= version
;
1850 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1851 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1855 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1856 * @s: The SSL connection
1857 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1858 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1860 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1861 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1862 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1863 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1864 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1866 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1867 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1868 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1870 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1871 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1873 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1877 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1878 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1879 const version_info
*table
;
1880 const version_info
*vent
;
1882 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1885 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1886 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1887 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1888 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1889 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1891 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1893 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1894 table
= tls_version_table
;
1896 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1897 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1902 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1903 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1904 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1905 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1907 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1908 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1909 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1911 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1912 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1913 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1915 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1916 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1917 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1918 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1919 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1920 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1922 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1924 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1926 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1927 * "version capability" vector.
1929 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1933 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1934 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1938 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1940 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1941 *min_version
= version
;
1946 *max_version
= version
;
1948 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1950 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1956 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1957 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1959 * @s: client SSL handle.
1961 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1963 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1965 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1967 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1972 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1974 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1975 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1976 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1978 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1983 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1984 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1985 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1986 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1989 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, unsigned int group_id
, const unsigned char *groups
,
1990 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1994 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1997 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++, groups
+= 2) {
1998 if (group_id
== GET_GROUP_ID(groups
, 0)
2000 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, groups
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2009 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2010 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
)
2012 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2014 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2016 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2018 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2019 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2020 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2025 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2026 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
2029 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2030 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2031 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = hashlen
;
2032 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2033 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2041 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2043 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2046 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2048 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2049 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2052 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2056 /* get the CA RDNs */
2057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2058 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2063 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2064 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2065 unsigned int name_len
;
2067 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2068 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2073 namestart
= namebytes
;
2074 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2078 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2083 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2085 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2091 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2092 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2097 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2099 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2104 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2106 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2108 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2109 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
))
2112 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2115 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2116 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2117 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2121 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2122 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2124 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2130 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
))