2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
66 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
68 **skp
, int sslv2format
,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
82 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
99 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
100 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
101 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
113 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
114 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
115 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION
,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
152 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
160 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
165 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
172 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
174 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
175 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
177 * 2) If we did request one then
178 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
180 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
181 * list if we requested a certificate)
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
184 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
185 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
186 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
187 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
189 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
190 * not going to accept it because we require a client
193 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
194 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
196 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
199 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
203 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
206 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
207 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
208 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
215 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
216 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
223 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
224 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
225 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
226 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
227 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
230 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
231 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
233 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
234 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
235 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
236 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
242 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
258 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
259 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
276 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
277 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
283 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
284 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
285 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
292 /* No valid transition found */
293 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
299 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
301 * Valid return values are:
305 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
307 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
310 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
311 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
312 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
313 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
314 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
317 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
319 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
323 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
324 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
325 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
326 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
327 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
330 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
331 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
341 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
343 * Valid return values are:
347 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
350 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
351 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
353 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
354 * during re-negotiation:
356 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
357 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
359 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
360 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
363 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
365 * ... except when the application insists on
366 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
369 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
370 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
371 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
373 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
376 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
384 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
390 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
393 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
394 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
398 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
399 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
402 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
404 /* Shouldn't happen */
405 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
407 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
412 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
418 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
419 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
430 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
433 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
434 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
436 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
438 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
444 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
445 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
447 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
449 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
452 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
453 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
457 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
459 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
461 /* Shouldn't happen */
462 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
465 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
466 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
469 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
474 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
478 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
479 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
480 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
481 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
483 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
489 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
491 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
492 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
494 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
496 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
497 /* normal PSK or SRP */
498 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
499 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
500 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
501 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
503 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
504 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
506 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
512 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
513 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
519 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
520 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
526 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
527 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
528 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
533 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
537 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
539 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
542 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
547 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
555 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
561 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
563 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
564 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
571 * the server to the client.
573 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
575 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
577 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
579 /* No pre work to be done */
582 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
585 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
588 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
591 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
592 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
597 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
598 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
600 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
601 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
607 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
609 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
610 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
615 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
617 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
618 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
624 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
625 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
626 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
627 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
630 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
632 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
633 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
634 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
635 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
639 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
642 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
645 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
649 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
650 * server to the client.
652 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
654 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
658 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
660 /* No post work to be done */
663 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
664 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
666 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
667 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
672 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
673 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
675 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
676 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
677 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
681 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
682 * treat like it was the first packet
687 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
690 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
691 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
694 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
697 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
698 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
700 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
701 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
702 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
704 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
708 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
709 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
713 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
714 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
715 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
716 * something clever in the record layer for this.
718 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
719 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
720 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
721 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)
722 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
723 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
))
728 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
732 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
735 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
739 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
740 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
742 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
747 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
750 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
751 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
755 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
756 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
761 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
764 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
769 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
770 s
->session
->master_key
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
771 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
772 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
773 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
779 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
783 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
786 * Valid return values are:
790 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
791 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
793 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
795 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
797 /* Shouldn't happen */
800 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
802 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
804 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
805 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
808 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
809 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
810 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
813 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
814 /* No construction function needed */
816 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
819 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
820 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
821 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
825 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
826 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
829 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
830 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
831 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
834 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
835 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
836 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
839 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
840 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
841 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
845 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
846 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
850 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
851 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
855 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
856 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
860 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
861 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
869 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
870 * calculated as follows:
872 * 2 + # client_version
873 * 32 + # only valid length for random
874 * 1 + # length of session_id
875 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
876 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
877 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
878 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
879 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
880 * 2 + # length of extensions
881 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
883 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
885 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
886 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
894 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
896 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
902 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
905 return s
->max_cert_list
;
907 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
908 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
910 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
911 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
914 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
915 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
918 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
919 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
921 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
922 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
927 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
929 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
931 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
933 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
935 /* Shouldn't happen */
936 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
938 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
939 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
942 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
944 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
945 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
947 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
948 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
951 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
952 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
955 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
956 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
958 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
959 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
964 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
967 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
969 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
971 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
973 /* Shouldn't happen */
976 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
977 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
979 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
