2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
33 ASN1_TYPE
*opaqueBlob
;
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, kxBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, opaqueBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
58 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
70 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
71 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
72 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
76 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
77 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
78 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
87 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
88 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
89 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
93 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
94 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
101 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
107 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
108 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
115 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
116 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
135 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
136 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
142 /* No valid transition found */
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
157 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
165 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
190 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
191 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
192 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
193 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
200 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
208 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
211 } else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
212 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
213 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
221 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
247 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
248 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
255 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
256 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s
->s3
.npn_seen
) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
270 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
281 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
289 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
290 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
306 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
307 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
313 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
314 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
327 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
345 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
374 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
376 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
377 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
379 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
382 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
383 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
385 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
386 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
389 && (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
391 * ... except when the application insists on
392 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
395 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
396 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
397 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
399 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
402 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
410 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
416 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
419 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
423 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
432 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
433 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
440 /* Try to read from the client instead */
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
448 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
449 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
451 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
458 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
461 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
466 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
467 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
475 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
476 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
488 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
492 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
504 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
505 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
506 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
509 * handshake at this point.
511 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
514 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
517 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
528 * been configured for.
530 if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
531 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
539 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
540 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
542 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
544 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
547 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
548 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
552 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
554 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
556 /* Shouldn't happen */
557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
558 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
563 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
566 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
586 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
587 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
588 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
590 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
602 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
608 /* normal PSK or SRP */
609 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
610 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
611 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
615 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
617 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
623 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
624 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
637 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
638 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
644 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
654 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
655 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
657 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
662 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
666 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
673 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
680 * the server to the client.
682 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
684 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
686 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
688 /* No pre work to be done */
691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0) {
728 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
729 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
730 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
735 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
737 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
738 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
744 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
747 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
748 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
749 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
750 } else if (s
->session
->cipher
!= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
) {
751 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
752 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK
,
753 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
756 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
762 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
763 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
764 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
765 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
769 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
771 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
772 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
773 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
778 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
785 static ossl_inline
int conn_is_closed(void)
787 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
792 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
796 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
806 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
807 * server to the client.
809 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
811 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
815 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
817 /* No post work to be done */
820 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
821 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
823 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
829 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
830 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
832 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
833 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
839 * treat like it was the first packet
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
845 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
846 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
847 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
852 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
853 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
854 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
858 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
861 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
862 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
864 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
865 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
866 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
869 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
870 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
873 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
874 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
879 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
880 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
884 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
885 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
889 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
890 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
891 if (!statem_flush(s
))
896 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
897 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
898 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
899 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
900 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
905 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
906 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
907 /* SSLfatal() already called */
911 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
912 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
913 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
915 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS
;
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
920 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
922 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
925 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
929 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
930 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
940 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
941 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
945 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
946 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
949 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
951 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
954 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
958 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
959 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
961 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
962 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
964 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
965 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
966 /* SSLfatal() already called */
971 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
972 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
973 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
978 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
979 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
981 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
982 /* SSLfatal() already called */
987 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
989 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1) {
990 if (SSL_get_error(s
, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
991 && conn_is_closed()) {
993 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
994 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
995 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
996 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
997 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
999 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1008 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1012 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1015 * Valid return values are:
1019 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1020 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
1022 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1024 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1028 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
1029 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
1032 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
1034 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1036 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1037 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1040 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1041 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
1042 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
1045 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
1046 /* No construction function needed */
1048 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
1052 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
1053 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1056 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT
:
1057 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
1058 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
1061 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1062 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1063 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1068 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1069 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1073 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1074 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1078 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1079 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1083 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1084 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1087 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1088 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1089 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1092 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1093 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1094 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1097 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1099 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1102 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1103 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1104 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1107 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1108 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1109 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1117 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1118 * calculated as follows:
1120 * 2 + # client_version
1121 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1122 * 1 + # length of session_id
1123 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1124 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1125 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1126 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1127 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1128 * 2 + # length of extensions
1129 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1131 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1133 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1134 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1137 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1138 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1140 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1142 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1144 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1146 /* Shouldn't happen */
