1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
168 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
170 int sslv2format
, int *al
);
173 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
174 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
175 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
176 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
178 * Valid return values are:
179 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
180 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
182 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
184 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
186 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
188 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
190 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
195 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
197 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
198 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
200 * 2) If we did request one then
201 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
203 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
204 * list if we requested a certificate)
206 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
207 && (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
208 || (!((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
209 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
210 && (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)))) {
211 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
213 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
214 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
215 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
228 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
230 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
231 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
232 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
233 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
234 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
237 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
238 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
240 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
241 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
242 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
243 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
249 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
257 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
258 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
263 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
265 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
266 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
267 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
272 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
283 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
284 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
290 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
291 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
292 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
301 /* No valid transition found */
306 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
308 * Valid return values are:
312 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
314 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
317 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
318 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
319 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
320 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
321 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
324 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
|SSL_kECDHE
)
326 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
330 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
331 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
332 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
333 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
334 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
337 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
338 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
348 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
350 * Valid return values are:
354 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
357 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
358 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
360 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
361 * during re-negotiation:
363 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
364 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
366 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
367 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
370 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
372 * ... except when the application insists on
373 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
376 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
377 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
378 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
380 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
383 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
391 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
392 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
394 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
396 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
398 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
400 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
404 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
405 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
408 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
410 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
413 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
414 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
415 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
416 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
418 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
421 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
422 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
424 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
426 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
427 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
431 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
432 /* normal PSK or SRP */
433 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
434 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
436 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
438 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
441 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
447 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
448 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
454 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
461 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
462 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
472 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
474 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
477 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
479 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
487 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
490 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
494 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
498 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
499 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
503 /* Shouldn't happen */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
509 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
510 * the server to the client.
512 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
514 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
516 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
517 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
520 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
525 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
526 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
527 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
532 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
535 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
536 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
545 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
547 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
549 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
552 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
553 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
559 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
560 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
561 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
562 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
565 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
567 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
568 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
569 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
570 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
574 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
577 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
580 /* No pre work to be done */
584 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
588 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
589 * server to the client.
591 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
593 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
597 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
598 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
599 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
601 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
604 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
605 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
607 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
608 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
609 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
611 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
612 * treat like it was the first packet
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
620 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
621 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
624 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
627 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
628 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
630 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
631 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
632 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
633 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
637 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
638 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
647 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
650 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
654 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
655 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
656 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
661 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
664 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
665 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
670 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
675 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
678 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
685 /* No post work to be done */
689 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
693 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
695 * Valid return values are:
699 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
701 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
703 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
704 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
705 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s
);
707 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
708 return tls_construct_hello_request(s
);
710 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
711 return tls_construct_server_hello(s
);
714 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s
);
716 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
717 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s
);
719 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
720 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s
);
722 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
723 return tls_construct_server_done(s
);
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
726 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s
);
728 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
729 return tls_construct_cert_status(s
);
731 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
733 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
735 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
737 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
738 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
740 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
742 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
745 /* Shouldn't happen */
752 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
753 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
756 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
757 * reading. Excludes the message header.
759 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
761 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
763 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
764 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
765 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
768 return s
->max_cert_list
;
770 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
771 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
773 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
774 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
777 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
778 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
782 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
784 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
785 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
788 /* Shouldn't happen */
796 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
798 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
800 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
802 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
803 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
804 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
807 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
809 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
810 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
812 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
813 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
816 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
817 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
820 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
821 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
823 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
824 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
835 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
838 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
840 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
842 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
843 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
844 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
846 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
847 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
849 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
851 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
852 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
853 /* Are we renegotiating? */
855 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
856 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
857 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
858 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
859 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
860 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
863 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
866 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
872 /* Shouldn't happen */
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
877 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
879 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
881 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
883 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
884 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
885 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
887 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
891 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
893 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
900 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
902 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0)) {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
904 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
911 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf
,
912 unsigned char *cookie
,
913 unsigned char cookie_len
)
915 unsigned int msg_len
;
919 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
