2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
46 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
47 s
->init_num
, &written
);
50 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
60 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
63 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
65 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
66 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
70 s
->init_off
+= written
;
71 s
->init_num
-= written
;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
79 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
83 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
101 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
113 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
120 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
140 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
144 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
146 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
152 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
155 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
169 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
171 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
194 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
195 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
207 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
219 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
221 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
222 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
223 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
224 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
225 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
227 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
228 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
231 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
236 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
238 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
244 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
247 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
251 /* Get the data to be signed */
252 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
257 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
263 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
270 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
276 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
277 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
278 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
279 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
285 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
286 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
287 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
288 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
289 s
->session
->master_key
)
290 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
296 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
304 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
306 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
307 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
308 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
309 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
313 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
315 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
319 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
320 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
321 /* SSLfatal() already called */
326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
330 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
336 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
337 const unsigned char *data
;
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
339 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
341 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
345 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
348 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
349 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
350 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
354 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
358 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
359 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
366 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
368 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
372 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
375 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
380 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
385 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
387 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
389 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
393 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
399 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
401 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
402 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
405 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
406 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
407 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
408 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
409 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
410 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
411 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
420 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
421 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
422 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
424 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
427 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
429 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
433 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
434 /* SSLfatal() already called */
439 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
441 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
448 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
449 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
450 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
451 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
452 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
453 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
457 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
463 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
464 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
465 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
466 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
472 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
473 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
474 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
475 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
476 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
481 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
483 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
487 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
490 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
495 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
497 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
498 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
499 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
501 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
506 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
508 size_t finish_md_len
;
512 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
513 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
514 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
517 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
522 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
523 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
524 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
530 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
531 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
533 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
534 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
537 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
539 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
540 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
545 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
547 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
548 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
554 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
555 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
557 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
558 s
->session
->master_key
,
559 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
560 /* SSLfatal() already called */
565 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
567 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
568 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
569 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
573 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
575 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
577 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
579 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
585 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
587 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
588 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
593 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
597 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
599 unsigned int updatetype
;
601 s
->key_update_count
++;
602 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
603 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
604 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
609 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
610 * be on a record boundary.
612 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
613 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
614 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
615 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
618 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
619 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
621 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
626 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
629 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
630 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
632 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
633 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
637 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
638 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
639 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
641 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
642 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
644 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
646 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
649 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
653 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
656 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
662 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
663 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
665 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
666 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
669 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
670 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
671 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
673 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
674 /* SSLfatal() already called */
681 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
685 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
687 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
688 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
689 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
692 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
693 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
694 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
695 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
696 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
697 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
698 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
704 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
705 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
710 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
711 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
713 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
717 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
718 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
721 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
725 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
727 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
728 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
732 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
733 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
736 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
743 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
748 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
751 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
752 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
755 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
756 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
757 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
765 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
766 * message must be on a record boundary.
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
769 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
770 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
774 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
775 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
777 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
778 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
780 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
782 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
784 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
785 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
786 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
790 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
793 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
798 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
800 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
801 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
803 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
806 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
808 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
810 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
812 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
816 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
817 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
819 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
821 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
822 !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
823 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
825 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
828 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
829 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
830 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
831 /* SSLfatal() already called */
832 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
834 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
835 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
839 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
846 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
849 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
851 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
852 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
853 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
860 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
861 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
864 unsigned char *outbytes
;
866 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
868 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
872 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
873 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
880 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
889 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
890 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
894 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
895 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
896 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
898 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
904 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
906 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
907 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
909 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
911 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
913 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
914 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
916 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
918 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
919 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
921 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
923 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
926 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
927 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
928 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
933 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
934 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
935 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
936 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
938 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
939 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
941 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
942 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
945 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
950 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
954 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
955 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
956 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
958 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
960 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
964 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
966 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
968 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
971 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
975 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
976 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
986 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
988 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
994 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
997 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1007 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1008 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1011 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1013 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1016 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1018 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1019 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1021 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1024 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1032 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1033 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1034 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1037 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1038 * post handshake exchange
1040 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1041 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1044 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1045 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1047 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1051 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1054 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1055 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1057 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1058 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1059 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1061 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
1063 * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
1064 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1067 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1070 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1072 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1073 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1075 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1076 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1077 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1080 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1083 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1086 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1088 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1089 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1091 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1093 * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
1094 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1097 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1101 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1102 /* done with handshaking */
1103 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1104 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1105 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1106 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1110 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1111 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1112 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1113 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1115 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1116 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1119 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1122 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1123 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1124 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1127 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1130 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1132 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1133 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1135 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1137 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1140 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1141 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1146 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1149 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1151 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1152 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1154 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1156 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1157 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1160 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1161 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1163 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1164 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1165 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1166 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1167 * with a valid cookie.
