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Introduce named constants for the ClientHello callback.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
28
29 /*
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
34 *
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
37 */
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
39 {
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
41
42 /*
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
46 */
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
48 default:
49 break;
50
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
55 return 1;
56 }
57 break;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
61 return 1;
62 }
63 break;
64 }
65 /* Fall through */
66
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
72 return 1;
73 }
74 } else {
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
77 return 1;
78 }
79 }
80 break;
81
82 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
86 return 1;
87 }
88 } else {
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
91 return 1;
92 }
93 }
94 break;
95
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
99 return 1;
100 }
101 break;
102
103 case TLS_ST_OK:
104 /*
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
107 */
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
109 break;
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
112 return 1;
113 }
114 break;
115 }
116
117 /* No valid transition found */
118 return 0;
119 }
120
121 /*
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
126 *
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
129 */
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
131 {
132 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
133
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
136 goto err;
137 return 1;
138 }
139
140 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 default:
142 break;
143
144 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
145 case TLS_ST_OK:
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
149 return 1;
150 }
151 break;
152
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
154 /*
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
157 * OR
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
160 * AND
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
163 */
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
165 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
166 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
167 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
168 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
169 /*
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
172 * cert.
173 */
174 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
175 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
177 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
178 return 0;
179 }
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
181 return 1;
182 }
183 } else {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
185 return 1;
186 }
187 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
188 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 }
193 break;
194
195 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
198 return 1;
199 }
200 break;
201
202 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
203 /*
204 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
205 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
206 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
207 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
208 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
209 * set.
210 */
211 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
213 /*
214 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
215 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
216 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
217 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 */
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
220 return 1;
221 }
222 } else {
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
225 return 1;
226 }
227 }
228 break;
229
230 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
233 return 1;
234 }
235 break;
236
237 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
239 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 } else {
245 #endif
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
248 return 1;
249 }
250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
251 }
252 #endif
253 break;
254
255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
256 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
259 return 1;
260 }
261 break;
262 #endif
263
264 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
267 return 1;
268 }
269 break;
270 }
271
272 err:
273 /* No valid transition found */
274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
276 return 0;
277 }
278
279 /*
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
281 *
282 * Valid return values are:
283 * 1: Yes
284 * 0: No
285 */
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
287 {
288 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
289
290 /*
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
296 * key exchange.
297 */
298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
299 /*
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
301 * provided
302 */
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
306 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
309 #endif
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
313 #endif
314 ) {
315 return 1;
316 }
317
318 return 0;
319 }
320
321 /*
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
323 *
324 * Valid return values are:
325 * 1: Yes
326 * 0: No
327 */
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
329 {
330 if (
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
333 /*
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
336 */
337 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
338 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
339 /*
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
342 * RFC 2246):
343 */
344 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
345 /*
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
348 * this for SSL 3)
349 */
350 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
353 /*
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
355 * are omitted
356 */
357 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
358 return 1;
359 }
360
361 return 0;
362 }
363
364 /*
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
367 * client.
368 */
369 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 {
371 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
372
373 /*
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
376 */
377
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 default:
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
382
383 case TLS_ST_OK:
384 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
385 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
386 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 }
388 /* Try to read from the client instead */
389 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
390
391 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
392 if (s->hello_retry_request)
393 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
394 else
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397
398 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401
402 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
405
406 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
407 if (s->hit)
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
409 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
410 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
411 else
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
413
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415
416 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419
420 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423
424 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427
428 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431
432 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
433 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
434
435 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
436 /*
437 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
438 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
439 * immediately.
440 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
441 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
442 * session ticket?
443 */
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446
447 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
448 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 }
452 /* Fall through */
453
454 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
455 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 }
459 }
460
461 /*
462 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
463 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
464 */
465 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
466 {
467 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
468
469 /*
470 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
471 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
472 */
473
474 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
475 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
476
477 switch (st->hand_state) {
478 default:
479 /* Shouldn't happen */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
481
482 case TLS_ST_OK:
483 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
484 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
486 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
487 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 }
489 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
490 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
491 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
492 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
493 }
494 /* Fall through */
495
496 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
497 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499
500 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503
504 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
506 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
507 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
508 else
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511
512 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
513 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
516 if (s->hit) {
517 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
519 else
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
521 } else {
522 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
523 /* normal PSK or SRP */
524 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
525 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
527 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
529 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
530 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
531 } else {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
533 }
534 }
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536
537 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
538 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 }
542 /* Fall through */
543
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
545 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 }
549 /* Fall through */
550
551 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
552 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555 }
556 /* Fall through */
557
558 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
561
562 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
564
565 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
566 if (s->hit) {
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
571 } else {
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
573 }
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575
576 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579
580 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583
584 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
585 if (s->hit) {
586 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
587 }
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
589 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 }
591 }
592
593 /*
594 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
595 * the server to the client.
