2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
80 /* Reset any extension flags */
81 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
84 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
85 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
88 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
89 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
92 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
94 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
97 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
98 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
100 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
101 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
102 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
104 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
112 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
114 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
117 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
118 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
119 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
121 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
123 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
124 * support secure renegotiation.
126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
127 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
128 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
131 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
133 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
136 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
137 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
139 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
141 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
142 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
145 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
148 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
155 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
156 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
158 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
159 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
161 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
162 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
164 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
165 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
167 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
170 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
171 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
172 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
173 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
174 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
175 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
177 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
180 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
181 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
182 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
184 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
185 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
186 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
187 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
188 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
189 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
190 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
195 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
199 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
208 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
210 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
211 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
212 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
213 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
214 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
216 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
217 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
218 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
220 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
224 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
225 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
227 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
232 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
238 /* Get the data to be signed */
239 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
244 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
248 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
249 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
255 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
260 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
261 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
262 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
263 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
267 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
268 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
269 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
270 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
276 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
283 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
285 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
286 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
287 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
288 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
292 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
297 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
298 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
302 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
311 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
313 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
314 const unsigned char *data
;
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
316 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
318 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
322 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
325 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
326 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
327 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
334 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
335 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
339 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
341 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
343 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
344 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
348 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
350 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
351 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
354 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
355 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
360 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
364 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
365 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
368 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
371 } else if (rv
== 0) {
372 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
376 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
378 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
379 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
383 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
385 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
387 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
391 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
392 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
393 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
395 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
398 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
400 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
404 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
410 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
412 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
418 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
419 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
420 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
421 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
422 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
426 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
432 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
433 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
434 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
435 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
439 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
440 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
441 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
442 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
447 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
453 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
458 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
461 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
462 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
464 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
465 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
466 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
468 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
473 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
475 size_t finish_md_len
;
479 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
481 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
484 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
489 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
490 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
491 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
497 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
498 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
500 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
501 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
504 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
506 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
507 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
512 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
514 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
520 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
521 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
523 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
524 s
->session
->master_key
,
525 s
->session
->master_key_length
))
529 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
532 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
533 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
535 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
537 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
538 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
540 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
545 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
549 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
551 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
556 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
560 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
564 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
567 unsigned int updatetype
;
569 s
->key_update_count
++;
570 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
571 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
577 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
578 * be on a record boundary.
580 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
581 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
586 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
587 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
588 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
594 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
597 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
598 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
599 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
605 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
606 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
607 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
609 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
610 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
612 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
613 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
618 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
620 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
621 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
627 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
630 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
635 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
636 * the appropriate error.
638 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
641 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
642 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
644 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
645 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
648 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
651 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
655 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
660 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
662 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
663 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
664 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
666 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
667 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
668 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
669 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
670 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
671 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
673 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
678 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
680 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
685 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
686 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
687 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
692 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
693 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
694 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
700 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
702 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
703 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
707 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
708 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
711 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
715 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
717 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
718 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
719 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
722 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
724 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
728 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
730 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
733 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
734 * message must be on a record boundary.
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
737 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
742 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
743 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
744 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
748 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
750 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
752 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
753 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
758 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
760 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
766 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
769 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
770 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
772 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
774 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
775 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
777 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
781 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
782 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
784 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
786 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
787 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
792 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
793 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
794 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
798 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
799 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
803 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
808 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
810 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
811 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
815 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
817 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
819 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
826 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
827 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
831 unsigned char *outbytes
;
833 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
836 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
839 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
840 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
842 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
847 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
854 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
855 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
859 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
860 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
861 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
862 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
864 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
870 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
872 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
873 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
875 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
877 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
879 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
880 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
882 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
884 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
885 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
887 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
891 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
892 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
897 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
898 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
899 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
900 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
902 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
903 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
905 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
906 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
909 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
914 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
918 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
919 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
920 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
922 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
923 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
927 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
929 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
934 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
936 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
937 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
938 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
949 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
952 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
954 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
955 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
956 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
965 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
966 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
969 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
971 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
974 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
976 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
977 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
983 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
985 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
986 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
988 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
991 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
995 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
996 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
999 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1001 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1004 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1006 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
1007 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1009 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1011 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
1013 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1014 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
1017 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1018 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1019 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1020 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1023 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1025 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1026 /* done with handshaking */
1027 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1028 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1029 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1030 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1035 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1039 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1041 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1042 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1045 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1047 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1048 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
1050 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1052 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1055 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1056 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1058 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1061 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1064 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1066 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1067 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1069 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1070 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1072 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1075 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1076 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1077 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1078 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1080 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1081 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1085 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1090 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1091 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1093 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1094 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1095 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1098 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1102 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1103 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1104 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1105 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1107 } while (skip_message
);
1108 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1111 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1113 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1115 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1118 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1119 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1121 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1122 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1123 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1125 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1126 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1129 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1130 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1131 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1135 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1137 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1143 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1147 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1149 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1153 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1154 /* We've already read everything in */
1155 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1160 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1162 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1163 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1165 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1169 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1175 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1176 * Finished verification.
1178 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1182 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1183 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1184 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1187 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1191 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1192 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1193 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1196 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1197 * processing the message
1199 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1200 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1201 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1203 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1207 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1208 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1209 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1210 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1217 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1219 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1222 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1226 return SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
1228 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1231 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1234 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1235 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1236 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1237 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1238 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1239 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1244 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1249 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1250 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1251 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1252 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1254 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1255 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1256 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1257 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1258 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1259 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1260 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1261 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1262 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1263 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1265 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1266 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1267 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1272 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1274 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1276 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1278 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1280 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1282 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1283 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1285 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1286 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1289 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1291 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1294 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1297 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1298 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1300 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1301 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1303 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1304 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1307 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1313 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1315 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1317 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1320 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1322 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1327 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1328 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1333 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1334 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1337 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1338 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1341 /* Must be in order high to low */
1342 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1344 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1346 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1349 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1351 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1354 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1356 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1359 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1361 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1364 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1366 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1371 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1372 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1375 /* Must be in order high to low */
1376 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1378 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1380 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1383 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1384 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1386 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1387 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1393 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1395 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1396 * @method: the intended method.
