2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
23 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
24 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
25 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
26 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
30 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
31 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
33 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
38 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
39 s
->init_num
, &written
);
42 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
44 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
45 * ignore the result anyway
46 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
48 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
49 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
50 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
51 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
52 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
55 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
57 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
58 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
62 s
->init_off
+= written
;
63 s
->init_num
-= written
;
67 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
71 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
72 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
75 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
81 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
83 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
84 /* SSLfatal() already called */
88 /* Reset any extension flags */
89 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
92 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
93 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
96 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
97 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
100 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
101 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
105 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
106 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
108 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
109 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
110 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
112 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
120 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
121 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
125 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
126 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
127 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
, 1, &i
,
128 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
130 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
131 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
, 1, &i
,
134 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
138 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
139 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
, 1, &discard
,
140 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
142 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
,
143 1, &discard
, s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
145 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
146 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
149 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
152 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
159 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
160 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
162 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
163 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
165 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
166 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
168 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
169 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
171 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
174 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
175 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
176 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
177 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
178 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
179 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
181 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
184 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
185 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
186 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
188 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
189 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
190 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
191 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
192 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
193 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
194 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
195 /* SSLfatal() already called */
200 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
204 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
216 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
218 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
219 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
220 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
221 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
222 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
224 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
225 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
226 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
228 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
229 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
233 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
235 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
241 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
244 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
248 /* Get the data to be signed */
249 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
254 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
259 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
260 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
263 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
267 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
273 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
274 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
275 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
276 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
277 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
282 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
283 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
284 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
285 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
286 s
->session
->master_key
)
287 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
293 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
294 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
301 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
303 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
304 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
305 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
306 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
310 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
316 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
317 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
318 /* SSLfatal() already called */
323 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
331 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
333 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
334 const unsigned char *data
;
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
336 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
338 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
342 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
345 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
346 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
347 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
351 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
355 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
356 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
363 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
365 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
369 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
372 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
377 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
378 /* SSLfatal() already called */
382 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
384 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
390 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
396 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
398 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
399 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
402 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
403 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
404 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
405 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
406 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
407 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
408 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
411 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
412 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
413 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
417 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
418 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
419 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
420 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
421 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
424 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
425 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
426 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
430 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
431 /* SSLfatal() already called */
436 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
438 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
445 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
446 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
447 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
448 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
449 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
451 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
454 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
460 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
461 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
462 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
463 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
469 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
470 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
471 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
472 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
473 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
478 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
480 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
484 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
486 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
487 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
492 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
494 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
495 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
496 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
498 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
503 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
505 size_t finish_md_len
;
509 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
510 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
511 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
514 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
519 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
520 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
521 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
527 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
528 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
530 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
531 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
534 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
536 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
537 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
542 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
544 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
551 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
552 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
554 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
555 s
->session
->master_key
,
556 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
564 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
565 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
566 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
570 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
572 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
574 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
576 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
582 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
584 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
586 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
590 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
594 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
596 unsigned int updatetype
;
598 s
->key_update_count
++;
599 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
601 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
602 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
606 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
607 * be on a record boundary.
609 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
611 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
612 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
615 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
616 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
618 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
619 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
623 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
626 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
627 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
628 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
629 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
634 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
635 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
636 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
638 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
639 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
641 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
643 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
646 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
650 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
653 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
659 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
660 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
662 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
663 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
667 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
668 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
670 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
671 /* SSLfatal() already called */
678 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
682 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
684 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
685 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
686 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
688 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
689 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
690 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
691 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
692 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
693 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
694 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
695 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
696 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
700 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
701 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
702 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
703 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
707 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
708 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
710 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
711 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
714 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
715 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
717 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
721 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
722 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
724 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
725 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
729 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
730 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
737 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
740 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
745 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
747 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
748 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
749 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
756 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
757 * message must be on a record boundary.