596 */
597 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
598 {
599 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
600
601 switch (st->hand_state) {
602 default:
603 /* No pre work to be done */
604 break;
605
606 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
607 s->shutdown = 0;
608 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
609 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
610 break;
611
612 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
613 s->shutdown = 0;
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
616 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
617 st->use_timer = 0;
618 }
619 break;
620
621 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
623 /*
624 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
625 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
626 */
627 st->use_timer = 1;
628 }
629 break;
630
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
635 #endif
636 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
637
638 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
639 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
640 /*
641 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
642 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
643 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
644 */
645 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
646 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
647 /*
648 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
649 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
650 */
651 st->use_timer = 0;
652 }
653 break;
654
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
657 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
659 return WORK_ERROR;
660 }
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 /*
663 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
664 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
665 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
666 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
667 */
668 st->use_timer = 0;
669 }
670 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
671
672 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
673 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
675 /* Fall through */
676
677 case TLS_ST_OK:
678 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
679 }
680
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
682 }
683
684 /*
685 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
686 * server to the client.
687 */
688 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
689 {
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
691
692 s->init_num = 0;
693
694 switch (st->hand_state) {
695 default:
696 /* No post work to be done */
697 break;
698
699 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
700 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
701 return WORK_MORE_A;
702 break;
703
704 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
705 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
706 return WORK_MORE_A;
707 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
708 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
709 return WORK_ERROR;
710 }
711 break;
712
713 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
714 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 return WORK_MORE_A;
716 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
717 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
718 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
719 return WORK_ERROR;
720 }
721 /*
722 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
723 * treat like it was the first packet
724 */
725 s->first_packet = 1;
726 break;
727
728 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
731 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
732 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
733
734 /*
735 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
736 * SCTP used.
737 */
738 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
739 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
740
741 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
742 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
743 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
744 0) <= 0) {
745 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
746 return WORK_ERROR;
747 }
748
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
750 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
751 }
752 #endif
753 /*
754 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
755 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
756 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
757 * something clever in the record layer for this.
758 */
759 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
760 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
761 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
762 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
763 return WORK_ERROR;
764
765 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
766 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
767 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
768 return WORK_ERROR;
769 }
770 break;
771
772 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
774 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
775 /*
776 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
777 * no SCTP used.
778 */
779 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
780 0, NULL);
781 }
782 #endif
783 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
784 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
785 {
786 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
787 return WORK_ERROR;
788 }
789
790 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
791 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
792 break;
793
794 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
795 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
796 return WORK_MORE_A;
797 break;
798
799 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
800 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
801 return WORK_MORE_A;
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
804 /*
805 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
806 * no SCTP used.
807 */
808 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
809 0, NULL);
810 }
811 #endif
812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
814 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
815 &s->session->master_key_length)
816 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
817 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
818 return WORK_ERROR;
819 }
820 break;
821
822 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
823 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
824 return WORK_MORE_A;
825 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
826 return WORK_ERROR;
827 break;
828
829 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
830 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 return WORK_MORE_A;
832 break;
833 }
834
835 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
836 }
837
838 /*
839 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
840 * server
841 *
842 * Valid return values are:
843 * 1: Success
844 * 0: Error
845 */
846 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
847 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
848 {
849 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
850
851 switch (st->hand_state) {
852 default:
853 /* Shouldn't happen */
854 return 0;
855
856 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
857 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
858 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
859 else
860 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
861 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
862 break;
863
864 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
865 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
866 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
867 break;
868
869 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
870 /* No construction function needed */
871 *confunc = NULL;
872 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
873 break;
874
875 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
876 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
877 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
878 break;
879
880 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
881 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
882 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
883 break;
884
885 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
886 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
887 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
888 break;
889
890
891 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
892 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
893 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
894 break;
895
896 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
897 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
898 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
899 break;
900
901 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
902 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
904 break;
905
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
907 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
909 break;
910
911 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
912 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
914 break;
915
916 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
917 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
918 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
919 break;
920
921 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
922 *confunc = NULL;
923 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
924 break;
925
926 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
929 break;
930
931 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
934 break;
935
936 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
937 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
938 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
939 break;
940 }
941
942 return 1;
943 }
944
945 /*
946 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
947 * calculated as follows:
948 *
949 * 2 + # client_version
950 * 32 + # only valid length for random
951 * 1 + # length of session_id
952 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
953 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
954 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
955 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
956 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
957 * 2 + # length of extensions
958 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
959 */
960 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
961
962 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
963 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
964
965 /*
966 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
967 * reading. Excludes the message header.
