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1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27
28 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29
30 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
31
32 /*
33 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
34 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
35 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
36 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 *
38 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
39 * (transition not allowed)
40 */
41 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 {
43 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
44
45 /*
46 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
47 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
48 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 */
50 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 default:
52 break;
53
54 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
55 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
56 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
57 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 return 1;
59 }
60 break;
61 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
62 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
63 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
64 return 1;
65 }
66 break;
67 }
68 /* Fall through */
69
70 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
71 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
72 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
73 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
74 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 return 1;
76 }
77 } else {
78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
80 return 1;
81 }
82 }
83 break;
84
85 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
86 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 return 1;
90 }
91 } else {
92 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
93 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
94 return 1;
95 }
96 }
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
102 return 1;
103 }
104 break;
105
106 case TLS_ST_OK:
107 /*
108 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
109 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 */
111 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
112 break;
113
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
115 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
117 return 1;
118 }
119
120 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
121 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 break;
125 }
126
127 /* No valid transition found */
128 return 0;
129 }
130
131 /*
132 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
133 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
134 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
135 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 *
137 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
138 * (transition not allowed)
139 */
140 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 {
142 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143
144 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
145 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
146 goto err;
147 return 1;
148 }
149
150 switch (st->hand_state) {
151 default:
152 break;
153
154 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
155 case TLS_ST_OK:
156 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
159 return 1;
160 }
161 break;
162
163 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 /*
165 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
166 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * OR
168 * 2) If we did request one then
169 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * AND
171 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
172 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 */
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
175 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
176 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
177 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
178 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 /*
180 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
181 * not going to accept it because we require a client
182 * cert.
183 */
184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
185 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
186 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
187 return 0;
188 }
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 } else {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
194 return 1;
195 }
196 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
199 return 1;
200 }
201 }
202 break;
203
204 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
205 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
206 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 return 1;
208 }
209 break;
210
211 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 /*
213 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
214 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
215 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
216 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
217 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
218 * set.
219 */
220 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 /*
223 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
224 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
225 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
226 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 */
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 } else {
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
233 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
234 return 1;
235 }
236 }
237 break;
238
239 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 break;
245
246 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
248 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
251 return 1;
252 }
253 } else {
254 #endif
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
257 return 1;
258 }
259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
260 }
261 #endif
262 break;
263
264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
265 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
268 return 1;
269 }
270 break;
271 #endif
272
273 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 return 1;
277 }
278 break;
279 }
280
281 err:
282 /* No valid transition found */
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
284 BIO *rbio;
285
286 /*
287 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
288 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
289 */
290 s->init_num = 0;
291 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
292 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
293 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
294 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
295 return 0;
296 }
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
298 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
299 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 return 0;
301 }
302
303 /*
304 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 *
306 * Valid return values are:
307 * 1: Yes
308 * 0: No
309 */
310 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 {
312 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
313
314 /*
315 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
316 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
317 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
318 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
319 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
320 * key exchange.
321 */
322 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 /*
324 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
325 * provided
326 */
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
328 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
329 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
330 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
331 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
332 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #endif
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
335 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
336 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
337 #endif
338 ) {
339 return 1;
340 }
341
342 return 0;
343 }
344
345 /*
346 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 *
348 * Valid return values are:
349 * 1: Yes
350 * 0: No
351 */
352 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
353 {
354 if (
355 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
356 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 /*
358 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
359 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 */
361 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
362 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 /*
364 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
365 * a second time:
366 */
367 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
368 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 /*
370 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
371 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
372 * RFC 2246):
373 */
374 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 /*
376 * ... except when the application insists on
377 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
378 * this for SSL 3)
379 */
380 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
381 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
382 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 /*
384 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
385 * are omitted
386 */
387 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
388 return 1;
389 }
390
391 return 0;
392 }
393
394 /*
395 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
396 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
397 * client.
398 */
399 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 {
401 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
402
403 /*
404 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
405 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
406 */
407
408 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 default:
410 /* Shouldn't happen */
411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
412 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
414 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
415
416 case TLS_ST_OK:
417 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 }
421 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 }
425 /* Try to read from the client instead */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427
428 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431
432 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
433 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
434 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
436 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 else
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
443 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 else
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448
449 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 if (s->hit)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
452 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 else
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458
459 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
460 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
461 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 } else {
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 }
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467
468 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471
472 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475
476 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479
480 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
481 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482
483 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 /*
485 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
486 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
487 * immediately.
488 */
489 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
490 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
491 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 /*
493 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
494 * handshake at this point.
495 */
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 }
499 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 else
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504
505 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
506 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509
510 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
511 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
512 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
513 * been configured for.
514 */
515 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
516 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 }
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 }
521 }
522
523 /*
524 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
525 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
526 */
527 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
528 {
529 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
530
531 /*
532 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
533 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
534 */
535
536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
537 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
538
539 switch (st->hand_state) {
540 default:
541 /* Shouldn't happen */
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
546
547 case TLS_ST_OK:
548 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
549 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
551 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 }
554 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
555 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
556 /* SSLfatal() already called */
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
558 }
559 /* Fall through */
560
561 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
562 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
564
565 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568
569 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
570 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
571 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
572 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
573 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
574 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 } else {
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
579 }
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581
582 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
583 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
584
585 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
586 if (s->hit) {
587 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
589 else
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
591 } else {
592 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
593 /* normal PSK or SRP */
594 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
595 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
597 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
599 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
601 } else {
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
603 }
604 }
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606
607 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
608 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 }
612 /* Fall through */
613
614 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
615 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 }
619 /* Fall through */
620
621 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
622 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 }
626 /* Fall through */
627
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631
632 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
633 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634
635 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
636 if (s->hit) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
641 } else {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
643 }
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649
650 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653
654 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
655 if (s->hit) {
656 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
657 }
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 }
661 }
662
663 /*
664 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
665 * the server to the client.
