2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
65 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
67 **skp
, int sslv2format
,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
82 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
84 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
86 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
87 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
88 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
93 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
95 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
96 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
98 * 2) If we did request one then
99 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
101 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
102 * list if we requested a certificate)
104 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
105 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
106 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
107 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
108 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
110 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
111 * not going to accept it because we require a client
114 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
115 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
116 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
117 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
124 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
127 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
128 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
129 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
136 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
137 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
142 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
144 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
145 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
146 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
147 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
148 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
151 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
152 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
154 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
155 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
156 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
157 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
159 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
163 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
164 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
170 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
172 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
177 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
179 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
180 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
186 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
187 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
196 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
197 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
198 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
204 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
205 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
230 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
248 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
280 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
312 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
314 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
316 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
320 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
321 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
322 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
324 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
326 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
327 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
329 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
331 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
332 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
337 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
338 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
340 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
342 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
343 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
345 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or SRP */
349 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
350 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
352 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
353 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
354 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
357 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
363 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
364 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
365 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
369 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
370 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
376 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
377 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
378 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
379 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
383 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
384 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
385 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
388 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
390 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
392 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
393 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
395 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
398 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
402 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
407 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
412 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
414 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
415 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
430 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
432 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
433 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
436 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
439 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
442 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
443 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
448 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
451 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
452 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
460 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
461 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
463 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
466 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
468 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
469 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
475 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
476 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
477 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
478 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
481 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
483 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
484 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
485 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
486 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
493 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
496 /* No pre work to be done */
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
509 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
513 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
514 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
515 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
517 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
518 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
524 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
526 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
527 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
528 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
532 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
533 * treat like it was the first packet
538 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
541 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
542 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
545 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
548 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
549 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
551 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
552 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
553 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
555 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
559 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
560 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
565 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
569 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
572 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
576 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
577 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
579 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
584 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
587 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
588 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
592 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
593 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
596 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
598 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
601 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
608 /* No post work to be done */
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
616 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
618 * Valid return values are:
622 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
624 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
626 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
627 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
628 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s
);
630 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
631 return tls_construct_hello_request(s
);
633 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
634 return tls_construct_server_hello(s
);
637 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s
);
639 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
640 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s
);
642 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
643 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s
);
645 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
646 return tls_construct_server_done(s
);
648 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
649 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s
);
651 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
652 return tls_construct_cert_status(s
);
654 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
656 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
658 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
660 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
661 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
663 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
665 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
668 /* Shouldn't happen */
676 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
677 * calculated as follows:
679 * 2 + # client_version
680 * 32 + # only valid length for random
681 * 1 + # length of session_id
682 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
683 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
684 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
685 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
686 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
687 * 2 + # length of extensions
688 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
690 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
692 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
693 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
696 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
697 * reading. Excludes the message header.
699 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
701 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
703 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
704 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
705 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
708 return s
->max_cert_list
;
710 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
711 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
713 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
714 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
717 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
718 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
721 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
722 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
724 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
725 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
728 /* Shouldn't happen */
736 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
738 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
740 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
742 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
743 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
744 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
747 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
749 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
750 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
752 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
753 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
756 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
757 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
760 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
763 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
764 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
767 /* Shouldn't happen */
771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
775 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
778 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
780 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
782 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
784 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
787 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
789 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
792 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
793 /* Are we renegotiating? */
794 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
795 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
796 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
797 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
798 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
799 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
802 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
805 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
811 /* Shouldn't happen */
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
816 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
818 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
820 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
822 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
823 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
824 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
826 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
830 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
832 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
839 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
841 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0)) {
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
843 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
850 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf
,
851 unsigned char *cookie
,
852 unsigned char cookie_len
)
854 unsigned int msg_len
;
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
860 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xFF;
862 *(p
++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len
;
863 memcpy(p
, cookie
, cookie_len
);
870 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
)
875 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
877 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
878 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
879 &(s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) == 0 ||
880 s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 255) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
882 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
883 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
887 len
= dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf
[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
],
888 s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
890 dtls1_set_message_header(s
, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, len
, 0, len
);
891 len
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
893 /* number of bytes to write */
900 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
902 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
903 unsigned int j
, complen
= 0;
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
907 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
909 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
911 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
912 PACKET session_id
, cipher_suites
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
914 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
916 is_v2_record
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
918 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
919 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
921 unsigned int version
;
924 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
925 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
926 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
927 * the rest right through. Its format is:
929 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
930 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
932 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
933 * 7-8 session_id_length
934 * 9-10 challenge_length
938 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
939 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
941 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
942 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
949 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)) {
950 /* No protocol version supplied! */
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
954 if (version
== 0x0002) {
955 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
958 } else if ((version
& 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
960 s
->client_version
= version
;
962 /* No idea what protocol this is */
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
968 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
969 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
971 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
)) {
972 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
979 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
980 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
982 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
983 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
984 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
985 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->client_version
, s
->version
)) {
986 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
993 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
995 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
998 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1000 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1004 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1007 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1008 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1009 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1011 unsigned int cipher_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1014 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &cipher_len
)
1015 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1016 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1018 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1019 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1023 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1024 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1029 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &cipher_suites
, cipher_len
)
1030 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &session_id
, session_id_len
)
1031 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1032 /* No extensions. */
1033 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1035 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1036 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1040 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1041 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
:
1043 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1044 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1045 s
->s3
->client_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1046 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1047 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1048 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1050 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1054 PACKET_null_init(&extensions
);
1056 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1058 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1059 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1064 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id
) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1065 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1070 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1071 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1072 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1077 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1078 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1079 * So check cookie length...