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1150 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1152 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1153 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1155 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1156 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1158 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1159 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1162 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1166 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1169 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1170 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1172 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1173 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1175 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1176 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1181 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1183 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1185 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1187 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1189 /* Shouldn't happen */
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1191 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1193 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1196 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1198 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1199 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1201 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1202 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1204 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1205 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1207 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1208 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1211 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1212 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1215 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1216 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1218 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1219 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1222 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1228 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1231 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1233 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1235 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1237 /* Shouldn't happen */
1238 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1239 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1243 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1244 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1246 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1247 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1252 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1253 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1256 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1258 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1259 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1260 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1262 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1266 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1267 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1270 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1273 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1274 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1275 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1276 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1277 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1286 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1289 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1290 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1291 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1297 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1299 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1300 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1301 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1302 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1303 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1305 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1308 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1310 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1311 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1322 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1323 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1324 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1328 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1330 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1331 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1332 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1333 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1335 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1337 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1338 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1339 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1340 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1341 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1342 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1343 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1345 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1346 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1347 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1348 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1349 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1350 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1351 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1352 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1353 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1354 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1355 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1356 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1357 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1359 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1360 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1365 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1367 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1368 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1369 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1373 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1376 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1377 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1379 s
->s3
.is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1382 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1386 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1387 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1388 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1389 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1391 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1392 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1393 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1398 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) != 0
1399 || (!s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
1401 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1402 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1403 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1409 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1410 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1417 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1419 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1420 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1422 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1425 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1426 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1428 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1433 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1434 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1435 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1436 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1438 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1439 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1441 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1442 * 7-8 session_id_length
1443 * 9-10 challenge_length
1447 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1448 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1450 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1451 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1452 * in the first place
1454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1460 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1466 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1467 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1469 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1470 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1471 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1473 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1476 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1477 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1478 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1480 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1484 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1486 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1490 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1492 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1493 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1494 /* No extensions. */
1495 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1496 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1497 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1500 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1502 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1503 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1504 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1505 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1507 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1508 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1509 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1510 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1511 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1512 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1513 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1514 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1515 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1516 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1520 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1522 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1523 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1524 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1525 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1526 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1527 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1529 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1534 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1536 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1539 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1540 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1541 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1547 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1548 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1549 * So check cookie length...
1551 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1552 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0) {
1553 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1554 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1559 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1560 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1561 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1565 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1566 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1567 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1571 /* Could be empty. */
1572 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1573 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1575 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1576 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1578 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1584 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1585 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1586 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1587 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1592 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1593 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1594 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1595 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1596 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1597 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1600 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1602 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1605 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1606 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1607 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1609 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1612 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1615 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1620 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1622 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1623 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1624 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1625 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1626 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1628 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1629 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1630 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1631 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1632 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1633 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1635 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1636 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1638 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1641 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1642 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1647 /* Set up the client_random */
1648 memcpy(s
->s3
.client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1650 /* Choose the version */
1652 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1653 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1654 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1655 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1657 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1661 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1662 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1666 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1669 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1670 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1672 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1673 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1674 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1675 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1676 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1682 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1683 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1684 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1687 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1691 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1692 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1693 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1694 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1695 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1700 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1701 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1702 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1703 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1704 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1706 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1707 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1709 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1711 /* default verification */
1712 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1713 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1714 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1716 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1717 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1720 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1722 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1723 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1724 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1725 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1726 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1727 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1735 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1736 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1737 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1738 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1743 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 0;
1744 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1745 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1746 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1747 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1748 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1749 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1750 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1751 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1752 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1753 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1756 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1757 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1758 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1760 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1761 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1762 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1763 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1764 * an insecure downgrade.