666 */
667 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
668 {
669 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
670
671 switch (st->hand_state) {
672 default:
673 /* No pre work to be done */
674 break;
675
676 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
677 s->shutdown = 0;
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
679 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
680 break;
681
682 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
683 s->shutdown = 0;
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
686 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
687 st->use_timer = 0;
688 }
689 break;
690
691 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 /*
694 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
695 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
696 */
697 st->use_timer = 1;
698 }
699 break;
700
701 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
706 }
707 #endif
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
709
710 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
712 /*
713 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
714 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
715 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
716 *
717 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
718 */
719 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
720 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
721 /*
722 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
723 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
724 */
725 st->use_timer = 0;
726 }
727 break;
728
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
730 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
731 break;
732 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 return WORK_ERROR;
736 }
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 /*
739 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
740 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
741 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
742 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
743 */
744 st->use_timer = 0;
745 }
746 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
747
748 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
749 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
750 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
752 /* Fall through */
753
754 case TLS_ST_OK:
755 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
756 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
757 }
758
759 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 }
761
762 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
763 {
764 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
765 #if defined(EPIPE)
766 case EPIPE:
767 return 1;
768 #endif
769 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
770 case ECONNRESET:
771 return 1;
772 #endif
773 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
774 case WSAECONNRESET:
775 return 1;
776 #endif
777 default:
778 return 0;
779 }
780 }
781
782 /*
783 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
784 * server to the client.
785 */
786 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
787 {
788 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
789
790 s->init_num = 0;
791
792 switch (st->hand_state) {
793 default:
794 /* No post work to be done */
795 break;
796
797 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
798 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
799 return WORK_MORE_A;
800 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
802 return WORK_ERROR;
803 }
804 break;
805
806 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
807 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
808 return WORK_MORE_A;
809 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
810 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
812 return WORK_ERROR;
813 }
814 /*
815 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
816 * treat like it was the first packet
817 */
818 s->first_packet = 1;
819 break;
820
821 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
822 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
823 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
824 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
825 return WORK_MORE_A;
826 break;
827 }
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
829 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
830 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
831 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
832 size_t labellen;
833
834 /*
835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
836 * SCTP used.
837 */
838 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
840
841 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
842 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
843 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
844 labellen += 1;
845
846 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
847 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
848 labellen, NULL, 0,
849 0) <= 0) {
850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
851 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 return WORK_ERROR;
854 }
855
856 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
857 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
858 }
859 #endif
860 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
861 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
862 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
863 break;
864 /* Fall through */
865
866 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
867 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
868 if (!statem_flush(s))
869 return WORK_MORE_A;
870 break;
871 }
872
873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
874 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
875 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
876 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
878 return WORK_ERROR;
879 }
880
881 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
882 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
883 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
885 return WORK_ERROR;
886 }
887 /*
888 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
889 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
890 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
891 */
892 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
893 break;
894 }
895
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
897 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
898 /*
899 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
900 * no SCTP used.
901 */
902 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
903 0, NULL);
904 }
905 #endif
906 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
907 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
908 {
909 /* SSLfatal() already called */
910 return WORK_ERROR;
911 }
912
913 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
914 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
918 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
919 return WORK_MORE_A;
920 break;
921
922 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
923 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
924 return WORK_MORE_A;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
926 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
927 /*
928 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
929 * no SCTP used.
930 */
931 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
932 0, NULL);
933 }
934 #endif
935 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
936 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
937 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
938 &s->session->master_key_length)
939 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
940 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
942 return WORK_ERROR;
943 }
944 break;
945
946 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
947 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
948 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
949 return WORK_MORE_A;
950 }
951 break;
952
953 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
954 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
955 return WORK_MORE_A;
956 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
957 /* SSLfatal() already called */
958 return WORK_ERROR;
959 }
960 break;
961
962 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
963 clear_sys_error();
964 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
965 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
966 && conn_is_closed()) {
967 /*
968 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
969 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
970 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
971 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
972 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
973 */
974 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
975 break;
976 }
977
978 return WORK_MORE_A;
979 }
980 break;
981 }
982
983 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
984 }
985
986 /*
987 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
988 * server
989 *
990 * Valid return values are:
991 * 1: Success
992 * 0: Error
993 */
994 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
995 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
996 {
997 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
998
999 switch (st->hand_state) {
1000 default:
1001 /* Shouldn't happen */
1002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1003 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1004 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1005 return 0;
1006
1007 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1008 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1009 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1010 else
1011 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1012 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1013 break;
1014
1015 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1016 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1017 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1018 break;
1019
1020 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1021 /* No construction function needed */
1022 *confunc = NULL;
1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1024 break;
1025
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1029 break;
1030
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1034 break;
1035
1036 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1037 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1039 break;
1040
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1043 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1045 break;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1060 break;
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1065 break;
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1070 break;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1073 *confunc = NULL;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1075 break;
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1080 break;
1081
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1085 break;
1086 }
1087
1088 return 1;
1089 }
1090
1091 /*
1092 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1093 * calculated as follows:
1094 *
1095 * 2 + # client_version
1096 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1097 * 1 + # length of session_id
1098 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1099 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1100 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1101 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1102 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1103 * 2 + # length of extensions
1104 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1105 */
1106 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1107
1108 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1109 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1110
1111 /*
1112 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1113 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1114 */
1115 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1116 {
1117 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1118
1119 switch (st->hand_state) {
1120 default:
1121 /* Shouldn't happen */
1122 return 0;
1123
1124 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1125 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1126
1127 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1128 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1129
1130 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1131 return s->max_cert_list;
1132
1133 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1134 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1135
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1137 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1138
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1140 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1141 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1142 #endif
1143
1144 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1145 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1146
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1148 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1149
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1151 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1152 }
1153 }
1154
1155 /*
1156 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1157 */
1158 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1159 {
1160 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1161
1162 switch (st->hand_state) {
1163 default:
1164 /* Shouldn't happen */
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1166 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1169
1170 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1171 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1172
1173 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1174 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1175
1176 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1177 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1178
1179 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1180 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1181
1182 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1183 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1184
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1186 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1187 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1188 #endif
1189
1190 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1191 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1192
1193 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1194 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1195
1196 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1197 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1198
1199 }
1200 }
1201
1202 /*
1203 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1204 * from the client
1205 */
1206 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1207 {
1208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1209
1210 switch (st->hand_state) {
1211 default:
1212 /* Shouldn't happen */
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1214 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 return WORK_ERROR;
1217
1218 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1219 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1220
1221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1222 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1223 }
1224 }
1225
1226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1227 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1228 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1229 {
1230 int ret;
1231 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1232
1233 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1234 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1235 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1236 /*
1237 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1238 * login name
1239 */
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1241 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1242 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1243 return -1;
1244 } else {
1245 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1246 if (ret < 0)
1247 return 0;
1248 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1249 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1250 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1251 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1252 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1253 return -1;
1254 }
1255 }
1256 }
1257 return 1;
1258 }
1259 #endif
1260
1261 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1262 size_t cookie_len)
1263 {
1264 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1265 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1266 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1267 return 0;
1268
1269 return 1;
1270 }
1271
1272 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1273 {
