2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
40 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
52 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
53 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
54 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
58 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
59 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
60 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
69 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
70 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
71 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
75 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
76 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
83 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
84 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
85 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
89 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
90 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
97 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
98 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
111 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
112 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
113 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
124 /* No valid transition found */
129 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
130 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
131 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
132 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
134 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
135 * (transition not allowed)
137 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
139 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
141 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
142 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
147 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
153 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
154 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
155 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
160 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
162 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
163 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
165 * 2) If we did request one then
166 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
168 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
169 * list if we requested a certificate)
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
172 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
173 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
174 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
175 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
177 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
178 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
183 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
186 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
190 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
193 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
194 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
195 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
202 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
203 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
208 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
210 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
211 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
212 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
213 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
214 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
218 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
220 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
221 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
222 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
223 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
225 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
229 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
230 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
237 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
243 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
245 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
246 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
247 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
252 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
253 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
270 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
271 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
272 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
279 /* No valid transition found */
280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
281 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
282 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
287 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
289 * Valid return values are:
293 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
295 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
298 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
299 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
300 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
301 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
302 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
305 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
307 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
311 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
312 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
313 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
314 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
315 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
318 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
319 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
329 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
331 * Valid return values are:
335 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
338 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
339 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
341 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
342 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
344 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
345 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
347 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
350 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
351 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
353 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
354 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
357 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
359 * ... except when the application insists on
360 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
363 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
364 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
365 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
367 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
370 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
378 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
379 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
382 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
384 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
387 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
388 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
391 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
393 /* Shouldn't happen */
394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
397 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
400 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
401 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
402 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
404 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
405 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
408 /* Try to read from the client instead */
409 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
412 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
416 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
417 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
418 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
419 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
422 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
426 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
427 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
432 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
435 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
442 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
443 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
444 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
456 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
459 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
464 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
466 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
468 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
469 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
471 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
472 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
475 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
476 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
480 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
481 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
496 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
498 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
500 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
503 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
504 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
508 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
510 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
519 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
520 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
521 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
522 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
526 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
527 /* SSLfatal() already called */
528 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
533 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
537 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
540 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
542 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
543 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
544 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
545 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
546 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
549 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
553 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
558 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
563 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
564 /* normal PSK or SRP */
565 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
566 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
568 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
569 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
570 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
579 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
585 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
586 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
587 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
592 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
593 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
600 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
603 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
604 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
606 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
608 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
610 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
611 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
621 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
625 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
627 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
629 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
635 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
636 * the server to the client.
638 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
640 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
642 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
644 /* No pre work to be done */
647 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
650 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
653 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
656 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
657 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
665 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
666 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
675 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
676 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
679 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
681 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
684 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
685 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
686 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
688 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
691 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
693 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
694 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
700 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
703 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
704 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
710 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
711 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
712 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
713 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
717 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
719 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
720 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
721 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * server to the client.
737 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
739 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
743 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
745 /* No post work to be done */
748 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
749 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
751 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
758 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
760 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
761 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
767 * treat like it was the first packet
772 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
774 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
775 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
781 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
782 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
785 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
788 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
789 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
791 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
792 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
793 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
795 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
796 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
801 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
802 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
806 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
807 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
811 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
812 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
813 if (!statem_flush(s
))
818 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
819 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
820 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
821 * something clever in the record layer for this.