968 */
969 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
970 {
971 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
972
973 switch (st->hand_state) {
974 default:
975 /* Shouldn't happen */
976 return 0;
977
978 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
979 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
980
981 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
982 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
983
984 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
985 return s->max_cert_list;
986
987 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
988 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
989
990 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
991 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
992
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
994 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
995 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
996 #endif
997
998 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
999 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1000
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1002 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1003
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1005 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1006 }
1007 }
1008
1009 /*
1010 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1011 */
1012 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1013 {
1014 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1015
1016 switch (st->hand_state) {
1017 default:
1018 /* Shouldn't happen */
1019 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1020
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1022 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1023
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1025 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1026
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1028 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1029
1030 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1031 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1032
1033 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1034 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1035
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1037 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1038 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1039 #endif
1040
1041 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1042 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1045 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1048 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1049
1050 }
1051 }
1052
1053 /*
1054 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1055 * from the client
1056 */
1057 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1058 {
1059 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1060
1061 switch (st->hand_state) {
1062 default:
1063 /* Shouldn't happen */
1064 return WORK_ERROR;
1065
1066 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1067 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1068
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1070 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1071 }
1072 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1073 }
1074
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1076 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1077 {
1078 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1079
1080 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1081
1082 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1083 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1084 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1085 /*
1086 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1087 * login name
1088 */
1089 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1090 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1091 } else {
1092 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1093 }
1094 }
1095 return ret;
1096 }
1097 #endif
1098
1099 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1100 size_t cookie_len)
1101 {
1102 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1103 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1105 return 0;
1106
1107 return 1;
1108 }
1109
1110 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1111 {
1112 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1113 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1114 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1115 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1116 cookie_leni > 255) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1118 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1119 return 0;
1120 }
1121 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1122
1123 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1124 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 return 0;
1127 }
1128
1129 return 1;
1130 }
1131
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1133 /*-
1134 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1135 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1136 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1137 * SNI,
1138 * elliptic_curves
1139 * ec_point_formats
1140 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1141 *
1142 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1143 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1144 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1145 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1146 */
1147 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1148 {
1149 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1150 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1151 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1152 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1153 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1154 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1155 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1156
1157 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1158 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1159 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1160 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1161 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1162 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1163 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1164 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1165 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1166 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1167 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1168 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1169 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1170 };
1171 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1172 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1173 unsigned int type;
1174 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1175 size_t ext_len;
1176
1177 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1178
1179 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1180 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1181 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1182 return;
1183 }
1184
1185 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1186 return;
1187
1188 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1189 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1190
1191 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1192 ext_len);
1193 }
1194 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1195
1196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1197 {
1198 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1199 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1200 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1201 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1202 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1203
1204 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1205 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 goto err;
1208 }
1209 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1210 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1211 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1212 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1213 goto err;
1214 }
1215 s->renegotiate = 1;
1216 s->new_session = 1;
1217 }
1218
1219 /*
1220 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1221 */
1222 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1223 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1224
1225 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1226 unsigned int mt;
1227
1228 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1229 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1231 goto f_err;
1232 }
1233
1234 /*-
1235 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1236 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1237 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1238 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1239 * Byte Content
1240 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1241 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1242 * 3-4 version
1243 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1244 * 7-8 session_id_length
1245 * 9-10 challenge_length
1246 * ... ...