1274 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1275 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1276 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1277 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1278 cookie_leni > 255) {
1279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1280 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1281 return 0;
1282 }
1283 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1284
1285 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1286 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 return 0;
1290 }
1291
1292 return 1;
1293 }
1294
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1296 /*-
1297 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1298 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1299 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1300 * SNI,
1301 * elliptic_curves
1302 * ec_point_formats
1303 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1304 *
1305 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1306 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1307 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1308 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1309 */
1310 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1311 {
1312 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1313 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1314 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1315 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1316 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1317 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1318 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1319
1320 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1321 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1322 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1323 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1324 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1325 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1326 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1327 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1328 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1329 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1330 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1331 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1332 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1333 };
1334 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1335 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1336 unsigned int type;
1337 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1338 size_t ext_len;
1339
1340 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1341
1342 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1343 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1344 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1345 return;
1346 }
1347
1348 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1349 return;
1350
1351 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1352 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1353
1354 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1355 ext_len);
1356 }
1357 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1358
1359 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1360 {
1361 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1362 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1363 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1364 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1365
1366 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1367 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1368 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 goto err;
1372 }
1373 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1374 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1375 && (s->options
1376 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1377 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1379 }
1380 s->renegotiate = 1;
1381 s->new_session = 1;
1382 }
1383
1384 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1385 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 goto err;
1389 }
1390
1391 /*
1392 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1393 */
1394 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1395 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1396
1397 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1398 unsigned int mt;
1399
1400 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1401 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1403 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1404 goto err;
1405 }
1406
1407 /*-
1408 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1409 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1410 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1411 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1412 * Byte Content
1413 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1414 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1415 * 3-4 version
1416 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1417 * 7-8 session_id_length
1418 * 9-10 challenge_length
1419 * ... ...
1420 */
1421
1422 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1423 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1424 /*
1425 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1426 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1427 * in the first place
1428 */
1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1430 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 goto err;
1432 }
1433 }
1434
1435 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1438 goto err;
1439 }
1440
1441 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1442 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1443 /*
1444 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1445 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1446 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1447 */
1448 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1449 PACKET challenge;
1450
1451 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1452 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1453 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1456 goto err;
1457 }
1458
1459 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1462 goto err;
1463 }
1464
1465 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1466 ciphersuite_len)
1467 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1468 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1469 /* No extensions. */
1470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1473 goto err;
1474 }
1475 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1476
1477 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1478 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1479 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1480 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1481 */
1482 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1484 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1485 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1486 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1487 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1488 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1489 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1492 goto err;
1493 }
1494
1495 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1496 } else {
1497 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1498 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1499 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1500 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1501 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1502 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1505 goto err;
1506 }
1507
1508 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1509 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1511 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1512 goto err;
1513 }
1514 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1515 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1516 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 goto err;
1520 }
1521 /*
1522 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1523 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1524 * So check cookie length...
1525 */
1526 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1527 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1528 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1529 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1530 }
1531 }
1532 }
1533
1534 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1536 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1537 goto err;
1538 }
1539
1540 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1542 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1543 goto err;
1544 }
1545
1546 /* Could be empty. */
1547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1548 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1549 } else {
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1551 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1554 goto err;
1555 }
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1560 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1561 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1568 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1569 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1570 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1571 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1573 goto err;
1574 }
1575 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1576
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1578
1579 err:
1580 if (clienthello != NULL)
1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1582 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1583
1584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1585 }
1586
1587 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1588 {
1589 unsigned int j;
1590 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 int protverr;
1592 size_t loop;
1593 unsigned long id;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1595 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1596 #endif
1597 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1600 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1601 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1602
1603 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1604 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1605 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1606 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1607 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1609 break;
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1611 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1612 return -1;
1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1614 default:
1615 SSLfatal(s, al,
1616 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1617 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1618 goto err;
1619 }
1620 }
1621
1622 /* Set up the client_random */
1623 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1624
1625 /* Choose the version */
1626
1627 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1628 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1629 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1630 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1631 /*
1632 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1633 * support it.
1634 */
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1636 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1637 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1638 goto err;
1639 }
1640 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1641 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1642 }
1643 /*
1644 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1645 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1646 */
1647 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1648 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1649 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1650 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1651 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1652 } else {
1653 protverr = 0;
1654 }
1655
1656 if (protverr) {
1657 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1658 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1659 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1660 }
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1662 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1663 goto err;
1664 }
1665
1666 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1667 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1669 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673
1674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1675 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1676 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1677 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1678 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1679 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1681 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1682 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1683 goto err;
1684 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1685 }
1686 /* default verification */
1687 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1688 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1689 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1691 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1692 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1693 goto err;
1694 }
1695 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1696 }
1697 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1698 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1699 if (protverr != 0) {
1700 s->version = s->client_version;
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1702 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705 }
1706 }
1707
1708 s->hit = 0;
1709
1710 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1711 clienthello->isv2) ||
1712 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1713 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1714 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1719 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1720 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1721 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1722 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1723 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1724 if (s->renegotiate) {
1725 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1727 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1728 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1729 goto err;
1730 }
1731 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1732 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1733 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1734 /*
1735 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1736 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1737 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1738 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1739 * an insecure downgrade.
1740 */
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1742 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1743 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1744 goto err;
1745 }
1746 }
1747 }
1748
1749 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1750 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1751 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1752 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1753
1754 if (cipher == NULL) {
1755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1756 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1757 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1758 goto err;
1759 }
1760 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1761 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1762 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1763 /*
1764 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1765 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1766 */
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1768 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1769 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1770 goto err;
1771 }
1772 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1773 }
1774
1775 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1776 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1777 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1778 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1780 goto err;
1781 }
1782
1783 /*
1784 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1785 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1786 *
1787 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1788 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1789 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1790 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1791 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1792 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1793 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1794 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1795 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1796 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1797 * ignored.
