2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
66 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
68 **skp
, int sslv2format
,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
82 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
99 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
100 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
101 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
113 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
114 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
115 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION
,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
152 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
160 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
165 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
172 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
174 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
175 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
177 * 2) If we did request one then
178 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
180 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
181 * list if we requested a certificate)
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
184 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
185 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
186 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
187 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
189 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
190 * not going to accept it because we require a client
193 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
194 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
196 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
199 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
203 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
206 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
207 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
208 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
215 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
216 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
223 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
224 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
225 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
226 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
227 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
230 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
231 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
233 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
234 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
235 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
236 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
242 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
258 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
259 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
276 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
277 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
283 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
284 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
285 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
292 /* No valid transition found */
293 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
299 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
301 * Valid return values are:
305 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
307 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
310 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
311 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
312 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
313 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
314 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
317 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
319 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
323 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
324 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
325 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
326 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
327 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
330 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
331 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
341 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
343 * Valid return values are:
347 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
350 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
351 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
353 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
354 * during re-negotiation:
356 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
357 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
359 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
360 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
363 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
365 * ... except when the application insists on
366 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
369 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
370 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
371 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
373 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
376 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
384 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
390 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
393 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
394 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
398 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
399 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
402 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
404 /* Shouldn't happen */
405 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
407 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
412 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
418 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
419 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
430 st
->hand_state
= s
->tlsext_status_expected
? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
431 : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
442 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
443 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
449 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
450 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
452 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
454 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
457 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
458 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
462 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
464 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
466 /* Shouldn't happen */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
470 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
474 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
475 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
478 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
480 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
483 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
484 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
485 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
486 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
488 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
494 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
496 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
497 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
499 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
501 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
502 /* normal PSK or SRP */
503 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
504 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
505 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
506 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
508 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
511 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
517 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
518 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
523 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
524 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
525 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
530 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
531 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
537 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
538 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
541 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
544 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
546 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
547 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
549 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
557 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
560 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
566 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
569 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
575 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
576 * the server to the client.
578 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
580 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
582 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
584 /* No pre work to be done */
587 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
590 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
593 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
596 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
597 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
602 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
603 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
605 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
606 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
612 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
615 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
617 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
622 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
623 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
630 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
631 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
632 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
637 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
638 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
639 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
640 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
647 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
650 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
654 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
655 * server to the client.
657 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
659 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
663 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
665 /* No post work to be done */
668 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
669 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
671 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
672 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
677 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
678 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
680 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
681 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
682 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
686 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
687 * treat like it was the first packet
692 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
695 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
696 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
699 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
702 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
703 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
705 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
706 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
707 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
709 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
713 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
714 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
718 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
719 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
720 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
721 * something clever in the record layer for this.
723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
724 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
725 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
726 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)
727 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
728 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
))
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
735 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
737 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
740 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
744 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
745 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
747 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
752 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
755 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
756 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
760 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
761 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
766 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
774 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
775 s
->session
->master_key
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
776 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
777 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
778 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
784 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
788 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
791 * Valid return values are:
795 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
796 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
798 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
800 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
802 /* Shouldn't happen */
805 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
807 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
809 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
810 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
813 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
814 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
815 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
818 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
819 /* No construction function needed */
821 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
824 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
825 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
826 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
830 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
831 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
834 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
835 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
836 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
839 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
840 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
841 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
845 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
846 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
850 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
851 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
855 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
856 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
860 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
861 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
864 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
865 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
866 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
874 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
875 * calculated as follows:
877 * 2 + # client_version
878 * 32 + # only valid length for random
879 * 1 + # length of session_id
880 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
881 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
882 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
883 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
884 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
885 * 2 + # length of extensions
886 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
888 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
890 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
891 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
894 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
895 * reading. Excludes the message header.