1247 */
1248
1249 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1250 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1251 /*
1252 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1253 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1254 * in the first place
1255 */
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 goto err;
1258 }
1259 }
1260
1261 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1262 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1264 goto err;
1265 }
1266
1267 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1268 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1269 /*
1270 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1271 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1272 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1273 */
1274 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1275 PACKET challenge;
1276
1277 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1278 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1279 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1281 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 goto f_err;
1284 }
1285
1286 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1287 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 goto f_err;
1290 }
1291
1292 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1293 ciphersuite_len)
1294 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1295 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1296 /* No extensions. */
1297 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1299 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1301 goto f_err;
1302 }
1303 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1304
1305 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1306 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1307 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1308 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1309 */
1310 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1311 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1312 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1313 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1314 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1315 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1316 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1317 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1319 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1320 goto f_err;
1321 }
1322
1323 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1324 } else {
1325 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1326 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1327 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1328 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1329 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1330 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1333 goto f_err;
1334 }
1335
1336 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1337 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1340 goto f_err;
1341 }
1342 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1343 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1344 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1345 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 goto f_err;
1348 }
1349 /*
1350 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1351 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1352 * So check cookie length...
1353 */
1354 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1355 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1356 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1357 }
1358 }
1359
1360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1361 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1363 goto f_err;
1364 }
1365
1366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1369 goto f_err;
1370 }
1371
1372 /* Could be empty. */
1373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1374 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1375 } else {
1376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1377 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1380 goto f_err;
1381 }
1382 }
1383 }
1384
1385 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1386 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1387 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1388 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 goto f_err;
1391 }
1392
1393 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1394 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1395 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1396 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1397 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1398 /* SSLerr already been called */
1399 goto f_err;
1400 }
1401 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1402
1403 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1404 f_err:
1405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1406 err:
1407 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1408
1409 if (clienthello != NULL)
1410 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1411 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1412
1413 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1414 }
1415
1416 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal)
1417 {
1418 unsigned int j;
1419 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1420 int protverr;
1421 size_t loop;
1422 unsigned long id;
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1424 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1425 #endif
1426 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1427 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1428 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1429 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1430 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1431
1432 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1433 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1434 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1435 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1436 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1437 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1438 break;
1439 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1440 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1441 return -1;
1442 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1443 default:
1444 goto err;
1445 }
1446 }
1447
1448 /* Set up the client_random */
1449 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1450
1451 /* Choose the version */
1452
1453 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1454 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1455 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1456 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1457 /*
1458 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1459 * support it.
1460 */
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1462 goto err;
1463 }
1464 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1465 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1466 }
1467 /*
1468 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1469 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1470 */
1471 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1472 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1473 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1474 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1475 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1476 } else {
1477 protverr = 0;
1478 }
1479
1480 if (protverr) {
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1482 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1483 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1484 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1485 }
1486 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1487 goto err;
1488 }
1489
1490 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1492 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1494 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1495 goto err;
1496 }
1497
1498 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1499 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1500 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1501 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1502 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1503 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1504 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1506 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1507 goto err;
1508 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1509 }
1510 /* default verification */
1511 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1512 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1513 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1514 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1516 goto err;
1517 }
1518 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1519 }
1520 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1521 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1522 if (protverr != 0) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1524 s->version = s->client_version;
1525 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1526 goto err;
1527 }
1528 }
1529 }
1530
1531 s->hit = 0;
1532
1533 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1534 clienthello->isv2, &al) ||
1535 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1536 clienthello->isv2, &al)) {
1537 goto err;
1538 }
1539
1540 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1541 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1542 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1543 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1544 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1545 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1546 if (s->renegotiate) {
1547 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1549 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1550 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1554 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1555 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1556 /*
1557 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1558 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1559 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1560 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1561 * an insecure downgrade.
1562 */
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1564 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1565 al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1566 goto err;
1567 }
1568 }
1569 }
1570
1571 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1572 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1573 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1574 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1575
1576 if (cipher == NULL) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1578 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1579 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1580 goto err;
1581 }
1582 if (s->hello_retry_request
1583 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1584 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1585 /*
1586 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1587 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1588 */
1589 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1591 goto err;
1592 }
1593 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1594 }
1595
1596 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1597 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1598 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1599 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1601 goto err;
1602 }
1603
1604 /*
1605 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1606 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1607 *
1608 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1609 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1610 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1611 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1612 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1613 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1614 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1615 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1616 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1617 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1618 * ignored.