980 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
982 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
984 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
985 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
986 /* Are we renegotiating? */
987 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
988 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
989 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
990 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
991 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
992 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
995 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
998 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1000 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1004 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1006 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
1008 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1010 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1011 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1012 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1014 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1017 ret
= SSL3_AL_FATAL
;
1018 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
1020 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
1027 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1030 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1031 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1032 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1038 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1040 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1041 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1042 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1043 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1044 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1046 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1049 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1051 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1052 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1062 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1063 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1064 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1069 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1070 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1071 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1072 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1074 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1076 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1077 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1078 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1079 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1080 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1081 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1082 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1084 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1085 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1086 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1087 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1088 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1089 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1090 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1091 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1092 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1093 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1094 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1095 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1096 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1098 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1099 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1104 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1106 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1107 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1108 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1112 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1115 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1116 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1118 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1121 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1123 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1125 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1129 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1131 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1133 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1135 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1136 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1137 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1138 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello
;
1141 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1143 memset(&clienthello
, 0, sizeof(clienthello
));
1144 clienthello
.isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1145 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1147 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1151 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1152 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1153 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1154 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1156 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1157 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1159 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1160 * 7-8 session_id_length
1161 * 9-10 challenge_length
1165 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1166 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1168 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1169 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1170 * in the first place
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1177 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.legacy_version
)) {
1178 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1183 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1184 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1186 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1187 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1188 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1190 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1193 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1194 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1195 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1197 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1198 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1202 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1208 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
,
1210 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.session_id
, session_id_len
)
1211 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1212 /* No extensions. */
1213 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1215 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1216 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1219 clienthello
.session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1221 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1222 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1223 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1224 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1226 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1227 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1228 memset(clienthello
.random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1229 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1230 clienthello
.random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1231 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1232 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1233 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1235 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1239 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1241 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1242 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1243 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1244 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
.session_id
,
1245 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1246 &clienthello
.session_id_len
)) {
1247 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1252 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1253 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1254 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1258 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1259 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1260 &clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1261 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1266 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1267 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1268 * So check cookie length...
1270 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1271 if (clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1276 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
)) {
1277 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1282 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1283 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1288 /* Could be empty. */
1289 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1290 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1292 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.extensions
)) {
1293 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1300 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
.compressions
,
1301 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1302 &clienthello
.compressions_len
)) {
1303 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1308 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1309 extensions
= clienthello
.extensions
;
1310 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1311 &clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, &al
)) {
1312 /* SSLerr already been called */
1316 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1318 /* Set up the client_random */
1319 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1321 /* Choose the version */
1323 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1324 if (clienthello
.legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1325 || (clienthello
.legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1326 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1328 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1335 s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1338 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1339 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1341 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1342 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1343 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1344 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
.legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1345 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1352 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1353 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1354 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1356 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1360 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1361 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1362 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1363 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1364 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1365 clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1366 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1368 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1370 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1372 /* default verification */
1373 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
1374 || memcmp(clienthello
.dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1375 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1376 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1380 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1382 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1383 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1384 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1386 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1387 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1395 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1396 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1398 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1404 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1405 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1407 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1408 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1409 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1410 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1411 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1412 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1413 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1414 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1415 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1416 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1419 if (clienthello
.isv2
||
1421 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1422 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1425 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &clienthello
);
1427 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1429 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1430 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1431 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1432 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1433 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1435 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1436 /* previous session */
1438 } else if (i
== -1) {
1442 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1447 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
, &ciphers
,
1448 clienthello
.isv2
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1452 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1455 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1458 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1460 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1461 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1463 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1464 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1473 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1476 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1478 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1483 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1484 if (clienthello
.compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1488 if (loop
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1490 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1496 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1497 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, &clienthello
);
1498 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1500 /* TLS extensions */
1501 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1502 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1507 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1508 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
&& !s
->hit
) {
1509 /* No suitable share */
1510 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1511 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
1517 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1518 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1519 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1520 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1524 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1525 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1530 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1531 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1533 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1534 * backwards compat reasons
1536 int master_key_length
;
1538 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1539 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1540 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1542 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1543 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1544 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1546 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1547 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1551 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1553 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1558 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1559 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1564 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1565 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1566 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1567 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1568 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1573 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1574 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1575 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1577 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1579 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1580 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1581 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1583 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1584 /* Can't disable compression */
1585 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1587 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1590 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1591 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1592 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1593 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1594 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1598 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1600 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1603 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1604 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; k
++) {
1605 if (clienthello
.compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1608 if (k
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1609 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1611 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1616 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1617 /* See if we have a match */
1618 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1621 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1622 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1623 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1625 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; o
++) {
1626 if (v
== clienthello
.compressions
[o
]) {
1635 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1641 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1642 * using compression.