1766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1767 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1768 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1774 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1775 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1776 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1777 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1779 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1780 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1781 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1782 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1785 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1786 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1787 || s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1789 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1790 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1793 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1797 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1800 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1801 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1802 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1803 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1809 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1810 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1812 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1813 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1814 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1815 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1816 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1817 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1818 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1819 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1820 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1821 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1824 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1826 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1827 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1828 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1832 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1834 /* previous session */
1836 } else if (i
== -1) {
1837 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1841 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1848 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1849 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1850 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1851 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1855 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1856 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1858 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1860 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1862 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER
) {
1863 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1864 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1866 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1867 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1868 if (trc_out
!= NULL
)
1869 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i
,
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1878 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1881 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1882 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1883 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1884 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER
);
1887 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER
);
1890 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1891 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1895 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1899 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1904 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1905 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1906 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1908 /* TLS extensions */
1909 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1910 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1911 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1916 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1917 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1918 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1919 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1923 pos
= s
->s3
.server_random
;
1924 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1925 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1926 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1933 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1936 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1937 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1939 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1940 * backwards compat reasons
1942 int master_key_length
;
1944 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1945 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1946 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1948 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1949 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1950 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1952 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
1953 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1957 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1958 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1959 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
,
1960 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1961 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1962 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1963 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1964 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1968 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1969 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1970 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1971 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1972 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1977 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1978 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1979 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1981 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1982 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1984 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1985 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1986 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1988 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1990 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1991 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1996 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1997 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1998 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
2000 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2001 /* Can't disable compression */
2002 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
2003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2004 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2005 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2008 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2009 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
2010 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
2011 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
2012 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2016 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
2017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2018 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2019 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
2022 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2023 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
2024 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
2027 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
2028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2029 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2030 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
2033 } else if (s
->hit
) {
2035 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
2036 /* See if we have a match */
2037 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
2040 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
2041 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
2042 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
2044 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
2045 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
2054 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2060 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2061 * using compression.
2063 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2064 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2065 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2066 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2072 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2075 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2076 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2077 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
2078 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2079 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2080 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2081 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2088 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2089 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2091 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2093 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2094 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2099 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2100 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2101 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2102 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2103 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2106 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2107 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2108 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2109 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2110 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2116 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2117 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2119 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2121 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2124 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2125 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2126 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2127 * influence which certificate is sent
2129 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2130 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2133 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2134 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2136 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2137 * et al can pick it up.
2139 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2140 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2142 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2143 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2144 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2146 /* status request response should be sent */
2147 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2148 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2149 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2151 /* something bad happened */
2152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2155 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
2156 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2166 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2167 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2169 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2171 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2172 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2174 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2175 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2176 s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
,
2177 (unsigned int)s
->s3
.alpn_proposed_len
,
2178 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2180 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2181 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
2182 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2183 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2188 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2190 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2194 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2195 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2196 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2197 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2198 selected_len
) != 0) {
2199 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2200 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2204 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2205 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2208 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2210 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2214 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2216 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2218 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2222 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2227 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2229 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2233 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2238 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2239 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2240 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2241 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2247 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2249 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2251 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2252 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2254 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2261 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2262 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2263 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2264 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2265 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2268 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2269 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2273 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2276 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2279 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2280 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2282 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2284 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2285 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2286 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2287 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2290 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2293 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2294 /* SSLfatal already called */
2297 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2298 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2299 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2300 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2301 ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2302 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2303 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2304 /* do not send a session ticket */
2305 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2308 /* Session-id reuse */
2309 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2313 * we now have the following setup.
2315 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2316 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2317 * compression - basically ignored right now
2318 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2319 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2320 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2321 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2325 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2326 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2328 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2333 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2334 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2335 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2336 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2338 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2346 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2348 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2350 * callback indicates further work to be done
2352 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2356 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2362 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2367 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2372 unsigned char *session_id
;
2373 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2375 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2378 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2379 * tls_process_client_hello()
2381 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2382 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2383 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
.server_random
,
2384 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2391 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2392 * back in the server hello:
2393 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2394 * we send back the old session ID.