759 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
761 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
765 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
766 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
767 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
768 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
771 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
773 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
775 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
777 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
778 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
781 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
784 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
785 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
789 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
791 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
797 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
799 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
801 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
803 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
807 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
808 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
810 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
812 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
813 !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
814 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
819 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
820 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
821 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
823 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
825 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
826 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
830 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
831 /* SSLfatal() already called */
832 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
837 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
840 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
842 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
843 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
844 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
851 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
852 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
855 unsigned char *outbytes
;
857 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
863 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
864 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
865 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
871 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
873 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
881 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
885 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
886 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
887 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
889 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
895 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
897 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
898 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
900 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
902 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
904 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
905 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
907 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
909 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
910 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
912 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
914 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
917 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
918 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
924 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
925 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
926 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
927 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
929 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
930 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
932 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
933 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
936 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
941 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
942 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
945 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
946 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
947 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
949 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
950 /* SSLfatal() already called */
951 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
955 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
957 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
962 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
966 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
967 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
968 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
969 /* SSLfatal() already called */
977 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
979 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
985 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
988 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
998 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
999 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1002 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1005 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1008 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
1010 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
1011 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
1017 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1019 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1020 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1022 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1025 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1033 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1034 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1035 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1037 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1038 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1041 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1043 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1046 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1048 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1049 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
, 1, &discard
,
1051 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1054 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1057 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1058 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1060 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
, 1, &discard
,
1061 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1063 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1064 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
, 1,
1065 &discard
, s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1068 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1069 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1070 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1071 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1074 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1076 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1077 /* done with handshaking */
1078 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1079 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1080 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1081 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1086 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1088 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1089 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1092 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1094 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1095 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1097 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1099 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1102 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1103 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1105 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1108 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1111 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1113 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1114 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1116 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1117 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1118 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1119 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1122 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1123 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1125 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1126 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1127 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1128 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1129 * with a valid cookie.
1133 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1134 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1135 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1136 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1138 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1140 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1141 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1144 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1149 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1150 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1152 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1153 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1154 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1157 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1161 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1162 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1163 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1164 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1166 } while (skip_message
);
1167 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1170 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1172 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1174 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1177 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1178 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1180 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1181 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1182 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1184 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1185 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1188 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1189 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1191 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1194 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1196 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1203 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1205 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1209 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1210 /* We've already read everything in */
1211 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1216 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1218 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1219 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1221 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1225 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1230 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1231 * Finished verification.
1233 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1234 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1239 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1240 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1241 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1248 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1249 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1252 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1253 * processing the message
1254 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1257 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1258 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1259 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1260 && s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1261 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1262 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1263 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1264 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1265 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1266 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1267 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1274 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1275 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1276 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1277 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1284 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1289 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1290 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1291 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1292 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1294 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1295 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1297 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1298 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1299 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1300 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1301 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1302 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1303 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1304 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1305 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1306 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1308 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1311 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1312 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1314 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1315 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1316 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1318 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1319 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1320 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1322 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1323 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1325 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1326 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1327 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1328 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1329 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1331 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1332 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1333 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1334 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1335 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1336 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1337 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1338 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1340 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1341 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1343 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1344 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1347 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1353 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1355 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1357 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1360 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1362 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1367 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1368 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1373 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1374 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1377 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1378 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1381 /* Must be in order high to low */
1382 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1384 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1386 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1389 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1391 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1394 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1396 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1399 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1401 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1404 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1406 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1411 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1412 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1415 /* Must be in order high to low */
1416 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1418 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1420 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1423 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1424 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1426 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1427 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1433 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1435 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1436 * @method: the intended method.
1438 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1440 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1442 int version
= method
->version
;
1444 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1445 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1446 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1447 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1449 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1450 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1451 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1453 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1454 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1455 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1456 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1462 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1465 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1466 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1468 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1470 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1472 const version_info
*vent
;
1473 const version_info
*table
;
1475 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1477 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1478 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1479 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1480 table
= tls_version_table
;
1482 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1483 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1488 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1490 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1491 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1492 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1500 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1501 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1502 * supported protocol version.
1504 * @s server SSL handle.
1506 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1508 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1510 const version_info
*vent
;
1511 const version_info
*table
;
1514 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1515 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1518 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1522 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1523 * highest protocol version).
1525 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1526 table
= tls_version_table
;
1527 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1528 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1530 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1534 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1535 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1536 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1542 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1543 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1544 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1545 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1547 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1548 * @version: the intended limit.
1549 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1551 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1553 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1561 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1562 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1563 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1565 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1566 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1567 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1568 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1569 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1571 switch (method_version
) {
1574 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1575 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1576 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1577 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1582 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1583 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1587 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1588 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1589 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1598 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1600 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1601 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1602 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1603 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1604 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1605 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
1606 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1608 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1613 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1614 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1615 * the version specific method.
