2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
24 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
26 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
31 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
32 s
->init_num
, &written
);
35 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
37 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
38 * ignore the result anyway
40 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
41 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
45 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
47 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
48 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
52 s
->init_off
+= written
;
53 s
->init_num
-= written
;
57 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
61 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
62 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
65 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
71 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
73 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
74 /* SSLfatal() already called */
78 /* Reset any extension flags */
79 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
82 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
83 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
86 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
87 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
90 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
91 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
92 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
95 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
96 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
99 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
100 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
102 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
110 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
111 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
115 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
116 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
117 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
, 1, &i
,
118 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
119 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
120 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
121 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
123 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
125 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
127 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
128 * support secure renegotiation.
130 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
131 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
134 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
135 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
, 1, &i
,
138 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
142 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
143 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
, 1, &discard
,
144 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
146 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
,
147 1, &discard
, s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
149 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
150 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
153 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
156 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
163 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
164 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
166 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
167 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
169 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
170 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
172 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
173 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
175 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
178 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
179 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
180 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
181 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
182 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
183 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
185 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
188 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
189 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
190 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
192 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
193 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
194 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
195 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
196 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
197 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
198 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
208 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
220 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
222 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
223 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
224 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
226 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
228 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
229 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
232 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
239 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
245 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
248 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
252 /* Get the data to be signed */
253 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
258 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
259 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
263 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
264 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
267 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
271 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
277 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
278 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
279 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
280 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
286 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
287 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
288 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
289 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
290 s
->session
->master_key
)
291 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
297 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
305 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
307 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
308 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
309 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
310 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
314 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
321 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
337 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
338 const unsigned char *data
;
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
340 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
342 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
346 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
349 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
350 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
351 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
359 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
360 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
367 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
369 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
381 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
386 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
388 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
390 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
394 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
395 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
400 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
402 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
403 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
406 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
407 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
408 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
409 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
410 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
411 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
412 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
415 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
417 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
421 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
422 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
423 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
425 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
428 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
430 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
434 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
440 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
442 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
443 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
449 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
450 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
451 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
452 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
453 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
458 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
464 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
465 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
466 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
467 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
473 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
474 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
475 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
476 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
477 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
478 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
482 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
484 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
488 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
491 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
496 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
498 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
499 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
500 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
502 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
507 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
509 size_t finish_md_len
;
513 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
515 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
518 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
523 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
524 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
525 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
531 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
532 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
534 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
535 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
538 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
540 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
541 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
548 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
555 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
556 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
558 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
559 s
->session
->master_key
,
560 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
566 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
568 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
569 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
570 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
574 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
576 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
578 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
580 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
586 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
588 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
594 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
598 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
600 unsigned int updatetype
;
602 s
->key_update_count
++;
603 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
605 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
606 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
610 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
611 * be on a record boundary.
613 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
615 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
616 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
619 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
620 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
622 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
623 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
627 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
630 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
631 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
632 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
633 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
638 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
639 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
640 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
642 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
643 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
645 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
647 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
650 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
655 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
658 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
663 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
664 * the appropriate error.
666 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
669 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
670 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
672 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
673 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
676 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
679 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
683 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
687 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
689 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
690 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
691 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
694 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
695 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
696 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
697 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
699 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
700 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
701 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
707 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
712 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
713 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
714 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
715 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
716 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
719 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
720 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
727 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
729 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
730 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
734 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
735 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
738 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
742 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
745 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
750 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
752 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
755 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
756 * message must be on a record boundary.