920 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
921 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xFF;
923 *(p
++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len
;
924 memcpy(p
, cookie
, cookie_len
);
931 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
)
936 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
938 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
939 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
940 &(s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) == 0 ||
941 s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 255) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
943 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
944 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
948 len
= dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf
[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
],
949 s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
951 dtls1_set_message_header(s
, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, len
, 0,
953 len
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
955 /* number of bytes to write */
962 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
964 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
965 unsigned int j
, complen
= 0;
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
971 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
973 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
974 PACKET session_id
, cipher_suites
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
977 is_v2_record
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
979 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
980 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
982 unsigned int version
;
985 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
986 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
987 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
988 * the rest right through. Its format is:
990 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
991 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
993 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
994 * 7-8 session_id_length
995 * 9-10 challenge_length
999 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1000 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1002 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1003 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1004 * in the first place
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)) {
1011 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1015 if (version
== 0x0002) {
1016 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1019 } else if ((version
& 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1021 s
->client_version
= version
;
1023 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1029 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1030 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1032 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
)) {
1033 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1040 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1041 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1043 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1044 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1045 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1046 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->client_version
, s
->version
)) {
1047 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1054 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1056 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1059 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1061 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1065 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1068 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1069 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1070 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1072 unsigned int cipher_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1075 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &cipher_len
)
1076 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1080 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1084 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1085 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1090 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &cipher_suites
, cipher_len
)
1091 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &session_id
, session_id_len
)
1092 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1093 /* No extensions. */
1094 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1096 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1097 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1101 /* Load the client random */
1102 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
:
1104 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1105 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1106 s
->s3
->client_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1107 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1109 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1113 PACKET_null_init(&compression
);
1114 PACKET_null_init(&extensions
);
1116 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1117 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1118 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1119 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1124 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id
) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1125 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1130 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1131 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1132 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1137 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1138 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1139 * So check cookie length...
1141 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1142 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) == 0)
1147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cipher_suites
)
1148 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1149 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1153 /* Could be empty. */
1160 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1161 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1163 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1164 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1165 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1166 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1167 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1168 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1169 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1170 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1171 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1172 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1177 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1178 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1181 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &extensions
, &session_id
);
1183 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1185 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1186 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1187 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1188 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1189 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1191 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1192 /* previous session */
1194 } else if (i
== -1) {
1198 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1204 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1205 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1206 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1207 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&cookie
),
1208 PACKET_remaining(&cookie
)) == 0) {
1209 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1211 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1213 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1215 /* default verification */
1216 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1217 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1218 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1222 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1224 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1225 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1226 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1228 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1229 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1232 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1236 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &cipher_suites
, &(ciphers
),
1237 is_v2_record
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1241 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1244 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1247 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1248 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1251 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1253 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1254 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1263 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1266 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1268 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1273 complen
= PACKET_remaining(&compression
);
1274 for (j
= 0; j
< complen
; j
++) {
1275 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[j
] == 0)
1281 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1286 /* TLS extensions */
1287 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1288 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &extensions
)) {
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1295 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1296 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1297 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1298 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1302 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1303 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1308 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1309 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1311 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1312 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1313 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1315 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1317 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1318 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1322 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1324 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1329 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1330 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1335 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1337 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1339 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1344 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1345 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1346 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1348 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1350 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1351 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1352 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1354 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1355 /* Can't disable compression */
1356 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1358 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1361 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1362 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1363 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1364 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1365 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1369 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1371 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1374 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1375 for (k
= 0; k
< complen
; k
++) {
1376 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[k
] == comp_id
)
1380 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1382 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1387 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1388 /* See if we have a match */
1389 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1392 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1393 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1394 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1396 for (o
= 0; o
< complen
; o
++) {
1397 if (v
== PACKET_data(&compression
)[o
]) {
1406 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1412 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1413 * using compression.
1415 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1422 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1426 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1427 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1429 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1431 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1432 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1433 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1434 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1439 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1445 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1446 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1448 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1450 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1452 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1453 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1457 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1459 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1460 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1462 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1464 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1465 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1466 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1468 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1473 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1476 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1478 cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1480 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1484 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1485 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1486 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1487 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1488 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1489 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1490 /* do not send a session ticket */
1491 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1493 /* Session-id reuse */
1494 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1497 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1498 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1499 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1505 * we now have the following setup.
1507 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1508 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1509 * compression - basically ignored right now
1510 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1511 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1512 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1513 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1516 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1517 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1518 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1520 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1528 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1530 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1532 * callback indicates further work to be done
1534 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1537 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1539 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1540 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1542 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1544 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1551 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1553 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1554 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1558 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1561 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1566 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1568 /* Do the message type and length last */
1569 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1571 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1572 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1575 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1576 * tls_process_client_hello()
1578 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1579 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1582 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1583 * back in the server hello:
1584 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1585 * we send back the old session ID.