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
824 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
825 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
826 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
831 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
832 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
833 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
850 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
851 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
861 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
862 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
866 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
867 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
870 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
872 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
875 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
879 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
880 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
881 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
882 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
883 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
884 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
885 /* SSLfatal() already called */
890 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
891 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
892 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
897 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
898 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
900 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
907 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
912 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
916 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
919 * Valid return values are:
923 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
924 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
926 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
928 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
932 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
933 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
936 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
938 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
940 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
941 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
944 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
945 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
946 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
950 /* No construction function needed */
952 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
955 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
956 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
957 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
961 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
962 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
965 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
966 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
967 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
971 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
972 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
973 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
976 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
977 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
978 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
981 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
982 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
983 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
986 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
987 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
988 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
991 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
992 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
993 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
996 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
997 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
998 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1001 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1003 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1006 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1007 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1008 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1011 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1012 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1013 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1021 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1022 * calculated as follows:
1024 * 2 + # client_version
1025 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1026 * 1 + # length of session_id
1027 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1028 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1029 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1030 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1031 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1032 * 2 + # length of extensions
1033 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1035 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1037 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1038 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1041 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1042 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1044 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1046 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1048 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1050 /* Shouldn't happen */
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1054 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1057 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1060 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1063 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1066 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1070 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1074 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1076 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1077 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1080 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1085 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1087 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1089 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1091 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1093 /* Shouldn't happen */
1094 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1095 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1100 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1102 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1103 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1105 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1106 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1108 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1109 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1111 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1112 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1115 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1116 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1120 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1123 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1126 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1132 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1135 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1137 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1139 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1141 /* Shouldn't happen */
1142 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1143 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1148 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1151 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1153 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1157 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1158 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1161 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1163 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1164 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1165 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1167 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1171 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1172 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1175 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1178 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1179 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1180 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1181 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1182 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1191 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1194 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1195 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1196 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1202 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1204 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1205 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1206 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1207 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1208 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1210 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1213 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1215 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1216 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1228 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1229 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1233 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1235 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1236 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1237 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1238 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1240 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1242 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1243 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1244 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1245 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1246 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1247 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1248 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1250 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1251 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1252 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1253 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1254 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1255 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1256 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1257 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1258 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1259 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1260 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1261 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1262 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1264 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1265 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1270 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1272 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1273 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1274 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1278 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1281 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1282 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1284 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1287 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1289 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1291 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1292 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1293 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1294 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1296 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1297 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1298 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1303 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) != 0
1304 || (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
1306 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1314 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1315 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1322 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1324 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1325 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1327 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1330 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1331 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1333 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1338 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1339 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1340 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1341 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1343 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1344 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1346 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1347 * 7-8 session_id_length
1348 * 9-10 challenge_length
1352 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1353 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1355 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1356 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1357 * in the first place
1359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1365 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1367 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1371 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1372 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1374 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1375 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1376 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1378 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1381 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1382 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1383 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1385 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1389 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1391 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1395 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1397 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1398 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1399 /* No extensions. */
1400 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1402 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1405 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1407 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1408 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1409 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1410 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1412 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1414 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1415 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1416 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1417 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1418 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1419 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1420 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1425 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1427 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1428 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1430 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1431 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1432 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1434 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1438 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1439 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1444 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1445 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1446 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1452 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1453 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1454 * So check cookie length...
1456 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1457 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1458 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1462 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1464 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1468 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1470 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1474 /* Could be empty. */
1475 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1476 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1478 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1481 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1487 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1488 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1489 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1495 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1496 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1497 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1498 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1499 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1500 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1503 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1505 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1508 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1509 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1510 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1515 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1518 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1523 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1525 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1526 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1527 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1528 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1529 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1531 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1532 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1533 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1534 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1535 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1536 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1538 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1539 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1541 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1544 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1545 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1550 /* Set up the client_random */
1551 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1553 /* Choose the version */
1555 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1556 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1557 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1558 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1560 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1563 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1564 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1565 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1569 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1572 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1573 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1575 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1576 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1577 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1578 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1579 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1585 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1586 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1587 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1590 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1594 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1595 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1597 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1598 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1603 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1604 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1605 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1606 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1607 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1609 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1610 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1612 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1614 /* default verification */
1615 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1616 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1617 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1618 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1619 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1620 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1623 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1625 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1626 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1627 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1628 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1630 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1638 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1639 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1640 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1641 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1646 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1647 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1648 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1649 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1650 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1651 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1652 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1653 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1655 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1656 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1659 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1660 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1661 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1663 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1664 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1665 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1666 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1667 * an insecure downgrade.