897 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
899 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
901 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
903 /* Shouldn't happen */
906 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
907 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
910 return s
->max_cert_list
;
912 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
913 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
915 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
919 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
920 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
923 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
924 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
926 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
927 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
932 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
934 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
936 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
938 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
940 /* Shouldn't happen */
941 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
943 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
944 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
947 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
949 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
950 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
952 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
953 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
956 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
957 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
960 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
961 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
963 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
964 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
969 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
972 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
974 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
976 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
978 /* Shouldn't happen */
981 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
982 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
984 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
985 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
987 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
989 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
990 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
991 /* Are we renegotiating? */
992 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
993 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
994 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
995 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
996 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
997 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
1000 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
1003 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1005 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1009 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1011 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
1013 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1015 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1016 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1017 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1019 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1022 ret
= SSL3_AL_FATAL
;
1023 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
1025 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
1032 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1035 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1036 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1037 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1043 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1045 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1046 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1047 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1048 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1049 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1051 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1054 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1056 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1057 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1065 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1067 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1071 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1073 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1075 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1077 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1078 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1079 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1080 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello
;
1083 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1085 memset(&clienthello
, 0, sizeof(clienthello
));
1086 clienthello
.isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1087 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1089 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1093 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1094 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1095 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1096 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1098 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1099 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1101 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1102 * 7-8 session_id_length
1103 * 9-10 challenge_length
1107 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1108 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1110 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1111 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1112 * in the first place
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1119 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.legacy_version
)) {
1120 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1125 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1126 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1128 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1129 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1130 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1132 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1135 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1136 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1137 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1139 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1140 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1144 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1145 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1150 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
,
1152 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.session_id
, session_id_len
)
1153 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1154 /* No extensions. */
1155 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1157 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1158 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1161 clienthello
.session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1163 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1164 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1165 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1166 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1168 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1169 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1170 memset(clienthello
.random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1171 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1172 clienthello
.random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1173 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1174 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1175 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1177 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1181 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1183 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1184 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1185 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1186 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
.session_id
,
1187 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1188 &clienthello
.session_id_len
)) {
1189 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1194 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1200 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1201 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1202 &clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1208 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1209 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1210 * So check cookie length...
1212 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1213 if (clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1218 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
)) {
1219 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1224 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1225 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1230 /* Could be empty. */
1231 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1232 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1234 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.extensions
)) {
1235 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1242 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
.compressions
,
1243 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1244 &clienthello
.compressions_len
)) {
1245 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1250 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1251 extensions
= clienthello
.extensions
;
1252 if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions
, &clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
,
1253 &clienthello
.num_extensions
, &al
)) {
1254 /* SSLerr already been called */
1258 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1260 /* Set up the client_random */
1261 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1263 /* Choose the version */
1265 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1266 if (clienthello
.legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1267 || (clienthello
.legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1268 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1270 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1277 s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1280 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1281 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1283 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1284 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1285 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1286 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
.legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1287 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1294 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1295 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1296 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1298 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1302 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1303 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1304 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1305 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1306 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1307 clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1308 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1310 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1312 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1314 /* default verification */
1315 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
1316 || memcmp(clienthello
.dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1317 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1318 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1322 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1324 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1325 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1326 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1328 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1329 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1337 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1338 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s
, &clienthello
)) {
1339 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1340 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1346 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1347 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1349 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1350 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1351 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1352 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1353 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1354 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1355 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1356 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1357 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1358 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1361 if (clienthello
.isv2
||
1363 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1364 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1367 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &clienthello
);
1369 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1371 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1372 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1373 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1374 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1375 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1377 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1378 /* previous session */
1380 } else if (i
== -1) {
1384 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1389 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
, &ciphers
,
1390 clienthello
.isv2
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1394 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1397 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1400 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1402 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1403 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1405 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1406 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1415 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1418 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1420 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1425 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1426 if (clienthello
.compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1430 if (loop
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1432 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1437 /* TLS extensions */
1438 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &clienthello
)) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1443 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1444 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
&& !s
->hit
) {
1445 /* No suitable share */
1446 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1447 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
1453 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1454 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1455 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1456 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1460 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1461 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1466 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1467 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1469 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1470 * backwards compat reasons
1472 int master_key_length
;
1474 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1475 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1476 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1478 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)
1479 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1480 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1482 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1483 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1487 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1489 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1494 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1495 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1500 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1501 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1502 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1503 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1504 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1509 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1510 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1511 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1513 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1515 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1516 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1517 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1519 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1520 /* Can't disable compression */
1521 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1523 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1526 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1527 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1528 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1529 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1530 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1534 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1536 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1539 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1540 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; k
++) {
1541 if (clienthello
.compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1544 if (k
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1545 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1547 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1552 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1553 /* See if we have a match */
1554 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1557 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1558 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1559 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1561 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; o
++) {
1562 if (v
== clienthello
.compressions
[o
]) {
1571 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1577 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1578 * using compression.
1580 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1587 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1591 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1592 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1594 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1596 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1597 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1598 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1599 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1604 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1610 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1611 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1612 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1614 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1616 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1618 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1619 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1624 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1626 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1627 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1629 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1631 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1632 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1633 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1635 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1637 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1641 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1644 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1647 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1649 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1651 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1654 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1655 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1656 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1657 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1658 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1659 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1660 /* do not send a session ticket */
1661 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1663 /* Session-id reuse */
1664 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1667 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1668 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1669 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1675 * we now have the following setup.