1798 */
1799 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1800 (s->new_session &&
1801 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1802 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1804 goto err;
1805 }
1806 } else {
1807 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1808 if (i == 1) {
1809 /* previous session */
1810 s->hit = 1;
1811 } else if (i == -1) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1813 goto err;
1814 } else {
1815 /* i == 0 */
1816 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820 }
1821 }
1822
1823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1824 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1825 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1826 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1827 }
1828
1829 /*
1830 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1831 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1832 */
1833 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1834 j = 0;
1835 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1836
1837 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1838 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1839 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1840 }
1841 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1842 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1843 if (trc_out != NULL)
1844 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1845 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1846 if (c->id == id) {
1847 j = 1;
1848 break;
1849 }
1850 }
1851 if (j == 0) {
1852 /*
1853 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1854 * to reuse it
1855 */
1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1858 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1859 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1860 goto err;
1861 }
1862 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1863 }
1864
1865 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1866 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1867 break;
1868 }
1869
1870 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1871 /* no compress */
1872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1874 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1875 goto err;
1876 }
1877
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1880 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1881 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1882
1883 /* TLS extensions */
1884 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1885 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1887 goto err;
1888 }
1889
1890 /*
1891 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1892 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1893 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1894 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1895 */
1896 {
1897 unsigned char *pos;
1898 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1899 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1901 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1903 goto err;
1904 }
1905 }
1906
1907 if (!s->hit
1908 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1909 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1910 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1911 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1912 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1913 /*
1914 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1915 * backwards compat reasons
1916 */
1917 int master_key_length;
1918
1919 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1920 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1921 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1922 &pref_cipher,
1923 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1924 && master_key_length > 0) {
1925 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1926 s->hit = 1;
1927 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1928 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1929
1930 ciphers = NULL;
1931
1932 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1933 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1934 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1935 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1936 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1939 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942
1943 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1944 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1945 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1946 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1947 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1948 }
1949 }
1950
1951 /*
1952 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1953 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1954 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1955 */
1956 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1957 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1958 /*
1959 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1960 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1961 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1962 */
1963 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1965 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1966 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1967 goto err;
1968 }
1969 }
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1971 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1972 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1973 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1974 unsigned int k;
1975 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1976 /* Can't disable compression */
1977 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1979 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1980 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1981 goto err;
1982 }
1983 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1984 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1985 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1986 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1987 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1988 break;
1989 }
1990 }
1991 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1993 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1994 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1995 goto err;
1996 }
1997 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1998 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1999 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2000 break;
2001 }
2002 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2004 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2005 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2006 goto err;
2007 }
2008 } else if (s->hit) {
2009 comp = NULL;
2010 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2011 /* See if we have a match */
2012 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2013 unsigned int o;
2014
2015 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2016 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2017 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2018 v = comp->id;
2019 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2020 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2021 done = 1;
2022 break;
2023 }
2024 }
2025 if (done)
2026 break;
2027 }
2028 if (done)
2029 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2030 else
2031 comp = NULL;
2032 }
2033 #else
2034 /*
2035 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2036 * using compression.
2037 */
2038 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2040 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2041 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2042 goto err;
2043 }
2044 #endif
2045
2046 /*
2047 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2048 */
2049
2050 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2051 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2052 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2053 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2055 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2056 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2057 goto err;
2058 }
2059 ciphers = NULL;
2060 }
2061
2062 if (!s->hit) {
2063 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2064 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2065 #else
2066 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2067 #endif
2068 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2069 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2070 goto err;
2071 }
2072 }
2073
2074 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2075 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2076 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2077 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2078 s->clienthello = NULL;
2079 return 1;
2080 err:
2081 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2082 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2083 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2084 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2085 s->clienthello = NULL;
2086
2087 return 0;
2088 }
2089
2090 /*
2091 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2092 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2093 */
2094 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2095 {
2096 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2097
2098 /*
2099 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2100 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2101 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2102 * influence which certificate is sent
2103 */
2104 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2105 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2106 int ret;
2107
2108 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2109 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2110 /*
2111 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2112 * et al can pick it up.
2113 */
2114 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2115 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2116 switch (ret) {
2117 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2118 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2119 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2120 break;
2121 /* status request response should be sent */
2122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2123 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2124 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2125 break;
2126 /* something bad happened */
2127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2128 default:
2129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2130 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2131 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2132 return 0;
2133 }
2134 }
2135 }
2136
2137 return 1;
2138 }
2139
2140 /*
2141 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2142 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2143 */
2144 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2145 {
2146 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2147 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2148
2149 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2150 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2151 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2152 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2153 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2154
2155 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2156 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2157 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2158 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2161 return 0;
2162 }
2163 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2165 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2166 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2167 #endif
2168
2169 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2170 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2171 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2172 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2173 selected_len) != 0) {
2174 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2175 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2176
2177 if (!s->hit) {
2178 /*
2179 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2180 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2181 * selected ALPN.
2182 */
2183 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2185 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2186 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2187 return 0;
2188 }
2189 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2190 selected_len);
2191 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2193 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2195 return 0;
2196 }
2197 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2198 }
2199 }
2200
2201 return 1;
2202 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2204 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2205 return 0;
2206 }
2207 /*
2208 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2209 * present.
2210 */
2211 }
2212
2213 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2214 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2215 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2216 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2217 }
2218
2219 return 1;
2220 }
2221
2222 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2223 {
2224 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2225
2226 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2227 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2228 if (rv == 0) {
2229 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2230 goto err;
2231 }
2232 if (rv < 0)
2233 return WORK_MORE_A;
2234 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2235 }
2236 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2237 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2238 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2239 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2240 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2241 if (rv == 0) {
2242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2243 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2244 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2245 goto err;
2246 }
2247 if (rv < 0) {
2248 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2249 return WORK_MORE_B;
2250 }
2251 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2252 }
2253
2254 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2255 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2256 cipher =
2257 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2258
2259 if (cipher == NULL) {
2260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2261 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2262 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2263 goto err;
2264 }
2265 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2266 }
2267 if (!s->hit) {
2268 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2269 /* SSLfatal already called */
2270 goto err;
2271 }
2272 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2273 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2274 s->session->not_resumable =
2275 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2276 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2277 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2278 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2279 /* do not send a session ticket */
2280 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2281 }
2282 } else {
2283 /* Session-id reuse */
2284 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2285 }
2286
2287 /*-
2288 * we now have the following setup.