1669 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1670 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1671 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1677 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1678 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1679 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1680 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1682 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1685 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1688 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1689 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1690 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1692 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1693 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1695 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1696 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1700 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1703 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1704 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1705 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1706 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1712 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1713 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1715 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1716 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1717 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1718 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1719 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1720 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1721 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1722 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1723 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1724 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1727 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1729 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1730 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1735 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1737 /* previous session */
1739 } else if (i
== -1) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1752 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1753 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1754 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1758 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1759 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1761 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1763 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1766 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1768 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1769 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1771 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1772 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1781 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1784 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1785 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1786 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1791 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1792 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1796 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1799 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1800 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1805 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1806 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1807 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1809 /* TLS extensions */
1810 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1811 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1817 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1818 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1819 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1820 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1824 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1825 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1826 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1827 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1828 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1834 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1837 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1838 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1840 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1841 * backwards compat reasons
1843 int master_key_length
;
1845 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1846 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1847 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1849 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1850 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1851 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1853 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1854 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1858 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1859 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1860 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1861 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1862 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1865 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1869 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1871 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1873 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1878 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1879 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1880 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1882 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1883 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1885 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1886 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1887 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1889 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1892 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1897 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1898 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1899 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1901 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1902 /* Can't disable compression */
1903 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1904 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1906 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1909 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1910 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1911 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1912 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1913 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1917 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1918 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1919 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1920 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1923 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1924 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1925 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1928 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1929 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1930 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1931 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1934 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1936 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1937 /* See if we have a match */
1938 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1941 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1942 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1943 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1945 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1946 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1955 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1961 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1962 * using compression.
1964 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1965 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1966 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1967 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1973 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1976 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1977 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1978 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1979 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1981 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1989 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1990 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1992 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1994 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1995 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2000 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2001 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2002 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2003 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2004 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2007 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2008 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2009 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2010 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2011 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2017 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2018 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2020 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2022 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2025 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2026 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2027 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2028 * influence which certificate is sent
2030 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2031 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2034 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2035 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2037 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2038 * et al can pick it up.
2040 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2041 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2043 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2045 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2047 /* status request response should be sent */
2048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2049 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2050 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2052 /* something bad happened */
2053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2056 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
2057 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2067 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2068 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2070 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2072 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2073 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2075 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2076 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2077 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
2078 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
2079 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2081 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2082 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2083 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2084 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2089 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2091 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2092 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
2095 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2096 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2097 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2098 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2099 selected_len
) != 0) {
2100 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2101 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2104 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2105 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2107 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2108 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2109 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2113 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2118 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2120 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2124 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2129 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2130 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2131 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2132 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2138 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2140 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2142 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2143 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2145 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2152 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2153 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2154 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2155 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2156 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2158 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2159 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2160 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2164 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2167 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2170 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2171 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2173 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2175 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2177 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2178 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2181 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2184 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2185 /* SSLfatal already called */
2188 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2189 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2190 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2191 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2192 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2193 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2194 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2195 /* do not send a session ticket */
2196 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2199 /* Session-id reuse */
2200 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2204 * we now have the following setup.
2206 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2207 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2208 * compression - basically ignored right now
2209 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2210 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2211 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2212 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2216 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2217 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2219 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2220 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2225 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2226 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2227 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2229 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2237 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2239 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2241 * callback indicates further work to be done
2243 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2247 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2253 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2258 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2263 unsigned char *session_id
;
2264 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2266 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2269 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2270 * tls_process_client_hello()
2272 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2273 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2274 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
->server_random
,
2275 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2282 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2283 * back in the server hello:
2284 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2285 * we send back the old session ID.