1644 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1651 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1655 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1656 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1658 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1660 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1661 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1662 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1663 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1668 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1674 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1675 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1676 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1678 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1680 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1682 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1683 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1685 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1689 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1690 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1692 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1694 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1697 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1698 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1699 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1700 * influence which certificate is sent
1702 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1703 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1705 CERT_PKEY
*certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
1707 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1708 if (certpkey
!= NULL
) {
1710 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1711 * et al can pick it up.
1713 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
1714 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1716 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1717 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1718 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1720 /* status request response should be sent */
1721 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1722 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1723 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1725 /* something bad happened */
1726 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1728 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1737 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1739 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1740 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1742 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1744 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1745 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1746 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1748 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1750 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1754 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1757 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1760 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1762 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1764 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1767 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1768 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1769 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1770 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
1771 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
, ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
1772 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
))
1774 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1775 /* do not send a session ticket */
1776 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1778 /* Session-id reuse */
1779 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1782 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1783 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1784 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1790 * we now have the following setup.
1792 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1793 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1794 * compression - basically ignored right now
1795 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1796 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1797 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1798 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1802 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1803 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1805 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
, &al
)) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1807 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1814 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1816 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1818 * callback indicates further work to be done
1820 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1823 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1825 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1826 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1828 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1830 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1833 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1840 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1842 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1843 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1847 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1849 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1853 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1854 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
1855 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
1857 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1858 * tls_process_client_hello()
1860 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1866 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1867 * back in the server hello:
1868 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1869 * we send back the old session ID.
1870 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1871 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1872 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1873 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1875 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1876 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1877 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1878 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1881 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1882 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1884 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1886 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1887 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1892 /* set up the compression method */
1893 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1896 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1899 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1902 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1903 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
1904 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
1905 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1906 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
1907 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
1909 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1910 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1918 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1922 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1924 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1925 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1926 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1933 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1936 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1939 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1940 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
1944 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1945 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
1948 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1949 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
1951 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1956 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1961 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1963 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1965 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1966 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1968 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1970 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1971 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1973 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1976 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1977 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1978 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1979 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1985 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1988 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1990 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1991 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1992 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2000 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2001 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2003 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2006 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2007 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2008 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2010 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2013 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2015 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2019 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2021 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2026 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2028 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2031 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2032 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2036 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2039 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2041 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2045 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2046 nid
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2047 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
2048 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2050 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2053 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
2054 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2055 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2060 /* Encode the public key. */
2061 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2063 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2069 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2070 * can set these to NULLs
2077 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2079 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2080 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2081 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2082 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2084 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2087 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2088 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2089 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2090 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2094 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2096 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2100 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2101 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2102 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
2104 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2112 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2113 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2114 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2117 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2118 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2120 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2121 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2130 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2131 unsigned char *binval
;
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2135 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2136 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2139 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2149 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2150 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2153 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2154 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2157 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2162 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2166 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2167 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2173 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2177 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2179 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2180 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2181 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2184 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2185 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2186 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2187 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2192 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2193 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2200 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2201 * points to the space at the end.