2289 * client_random
2290 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2291 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2292 * compression - basically ignored right now
2293 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2294 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2295 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2296 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2297 */
2298
2299 /*
2300 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2301 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2302 */
2303 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2304 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2305 goto err;
2306 }
2307 /*
2308 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2309 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2310 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2311 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2312 */
2313 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2314 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2315 goto err;
2316 }
2317
2318 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2319 }
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2321 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2322 int ret;
2323 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2324 /*
2325 * callback indicates further work to be done
2326 */
2327 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2328 return WORK_MORE_C;
2329 }
2330 if (ret < 0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2332 goto err;
2333 }
2334 }
2335 #endif
2336
2337 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2338 err:
2339 return WORK_ERROR;
2340 }
2341
2342 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2343 {
2344 int compm;
2345 size_t sl, len;
2346 int version;
2347 unsigned char *session_id;
2348 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2349
2350 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2352 /*
2353 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2354 * tls_process_client_hello()
2355 */
2356 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2357 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2358 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2359 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 return 0;
2363 }
2364
2365 /*-
2366 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2367 * back in the server hello:
2368 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2369 * we send back the old session ID.
2370 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2371 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2372 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2373 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2374 * session ID.
2375 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2376 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2377 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2378 * regardless
2379 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2380 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2381 * to send back.
2382 */
2383 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2384 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2385 && !s->hit))
2386 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2387
2388 if (usetls13) {
2389 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2390 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2391 } else {
2392 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2393 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2394 }
2395
2396 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2398 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 return 0;
2400 }
2401
2402 /* set up the compression method */
2403 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2404 compm = 0;
2405 #else
2406 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2407 compm = 0;
2408 else
2409 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2410 #endif
2411
2412 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2413 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2414 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2416 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 return 0;
2418 }
2419
2420 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2421 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2422 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2423 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2424 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2425 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2426 NULL, 0)) {
2427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2428 return 0;
2429 }
2430
2431 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2432 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2433 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2434 s->session = NULL;
2435 s->hit = 0;
2436
2437 /*
2438 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2439 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2440 */
2441 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2443 return 0;
2444 }
2445 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2446 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2447 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2448 return 0;
2449 }
2450
2451 return 1;
2452 }
2453
2454 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2455 {
2456 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2457 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2459 return 0;
2460 }
2461 }
2462 return 1;
2463 }
2464
2465 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2466 {
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2468 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2469 #endif
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2471 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2472 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2473 int curve_id = 0;
2474 #endif
2475 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2476 int i;
2477 unsigned long type;
2478 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2479 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2480 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2481 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2482
2483 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2486 goto err;
2487 }
2488
2489 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2491 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2492 goto err;
2493 }
2494
2495 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2496
2497 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2499 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2500 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2501 } else
2502 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2504 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2505 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2506
2507 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2508 DH *dh;
2509
2510 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2511 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2512 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2513 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2514 DH_free(dhp);
2515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2516 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2518 goto err;
2519 }
2520 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2521 pkdhp = pkdh;
2522 } else {
2523 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2524 }
2525 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2526 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2527 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2528 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2530 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2532 goto err;
2533 }
2534 pkdhp = pkdh;
2535 }
2536 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2543 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2547 goto err;
2548 }
2549 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2551 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2553 goto err;
2554 }
2555
2556 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2557 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2559 goto err;
2560 }
2561
2562 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2563 if (dh == NULL) {
2564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2565 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2567 goto err;
2568 }
2569
2570 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2571 pkdh = NULL;
2572
2573 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2574 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2575 } else
2576 #endif
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2578 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2579
2580 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 goto err;
2585 }
2586
2587 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2588 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2589 if (curve_id == 0) {
2590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2591 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2592 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2593 goto err;
2594 }
2595 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2596 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2597 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2598 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2599 goto err;
2600 }
2601
2602 /* Encode the public key. */
2603 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2604 &encodedPoint);
2605 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2607 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2608 goto err;
2609 }
2610
2611 /*
2612 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2613 * can set these to NULLs
2614 */
2615 r[0] = NULL;
2616 r[1] = NULL;
2617 r[2] = NULL;
2618 r[3] = NULL;
2619 } else
2620 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2622 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2623 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2624 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2625 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2627 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2629 goto err;
2630 }
2631 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2632 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2633 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2634 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2635 } else
2636 #endif
2637 {
2638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2639 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2641 goto err;
2642 }
2643
2644 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2645 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2646 lu = NULL;
2647 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2649 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2650 goto err;
2651 }
2652
2653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2654 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2655 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2656 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2657
2658 /*
2659 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2660 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2661 */
2662 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2663 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2664 len)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2667 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2668 goto err;
2669 }
2670 }
2671 #endif
2672
2673 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2674 unsigned char *binval;
2675 int res;
2676
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2678 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2679 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2680 } else
2681 #endif
2682 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2683
2684 if (!res) {
2685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2686 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2687 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2688 goto err;
2689 }
2690
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2692 /*-
2693 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2694 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2695 * as the prime
2696 */
2697 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2698 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2699
2700 if (len > 0) {
2701 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2703 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2705 goto err;
2706 }
2707 memset(binval, 0, len);
2708 }
2709 }
2710 #endif
2711 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2712 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2714 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 goto err;
2717 }
2718
2719 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2720 }
2721
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2723 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2724 /*
2725 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2726 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2727 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2728 * point itself
2729 */
2730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2731 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2732 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2733 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2735 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2736 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 goto err;
2738 }
2739 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2740 encodedPoint = NULL;
2741 }
2742 #endif
2743
2744 /* not anonymous */
2745 if (lu != NULL) {
2746 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2747 const EVP_MD *md;
2748 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2749 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2750 int rv;
2751
2752 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2753 /* Should never happen */
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2755 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2757 goto err;
2758 }
2759 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2760 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2762 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2764 goto err;
2765 }
2766 /* send signature algorithm */
2767 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2769 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 goto err;
2772 }
2773 /*
2774 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2775 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2776 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2777 * afterwards.