1677 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1678 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1679 * compression - basically ignored right now
1680 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1681 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1682 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1683 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1686 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1687 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1688 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
, &al
)) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1690 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1698 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1700 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1702 * callback indicates further work to be done
1704 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1707 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1709 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1710 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1712 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1714 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1717 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1724 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1726 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1727 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1731 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1733 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1737 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1738 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
1739 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
1741 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1742 * tls_process_client_hello()
1744 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1750 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1751 * back in the server hello:
1752 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1753 * we send back the old session ID.
1754 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1755 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1756 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1757 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1759 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1760 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1761 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1762 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1765 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1766 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1768 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1770 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1771 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1776 /* set up the compression method */
1777 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1780 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1783 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1786 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1787 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
1788 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
1789 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1790 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
1791 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
)
1792 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1799 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1803 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1805 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1806 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1807 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1814 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1817 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1820 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1821 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
1825 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1826 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
1829 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1830 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
1832 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1837 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1842 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1844 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1846 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1847 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1849 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1851 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1852 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1854 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1857 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1858 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1859 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1860 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1863 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1866 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1869 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1871 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1872 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1873 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1876 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1881 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
1882 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1884 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1887 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1888 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
1889 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1891 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1894 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1900 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
1902 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1907 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1909 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1912 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
1913 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1917 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1920 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1926 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1927 nid
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
1928 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
1929 if (curve_id
== 0) {
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1931 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1934 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
1935 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1936 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1941 /* Encode the public key. */
1942 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
1944 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1950 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1951 * can set these to NULLs
1958 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1960 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1961 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1962 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1963 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1965 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1968 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1969 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1970 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1971 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1975 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1977 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1981 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1982 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1983 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1985 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1993 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1994 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
1995 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1998 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1999 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2001 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2002 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2011 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2012 unsigned char *binval
;
2015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2016 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2017 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2020 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2030 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2031 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2034 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2035 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2038 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2040 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2043 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2047 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2048 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2054 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2058 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2060 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2061 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2062 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2065 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2066 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2067 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2068 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2073 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2074 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2081 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2082 * points to the space at the end.
2085 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
2086 unsigned int siglen
;
2088 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2089 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2094 /* send signature algorithm */
2095 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2096 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
2097 /* Should never happen */
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2104 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2107 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2108 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2109 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2112 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
),
2114 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
2115 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2116 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2117 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2118 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2119 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2121 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, pkey
) <= 0
2122 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2123 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2129 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2130 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2132 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2137 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2140 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2143 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2146 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2148 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2152 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2155 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2157 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2158 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2159 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
)
2160 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2165 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2166 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2167 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2168 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2169 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2170 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2172 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2177 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2178 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2183 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2185 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2186 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2187 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2191 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2192 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2194 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2201 /* else no CA names */
2203 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2208 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2212 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2219 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2221 PACKET psk_identity
;
2223 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2224 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2228 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2229 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2233 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2234 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2239 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2240 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2245 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2248 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2249 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2252 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2254 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2256 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2258 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2262 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2263 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2264 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2266 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2267 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2272 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2276 /* Should never happen */
2277 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2283 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2286 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2288 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2289 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2290 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2292 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2295 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2297 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2302 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2303 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2304 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2307 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2308 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2315 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2316 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2317 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2318 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2320 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2321 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2326 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2327 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2328 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2334 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2335 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2336 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2337 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2338 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2341 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2345 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2346 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2348 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2349 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2350 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2351 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2352 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2355 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2358 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2359 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2360 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2362 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2363 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2368 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2369 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2370 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2371 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2372 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2374 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2377 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2378 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2379 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2380 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2381 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2382 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2385 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2386 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2388 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2389 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2392 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2393 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2394 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2395 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2396 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2397 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2400 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2401 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2402 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2403 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2405 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2406 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2407 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2411 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2412 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2414 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2417 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2418 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2419 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2420 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2422 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2423 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2424 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2425 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2426 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2429 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2430 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2431 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2438 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2441 /* Should never happen */
2442 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2448 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2451 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2455 const unsigned char *data
;
2456 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2460 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2462 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2465 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2467 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2472 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2473 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2477 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2478 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2479 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2483 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2484 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2488 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2489 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2491 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2493 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2498 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2499 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2505 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2506 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2508 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2511 /* Should never happen */
2512 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2518 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2521 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2522 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2525 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2526 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2527 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2532 const unsigned char *data
;
2535 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2536 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2539 /* Get encoded point length */
2540 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2541 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2542 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2546 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2547 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2551 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2552 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2558 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2559 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2565 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2566 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2568 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2572 /* Should never happen */
2573 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2579 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2583 const unsigned char *data
;
2585 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2586 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2587 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2591 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2595 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2596 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2600 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2601 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2602 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2607 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2614 /* Should never happen */
2615 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2621 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2624 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2625 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2626 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2627 const unsigned char *start
;
2628 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2629 unsigned long alg_a
;
2632 size_t sess_key_len
;
2633 const unsigned char *data
;
2636 /* Get our certificate private key */
2637 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2638 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2640 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2642 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2644 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2647 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2649 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2650 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2653 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2654 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2655 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2659 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2660 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2665 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2666 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2667 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2668 * client certificate for authorization only.