2204 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
2205 unsigned int siglen
;
2207 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2208 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2213 /* send signature algorithm */
2214 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2215 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
2216 /* Should never happen */
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2223 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2226 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2227 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2228 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2231 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
),
2233 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
2234 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2235 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2236 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2237 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2238 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2240 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, pkey
) <= 0
2241 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2242 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2248 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2249 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2251 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2256 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2259 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2262 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2265 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2267 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2271 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2274 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2276 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2277 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2278 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
)
2279 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2284 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2285 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2286 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2287 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2288 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2289 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2296 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2297 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2302 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2304 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2305 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2306 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2310 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2311 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2313 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2315 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2320 /* else no CA names */
2322 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2327 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2331 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2335 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2338 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2340 PACKET psk_identity
;
2342 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2343 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2347 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2348 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2352 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2353 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2358 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2359 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2364 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2367 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2368 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2371 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2373 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2375 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2377 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2381 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2382 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2383 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2385 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2386 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2391 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2395 /* Should never happen */
2396 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2402 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2405 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2407 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2408 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2409 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2411 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2414 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2416 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2421 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2422 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2423 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2425 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2426 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2427 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2434 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2435 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2436 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2437 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2439 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2440 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2445 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2446 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2447 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2453 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2454 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2455 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2456 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2457 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2460 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2464 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2465 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2467 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2468 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2469 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2470 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2471 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2474 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2477 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2478 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2479 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2481 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2482 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2487 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2488 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2489 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2490 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2491 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2493 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2496 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2497 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2498 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2499 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2500 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2501 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2504 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2505 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2507 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2508 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2511 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2512 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2513 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2514 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2515 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2516 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2519 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2520 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2521 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2522 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2524 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2525 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2526 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2530 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2531 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2533 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2536 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2537 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2538 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2539 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2541 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2542 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2543 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2544 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2545 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2548 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2549 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2550 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2557 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2560 /* Should never happen */
2561 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2567 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2570 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2574 const unsigned char *data
;
2575 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2578 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2579 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2581 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2584 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2586 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2591 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2592 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2596 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2597 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2598 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2602 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2603 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2607 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2608 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2610 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2612 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2617 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2618 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2624 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2625 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2627 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2630 /* Should never happen */
2631 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2637 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2640 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2641 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2644 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2645 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2646 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2651 const unsigned char *data
;
2654 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2655 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2658 /* Get encoded point length */
2659 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2660 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2661 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2665 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2666 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2670 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2671 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2677 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2678 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2684 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2685 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2687 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2691 /* Should never happen */
2692 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2698 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2702 const unsigned char *data
;
2704 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2705 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2706 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2710 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2714 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2715 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2719 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2720 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2721 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2726 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2733 /* Should never happen */
2734 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2740 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2743 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2744 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2745 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2746 const unsigned char *start
;
2747 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2748 unsigned long alg_a
;
2751 size_t sess_key_len
;
2752 const unsigned char *data
;
2755 /* Get our certificate private key */
2756 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2757 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2759 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2761 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2763 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2766 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2768 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2769 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2772 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2773 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2774 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2778 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2779 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2784 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2785 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2786 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2787 * client certificate for authorization only.
