2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
82 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
83 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
95 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
101 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
103 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
109 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
112 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
126 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
128 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
151 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
152 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
159 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
163 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
174 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
175 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
176 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
178 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
180 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
182 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
184 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
188 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
189 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
191 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
196 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
202 /* Get the data to be signed */
203 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
212 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
213 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
219 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
220 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
225 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
226 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
227 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
228 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
232 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
233 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
234 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
235 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
241 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
248 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
250 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
251 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
252 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
253 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
257 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
263 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
267 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
272 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
278 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
279 const unsigned char *data
;
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
281 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
283 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
284 int type
= 0, j
, pktype
;
287 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
290 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
291 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
292 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
299 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
300 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
302 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
306 pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
307 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
309 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
311 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
312 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
316 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
318 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
319 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
323 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
332 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
333 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
336 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
339 } else if (rv
== 0) {
340 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
344 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
346 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
347 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
351 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
353 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
355 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
359 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
360 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
361 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
363 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
366 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
368 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
372 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
378 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
381 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
387 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
388 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
389 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
390 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
394 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
400 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
401 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
402 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
403 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
407 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
408 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
409 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
410 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
415 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
416 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
422 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
424 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
427 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
428 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
430 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
431 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
434 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
439 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
441 size_t finish_md_len
;
445 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
447 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
450 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
455 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
456 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
457 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
463 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
464 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
466 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
467 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
470 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
472 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
473 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
478 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
480 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
486 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
487 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
489 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
490 s
->session
->master_key
,
491 s
->session
->master_key_length
))
495 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
498 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
499 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
501 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
503 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
504 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
506 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
511 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
515 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
517 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
522 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
526 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
530 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
533 unsigned int updatetype
;
535 s
->key_update_count
++;
536 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
537 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
543 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
544 * be on a record boundary.
546 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
547 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
552 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
554 || (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
555 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)) {
556 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
562 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
563 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
564 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
566 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
567 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
569 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
570 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
575 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
577 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
578 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
584 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
587 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
592 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
593 * the appropriate error.
595 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
598 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
599 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
601 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
602 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
605 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
608 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
612 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
617 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
619 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
620 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
621 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
623 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
624 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
625 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
626 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
627 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
628 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
630 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
635 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
637 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
642 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
643 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
644 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
649 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
650 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
651 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
657 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
659 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
660 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
664 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
665 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
668 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
672 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
674 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
675 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
679 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
681 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
685 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
687 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
690 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
691 * message must be on a record boundary.
693 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
694 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
699 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
700 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
701 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
705 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
707 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
709 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
710 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
715 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
717 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
723 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
726 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
727 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
729 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
731 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
732 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
734 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
738 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
739 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
741 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
743 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
744 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
749 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
750 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
751 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
755 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
756 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
760 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
765 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
767 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
768 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
772 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
774 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
776 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
783 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
784 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
788 unsigned char *outbytes
;
790 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
793 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
796 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
797 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
799 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
804 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
811 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
812 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
816 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
817 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
818 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
819 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
821 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
827 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
829 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
830 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
832 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
834 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
836 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
837 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
839 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
841 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
842 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
844 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
848 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
849 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
854 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
855 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
856 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
857 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
859 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
860 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
862 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
863 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
866 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
871 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
875 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
876 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
877 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
879 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
880 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
884 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
886 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
891 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
893 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
894 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
895 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
906 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
909 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
911 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
912 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
913 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
922 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
923 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
926 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
928 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
931 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
933 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
934 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
940 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
942 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
943 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
945 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
948 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
952 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
953 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
956 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
958 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
961 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
963 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
964 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
966 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
968 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
970 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
971 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
974 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
975 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
976 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
977 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
980 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
982 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
983 /* done with handshaking */
984 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
985 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
986 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
987 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
992 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
996 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
998 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
999 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1002 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1004 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1005 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
1007 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1009 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1012 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1013 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1015 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1018 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1021 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1023 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1024 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1026 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1027 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1029 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1032 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1033 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1034 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1035 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1037 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1038 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1042 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1047 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1048 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1050 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1051 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1052 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1055 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1059 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1060 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1061 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1062 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1064 } while (skip_message
);
1065 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1068 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1070 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1072 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1075 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1076 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1078 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1079 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1080 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1082 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1083 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1086 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1087 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1088 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1092 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1094 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1100 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1104 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1106 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1110 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1111 /* We've already read everything in */
1112 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1117 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1119 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1120 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1122 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1126 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1132 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1133 * Finished verification.
1135 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1139 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1140 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1141 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1144 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1148 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1149 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1150 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1153 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1154 * processing the message
1156 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1157 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1158 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1160 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1164 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1165 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1166 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1167 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1174 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1176 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1179 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1183 return SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
1185 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1188 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1191 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1192 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1193 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1194 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1195 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1196 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1201 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1206 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1207 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1208 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1209 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1211 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1212 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1213 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1214 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1215 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1216 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1217 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1218 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1219 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1220 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1221 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1222 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1223 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1224 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1225 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1226 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1227 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1228 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1229 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1231 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1232 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1233 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1235 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1236 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1237 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1239 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1240 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1242 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1243 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1244 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1245 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1246 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1248 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1249 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1250 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1251 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1252 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1253 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1254 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1255 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1257 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1258 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1260 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1261 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1264 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1270 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1272 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1274 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1277 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1279 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1284 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1285 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1290 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1291 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1294 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1295 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1298 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1300 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1302 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1305 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1307 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1310 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1312 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1315 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1317 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1320 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1322 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1327 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1328 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1331 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1333 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1335 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1338 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1339 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1341 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1342 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1348 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1350 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1351 * @method: the intended method.