1617 * @s: server SSL handle.
1619 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1621 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1624 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1626 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1627 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1629 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1632 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1633 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1634 const version_info
*vent
;
1635 const version_info
*table
;
1637 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1639 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1641 switch (server_version
) {
1643 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1644 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1645 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1646 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1648 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1649 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1650 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1651 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1652 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1657 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1658 * a HelloRetryRequest
1661 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1662 table
= tls_version_table
;
1664 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1665 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1669 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1671 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1672 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1673 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1675 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1676 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1677 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1678 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1679 PACKET versionslist
;
1681 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1683 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1684 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1685 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1688 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1689 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1690 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1691 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1693 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1694 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1695 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1697 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1700 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1703 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1704 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1706 method
= vent
->smeth();
1707 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1708 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1709 best_method
= method
;
1713 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1714 /* Trailing data? */
1715 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1718 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1719 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1721 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1722 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1724 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1725 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1728 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1729 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1730 s
->method
= best_method
;
1733 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1737 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1738 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1740 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1741 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1744 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1747 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1748 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1750 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1751 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1753 method
= vent
->smeth();
1754 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1755 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1756 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1762 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1766 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1767 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1768 * the version specific method.
1770 * @s: client SSL handle.
1771 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1772 * @extensions: The extensions received
1774 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1776 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1778 const version_info
*vent
;
1779 const version_info
*table
;
1784 s
->version
= version
;
1786 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1787 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
1788 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1789 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
1795 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
1796 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1799 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1803 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1805 if (s
->version
!= s
->method
->version
) {
1807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1808 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1809 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1813 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1814 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1815 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1816 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1817 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1820 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1821 table
= tls_version_table
;
1823 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1824 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1828 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1829 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1832 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1835 if (highver
!= 0 && s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1838 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1839 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1841 if (s
->version
== vent
->version
) {
1843 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1844 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, err
);
1851 highver
= vent
->version
;
1853 if (s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1857 /* Check for downgrades */
1858 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> s
->version
) {
1859 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1860 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1861 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1862 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1865 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1866 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1869 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1870 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1871 && highver
> s
->version
) {
1872 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1873 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1874 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1875 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1878 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1879 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1891 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1896 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1897 * @s: The SSL connection
1898 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1899 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1901 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1902 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1903 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1904 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1905 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1907 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1908 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1909 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1911 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1912 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1914 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1918 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1919 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1920 const version_info
*table
;
1921 const version_info
*vent
;
1923 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1926 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1927 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1928 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1929 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1930 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1932 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1934 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1935 table
= tls_version_table
;
1937 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1938 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1943 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1944 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1945 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1946 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1948 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1949 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1950 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1952 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1953 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1954 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1956 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1957 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1958 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1959 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1960 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1961 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1963 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1965 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1967 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1968 * "version capability" vector.
1970 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1974 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1975 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1979 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1981 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1982 *min_version
= version
;
1987 *max_version
= version
;
1989 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1991 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1997 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1998 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2000 * @s: client SSL handle.
2002 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2004 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
2006 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2008 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
2013 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2015 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2016 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2017 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2019 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2024 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2025 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2026 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2027 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2030 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2031 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2035 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2038 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2039 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2041 if (group_id
== group
2043 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2052 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2053 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *hashval
,
2054 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2057 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2058 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2060 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2062 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2063 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2065 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2066 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2067 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2069 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2074 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2075 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2076 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2080 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2081 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2082 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2083 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2084 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2090 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2091 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2092 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2095 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2096 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2097 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
2098 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2099 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2106 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2108 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2111 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2113 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2114 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2117 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2119 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2122 /* get the CA RDNs */
2123 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2124 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2125 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2129 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2130 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2131 unsigned int name_len
;
2133 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2134 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2135 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2136 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2140 namestart
= namebytes
;
2141 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2142 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2146 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2148 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2152 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2154 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2160 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2161 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2166 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2171 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2173 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2175 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2176 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2177 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2182 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2185 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2186 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2187 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2191 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2192 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2194 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2202 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2203 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2211 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2212 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2213 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2215 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2216 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2223 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2224 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2226 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2233 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2234 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2236 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2238 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2239 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2243 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2244 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2246 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2250 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2251 s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
)) {
2252 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2253 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2262 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2263 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2265 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2267 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2269 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2270 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2273 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
,
2275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2276 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);