1081 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1082 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) == 0)
1087 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cipher_suites
)
1088 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1089 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1093 /* Could be empty. */
1097 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1098 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1099 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1100 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1101 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&cookie
),
1102 PACKET_remaining(&cookie
)) ==
1104 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1106 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1108 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1110 /* default verification */
1111 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1112 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1116 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1118 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1119 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1120 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1122 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1123 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1132 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1133 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1135 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1136 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1137 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1138 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1139 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1140 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1141 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1142 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1143 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1144 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1149 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1150 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1153 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &extensions
, &session_id
);
1155 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1157 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1158 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1159 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1160 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1161 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1163 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1164 /* previous session */
1166 } else if (i
== -1) {
1170 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1175 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &cipher_suites
, &(ciphers
),
1176 is_v2_record
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1180 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1183 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1186 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1188 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1189 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1191 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1192 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1201 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1204 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1206 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1211 complen
= PACKET_remaining(&compression
);
1212 for (j
= 0; j
< complen
; j
++) {
1213 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[j
] == 0)
1219 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1224 /* TLS extensions */
1225 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1226 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &extensions
)) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1233 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1234 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1235 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1236 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1240 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1241 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1246 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1247 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1249 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1250 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1251 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1253 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1255 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1256 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1260 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1262 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1267 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1268 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1273 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1274 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1275 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1276 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1277 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1282 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1283 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1284 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1286 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1288 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1289 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1290 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1292 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1293 /* Can't disable compression */
1294 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1296 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1299 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1300 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1301 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1302 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1303 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1307 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1309 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1312 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1313 for (k
= 0; k
< complen
; k
++) {
1314 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[k
] == comp_id
)
1318 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1320 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1325 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1326 /* See if we have a match */
1327 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1330 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1331 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1332 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1334 for (o
= 0; o
< complen
; o
++) {
1335 if (v
== PACKET_data(&compression
)[o
]) {
1344 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1350 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1353 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1360 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1364 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1365 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1367 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1369 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1370 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1371 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1372 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1377 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1383 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1384 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1386 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1388 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1390 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1391 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1395 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1397 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1398 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1400 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1402 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1403 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1404 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1406 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1408 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1415 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1418 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1420 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1422 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1425 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1426 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1427 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1428 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1429 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1430 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1431 /* do not send a session ticket */
1432 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1434 /* Session-id reuse */
1435 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1438 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1439 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1440 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1446 * we now have the following setup.
1448 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1449 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1450 * compression - basically ignored right now
1451 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1452 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1453 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1454 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1457 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1458 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1459 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
, &al
)) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1461 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1469 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1471 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1473 * callback indicates further work to be done
1475 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1478 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1480 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1481 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1483 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1485 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1492 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1494 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1495 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1499 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1502 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1507 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1509 /* Do the message type and length last */
1510 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1512 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1513 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1516 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1517 * tls_process_client_hello()
1519 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1520 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1523 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1524 * back in the server hello:
1525 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1526 * we send back the old session ID.