758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
760 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
764 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
765 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
767 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
770 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
772 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
774 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
775 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
776 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
777 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
780 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
782 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
783 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
784 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
788 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
790 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
793 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
796 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
798 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
800 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
802 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
806 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
807 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
809 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
811 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
812 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
817 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
818 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
819 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
823 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
824 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
825 /* SSLfatal() already called */
826 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
828 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
829 /* SSLfatal() already called */
830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
835 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
838 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
840 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
841 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
842 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
849 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
850 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
853 unsigned char *outbytes
;
855 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
857 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
861 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
862 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
864 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
869 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
878 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
879 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
883 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
884 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
885 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
887 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
893 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
895 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
896 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
898 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
900 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
902 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
903 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
905 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
907 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
908 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
910 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
911 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
912 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
915 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
916 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
922 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
923 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
924 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
925 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
927 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
928 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
930 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
931 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
934 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
939 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
940 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
943 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
944 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
945 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
947 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
948 /* SSLfatal() already called */
949 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
953 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
955 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
960 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
964 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
965 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
966 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
967 /* SSLfatal() already called */
975 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
977 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
978 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
983 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
986 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
987 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
988 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
996 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
997 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1000 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
1003 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1006 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
1008 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
1009 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
1015 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1017 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1018 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1020 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1023 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1024 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1031 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1032 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1035 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1037 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1040 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1042 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1043 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
, 1, &discard
,
1045 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1048 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1051 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1052 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1054 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
, 1, &discard
,
1055 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1057 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1058 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
, 1,
1059 &discard
, s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1062 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1063 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1064 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1065 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1068 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1070 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1071 /* done with handshaking */
1072 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1073 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1074 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1075 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1080 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1084 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1086 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1087 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1090 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1092 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1093 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1095 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1097 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1100 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1101 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1103 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1106 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1109 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1111 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1112 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1114 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1116 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1117 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1120 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1121 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1122 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1123 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1125 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1127 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1128 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1131 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1136 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1137 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1139 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1140 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1141 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1144 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1148 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1149 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1150 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1151 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1153 } while (skip_message
);
1154 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1157 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1159 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1161 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1164 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1165 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1167 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1168 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1169 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1171 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1172 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1175 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1176 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1177 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1178 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1181 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1183 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1190 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1192 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1196 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1197 /* We've already read everything in */
1198 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1203 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1205 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1206 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1208 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1212 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1218 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1219 * Finished verification.
1221 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1225 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1226 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1227 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1229 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1233 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1234 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1235 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1238 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1239 * processing the message
1241 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1242 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1243 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1248 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1249 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1250 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1251 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1258 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1263 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1265 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1266 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1268 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1273 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1277 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1285 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1286 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1288 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1290 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1292 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1294 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1296 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1297 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1299 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1300 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1301 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1302 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1303 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1305 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1306 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1308 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1311 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1312 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1314 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1315 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1317 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1318 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1321 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1327 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1329 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1331 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1334 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1336 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1341 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1342 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1347 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1348 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1351 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1352 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1355 /* Must be in order high to low */
1356 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1358 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1360 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1363 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1365 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1368 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1370 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1373 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1375 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1378 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1380 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1385 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1386 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1389 /* Must be in order high to low */
1390 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1392 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1394 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1397 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1398 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1400 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1401 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1407 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1409 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1410 * @method: the intended method.
1412 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1414 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1416 int version
= method
->version
;
1418 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1419 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1420 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1421 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1423 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1424 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1425 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1427 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1428 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1429 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1430 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1436 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1439 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1440 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1442 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1444 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1446 const version_info
*vent
;
1447 const version_info
*table
;
1449 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1451 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1452 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1453 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1454 table
= tls_version_table
;
1456 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1457 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1462 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1464 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1465 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1466 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1474 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1475 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1476 * supported protocol version.
1478 * @s server SSL handle.
1480 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1482 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1484 const version_info
*vent
;
1485 const version_info
*table
;
1488 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1489 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1492 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1496 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1497 * highest protocol version).
1499 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1500 table
= tls_version_table
;
1501 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1502 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1504 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1508 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1509 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1510 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1516 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1517 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1518 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1519 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1521 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1522 * @version: the intended limit.
1523 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1525 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1527 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1535 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1536 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1537 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1539 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1540 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1541 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1542 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1543 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1545 switch (method_version
) {
1548 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1549 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1550 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1551 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1556 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1557 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1561 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1562 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1563 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1572 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1574 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1575 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1576 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1577 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1578 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1579 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
1580 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1582 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1587 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1588 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1589 * the version specific method.