2789 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2790 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2791 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2794 /* Decrypt session key */
2795 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2796 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2797 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2801 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2802 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2803 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2804 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2805 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2811 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2812 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2813 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2817 /* Generate master secret */
2818 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2819 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2820 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2824 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2825 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2826 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2827 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2831 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2834 /* Should never happen */
2835 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2841 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2844 unsigned long alg_k
;
2846 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2848 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2849 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2852 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2853 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2854 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2855 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2857 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2860 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2861 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2862 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2866 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2867 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2869 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2870 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2872 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2873 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2875 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2876 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2878 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2879 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2882 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2884 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2888 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2891 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2893 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2894 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2896 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2897 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2900 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2903 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2904 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2905 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2906 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2908 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2911 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2912 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2914 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2915 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2916 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
2918 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2922 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2923 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2928 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2930 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2931 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2933 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2934 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2935 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2936 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2937 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2938 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2939 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2940 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2943 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2947 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
2949 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2950 * the handshake_buffer
2952 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2953 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2956 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2958 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2961 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2965 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2966 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2968 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2969 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2974 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2977 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2979 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2980 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2982 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2984 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2988 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2992 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2996 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3000 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
3001 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
3002 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
3004 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
3006 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3007 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3011 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3013 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3014 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3017 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
3018 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3023 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3026 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
3027 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3030 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
3032 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3034 } else if (rv
== 0) {
3035 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3039 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3042 /* Use default digest for this key type */
3043 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
3045 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
3047 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3052 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3054 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3058 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3059 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
3060 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3062 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3065 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3067 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3071 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3072 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3074 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3079 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3081 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3082 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3084 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3089 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
3090 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
3091 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
3092 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
3093 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3095 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3098 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
3104 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
3105 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
3106 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
3107 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3109 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3113 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3114 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3119 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3122 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3123 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3125 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3126 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3127 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3129 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
3134 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3136 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3138 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3139 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3140 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3141 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3144 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3149 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3150 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3151 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3152 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3153 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3154 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3159 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3160 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3161 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3162 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3164 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3168 certstart
= certbytes
;
3169 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3174 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3175 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3177 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3181 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3182 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3185 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3186 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3190 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3192 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3193 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
))
3197 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3204 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3205 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3206 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3207 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3209 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3212 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3213 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3214 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3217 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3220 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3221 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3226 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3228 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3230 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3235 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3238 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3240 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3242 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3247 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3248 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3249 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3251 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3252 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3255 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3258 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3259 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3265 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3266 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3269 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3273 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3274 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3277 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3281 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3284 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3286 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3293 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3294 * for the server Certificate message
3296 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3297 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &al
)) {
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3299 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3306 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3308 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3309 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3310 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3311 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3312 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3313 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3316 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3317 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3318 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3320 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3322 /* get session encoding length */
3323 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3325 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3328 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3329 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3332 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3334 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3338 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3339 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3340 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3346 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3350 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3353 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3356 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3358 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3359 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3360 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3364 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3365 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3368 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3371 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3372 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3374 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3375 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3376 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3381 /* Put timeout and length */
3382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3383 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3385 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3390 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3395 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3397 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3399 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3400 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3402 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3403 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3405 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3406 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3407 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3409 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3410 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3414 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3415 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3416 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3418 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3419 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3420 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3421 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3422 /* Output key name */
3423 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3425 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3426 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3428 /* Encrypt session data */
3429 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3430 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3431 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3432 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3433 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3434 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3435 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3436 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3437 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3438 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3439 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3440 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3441 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3442 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3443 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3444 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3445 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3450 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3457 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3458 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3463 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3464 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3466 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3468 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3469 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3470 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3478 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3480 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3481 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3490 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3491 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3493 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3495 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3496 size_t next_proto_len
;
3499 * The payload looks like:
3501 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3502 * uint8 padding_len;
3503 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3505 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3506 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3507 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3512 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3517 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3519 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3521 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3526 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3530 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3532 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3534 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3541 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3543 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3544 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3545 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3546 int sslv2format
, int *al
)
3548 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3549 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3551 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3552 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3554 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3556 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3558 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3560 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3564 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3566 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3567 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3571 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3572 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3575 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3580 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3583 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3584 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3585 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3589 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3591 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3592 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3593 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3595 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3598 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3599 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3600 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3601 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3602 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3604 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3605 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3608 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3612 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3613 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3614 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3616 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3617 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3620 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3622 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3623 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3629 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3630 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3632 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3634 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3639 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3640 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3649 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3650 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);