2778 */
2779 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2780 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2781 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2783 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2785 goto err;
2786 }
2787 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2788 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2789 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2791 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2793 goto err;
2794 }
2795 }
2796 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2797 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2798 paramlen);
2799 if (tbslen == 0) {
2800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2804 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2805 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2806 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2808 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2810 goto err;
2811 }
2812 }
2813
2814 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2815 return 1;
2816 err:
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2818 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2819 #endif
2820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2821 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2822 #endif
2823 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2824 return 0;
2825 }
2826
2827 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2828 {
2829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2830 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2831 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2832 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2833 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2834 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2835 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2836 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2838 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 return 0;
2841 }
2842 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2843 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2845 return 0;
2846 }
2847 } else {
2848 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2850 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2852 return 0;
2853 }
2854 }
2855
2856 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2857 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2858 0)) {
2859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2860 return 0;
2861 }
2862 goto done;
2863 }
2864
2865 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2866 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2867 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2869 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 return 0;
2871 }
2872
2873 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2874 const uint16_t *psigs;
2875 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2876
2877 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2878 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2879 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2880 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2882 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 return 0;
2885 }
2886 }
2887
2888 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2889 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2890 return 0;
2891 }
2892
2893 done:
2894 s->certreqs_sent++;
2895 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2896 return 1;
2897 }
2898
2899 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2900 {
2901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2902 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2903 size_t psklen;
2904 PACKET psk_identity;
2905
2906 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2908 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2909 return 0;
2910 }
2911 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2913 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2914 return 0;
2915 }
2916 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2918 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2919 return 0;
2920 }
2921
2922 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 return 0;
2926 }
2927
2928 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2929 psk, sizeof(psk));
2930
2931 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2934 return 0;
2935 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2936 /*
2937 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2938 */
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2940 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2941 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2942 return 0;
2943 }
2944
2945 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2946 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2947 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2948
2949 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2951 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 return 0;
2953 }
2954
2955 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2956
2957 return 1;
2958 #else
2959 /* Should never happen */
2960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2961 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2962 return 0;
2963 #endif
2964 }
2965
2966 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2967 {
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2969 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2970 int decrypt_len;
2971 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2972 size_t j, padding_len;
2973 PACKET enc_premaster;
2974 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2975 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2976 int ret = 0;
2977
2978 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2979 if (rsa == NULL) {
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2981 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2982 return 0;
2983 }
2984
2985 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2986 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2987 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2988 } else {
2989 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2990 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2992 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2993 return 0;
2994 }
2995 }
2996
2997 /*
2998 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2999 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
3000 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
3001 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
3002 */
3003 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3005 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
3006 return 0;
3007 }
3008
3009 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3010 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3012 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3013 return 0;
3014 }
3015
3016 /*
3017 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3018 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3019 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3020 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3021 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3022 */
3023
3024 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3025 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 goto err;
3029 }
3030
3031 /*
3032 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3033 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3034 */
3035 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3036 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3037 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3038 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3039 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3041 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3042 goto err;
3043 }
3044
3045 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3046
3047 /*
3048 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3049 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3050 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3051 */
3052 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3054 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3055 goto err;
3056 }
3057
3058 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3059 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3060 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3061 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3062 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3063 }
3064 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3065
3066 /*
3067 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3068 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3069 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3070 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3071 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3072 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3073 */
3074 version_good =
3075 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3076 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3077 version_good &=
3078 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3079 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3080
3081 /*
3082 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3083 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3084 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3085 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3086 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3087 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3088 * clients.
3089 */
3090 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3091 unsigned char workaround_good;
3092 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3093 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3094 workaround_good &=
3095 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3096 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3097 version_good |= workaround_good;
3098 }
3099
3100 /*
3101 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3102 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3103 */
3104 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3105
3106 /*
3107 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3108 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3109 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3110 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3111 */
3112 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3113 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3114 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3115 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3116 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3117 }
3118
3119 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3120 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3121 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3122 goto err;
3123 }
3124
3125 ret = 1;
3126 err:
3127 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3128 return ret;
3129 #else
3130 /* Should never happen */
3131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 return 0;
3134 #endif
3135 }
3136
3137 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3138 {
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3140 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3141 DH *cdh;
3142 unsigned int i;
3143 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3144 const unsigned char *data;
3145 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3146 int ret = 0;
3147
3148 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3150 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3151 goto err;
3152 }
3153 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3154 if (skey == NULL) {
3155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3156 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3157 goto err;
3158 }
3159
3160 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3162 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3163 goto err;
3164 }
3165 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3166 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3168 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3169 goto err;
3170 }
3171 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3172 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3174 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3175 goto err;
3176 }
3177
3178 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3179 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3180 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 BN_free(pub_key);
3184 goto err;
3185 }
3186
3187 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3189 goto err;
3190 }
3191
3192 ret = 1;
3193 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3194 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3195 err:
3196 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3197 return ret;
3198 #else
3199 /* Should never happen */
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 return 0;
3203 #endif
3204 }
3205
3206 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3207 {
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3209 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3210 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3211 int ret = 0;
3212
3213 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3214 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3216 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3217 goto err;
3218 } else {
3219 unsigned int i;
3220 const unsigned char *data;
3221
3222 /*
3223 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3224 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3225 */
3226
3227 /* Get encoded point length */
3228 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3229 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3231 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3232 goto err;
3233 }
3234 if (skey == NULL) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3236 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3237 goto err;
3238 }
3239
3240 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3241 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3243 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3244 goto err;
3245 }
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3248 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3249 goto err;
3250 }
3251 }
3252
3253 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3255 goto err;
3256 }
3257
3258 ret = 1;
3259 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3260 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3261 err:
3262 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3263
3264 return ret;
3265 #else
3266 /* Should never happen */
3267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3268 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3269 return 0;
3270 #endif
3271 }
3272
3273 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3274 {
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3276 unsigned int i;
3277 const unsigned char *data;
3278
3279 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3280 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3282 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3283 return 0;
3284 }
3285 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3287 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3288 return 0;
3289 }
3290 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3292 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3293 return 0;
3294 }
3295 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3296 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3297 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3299 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3300 return 0;
3301 }
3302
3303 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3304 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3305 return 0;
3306 }
3307
3308 return 1;
3309 #else
3310 /* Should never happen */
3311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 return 0;
3314 #endif
3315 }
3316
3317 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3318 {
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3320 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3321 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3322 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3323 const unsigned char *start;
3324 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3325 unsigned long alg_a;
3326 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3327 int ret = 0;
3328 PACKET encdata;
3329
3330 /* Get our certificate private key */
3331 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3332 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3333 /*
3334 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3335 */
3336 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3337 if (pk == NULL) {
3338 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3339 }
3340 if (pk == NULL) {
3341 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3342 }
3343 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3344 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3345 }
3346
3347 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3348 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3350 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3351 return 0;
3352 }
3353 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 return 0;
3357 }
3358 /*
3359 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3360 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3361 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3362 * client certificate for authorization only.