1527 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1528 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1529 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1530 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1532 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1533 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1534 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1535 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1538 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1539 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1541 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1543 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1544 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1546 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1550 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1553 /* put the cipher */
1554 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char_old(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1557 /* put the compression method */
1558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1561 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1564 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1567 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1569 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1573 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1577 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1583 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
)) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1585 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1592 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1594 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1596 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1600 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1601 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1602 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1609 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1612 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1616 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1621 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1622 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1629 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1631 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1633 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1637 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1641 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1644 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1646 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1649 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
1650 n
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1652 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1653 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1655 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1657 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1658 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1660 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1663 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1664 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1665 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1666 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1668 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1673 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1676 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1678 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1679 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1680 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1682 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1684 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1689 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
1690 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1692 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1695 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1696 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
1697 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1699 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1702 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1708 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
1710 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1715 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1717 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1720 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
1721 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
1724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1725 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1728 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1734 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1735 nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1736 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
1737 if (curve_id
== 0) {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1739 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1742 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
1743 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1744 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1745 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1750 /* Encode the public key. */
1751 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
1753 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1759 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1760 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1761 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1763 n
+= 4 + encodedlen
;
1766 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1767 * can set these to NULLs
1774 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1776 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1777 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1778 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1779 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1781 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1784 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1785 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1786 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1787 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1791 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1793 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1796 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1797 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1799 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1805 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1806 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1807 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1809 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)))
1816 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1817 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1818 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1820 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1823 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1824 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1825 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1827 /* Allow space for signature length */
1834 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1838 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1841 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1842 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1843 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
) {
1844 size_t len
= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1845 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1847 * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1855 memcpy(p
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
, len
);
1863 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1872 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1873 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1876 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
1878 for (j
= 0; j
< (nr
[0] - nr
[2]); ++j
) {
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1892 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1893 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1894 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1895 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1897 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1905 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1906 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1907 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1915 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1916 * points to the space at the end.
1919 /* send signature algorithm */
1920 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1921 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1922 /* Should never happen */
1923 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1925 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1931 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1933 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1934 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1935 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1936 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1937 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1938 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, d
, n
) <= 0
1939 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1940 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1942 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1947 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1950 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1951 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1953 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1958 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
1959 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1964 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1967 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1970 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1973 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1975 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1976 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1980 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1982 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1983 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
1984 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
1990 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1992 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1994 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
1999 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2000 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2001 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2002 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2003 /* Skip over length for now */
2005 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2006 /* Now fill in length */
2016 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2019 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2020 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2021 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2022 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2026 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2028 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2033 /* else no CA names */
2034 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2037 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
)) {
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2042 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2046 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2050 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2053 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2055 PACKET psk_identity
;
2057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2058 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2062 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2063 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2067 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2068 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2073 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2074 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2079 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2082 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2083 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2086 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2088 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2090 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2092 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2096 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2097 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2098 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2100 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2101 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2106 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2110 /* Should never happen */
2111 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2117 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2120 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2122 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2123 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2124 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2126 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2129 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2131 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2136 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2137 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2138 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2140 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2141 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2142 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2149 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2150 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2151 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2152 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2154 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2155 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2160 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2161 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2162 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2168 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2169 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2170 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2171 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2172 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2175 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2179 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2180 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2182 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2183 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2184 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2185 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2188 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2191 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2192 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2193 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2195 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2196 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2201 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2202 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2203 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2204 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2205 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2207 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2210 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2211 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2212 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2213 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2214 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2215 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2218 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2219 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2221 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2222 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2225 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2226 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2227 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2228 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2229 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2230 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2233 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2234 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2235 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2236 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2238 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2239 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2240 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2244 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2245 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2247 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2250 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2251 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2252 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2253 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2255 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2256 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2257 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2258 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2259 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2262 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2263 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2264 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2271 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2274 /* Should never happen */
2275 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2281 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2284 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2288 const unsigned char *data
;
2289 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2292 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2293 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2295 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2298 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2300 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2305 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2306 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2310 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2311 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2312 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2316 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2317 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2321 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2322 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2324 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2326 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2331 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2332 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2338 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2339 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2341 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2344 /* Should never happen */
2345 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2351 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2354 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2355 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2358 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2359 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2360 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2365 const unsigned char *data
;
2368 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2369 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2372 /* Get encoded point length */
2373 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2374 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2375 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2379 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2380 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2384 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2385 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2391 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2392 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2398 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2399 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2401 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2405 /* Should never happen */
2406 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2412 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2416 const unsigned char *data
;
2418 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2419 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2420 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2424 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2428 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2429 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2433 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2434 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2435 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2440 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2447 /* Should never happen */
2448 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2454 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2457 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2458 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2459 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2460 const unsigned char *start
;
2461 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2462 unsigned long alg_a
;
2466 const unsigned char *data
;
2469 /* Get our certificate private key */
2470 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2471 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2473 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2475 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2477 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2480 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2482 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2483 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2486 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2487 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2488 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2492 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2493 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2498 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2499 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2500 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2501 * client certificate for authorization only.