1171 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1172 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1173 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1174 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1176 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1177 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1178 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1179 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1182 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1187 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1188 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1190 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1191 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1192 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1195 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1199 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1200 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1201 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1202 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1204 } while (skip_message
);
1205 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1208 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1210 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1212 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1215 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1216 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1218 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1219 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1220 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1222 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1223 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1226 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1227 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1229 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1232 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1234 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1241 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1243 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1247 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1248 /* We've already read everything in */
1249 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1254 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1256 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1257 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1259 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1263 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1268 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1269 * Finished verification.
1271 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1272 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1277 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1278 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1279 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1285 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1286 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1287 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1290 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1291 * processing the message
1292 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1295 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1296 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1297 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1298 && s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1299 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1300 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1301 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1302 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1303 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1304 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1305 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1312 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1313 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1314 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1315 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1322 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1323 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1324 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1325 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1326 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1327 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1328 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1329 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1363 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1364 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1367 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1369 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1371 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1372 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1377 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1379 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1381 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1384 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1386 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1391 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1392 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1397 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1398 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1401 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1402 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1405 /* Must be in order high to low */
1406 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1408 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1410 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1413 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1415 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1418 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1420 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1423 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1425 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1428 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1430 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1435 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1436 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1439 /* Must be in order high to low */
1440 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1442 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1444 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1447 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1448 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1450 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1451 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1457 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1459 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1460 * @method: the intended method.
1462 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1464 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1466 int version
= method
->version
;
1468 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1469 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1470 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1471 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1473 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1474 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1475 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1477 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1478 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1479 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1480 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1486 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1487 * certificate type, or has PSK configured. Otherwise returns 0.
1489 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL
*s
)
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1494 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1498 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1501 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1502 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1504 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1505 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1506 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1507 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1512 if (ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1520 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1523 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1524 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1526 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1528 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
, const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1530 const version_info
*vent
;
1531 const version_info
*table
;
1533 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1535 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1536 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1537 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1538 table
= tls_version_table
;
1540 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1541 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1546 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1548 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1549 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1550 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1552 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1553 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1555 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1563 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1564 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1565 * supported protocol version.
1567 * @s server SSL handle.
1569 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1571 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1573 const version_info
*vent
;
1574 const version_info
*table
;
1577 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1578 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1581 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1585 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1586 * highest protocol version).
1588 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1589 table
= tls_version_table
;
1590 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1591 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1593 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1597 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1598 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1599 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1605 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1606 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1607 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1608 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1610 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1611 * @version: the intended limit.
1612 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1614 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1616 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1624 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1625 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1626 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1628 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1629 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1630 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1631 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1632 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1634 switch (method_version
) {
1637 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1638 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1639 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1640 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1645 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1646 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1650 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1651 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1652 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1661 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1663 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1664 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1665 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1666 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1667 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)
1668 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
))) {
1669 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1671 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1676 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1677 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1678 * the version specific method.
1680 * @s: server SSL handle.