2286 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2287 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2288 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2289 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2291 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2292 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2293 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2295 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2296 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2299 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2300 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2302 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2305 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2306 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2308 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2309 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2312 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2314 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2318 /* set up the compression method */
2319 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2322 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2325 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2328 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2329 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2330 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)
2331 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2332 s
->hello_retry_request
2334 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2336 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2337 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2343 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2344 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2345 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2350 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2351 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2353 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2354 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2357 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2358 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2359 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2366 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2368 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2369 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2377 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2380 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2383 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2384 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2387 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2391 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2392 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2393 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2395 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2397 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2401 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2403 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2407 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2409 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2411 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2412 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2414 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2416 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2417 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2419 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2422 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2423 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2424 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2425 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2428 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2432 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2435 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2437 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2438 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2439 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2441 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2448 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2450 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2451 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2454 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2455 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2457 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2458 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2461 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2463 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2464 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2468 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2469 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2470 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2474 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2476 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2479 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2480 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2484 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2486 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2488 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2489 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2493 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2494 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2495 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2496 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2497 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2498 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2501 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2502 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2503 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2508 /* Encode the public key. */
2509 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2511 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2518 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2519 * can set these to NULLs
2526 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2528 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2529 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2530 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2531 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2534 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2537 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2538 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2539 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2540 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2546 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2550 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2551 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2553 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2560 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2561 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2562 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2565 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2566 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2568 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2569 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2572 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2573 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2579 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2580 unsigned char *binval
;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2584 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2585 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2588 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2592 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2599 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2600 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2603 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2604 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2607 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2609 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2613 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2617 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2618 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2620 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2625 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2629 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2631 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2632 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2633 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2637 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2638 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2639 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2640 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2641 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2645 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2646 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2652 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2654 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2655 size_t siglen
, tbslen
;
2658 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
2659 /* Should never happen */
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2665 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2666 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2672 /* send signature algorithm */
2673 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2675 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2680 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2681 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2682 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2685 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2686 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2687 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2693 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2694 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2695 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2696 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2702 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2703 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2709 rv
= EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
);
2711 if (rv
<= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2712 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2714 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2720 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2724 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2727 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2729 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2733 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2736 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2737 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2738 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2739 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2740 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
2741 || ssl_randbytes(s
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
) <= 0
2742 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2743 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2744 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2748 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2749 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2756 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2762 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2763 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2771 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2772 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2773 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2774 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2775 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2779 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2780 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2781 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2783 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2784 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2785 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2786 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2794 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2801 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2805 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2808 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2810 PACKET psk_identity
;
2812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2814 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2817 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2819 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2822 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2823 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2824 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2828 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2834 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2837 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2841 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2843 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2846 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2847 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2851 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2852 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2853 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2855 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2861 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2865 /* Should never happen */
2866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2872 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2875 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2877 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2878 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2879 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2881 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2884 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2887 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2891 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2892 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2893 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2895 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2896 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2898 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2904 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2905 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2906 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2907 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2909 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2911 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2915 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2916 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2918 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2923 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2924 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2925 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2926 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2927 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2930 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, rand_premaster_secret
,
2931 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2932 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2938 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2939 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2941 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2942 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2943 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2944 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2945 if (decrypt_len
< 0) {
2946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2951 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2954 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2955 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2956 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2958 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2960 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2964 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2965 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2966 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2967 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2968 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2970 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2973 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2974 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2975 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2976 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2977 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2978 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2981 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2982 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2984 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2985 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2988 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2989 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2990 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2991 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2992 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2993 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2996 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2997 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2998 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2999 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
3001 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
3002 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
3003 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
3007 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3008 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3010 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
3013 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3014 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3015 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3016 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3018 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
3019 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
3020 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
3021 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
3022 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
3025 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
3026 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3033 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
3036 /* Should never happen */
3037 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3043 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3046 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
3050 const unsigned char *data
;
3051 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3054 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
3055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3056 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
3059 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3062 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3066 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3068 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3071 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3072 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3073 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3077 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3078 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
3079 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3083 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3084 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
3086 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
3087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3089 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
3094 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3101 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3106 /* Should never happen */
3107 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3108 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3113 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3116 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3117 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3120 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3121 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3122 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3123 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3127 const unsigned char *data
;
3130 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3131 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3134 /* Get encoded point length */
3135 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3136 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3138 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3141 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3142 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3147 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3154 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3155 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3161 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3163 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3167 /* Should never happen */
3168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3174 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3178 const unsigned char *data
;
3180 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3181 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3183 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3186 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3187 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3191 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3193 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3196 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3197 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3198 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3199 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3200 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3204 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3205 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3211 /* Should never happen */
3212 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3218 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3222 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3223 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3224 const unsigned char *start
;
3225 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3226 unsigned long alg_a
;
3229 size_t sess_key_len
;
3230 const unsigned char *data
;
3233 /* Get our certificate private key */
3234 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3235 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3237 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3239 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3241 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3244 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3246 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3247 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3250 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
3251 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3252 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3262 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3263 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3264 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3265 * client certificate for authorization only.