2670 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2671 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2672 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2675 /* Decrypt session key */
2676 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2677 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2678 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2682 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2683 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2684 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2685 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2686 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2692 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2693 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2694 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2698 /* Generate master secret */
2699 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2700 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2701 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2705 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2706 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2707 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2708 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2712 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2715 /* Should never happen */
2716 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2722 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2725 unsigned long alg_k
;
2727 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2729 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2730 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2733 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2734 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2735 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2736 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2738 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2741 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2742 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2743 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2747 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2748 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2750 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2751 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2753 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2754 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2756 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2757 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2759 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2760 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2763 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2765 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2769 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2774 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2775 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2777 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2778 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2781 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2784 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2785 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2786 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2787 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2789 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2792 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2793 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2795 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2796 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2797 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
2799 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2803 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2804 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2809 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2811 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2812 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2814 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2815 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2816 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2817 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2818 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2819 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2820 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2821 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2824 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2828 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
2830 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2831 * the handshake_buffer
2833 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2834 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2837 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2839 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2842 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2846 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2847 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2849 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2850 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2855 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2858 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2860 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2861 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2863 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2865 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2869 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2873 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2877 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2881 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2882 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
2883 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2885 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2887 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2888 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2892 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2894 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2895 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2898 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
2899 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2904 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2907 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2908 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2911 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2913 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2915 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2916 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2920 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2923 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2924 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2926 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2928 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2933 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2935 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2939 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2940 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2941 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2943 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2946 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2948 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2952 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2953 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2960 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2962 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2963 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2965 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2970 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2971 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2972 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2973 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2974 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2976 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2979 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
2985 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2986 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2987 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2988 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2990 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2994 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2995 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3000 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3003 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3004 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3006 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3007 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3008 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
3009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3010 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
3015 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3017 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3019 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3020 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3021 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3024 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3029 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3030 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3031 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3032 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3037 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
3038 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3039 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3040 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3042 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3046 certstart
= certbytes
;
3047 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3052 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3053 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3055 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3058 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3065 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3066 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3067 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3068 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3070 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3073 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3074 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3075 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3077 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3078 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3081 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3082 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3087 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3089 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3091 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3096 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3099 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3101 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3103 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3108 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3109 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3110 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3112 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3113 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3116 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3119 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3120 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3126 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3127 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3130 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3134 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3135 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3138 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3142 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3146 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3152 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3160 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3162 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3163 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3164 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3165 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3166 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3167 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3170 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3171 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3172 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3174 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3176 /* get session encoding length */
3177 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3179 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3182 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3183 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3186 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3188 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3192 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3193 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3194 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3200 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3204 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3207 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3210 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3212 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3213 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3214 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3218 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3219 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3222 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3225 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3226 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3228 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3229 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3230 int ret
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3235 /* Put timeout and length */
3236 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3237 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3244 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3249 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3251 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3253 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3254 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3256 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3257 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3259 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
3260 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
3261 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3263 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
3264 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
));
3268 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3269 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3270 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3273 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3274 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3275 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3276 /* Output key name */
3277 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3279 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3280 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3282 /* Encrypt session data */
3283 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3284 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3285 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3286 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3287 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3288 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3289 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3290 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3291 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3292 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3293 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3294 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3295 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3296 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3297 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3298 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3299 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3303 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3304 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3310 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3311 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3312 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3316 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->tlsext_status_type
)
3319 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
,
3320 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3331 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3332 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3336 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3337 size_t next_proto_len
;
3340 * The payload looks like:
3342 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3343 * uint8 padding_len;
3344 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3346 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3347 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3353 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3354 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3358 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3360 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3362 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3367 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3369 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Zero length encrypted extensions message for now */
3370 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3379 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3381 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3382 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3383 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3384 int sslv2format
, int *al
)
3386 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3387 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3389 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3390 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3392 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3394 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3396 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3398 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3402 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3404 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3405 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3409 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3410 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3413 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3418 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3421 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3422 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3423 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3427 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3429 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3430 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3431 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3433 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3436 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3437 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3438 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3439 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3440 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3442 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3443 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3446 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3450 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3451 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3452 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3454 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3455 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3458 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3460 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3461 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3467 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3468 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3470 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3472 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3477 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3478 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3487 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3488 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);