1586 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1587 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1588 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1589 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1591 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1592 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1593 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1594 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1597 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1598 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1600 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1602 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1603 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1605 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1609 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1612 /* put the cipher */
1613 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1616 /* put the compression method */
1617 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1620 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1623 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1626 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1628 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1632 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1634 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1636 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1642 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
)) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1644 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1651 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1653 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0)) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1655 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1659 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1660 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1661 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1668 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1671 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1674 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1679 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1680 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1687 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1689 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1691 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1695 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1699 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1702 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1704 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1707 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
1708 n
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1710 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1711 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1713 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1715 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1716 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1718 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1721 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1722 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1723 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1724 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1726 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1731 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1734 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1736 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1737 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1738 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1740 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1742 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1747 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
1748 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1750 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1753 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1754 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
1755 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1757 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1760 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1766 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
, NID_undef
);
1768 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1773 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1775 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1787 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1793 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1794 nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1795 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
1796 if (curve_id
== 0) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1798 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1801 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(NULL
, nid
);
1802 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1803 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1804 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1809 /* Encode the public key. */
1810 encodedlen
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
),
1811 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1812 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
1814 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1820 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1821 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1822 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1824 n
+= 4 + encodedlen
;
1827 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1828 * can set these to NULLs
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1837 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1838 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1839 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1840 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1842 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1845 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1846 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1847 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1848 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1852 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1854 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1857 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1858 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1860 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1867 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
|SSL_aSRP
))
1868 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1869 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1871 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1874 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1884 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1887 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1888 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1889 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
) {
1890 s2n(strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1891 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
1892 strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
));
1893 p
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1900 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1902 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1913 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1915 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1916 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1917 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1918 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1920 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1928 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1929 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1930 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1938 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1939 * points to the space at the end.
1942 /* send signature algorithm */
1943 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1944 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1945 /* Should never happen */
1946 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1954 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1956 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1957 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1958 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1959 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1960 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1961 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, d
, n
) <= 0
1962 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1963 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1965 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1970 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1973 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1974 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1976 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1981 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
1982 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1987 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1990 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1993 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1996 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1998 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1999 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2003 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2005 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2006 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2007 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2013 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2015 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2017 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2022 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2023 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2024 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2025 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2026 /* Skip over length for now */
2028 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2029 /* Now fill in length */
2039 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2042 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2043 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2044 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2045 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2046 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2051 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2053 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2058 /* else no CA names */
2059 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2062 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
)) {
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2067 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2071 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2075 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2079 unsigned long alg_k
;
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2083 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2084 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2086 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2087 const unsigned char *data
;
2088 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2090 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2093 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2094 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2095 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2097 PACKET psk_identity
;
2099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2100 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2104 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2105 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2107 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2110 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2111 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2113 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2117 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2119 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2123 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2126 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2127 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2130 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2132 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2135 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2136 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2140 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2141 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2142 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2144 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2145 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2150 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2152 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2153 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2154 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2155 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2159 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2160 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2161 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2169 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2171 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2174 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2175 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2177 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2179 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2183 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2184 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2185 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2187 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2188 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2189 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2191 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2197 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2198 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2199 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2200 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2202 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2203 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2205 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2209 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2210 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2211 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2217 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2218 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2219 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2220 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2221 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2224 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2225 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2229 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2230 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2231 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2235 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2236 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2239 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2242 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2243 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2244 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2245 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2246 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2247 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2250 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0],
2251 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2253 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2254 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2257 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2258 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2259 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2260 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2261 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2262 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2265 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2266 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2268 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2270 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2271 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2272 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2276 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2277 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2279 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2282 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2283 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2284 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2285 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2287 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2289 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, rsa_decrypt
[j
],
2290 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2293 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
2294 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2295 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2299 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2304 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2305 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2308 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)) {
2309 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2310 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2312 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2317 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2319 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2322 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2324 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2326 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2330 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2331 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2333 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2336 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2337 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2338 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2343 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2344 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2348 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2349 cdh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2350 if (cdh
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2355 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2356 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2361 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2363 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2364 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2370 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2371 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2374 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2375 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2377 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2381 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2382 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2385 /* Get encoded point length */
2386 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
)) {
2387 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2389 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2392 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2393 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2397 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2398 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2402 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
), data
, i
,
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2409 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2410 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2415 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2417 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2418 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2420 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2424 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2425 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2426 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2427 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2431 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2435 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2436 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2437 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2439 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2442 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2443 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2444 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2449 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2456 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2457 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2458 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2459 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2460 const unsigned char *start
;
2461 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2462 unsigned long alg_a
;
2467 /* Get our certificate private key */
2468 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2469 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2471 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2473 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2475 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2478 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2480 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2481 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2484 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2485 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2486 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2490 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2491 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2496 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2497 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2498 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2499 * client certificate for authorization only.
