2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
82 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
83 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
85 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
86 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
89 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
91 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
92 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
109 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
111 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
114 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
116 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
141 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
142 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
144 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
145 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
148 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
151 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
156 * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
158 * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
161 * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
162 * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
163 * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
165 static int compare_extensions(const void *p1
, const void *p2
)
167 const RAW_EXTENSION
*e1
= (const RAW_EXTENSION
*)p1
;
168 const RAW_EXTENSION
*e2
= (const RAW_EXTENSION
*)p2
;
170 if (e1
->type
< e2
->type
)
172 else if (e1
->type
> e2
->type
)
179 * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
180 * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
182 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
183 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
184 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
185 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
186 * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
189 * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
190 * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
192 int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET
*packet
, RAW_EXTENSION
**res
,
193 size_t *numfound
, int *ad
)
195 PACKET extensions
= *packet
;
196 size_t num_extensions
= 0, i
= 0;
197 RAW_EXTENSION
*raw_extensions
= NULL
;
199 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
200 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions
) > 0) {
204 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions
, &type
) ||
205 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions
, &extension
)) {
206 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
212 if (num_extensions
> 0) {
213 raw_extensions
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions
)
215 if (raw_extensions
== NULL
) {
216 *ad
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
221 /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
222 for (i
= 0; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
223 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet
, &raw_extensions
[i
].type
) ||
224 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet
,
225 &raw_extensions
[i
].data
)) {
226 /* This should not happen. */
227 *ad
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
233 if (PACKET_remaining(packet
) != 0) {
234 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
238 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
239 qsort(raw_extensions
, num_extensions
, sizeof(*raw_extensions
),
241 for (i
= 1; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
242 if (raw_extensions
[i
- 1].type
== raw_extensions
[i
].type
) {
243 *ad
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
249 *res
= raw_extensions
;
250 *numfound
= num_extensions
;
254 OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions
);
260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
265 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
267 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
268 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
269 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
271 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
272 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
273 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
274 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
275 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
276 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
278 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
283 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
285 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
290 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
291 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
292 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
297 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
298 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
299 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
305 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
307 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
308 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
312 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
313 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
316 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
320 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
323 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
327 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
332 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
333 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
334 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
338 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
340 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
342 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
343 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
348 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
350 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
356 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
359 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
360 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
362 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
364 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
365 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
367 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
370 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
372 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
373 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
377 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
379 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
381 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
388 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
390 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
391 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
392 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
399 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
401 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
404 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
406 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
407 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
412 /* clean a few things up */
413 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
415 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
417 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
418 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
420 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
424 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
428 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
429 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
434 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
436 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
437 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
439 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
441 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
443 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
444 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
447 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
448 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
449 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
450 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
453 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
455 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
456 /* done with handshaking */
457 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
458 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
459 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
460 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
464 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
467 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
469 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
470 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
474 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
477 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
478 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
480 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
483 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
486 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
488 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
489 * in the middle of a handshake message.
491 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
492 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
494 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
497 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
498 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
499 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
500 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
502 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
503 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
507 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
512 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
514 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
515 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
516 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
519 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
524 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
525 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
526 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
528 } while (skip_message
);
529 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
532 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
534 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
536 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
539 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
540 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
542 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
543 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
544 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
546 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
547 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
550 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
551 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
552 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
556 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
558 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
564 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
568 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
574 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
575 /* We've already read everything in */
576 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
581 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
583 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
584 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
586 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
590 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
596 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
597 * Finished verification.
599 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
603 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
604 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
605 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
608 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
613 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
614 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
616 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
617 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
619 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
624 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
625 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
626 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
633 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
635 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
638 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
642 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
644 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
650 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
651 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
652 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
653 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
654 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
655 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
660 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
665 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
666 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
667 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
668 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
670 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
671 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
672 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
673 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
674 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
675 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
676 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
677 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
678 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
679 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
680 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
681 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
682 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
683 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
684 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
685 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
686 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
687 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
688 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
690 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
691 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
692 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
694 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
695 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
696 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
698 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
699 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
701 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
702 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
703 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
704 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
705 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
707 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
708 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
709 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
710 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
711 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
712 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
713 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
714 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
716 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
717 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
719 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
720 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
723 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
729 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
731 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
733 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
736 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
738 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
743 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
744 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
749 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
750 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
753 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
754 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
757 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
759 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
761 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
764 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
766 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
769 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
771 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
774 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
776 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
779 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
781 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
786 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
787 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
790 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
792 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
794 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
797 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
798 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
800 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
801 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
807 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
809 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
810 * @method: the intended method.