2503 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2504 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2505 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2508 /* Decrypt session key */
2509 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2510 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2511 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2515 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2516 &Tclass
, sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2517 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2518 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2524 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2525 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2526 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2530 /* Generate master secret */
2531 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2532 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2533 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2537 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2538 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2539 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2540 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2544 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2547 /* Should never happen */
2548 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2554 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2557 unsigned long alg_k
;
2559 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2561 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2562 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2565 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2566 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2567 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2568 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2570 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2573 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2574 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2575 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2579 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2580 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2582 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2583 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2585 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2586 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2588 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2589 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2591 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2592 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2595 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2597 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2601 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2604 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2606 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2607 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2609 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2610 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2613 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2616 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2618 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2619 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2621 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2624 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2625 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2627 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2628 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2629 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
2631 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2635 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2636 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2641 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2643 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2644 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2646 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2647 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2648 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2649 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2650 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2651 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2652 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2653 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2656 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2660 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
2662 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2663 * the handshake_buffer
2665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2666 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2669 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2671 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2673 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2674 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2678 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2679 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2681 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2682 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2690 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2692 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2693 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2695 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2697 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2701 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2705 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2709 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2713 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2714 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
2715 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2717 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2719 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2720 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2724 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2726 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2727 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2730 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
2731 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2736 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2739 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2740 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2743 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2745 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2747 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2748 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2752 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2755 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2756 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2758 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2760 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2765 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2767 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2771 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2772 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2773 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2775 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2778 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2780 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2784 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2785 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2787 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2791 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2793 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2794 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2796 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2801 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2802 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2803 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2804 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2805 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2807 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2810 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
2816 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2817 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2818 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2819 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2821 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2825 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2826 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2831 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2834 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2835 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2837 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2838 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2839 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2841 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
2846 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2848 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2850 unsigned long l
, llen
;
2851 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
2852 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
2855 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2860 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
2861 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
2862 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2863 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2868 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
2869 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
2870 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
2871 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2873 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2877 certstart
= certbytes
;
2878 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2883 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
2884 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2886 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2889 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2896 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
2897 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2898 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2899 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2901 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2904 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2905 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2906 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2908 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2909 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2912 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2913 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2918 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
2920 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2922 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
2927 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2930 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
2932 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2934 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2939 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2940 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2941 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2943 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
2944 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
2946 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2947 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2950 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2954 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2955 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2958 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
2962 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2966 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2969 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2973 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2975 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2982 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2984 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
2985 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
2986 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
2987 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
2988 const unsigned char *const_p
;
2989 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
2992 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
2993 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2994 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
2997 /* get session encoding length */
2998 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3000 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3003 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3004 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3007 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3009 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3013 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3014 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3017 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3021 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3024 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3027 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3029 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3030 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3031 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3035 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3036 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3039 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3042 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3043 * follows handshake_header_length +
3044 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3045 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3046 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3047 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3049 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3050 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 6 + sizeof(key_name
) +
3051 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3052 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3055 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3057 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3058 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3060 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3061 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3062 int ret
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3066 l2n(0, p
); /* timeout */
3067 s2n(0, p
); /* length */
3068 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
3069 (s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
)))
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3073 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3078 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3080 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3082 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3083 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3085 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3086 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3088 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
3089 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
3090 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3092 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
3093 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
));
3097 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3098 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3099 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3101 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3103 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3105 /* Output key name */
3107 memcpy(p
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
));
3108 p
+= sizeof(key_name
);
3110 memcpy(p
, iv
, iv_len
);
3112 /* Encrypt session data */
3113 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3116 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, p
, &len
))
3120 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3122 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3126 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3131 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3133 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3134 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3135 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3137 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
))
3144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3145 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3146 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3150 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3156 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3157 * follows handshake_header_length +
3158 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3161 msglen
= 4 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3162 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + msglen
))
3165 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3168 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3169 /* length of OCSP response */
3170 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3171 /* actual response */
3172 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3174 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, msglen
))
3180 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3186 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3187 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3189 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3191 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3192 size_t next_proto_len
;
3195 * The payload looks like:
3197 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3198 * uint8 padding_len;
3199 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3201 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3202 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3203 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3208 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3209 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3213 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3215 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3217 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3218 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3222 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3224 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3225 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3226 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3227 int sslv2format
, int *al
)
3229 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3230 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3232 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3233 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3235 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3237 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3239 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3241 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3245 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3247 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3248 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3252 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3253 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3256 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3264 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3265 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3266 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3270 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3272 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3273 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3274 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3276 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3279 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3280 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3281 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3282 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3283 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3285 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3286 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3289 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3293 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3294 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3295 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3297 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3298 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3301 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3303 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3304 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3310 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3311 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3313 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3315 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3320 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3321 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3330 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3331 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);