3267 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3268 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3269 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3272 /* Decrypt session key */
3273 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3274 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
3275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3276 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3279 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3280 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
3281 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3282 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
3283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3284 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3289 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3291 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3292 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3295 /* Generate master secret */
3296 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3297 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3301 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3302 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3304 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3308 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3311 /* Should never happen */
3312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3320 unsigned long alg_k
;
3322 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3324 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3325 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3330 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3331 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3332 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3333 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3334 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3338 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3339 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3343 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3344 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3345 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3349 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3350 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3353 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3354 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3358 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3359 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3360 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3363 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3364 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3370 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3371 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3375 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3378 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3379 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3384 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3387 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3389 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3390 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3392 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3395 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3396 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3398 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3399 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3400 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3403 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3408 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3409 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3414 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3416 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3417 * the handshake_buffer
3419 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3423 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3425 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3427 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3432 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3433 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3435 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3441 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3444 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3450 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3451 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3452 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3454 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3456 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3457 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3458 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3462 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3463 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3464 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3465 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3467 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3471 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3472 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3478 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3479 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3480 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3483 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3487 certstart
= certbytes
;
3488 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3491 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3494 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3496 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3497 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3501 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3502 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3505 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3511 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3512 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3513 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3514 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3515 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3516 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3517 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3520 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3523 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3525 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3526 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3532 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3533 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3534 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3537 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3540 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3541 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3542 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3543 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3545 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3548 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3549 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3555 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3557 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
3558 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3559 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3563 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3564 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3567 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3569 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3570 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3571 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3577 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3578 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3579 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3580 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3581 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3584 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3585 int m
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
3587 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3588 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3589 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3590 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3594 if (m
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
) {
3596 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
3598 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
3601 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3602 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3605 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3606 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3607 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3609 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3610 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3612 if (new_sess
!= NULL
)
3613 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
3616 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3619 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3625 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3626 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3630 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3632 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3633 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3634 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3639 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3643 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3647 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3649 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3653 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3658 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3659 * for the server Certificate message
3661 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3666 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3674 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3676 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3677 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3678 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3679 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3680 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3681 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3684 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3685 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3686 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3688 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3690 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3694 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3695 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
3696 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3697 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3701 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3703 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3704 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3705 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3707 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
);
3708 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3709 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
== NULL
) {
3710 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3715 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
= 1;
3716 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
3717 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3718 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3719 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3720 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
3721 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3723 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3724 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3727 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
3729 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3732 /* get session encoding length */
3733 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3735 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3738 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3740 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3743 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3745 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3746 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3750 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3751 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3752 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3753 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3754 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3759 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3761 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3766 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3769 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3772 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3775 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3777 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3778 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3779 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3780 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3781 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3782 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3786 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3789 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3792 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3795 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3796 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3798 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3799 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3800 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3805 /* Put timeout and length */
3806 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3807 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3808 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3814 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3815 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3819 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3820 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3821 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3824 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3826 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3828 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3829 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3830 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3831 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3832 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3833 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3834 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
3835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3836 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3840 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3841 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3845 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3846 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3847 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3850 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3851 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3852 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3854 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
)
3855 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
3856 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
3857 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3858 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3859 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3860 /* Output key name */
3861 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3863 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3864 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3866 /* Encrypt session data */
3867 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3868 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3869 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3870 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3871 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3872 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3873 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3874 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3875 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3876 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3877 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3878 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3879 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3880 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3881 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3882 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3883 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3884 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3885 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3889 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3890 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3895 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3896 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3902 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3903 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3908 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3909 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3911 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3914 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3915 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
3917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3924 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3926 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3936 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3937 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3939 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3941 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3942 size_t next_proto_len
;
3945 * The payload looks like:
3947 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3948 * uint8 padding_len;
3949 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3951 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3952 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3953 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3955 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3956 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3959 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3961 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3963 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3966 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3968 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3972 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3974 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3976 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3983 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3985 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3988 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3991 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3992 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
3993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3995 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3999 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4000 * a record boundary.
4002 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
4004 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4005 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4006 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4009 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4010 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4011 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4012 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4016 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;