812 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
814 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
816 int version
= method
->version
;
818 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
819 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
820 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
821 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
823 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
824 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
825 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
827 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
828 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
829 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
830 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
831 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
832 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
838 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
841 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
842 * @version: Protocol version to test against
844 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
846 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
848 const version_info
*vent
;
849 const version_info
*table
;
851 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
853 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
854 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
855 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
856 table
= tls_version_table
;
858 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
859 table
= dtls_version_table
;
864 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
866 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
867 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
868 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
876 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
877 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
878 * supported protocol version.
880 * @s server SSL handle.
882 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
884 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
886 const version_info
*vent
;
887 const version_info
*table
;
890 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
891 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
894 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
898 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
899 * highest protocol version).
901 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
902 table
= tls_version_table
;
903 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
904 table
= dtls_version_table
;
906 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
910 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
911 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
912 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
918 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
919 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
920 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
921 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
923 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
924 * @version: the intended limit.
925 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
927 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
929 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
937 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
938 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
939 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
941 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
942 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
943 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
944 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
945 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
947 switch (method_version
) {
950 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
951 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
952 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
953 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
958 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
959 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
963 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
964 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
965 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
975 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
976 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
977 * the version specific method.
979 * @s: server SSL handle.
981 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
983 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
986 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
988 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
989 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
991 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
994 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
995 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
996 const version_info
*vent
;
997 const version_info
*table
;
999 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1001 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1003 switch (server_version
) {
1005 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1006 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1008 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1009 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1010 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1011 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1012 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1015 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1016 table
= tls_version_table
;
1018 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1019 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1023 suppversions
= tls_get_extension_by_type(hello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1024 hello
->num_extensions
,
1025 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
);
1027 if (suppversions
!= NULL
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1028 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1029 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1030 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1031 PACKET versionslist
;
1033 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1034 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1035 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1038 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1039 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1040 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1041 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1042 if ((int)candidate_vers
> s
->client_version
)
1043 s
->client_version
= candidate_vers
;
1044 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1047 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1050 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1051 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1053 method
= vent
->smeth();
1054 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1055 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1056 best_method
= method
;
1060 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1061 /* Trailing data? */
1062 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1065 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1066 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1067 s
->method
= best_method
;
1070 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1074 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1075 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1077 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1078 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1081 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1084 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1085 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1087 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1088 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1090 method
= vent
->smeth();
1091 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1092 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1098 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1102 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1103 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1104 * the version specific method.
1106 * @s: client SSL handle.
1107 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1109 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1111 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1113 const version_info
*vent
;
1114 const version_info
*table
;
1116 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1118 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1119 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1121 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1122 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1123 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1124 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1125 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1128 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1129 table
= tls_version_table
;
1131 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1132 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1136 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1137 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1140 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1142 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1144 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1145 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1149 s
->version
= version
;
1153 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1157 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1158 * @s: The SSL connection
1159 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1160 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1162 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1163 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1164 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1165 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1166 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1168 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1169 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1170 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1172 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1173 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1175 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1180 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1181 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1182 const version_info
*table
;
1183 const version_info
*vent
;
1185 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1188 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1189 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1190 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1191 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1192 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1194 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1196 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1197 table
= tls_version_table
;
1199 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1200 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1205 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1206 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1207 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1208 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1210 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1211 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1212 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1214 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1215 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1216 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1218 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1219 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1220 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1221 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1222 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1223 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1225 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1227 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1229 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1230 * "version capability" vector.
1232 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1236 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1237 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1241 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1243 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1244 *min_version
= version
;
1249 *max_version
= version
;
1251 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1253 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1259 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1260 * the initial ClientHello.
1262 * @s: client SSL handle.
1264 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1266 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1268 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1270 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1275 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;