2395 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2396 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2397 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2398 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2400 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2401 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2402 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2404 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2405 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2408 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2409 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2411 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2414 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2415 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2417 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2418 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2421 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2423 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2427 /* set up the compression method */
2428 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2431 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2434 compm
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2437 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2438 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2439 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)) {
2440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2441 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2445 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2446 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2447 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2449 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2450 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2452 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2456 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2457 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2458 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2463 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2464 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2466 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2470 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2471 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2472 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2479 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2481 if (!s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
2482 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2483 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2490 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2493 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2496 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2497 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2500 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
2504 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2505 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2506 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2508 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2514 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2515 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2516 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2520 type
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2522 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2524 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2525 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2527 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2529 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2530 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2532 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2535 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2536 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2537 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2538 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2541 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2542 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2545 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2548 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2550 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2551 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2552 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2561 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2563 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2564 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2567 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2568 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2569 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2570 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2571 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2574 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2575 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2576 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2577 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2581 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, pkdhp
);
2582 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2587 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
2589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2595 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2598 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2599 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2603 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2605 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2606 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2607 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2608 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2612 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2613 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2614 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2615 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2616 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2617 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2620 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2621 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2622 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2623 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2628 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
2629 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
2630 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
2631 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
2635 EVP_PKEY_get0(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
2636 if (EVP_PKEY_id(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_NONE
) {
2637 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, 0, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2641 /* Encode the public key. */
2642 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2644 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2645 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2646 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2651 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2652 * can set these to NULLs
2659 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2661 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2662 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2663 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2664 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2667 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2670 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2671 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2672 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2673 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2678 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2679 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2683 if (((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2684 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2686 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2688 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2693 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2694 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2695 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2698 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2699 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2701 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2702 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2706 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2712 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2713 unsigned char *binval
;
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2717 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2718 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2721 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2725 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2732 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2733 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2736 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2737 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2740 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2741 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2742 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2746 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2750 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2751 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2753 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2758 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2762 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2764 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2765 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2766 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2769 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2770 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2771 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2772 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2775 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2778 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2779 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2785 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2787 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2788 size_t siglen
= 0, tbslen
;
2790 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
2791 /* Should never happen */
2792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2793 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2794 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2797 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2798 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2800 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2804 /* send signature algorithm */
2805 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2806 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2807 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2808 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2812 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2813 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_name(md
),
2814 s
->ctx
->propq
, pkey
, s
->ctx
->libctx
) <= 0) {
2815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2816 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2820 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2821 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2822 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2823 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2824 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2829 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2830 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2837 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <=0
2838 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2839 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <= 0
2840 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2841 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2843 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2844 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2845 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2851 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2855 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2858 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2860 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2864 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2866 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2867 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2868 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2869 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2870 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2871 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
2872 || RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->pha_context
,
2873 s
->pha_context_len
) <= 0
2874 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2875 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2876 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2877 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2880 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2881 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2886 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2887 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2888 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2889 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2894 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2895 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2903 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2904 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2905 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2907 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2911 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2912 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2913 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2915 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2916 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2917 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2918 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2920 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2926 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, get_ca_names(s
), pkt
)) {
2927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2933 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2937 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2940 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2942 PACKET psk_identity
;
2944 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2946 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2949 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2950 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2951 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2954 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2956 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2960 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2961 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2966 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2969 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2973 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2975 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2978 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2979 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2983 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2984 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2985 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2987 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2988 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2989 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2993 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2997 /* Should never happen */
2998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3004 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3008 PACKET enc_premaster
;
3009 EVP_PKEY
*rsa
= NULL
;
3010 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
3012 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3013 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3015 rsa
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
;
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3018 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
3022 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
3023 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
3024 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
3026 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
3027 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3029 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3034 outlen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
3035 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(outlen
);
3036 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
3037 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3038 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3042 ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, rsa
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3044 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3045 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3050 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3051 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3052 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3053 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3054 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3055 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3056 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3057 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3058 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3060 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx
) <= 0
3061 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx
, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING
) <= 0) {
3062 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3063 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3067 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION
,
3068 (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
);
3069 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) != 0)
3070 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3071 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION
,
3072 (unsigned int *)&s
->version
);
3073 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3075 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx
, params
)
3076 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx
, rsa_decrypt
, &outlen
,
3077 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
3078 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
)) <= 0) {
3079 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3080 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3085 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3086 * we double check anyway.