1591 * @s: server SSL handle.
1593 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1595 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1598 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1600 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1601 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1603 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1606 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1607 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1608 const version_info
*vent
;
1609 const version_info
*table
;
1611 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1613 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1615 switch (server_version
) {
1617 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1618 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1619 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1620 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1622 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1623 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1624 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1625 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1626 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1631 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1632 * a HelloRetryRequest
1635 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1636 table
= tls_version_table
;
1638 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1639 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1643 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1645 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1646 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1647 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1648 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1649 PACKET versionslist
;
1651 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1653 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1654 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1655 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1658 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1659 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1660 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1661 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1663 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1664 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1665 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1667 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1670 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1673 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1674 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1676 method
= vent
->smeth();
1677 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1678 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1679 best_method
= method
;
1683 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1684 /* Trailing data? */
1685 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1688 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1689 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1691 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1692 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1694 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1695 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1698 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1699 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1700 s
->method
= best_method
;
1703 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1707 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1708 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1710 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1711 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1714 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1717 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1718 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1720 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1721 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1723 method
= vent
->smeth();
1724 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1725 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1726 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1732 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1736 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1737 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1738 * the version specific method.
1740 * @s: client SSL handle.
1741 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1742 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1743 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1745 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1747 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, int checkdgrd
, int *al
)
1749 const version_info
*vent
;
1750 const version_info
*table
;
1753 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1754 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1755 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1757 if (s
->hello_retry_request
&& version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1758 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1759 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1762 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1764 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
1765 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1766 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1769 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1770 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1771 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1772 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1773 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1776 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1777 table
= tls_version_table
;
1779 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1780 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1784 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1785 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1788 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1791 if (highver
!= 0 && version
!= vent
->version
)
1794 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1795 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1797 if (version
== vent
->version
) {
1798 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1805 highver
= vent
->version
;
1807 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1811 /* Check for downgrades */
1813 if (version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> version
) {
1814 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1815 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1816 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1817 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1818 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1819 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1821 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1822 && version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1823 && highver
> version
) {
1824 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1825 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1826 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1827 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1828 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1829 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1836 s
->version
= version
;
1840 *al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1841 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1845 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1846 * @s: The SSL connection
1847 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1848 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1850 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1851 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1852 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1853 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1854 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1856 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1857 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1858 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1860 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1861 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1863 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1867 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1868 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1869 const version_info
*table
;
1870 const version_info
*vent
;
1872 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1875 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1876 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1877 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1878 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1879 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1881 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1883 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1884 table
= tls_version_table
;
1886 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1887 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1892 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1893 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1894 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1895 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1897 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1898 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1899 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1901 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1902 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1903 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1905 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1906 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1907 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1908 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1909 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1910 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1912 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1914 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1916 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1917 * "version capability" vector.
1919 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1923 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1924 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1928 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1930 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1931 *min_version
= version
;
1936 *max_version
= version
;
1938 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1940 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1946 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1947 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1949 * @s: client SSL handle.
1951 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1953 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1955 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1957 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1962 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1964 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1965 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1966 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1968 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
1973 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1974 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1975 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1976 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1979 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
1980 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
1984 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
1987 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
1988 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
1990 if (group_id
== group
1992 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2001 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2002 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
)
2004 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2006 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2008 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2010 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2011 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2012 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
2013 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2017 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2018 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2019 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2023 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2024 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2025 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2026 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2027 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2035 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2037 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2040 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2042 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2043 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2046 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2048 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2051 /* get the CA RDNs */
2052 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2054 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2058 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2059 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2060 unsigned int name_len
;
2062 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2063 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2064 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2065 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2069 namestart
= namebytes
;
2070 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2071 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2075 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2077 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2081 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2083 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2089 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2090 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2095 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2100 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2102 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2104 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2105 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2111 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2114 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2115 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2116 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2120 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2121 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2123 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2124 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2131 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2140 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2141 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2142 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2144 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2145 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2149 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2152 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2153 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2155 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);