3363 */
3364 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3365 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3366 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3367 ERR_clear_error();
3368 }
3369 /* Decrypt session key */
3370 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3371 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3372 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3374 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3375 goto err;
3376 }
3377 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3378 /*
3379 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3380 * isn't supported.
3381 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3382 */
3383 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3385 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3386 goto err;
3387 }
3388 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3389 /*
3390 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3391 * support it
3392 */
3393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3394 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3395 goto err;
3396 } /* else short form length */
3397
3398 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3400 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3401 goto err;
3402 }
3403 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3404 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3405
3406 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3407 inlen) <= 0) {
3408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3409 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3410 goto err;
3411 }
3412 /* Generate master secret */
3413 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3414 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3415 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3416 goto err;
3417 }
3418 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3419 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3420 NULL) > 0)
3421 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3422
3423 ret = 1;
3424 err:
3425 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3426 return ret;
3427 #else
3428 /* Should never happen */
3429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3430 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3431 return 0;
3432 #endif
3433 }
3434
3435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3436 {
3437 unsigned long alg_k;
3438
3439 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3440
3441 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3442 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3443 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3444 goto err;
3445 }
3446
3447 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3448 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3449 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3451 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3452 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3453 goto err;
3454 }
3455 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3456 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3458 goto err;
3459 }
3460 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3461 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3463 goto err;
3464 }
3465 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3466 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3468 goto err;
3469 }
3470 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3471 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3473 goto err;
3474 }
3475 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3476 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3478 goto err;
3479 }
3480 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3481 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3482 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3483 goto err;
3484 }
3485 } else {
3486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3487 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3488 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3489 goto err;
3490 }
3491
3492 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3493 err:
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3495 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3496 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3497 #endif
3498 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3499 }
3500
3501 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3502 {
3503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3504 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3506 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3507 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3508 size_t labellen;
3509 /*
3510 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3511 * used.
3512 */
3513 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3514 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3515
3516 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3517 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3518 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3519 labellen += 1;
3520
3521 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3522 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3523 labellen, NULL, 0,
3524 0) <= 0) {
3525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3526 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3527 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3528 return WORK_ERROR;
3529 }
3530
3531 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3532 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3533 }
3534 }
3535 #endif
3536
3537 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3538 /*
3539 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3540 * the handshake_buffer
3541 */
3542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3544 return WORK_ERROR;
3545 }
3546 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3547 } else {
3548 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3550 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3551 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 return WORK_ERROR;
3553 }
3554 /*
3555 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3556 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3557 */
3558 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3559 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3560 return WORK_ERROR;
3561 }
3562 }
3563
3564 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3565 }
3566
3567 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3568 {
3569 int i;
3570 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3571 X509 *x = NULL;
3572 unsigned long l;
3573 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3574 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3575 PACKET spkt, context;
3576 size_t chainidx;
3577 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3578
3579 /*
3580 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3581 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3582 * TLSv1.3
3583 */
3584 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3585
3586 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3589 goto err;
3590 }
3591
3592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3593 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3594 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3595 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3597 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3598 goto err;
3599 }
3600
3601 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3602 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3604 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3605 goto err;
3606 }
3607
3608 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3609 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3610 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3612 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3613 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3614 goto err;
3615 }
3616
3617 certstart = certbytes;
3618 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3619 if (x == NULL) {
3620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3621 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3622 goto err;
3623 }
3624 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3627 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3628 goto err;
3629 }
3630
3631 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3632 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3633 PACKET extensions;
3634
3635 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3637 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3638 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3639 goto err;
3640 }
3641 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3642 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3643 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3644 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3645 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3646 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3647 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3648 goto err;
3649 }
3650 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3651 }
3652
3653 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3655 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3657 goto err;
3658 }
3659 x = NULL;
3660 }
3661
3662 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3663 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3664 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3666 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3667 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3668 goto err;
3669 }
3670 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3671 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3672 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3674 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3675 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3676 goto err;
3677 }
3678 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3679 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3681 goto err;
3682 }
3683 } else {
3684 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3685 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3686 if (i <= 0) {
3687 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3688 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3689 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3690 goto err;
3691 }
3692 if (i > 1) {
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3694 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3695 goto err;
3696 }
3697 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3698 if (pkey == NULL) {
3699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3700 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3701 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3702 goto err;
3703 }
3704 }
3705
3706 /*
3707 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3708 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3709 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3710 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3711 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3712 */
3713
3714 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3715 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3717 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3718 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3719 goto err;
3720 }
3721
3722 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3723 s->session = new_sess;
3724 }
3725
3726 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3727 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3728 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3729
3730 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3731 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3732
3733 /*
3734 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3735 * message
3736 */
3737 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3738 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3739 goto err;
3740 }
3741
3742 /*
3743 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3744 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3745 */
3746 sk = NULL;
3747
3748 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3749 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3750 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3751 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3752 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3754 goto err;
3755 }
3756
3757 /* Resend session tickets */
3758 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3759 }
3760
3761 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3762
3763 err:
3764 X509_free(x);
3765 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3766 return ret;
3767 }
3768
3769 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3770 {
3771 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3772
3773 if (cpk == NULL) {
3774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3775 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3776 return 0;
3777 }
3778
3779 /*
3780 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3781 * for the server Certificate message
3782 */
3783 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3786 return 0;
3787 }
3788 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3790 return 0;
3791 }
3792
3793 return 1;
3794 }
3795
3796 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3797 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3798 {
3799 /*
3800 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3801 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3802 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3803 * timeout.