3088 if (outlen
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
3089 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
3090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3091 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3095 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3096 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
3097 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
, 0)) {
3098 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3104 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
3105 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx
);
3108 /* Should never happen */
3109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3115 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3118 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
3122 const unsigned char *data
;
3123 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3126 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
3127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3128 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
3131 skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3133 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3134 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3138 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3140 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3143 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3144 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3145 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3149 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3150 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
3151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3156 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3157 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
3158 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| cdh
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
3159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3165 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3166 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3171 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3172 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3174 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3177 /* Should never happen */
3178 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3187 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3188 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3191 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3192 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3193 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3194 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3198 const unsigned char *data
;
3201 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3202 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3205 /* Get encoded point length */
3206 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3207 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3209 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3214 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3218 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3219 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3226 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint()
3227 * knows how to get a key from an encoded point with the help of
3228 * a OSSL_SERIALIZER deserializer. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0()
3229 * downgrades an EVP_PKEY to contain a legacy key.
3233 EVP_PKEY_get0(ckey
);
3234 if (EVP_PKEY_id(ckey
) == EVP_PKEY_NONE
) {
3235 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3240 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3241 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3247 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3248 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3253 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3254 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3256 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3260 /* Should never happen */
3261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3267 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3271 const unsigned char *data
;
3273 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3274 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3276 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3279 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3284 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3285 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3286 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3289 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3290 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3291 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3293 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3297 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3304 /* Should never happen */
3305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3306 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3311 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3314 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3315 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3316 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3317 const unsigned char *start
;
3318 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3319 unsigned long alg_a
;
3320 GOST_KX_MESSAGE
*pKX
= NULL
;
3321 const unsigned char *ptr
;
3324 /* Get our certificate private key */
3325 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3326 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3328 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3330 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3332 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3335 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3337 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3338 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3341 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pk
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3342 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3344 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3347 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3349 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3353 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3354 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3355 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3356 * client certificate for authorization only.
3358 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3359 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3360 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3364 ptr
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3365 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3366 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3367 pKX
= d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL
, &ptr
, PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
3369 || pKX
->kxBlob
== NULL
3370 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX
->kxBlob
) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
) {
3371 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3372 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3376 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, ptr
- PACKET_data(pkt
))) {
3377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3378 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3382 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3384 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3388 inlen
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->length
;
3389 start
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->data
;
3391 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3394 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3397 /* Generate master secret */
3398 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3399 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3400 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3403 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3404 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3406 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3410 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3411 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX
);
3414 /* Should never happen */
3415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3416 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3421 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3423 unsigned long alg_k
;
3425 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3427 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3428 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3429 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3433 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3434 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3435 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3437 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3438 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3441 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3442 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3443 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3446 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3447 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3451 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3452 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3456 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3457 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3461 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3462 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3463 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3466 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3467 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3468 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3473 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3474 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3478 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3481 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3482 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3484 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3487 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3490 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3491 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3492 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3493 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3496 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3499 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3500 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3502 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3503 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3504 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3507 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3508 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3512 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3513 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3517 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3518 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3523 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3525 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3526 * the handshake_buffer
3528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3529 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3532 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3534 if (!s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
) {
3535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3536 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3537 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3541 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3542 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3544 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3550 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3553 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3556 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3559 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3560 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3561 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3563 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3566 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3567 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3570 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
3572 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3574 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3578 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3579 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3580 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3581 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3582 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3583 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3587 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3588 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3590 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3594 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3595 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3596 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3597 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3598 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3599 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3603 certstart
= certbytes
;
3604 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3606 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3607 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3610 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3611 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3612 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3613 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3617 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3618 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3621 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3623 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3627 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3628 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3629 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3630 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3631 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3632 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3633 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3636 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3639 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3640 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3641 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3642 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3648 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3649 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3650 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3652 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3653 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3656 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3657 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3658 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3660 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3661 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3664 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3665 if (s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3666 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3671 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3673 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3674 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3675 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3680 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3683 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3686 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3687 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3693 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3694 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3695 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3696 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3697 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3700 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3701 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3702 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3703 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3704 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3708 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3709 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3712 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3713 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3714 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3716 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3717 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3720 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3724 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3729 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3730 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3734 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3736 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3737 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3738 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3743 /* Resend session tickets */