2501 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2502 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2503 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2506 /* Decrypt session key */
2507 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2508 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2509 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2513 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2514 &Tclass
, sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2515 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2516 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2517 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2519 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2524 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2525 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2526 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2531 /* Generate master secret */
2532 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2533 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2534 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2538 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2539 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2540 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2541 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2543 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2544 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2546 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2551 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2556 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2558 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2559 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2562 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2563 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2565 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2567 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2568 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2570 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2574 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2577 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2578 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2579 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2580 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2582 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2585 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2586 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2588 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2589 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2590 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2591 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2595 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2596 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2601 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2603 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2604 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2606 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2607 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2608 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2609 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2610 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2611 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2612 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2613 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2616 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2620 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
) {
2621 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2622 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2623 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2624 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2626 if (!s
->session
->peer
) {
2627 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2628 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2629 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2631 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2634 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2638 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2639 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2642 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2650 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2652 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2653 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2654 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2655 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2659 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2663 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2667 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2671 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2672 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
2673 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2675 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2677 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2678 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2682 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2684 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2685 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2688 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
2689 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2694 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2697 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2698 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2701 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2703 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2705 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2706 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2710 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2713 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2714 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2716 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2718 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2723 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2725 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2729 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2730 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2731 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2733 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2736 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2738 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2742 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2743 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2745 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2749 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2751 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2752 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2754 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2760 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2761 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2762 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2763 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2764 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2766 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2769 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
2775 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2776 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2777 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2778 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2780 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2784 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2785 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2790 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2794 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2796 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2797 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2798 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2799 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
2803 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2805 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2807 unsigned long l
, llen
;
2808 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
2809 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
2812 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2817 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
2818 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
2819 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2820 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2825 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
2826 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
2827 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
2828 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2830 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2834 certstart
= certbytes
;
2835 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2840 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
2841 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2843 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2846 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2853 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
2854 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2855 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2856 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2858 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2861 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2862 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2863 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2865 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2866 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2869 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2870 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2875 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
2877 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2879 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
2884 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2887 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
2889 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2891 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2896 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2897 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2898 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2900 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
2901 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
2903 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2904 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2907 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2911 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2912 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2915 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
2919 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2923 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2926 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2930 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2932 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2939 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2941 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
2942 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
2943 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
2944 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
2945 const unsigned char *const_p
;
2946 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
2949 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
2950 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2951 unsigned char key_name
[16];
2953 /* get session encoding length */
2954 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2956 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2959 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
2960 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2963 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
2965 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2969 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2970 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
2973 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
2977 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2980 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
2983 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2985 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
2986 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2987 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2991 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
2992 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2998 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2999 * follows handshake_header_length +
3000 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3001 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3002 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3003 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3005 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3006 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3007 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3010 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3012 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3013 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3015 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3016 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
, hctx
, 1) < 0)
3019 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3021 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3022 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3024 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3025 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3027 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3031 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3032 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3033 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3035 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3037 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3039 /* Output key name */
3041 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3044 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
));
3045 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3046 /* Encrypt session data */
3047 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3050 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, p
, &len
))
3054 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3056 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3059 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3060 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3065 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3067 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3068 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3069 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3071 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
))
3078 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3079 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3080 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3084 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3088 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3089 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3090 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3093 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3094 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3098 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3101 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3102 /* message length */
3103 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3105 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3106 /* length of OCSP response */
3107 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3108 /* actual response */
3109 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3110 /* number of bytes to write */
3111 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3119 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3120 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3122 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3124 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3125 size_t next_proto_len
;
3128 * The payload looks like:
3130 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3131 * uint8 padding_len;
3132 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3134 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3135 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3136 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3141 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
,
3143 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3147 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3149 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3151 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3152 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3156 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3158 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3159 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3160 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3161 int sslv2format
, int *al
3164 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3165 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3167 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3168 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3170 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3172 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3174 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3176 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3180 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3182 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3183 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3187 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3188 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3191 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3196 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3199 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3200 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3201 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3205 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3207 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3208 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3209 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3211 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3214 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3215 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3216 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3217 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3218 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3220 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3221 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3224 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3228 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3229 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3230 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3232 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3233 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3236 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3238 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3239 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3245 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3246 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3248 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3250 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3255 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3256 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3265 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3266 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);