1398 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1400 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1402 int version
= method
->version
;
1404 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1405 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1406 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1407 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1409 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1410 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1411 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1413 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1414 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1415 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1416 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1422 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1425 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1426 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1428 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1430 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1432 const version_info
*vent
;
1433 const version_info
*table
;
1435 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1437 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1438 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1439 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1440 table
= tls_version_table
;
1442 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1443 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1448 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1450 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1451 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1452 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1460 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1461 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1462 * supported protocol version.
1464 * @s server SSL handle.
1466 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1468 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1470 const version_info
*vent
;
1471 const version_info
*table
;
1474 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1475 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1478 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1482 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1483 * highest protocol version).
1485 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1486 table
= tls_version_table
;
1487 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1488 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1490 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1494 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1495 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1496 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1502 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1503 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1504 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1505 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1507 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1508 * @version: the intended limit.
1509 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1511 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1513 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1521 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1522 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1523 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1525 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1526 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1527 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1528 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1529 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1531 switch (method_version
) {
1534 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1535 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1536 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1537 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1542 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1543 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1547 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1548 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1549 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1558 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1560 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1561 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1562 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1563 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1564 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1565 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
1566 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1568 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1573 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1574 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1575 * the version specific method.
1577 * @s: server SSL handle.
1579 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1581 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1584 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1586 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1587 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1589 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1592 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1593 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1594 const version_info
*vent
;
1595 const version_info
*table
;
1597 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1599 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1601 switch (server_version
) {
1603 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1604 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1605 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1606 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1608 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1609 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1610 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1611 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1612 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1617 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1618 * a HelloRetryRequest
1621 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1622 table
= tls_version_table
;
1624 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1625 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1629 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1631 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1632 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1633 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1634 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1635 PACKET versionslist
;
1637 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1639 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1640 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1641 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1644 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1645 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1646 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1647 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1649 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1650 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1651 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1653 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1656 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1659 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1660 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1662 method
= vent
->smeth();
1663 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1664 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1665 best_method
= method
;
1669 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1670 /* Trailing data? */
1671 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1674 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1675 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1677 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1678 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1680 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1681 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1684 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1685 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1686 s
->method
= best_method
;
1689 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1693 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1694 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1696 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1697 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1700 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1703 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1704 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1706 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1707 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1709 method
= vent
->smeth();
1710 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1711 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1712 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1718 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1722 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1723 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1724 * the version specific method.
1726 * @s: client SSL handle.
1727 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1728 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1729 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1731 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1733 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, int checkdgrd
, int *al
)
1735 const version_info
*vent
;
1736 const version_info
*table
;
1739 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1740 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1741 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1743 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1744 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1745 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1748 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1750 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
1751 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1752 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1755 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1756 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1757 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1758 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1759 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1762 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1763 table
= tls_version_table
;
1765 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1766 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1770 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1771 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1774 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1777 if (highver
!= 0 && version
!= vent
->version
)
1780 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1781 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1783 if (version
== vent
->version
) {
1784 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1791 highver
= vent
->version
;
1793 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1797 /* Check for downgrades */
1799 if (version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> version
) {
1800 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1801 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1802 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1803 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1804 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1805 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1807 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1808 && version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1809 && highver
> version
) {
1810 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1811 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1812 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1813 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1814 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1815 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1822 s
->version
= version
;
1826 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1827 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1831 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1832 * @s: The SSL connection
1833 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1834 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1836 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1837 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1838 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1839 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1840 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1842 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1843 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1844 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1846 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1847 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1849 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1853 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1854 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1855 const version_info
*table
;
1856 const version_info
*vent
;
1858 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1861 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1862 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1863 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1864 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1865 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1867 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1869 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1870 table
= tls_version_table
;
1872 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1873 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1878 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1879 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1880 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1881 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1883 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1884 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1885 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1887 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1888 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1889 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1891 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1892 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1893 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1894 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1895 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1896 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1898 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1900 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1902 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1903 * "version capability" vector.
1905 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1909 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1910 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1914 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1916 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1917 *min_version
= version
;
1922 *max_version
= version
;
1924 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1926 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1932 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1933 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1935 * @s: client SSL handle.
1937 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1939 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1941 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1943 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1948 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1950 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1951 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1952 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1954 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1959 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1960 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1961 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1962 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, unsigned int group_id
, const unsigned char *groups
,
1966 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1970 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1973 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++, groups
+= 2) {
1974 if (group_id
== GET_GROUP_ID(groups
, 0)
1976 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, groups
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
1985 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1986 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
)
1988 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1990 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
1992 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
1994 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
1995 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
1996 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2001 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2002 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
2005 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2006 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2007 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = hashlen
;
2008 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2009 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2017 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2019 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2022 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2024 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2025 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2028 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2032 /* get the CA RDNs */
2033 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2034 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2039 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2040 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2041 unsigned int name_len
;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2044 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2049 namestart
= namebytes
;
2050 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2054 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2059 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2061 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2067 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2068 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2073 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2075 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2080 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2082 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2084 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2085 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
))
2088 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2091 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2092 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2093 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2097 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2098 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2100 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2106 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
))