3744 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3747 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3751 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3755 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3757 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3761 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3766 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3767 * for the server Certificate message
3769 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3770 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3771 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3774 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3782 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3783 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3786 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3787 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3788 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3791 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3792 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3793 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)) {
3794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3795 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3799 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3800 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3801 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3802 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3803 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3808 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3809 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3810 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3818 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3819 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3821 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3822 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3823 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
3824 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3825 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3826 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3829 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3830 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3831 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3833 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3835 /* get session encoding length */
3836 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3838 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3841 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3846 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3848 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3849 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3853 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3854 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
3855 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3857 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3862 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3864 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3869 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3872 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3879 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3880 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3881 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3882 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3884 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3888 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3891 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3894 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3897 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3898 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3901 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3903 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3908 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3909 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3910 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
3912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3913 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3914 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3915 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3916 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 1);
3921 /* Put timeout and length */
3922 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3923 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3925 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3930 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3931 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
3935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3936 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3939 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3941 EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
3944 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
3945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3946 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED
);
3950 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3951 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3952 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3953 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3954 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
3955 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
3957 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3962 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3963 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3964 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3967 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3972 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3973 /* Output key name */
3974 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3976 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3977 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3979 /* Encrypt session data */
3980 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3981 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3982 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3983 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3984 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3985 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3986 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3987 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3988 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx
,
3989 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3990 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3991 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3992 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)
3993 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3994 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3995 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
3996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3997 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4001 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4002 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
4003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
4004 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4011 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
4012 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
4016 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
4017 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
4019 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4020 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4024 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
4025 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
4026 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
4027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET
,
4028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4035 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4037 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
4038 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
4040 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4044 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
4046 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4049 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
4050 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
4051 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
4053 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4054 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
4055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4056 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4057 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4060 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
4063 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4064 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4065 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4067 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
4068 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
4070 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
4071 /* SSLfatal already called */
4075 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
4076 s
->session
= new_sess
;
4079 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
4080 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4083 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
,
4084 sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
4085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4086 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4090 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
4092 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
4093 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
4094 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
4098 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
4100 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
4103 s
->session
->master_key
,
4105 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4108 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
4110 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
4111 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
4112 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
4113 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
4114 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
4115 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
4116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4117 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4118 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
4121 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
4123 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
4126 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
4127 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(s
, tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0)
4131 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4132 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4133 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4136 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
4137 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
4138 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
4139 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4143 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
4145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4149 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4150 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
4151 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4153 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4157 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4158 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4159 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4162 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
4163 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
4172 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4173 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4175 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4177 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4178 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4179 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4180 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
4181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4188 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4190 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4200 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4201 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4203 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4205 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4206 size_t next_proto_len
;
4209 * The payload looks like:
4211 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4212 * uint8 padding_len;
4213 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4215 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4216 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4217 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4219 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4220 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4223 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4227 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4230 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4232 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4236 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4238 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4249 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4251 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4252 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4255 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4256 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4259 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4263 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4264 * a record boundary.
4266 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4267 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
4268 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4269 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4270 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4273 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4274 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4275 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4276 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4277 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4280 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;