1353 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1355 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1357 int version
= method
->version
;
1359 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1360 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1361 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1362 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1364 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1365 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1366 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1368 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1369 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1370 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1371 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1377 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1380 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1381 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1383 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1385 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1387 const version_info
*vent
;
1388 const version_info
*table
;
1390 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1392 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1393 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1394 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1395 table
= tls_version_table
;
1397 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1398 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1403 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1405 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1406 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1407 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1415 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1416 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1417 * supported protocol version.
1419 * @s server SSL handle.
1421 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1423 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1425 const version_info
*vent
;
1426 const version_info
*table
;
1429 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1430 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1433 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1437 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1438 * highest protocol version).
1440 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1441 table
= tls_version_table
;
1442 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1443 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1445 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1449 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1450 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1451 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1457 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1458 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1459 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1460 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1462 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1463 * @version: the intended limit.
1464 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1466 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1468 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1476 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1477 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1478 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1480 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1481 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1482 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1483 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1484 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1486 switch (method_version
) {
1489 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1490 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1491 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1492 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1497 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1498 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1502 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1503 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1504 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1514 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1515 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1516 * the version specific method.
1518 * @s: server SSL handle.
1520 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1522 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1525 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1527 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1528 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1530 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1533 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1534 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1535 const version_info
*vent
;
1536 const version_info
*table
;
1538 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1540 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1542 switch (server_version
) {
1544 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1545 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1546 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1548 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1549 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1550 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1551 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1552 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1557 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1558 * a HelloRetryRequest
1560 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1561 table
= tls_version_table
;
1563 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1564 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1568 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1570 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1571 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1572 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1573 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1574 PACKET versionslist
;
1576 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1578 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1579 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1580 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1583 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1584 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1585 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1586 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1588 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1589 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1590 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1592 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1595 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1598 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1599 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1601 method
= vent
->smeth();
1602 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1603 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1604 best_method
= method
;
1608 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1609 /* Trailing data? */
1610 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1613 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1614 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1616 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1617 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1619 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1620 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1623 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1624 s
->method
= best_method
;
1627 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1631 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1632 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1634 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1635 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1638 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1641 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1642 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1644 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1645 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1647 method
= vent
->smeth();
1648 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1649 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1655 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1659 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1660 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1661 * the version specific method.
1663 * @s: client SSL handle.
1664 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1666 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1668 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1670 const version_info
*vent
;
1671 const version_info
*table
;
1673 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1674 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1675 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1677 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1679 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1680 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1682 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1683 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1684 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1685 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1686 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1689 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1690 table
= tls_version_table
;
1692 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1693 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1697 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1698 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1701 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1703 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1705 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1706 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1708 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1709 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1713 s
->version
= version
;
1717 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1721 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1722 * @s: The SSL connection
1723 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1724 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1726 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1727 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1728 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1729 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1730 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1732 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1733 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1734 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1736 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1737 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1739 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1744 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1745 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1746 const version_info
*table
;
1747 const version_info
*vent
;
1749 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1752 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1753 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1754 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1755 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1756 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1758 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1760 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1761 table
= tls_version_table
;
1763 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1764 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1769 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1770 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1771 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1772 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1774 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1775 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1776 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1778 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1779 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1780 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1782 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1783 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1784 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1785 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1786 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1787 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1789 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1791 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1793 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1794 * "version capability" vector.
1796 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1800 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1801 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1805 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1807 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1808 *min_version
= version
;
1813 *max_version
= version
;
1815 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1817 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1823 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1824 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1826 * @s: client SSL handle.
1828 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1830 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1832 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1834 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1839 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1841 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1842 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1843 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1845 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1850 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1851 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1852 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1853 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1856 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, unsigned int group_id
, const unsigned char *groups
,
1857 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1861 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1864 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++, groups
+= 2) {
1865 unsigned int share_id
= (groups
[0] << 8) | (groups
[1]);
1867 if (group_id
== share_id
1869 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, groups
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
1874 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1875 return i
< num_groups
;
1879 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1880 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
)
1882 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1884 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
1886 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
1888 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
1889 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
1890 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1895 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
1896 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
1899 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
1900 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
1901 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = hashlen
;
1902 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
1903 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1911 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1913 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
1916 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1918 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
1919 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1922 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1926 /* get the CA RDNs */
1927 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
1928 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1933 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
1934 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1935 unsigned int name_len
;
1937 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
1938 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1943 namestart
= namebytes
;
1944 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1948 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1953 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1955 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1961 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1962 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1967 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1969 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1974 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1976 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1978 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1979 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
))
1982 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
1985 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
1986 unsigned char *namebytes
;
1987 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
1991 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
1992 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
1994 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2000 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
))