3804 */
3805 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3806 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3807 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3810 return 0;
3811 }
3812
3813 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3814 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3815 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3818 return 0;
3819 }
3820 }
3821
3822 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3823 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3825 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3826 return 0;
3827 }
3828
3829 return 1;
3830 }
3831
3832 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3833 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3834 {
3835 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3836 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3837 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3838 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3839 const unsigned char *const_p;
3840 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3841 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3842 unsigned int hlen;
3843 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3844 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3845 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3846 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3847 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3848
3849 /* get session encoding length */
3850 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3851 /*
3852 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3853 * long
3854 */
3855 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3858 goto err;
3859 }
3860 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3861 if (senc == NULL) {
3862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3863 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3864 goto err;
3865 }
3866
3867 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3868 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3869 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3871 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3872 goto err;
3873 }
3874
3875 p = senc;
3876 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3879 goto err;
3880 }
3881
3882 /*
3883 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3884 */
3885 const_p = senc;
3886 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3887 if (sess == NULL) {
3888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3889 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3890 goto err;
3891 }
3892
3893 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3894 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3895 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3897 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3898 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3899 goto err;
3900 }
3901 p = senc;
3902 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3905 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3906 goto err;
3907 }
3908 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3909
3910 /*
3911 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3912 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3913 */
3914 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3915 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3916 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3917 hctx, 1);
3918
3919 if (ret == 0) {
3920
3921 /* Put timeout and length */
3922 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3923 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3925 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3927 goto err;
3928 }
3929 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3930 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3931 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3932 return 1;
3933 }
3934 if (ret < 0) {
3935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3936 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3937 goto err;
3938 }
3939 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3940 } else {
3941 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3942
3943 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3944 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3945 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3946 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3947 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3948 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3949 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3952 goto err;
3953 }
3954 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3955 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3956 }
3957
3958 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3960 goto err;
3961 }
3962
3963 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3964 /* Output key name */
3965 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3966 /* output IV */
3967 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3968 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3969 &encdata1)
3970 /* Encrypt session data */
3971 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3972 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3973 || encdata1 != encdata2
3974 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3975 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3976 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3977 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3978 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3979 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3980 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3981 macendoffset - macoffset)
3982 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3983 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3984 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3985 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3986 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3988 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3989 goto err;
3990 }
3991
3992 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3993 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3996 goto err;
3997 }
3998
3999 ok = 1;
4000 err:
4001 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4002 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4003 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
4004 return ok;
4005 }
4006
4007 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4008 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4009 {
4010 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4011 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4012 return 0;
4013 }
4014
4015 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4016 s->session->session_id_length)
4017 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4020 return 0;
4021 }
4022
4023 return 1;
4024 }
4025
4026 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4027 {
4028 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4029 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4030 union {
4031 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4032 uint32_t age_add;
4033 } age_add_u;
4034
4035 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4036
4037 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4038 size_t i, hashlen;
4039 uint64_t nonce;
4040 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4041 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4042 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4043
4044 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4045 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4047 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4049 goto err;
4050 }
4051 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4052
4053 /*
4054 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4055 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4056 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4057 */
4058 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4059 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4060
4061 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4062 /* SSLfatal already called */
4063 goto err;
4064 }
4065
4066 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4067 s->session = new_sess;
4068 }
4069
4070 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4071 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4072 goto err;
4073 }
4074 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4076 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4078 goto err;
4079 }
4080 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4081
4082 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4083 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4084 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4085 nonce >>= 8;
4086 }
4087
4088 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4089 nonce_label,
4090 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4091 tick_nonce,
4092 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4093 s->session->master_key,
4094 hashlen, 1)) {
4095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4096 goto err;
4097 }
4098 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4099
4100 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4101 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4102 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4103 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4104 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4105 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4107 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4108 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4109 goto err;
4110 }
4111 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4112 }
4113 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4114 }
4115
4116 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4117 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4118 goto err;
4119
4120 /*
4121 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4122 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4123 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4124 */
4125 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4126 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4127 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4128 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4129 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4131 goto err;
4132 }
4133 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4134 tick_nonce)) {
4135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4136 goto err;
4137 }
4138
4139 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4140 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4141 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4142 NULL, 0)) {
4143 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4144 goto err;
4145 }
4146 /*
4147 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4148 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4149 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4150 */
4151 s->sent_tickets++;
4152 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4153 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4154 }
4155
4156 return 1;
4157 err:
4158 return 0;
4159 }
4160
4161 /*
4162 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4163 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4164 */
4165 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4166 {
4167 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4168 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4169 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4172 return 0;
4173 }
4174
4175 return 1;
4176 }
4177
4178 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4179 {
4180 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4182 return 0;
4183 }
4184
4185 return 1;
4186 }
4187
4188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4189 /*
4190 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4191 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4192 */
4193 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4194 {
4195 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4196 size_t next_proto_len;
4197
4198 /*-
4199 * The payload looks like:
4200 * uint8 proto_len;
4201 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4202 * uint8 padding_len;
4203 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4204 */
4205 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4206 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4207 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4209 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4210 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4211 }
4212
4213 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4214 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4217 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4218 }
4219
4220 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4221
4222 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4223 }
4224 #endif
4225
4226 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4227 {
4228 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4229 NULL, 0)) {
4230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4231 return 0;
4232 }
4233
4234 return 1;
4235 }
4236
4237 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4238 {
4239 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4241 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4242 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4243 }
4244
4245 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4246 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4249 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4250 }
4251
4252 /*
4253 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4254 * a record boundary.
4255 */
4256 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4258 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4259 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4260 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4261 }
4262
4263 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4264 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4265 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4266 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4267 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4268 }
4269
4270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4271 }
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