1682 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1684 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1687 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1689 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1690 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1692 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1695 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1696 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1697 const version_info
*vent
;
1698 const version_info
*table
;
1700 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1702 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1704 switch (server_version
) {
1706 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1707 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1708 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1709 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1711 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1712 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1713 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1714 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1715 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1720 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1721 * a HelloRetryRequest
1724 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1725 table
= tls_version_table
;
1727 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1728 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1732 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1734 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1735 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1736 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1738 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1739 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1740 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1741 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1742 PACKET versionslist
;
1743 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1744 unsigned int orig_candidate
= 0;
1746 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1748 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1749 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1750 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1754 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1755 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1756 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1757 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1758 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1759 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1760 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1762 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
1763 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
1765 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1766 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1767 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
1768 || candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_27
1769 || candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_26
) {
1770 if (best_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1771 && orig_candidate
> candidate_vers
)
1773 orig_candidate
= candidate_vers
;
1774 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1775 } else if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1776 /* Don't actually accept real TLSv1.3 */
1780 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1781 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1782 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1784 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1786 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
1787 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1789 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1790 /* Trailing data? */
1791 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1794 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1795 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1797 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1798 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1800 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1801 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1804 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1805 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1806 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1807 if (best_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1808 s
->version_draft
= orig_candidate
;
1809 s
->method
= best_method
;
1812 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1816 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1817 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1819 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1820 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1823 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1826 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1827 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1829 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1830 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1832 method
= vent
->smeth();
1833 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1834 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1835 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1841 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1845 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1846 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1847 * the version specific method.
1849 * @s: client SSL handle.
1850 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1851 * @extensions: The extensions received
1853 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1855 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1857 const version_info
*vent
;
1858 const version_info
*table
;
1863 s
->version
= version
;
1865 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1866 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
1867 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1868 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
1874 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
1875 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1878 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1882 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1884 if (s
->version
!= s
->method
->version
) {
1886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1887 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1888 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1892 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1893 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1894 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1895 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1896 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1899 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1900 table
= tls_version_table
;
1902 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1903 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1907 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1908 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1911 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1914 if (highver
!= 0 && s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1917 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1918 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1920 if (s
->version
== vent
->version
) {
1922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1923 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, err
);
1930 highver
= vent
->version
;
1932 if (s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1936 /* Check for downgrades */
1937 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> s
->version
) {
1938 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1939 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1940 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1941 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1943 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1944 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1945 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1948 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1949 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1950 && highver
> s
->version
) {
1951 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1952 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1953 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1954 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1956 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1957 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1958 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1969 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1970 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1975 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1976 * @s: The SSL connection
1977 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1978 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1980 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1981 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1982 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1983 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1984 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1986 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1987 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1988 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1990 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1991 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1993 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1997 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1998 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1999 const version_info
*table
;
2000 const version_info
*vent
;
2002 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
2005 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2006 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2007 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2008 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2009 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2011 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
2013 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2014 table
= tls_version_table
;
2016 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2017 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2022 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2023 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2024 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2025 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2027 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2028 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2029 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2031 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2032 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2033 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2035 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2036 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2037 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2038 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2039 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2040 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2042 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2044 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2046 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2047 * "version capability" vector.
2049 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2053 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2054 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2058 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2060 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2061 *min_version
= version
;
2066 *max_version
= version
;
2068 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2070 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2076 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2077 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2079 * @s: client SSL handle.
2081 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2083 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
2085 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2088 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2089 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2091 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2094 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
2099 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2101 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2102 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2103 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2105 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2110 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2111 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2112 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2113 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2116 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2117 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2121 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2124 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2125 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2127 if (group_id
== group
2129 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2138 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2139 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *hashval
,
2140 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2143 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2144 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2146 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2148 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2149 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2151 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2152 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2153 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2155 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2160 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2161 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2162 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2166 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2167 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2168 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2169 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2170 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2171 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2176 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2177 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2178 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2181 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2182 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2183 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
2184 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2185 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2192 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2194 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2197 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2199 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2200 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2203 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2204 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2205 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2208 /* get the CA RDNs */
2209 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2211 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2215 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2216 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2217 unsigned int name_len
;
2219 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2220 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2221 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2222 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2226 namestart
= namebytes
;
2227 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2232 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2234 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2238 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2240 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2246 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2247 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2252 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2257 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2259 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2261 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2262 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2263 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2268 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2271 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2272 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2273 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2277 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2278 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2280 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2288 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2297 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2298 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2299 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2301 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2302 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2306 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2309 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2310 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2312 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2319 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2320 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2322 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2324 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2325 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2329 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2330 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2332 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2336 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2337 s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
)) {
2338 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2339 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2348 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2349 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2351 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2353 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2355 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2359 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
,
2361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2362 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);