1619 */
1620 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1621 (s->new_session &&
1622 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1623 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1624 goto err;
1625 } else {
1626 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al);
1627 if (i == 1) {
1628 /* previous session */
1629 s->hit = 1;
1630 } else if (i == -1) {
1631 goto err;
1632 } else {
1633 /* i == 0 */
1634 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1635 goto err;
1636 }
1637 }
1638
1639 /*
1640 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1641 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1642 */
1643 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1644 j = 0;
1645 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1646
1647 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1648 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1649 #endif
1650 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1651 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1652 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1653 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1654 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1655 #endif
1656 if (c->id == id) {
1657 j = 1;
1658 break;
1659 }
1660 }
1661 if (j == 0) {
1662 /*
1663 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1664 * to reuse it
1665 */
1666 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1668 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1669 goto err;
1670 }
1671 }
1672
1673 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1674 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1675 break;
1676 }
1677
1678 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1679 /* no compress */
1680 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1682 goto err;
1683 }
1684
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1686 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1687 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1688 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1689
1690 /* TLS extensions */
1691 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1692 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1694 goto err;
1695 }
1696
1697 /*
1698 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1699 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1700 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1701 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1702 */
1703 {
1704 unsigned char *pos;
1705 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1706 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1707 goto err;
1708 }
1709 }
1710
1711 if (!s->hit
1712 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1713 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1714 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1715 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1716 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1717 /*
1718 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1719 * backwards compat reasons
1720 */
1721 int master_key_length;
1722
1723 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1724 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1725 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1726 &pref_cipher,
1727 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1728 && master_key_length > 0) {
1729 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1730 s->hit = 1;
1731 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1732 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1733
1734 ciphers = NULL;
1735
1736 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1737 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1738 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1739 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1740 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1741 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1743 goto err;
1744 }
1745
1746 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1747 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1748 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1749 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1750 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1751 }
1752 }
1753
1754 /*
1755 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1756 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1757 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1758 */
1759 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1760 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1761 /*
1762 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1763 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1764 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1765 */
1766 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1767 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1769 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1770 goto err;
1771 }
1772 }
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1774 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1775 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1776 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1777 unsigned int k;
1778 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1779 /* Can't disable compression */
1780 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1782 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1783 goto err;
1784 }
1785 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1786 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1787 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1788 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1789 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1790 break;
1791 }
1792 }
1793 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1795 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1796 goto err;
1797 }
1798 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1799 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1800 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1801 break;
1802 }
1803 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1804 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1806 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1807 goto err;
1808 }
1809 } else if (s->hit) {
1810 comp = NULL;
1811 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1812 /* See if we have a match */
1813 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1814 unsigned int o;
1815
1816 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1817 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1818 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1819 v = comp->id;
1820 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1821 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1822 done = 1;
1823 break;
1824 }
1825 }
1826 if (done)
1827 break;
1828 }
1829 if (done)
1830 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1831 else
1832 comp = NULL;
1833 }
1834 #else
1835 /*
1836 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1837 * using compression.
1838 */
1839 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1841 goto err;
1842 }
1843 #endif
1844
1845 /*
1846 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1847 */
1848
1849 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1850 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1851 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1852 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1853 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857 ciphers = NULL;
1858 }
1859
1860 if (!s->hit) {
1861 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1862 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1863 #else
1864 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1865 #endif
1866 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1868 goto err;
1869 }
1870 }
1871
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1873 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1874 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1875 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1876 s->clienthello = NULL;
1877 return 1;
1878 err:
1879 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1880 *pal = al;
1881
1882 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1883 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1884 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1885 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1886 s->clienthello = NULL;
1887
1888 return 0;
1889 }
1890
1891 /*
1892 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1893 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1894 */
1895 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1896 {
1897 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1898
1899 /*
1900 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1901 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1902 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1903 * influence which certificate is sent
1904 */
1905 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1906 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1907 int ret;
1908
1909 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1910 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1911 /*
1912 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1913 * et al can pick it up.
1914 */
1915 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1916 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1917 switch (ret) {
1918 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1919 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1920 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1921 break;
1922 /* status request response should be sent */
1923 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1924 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1925 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1926 break;
1927 /* something bad happened */
1928 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1929 default:
1930 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1931 return 0;
1932 }
1933 }
1934 }
1935
1936 return 1;
1937 }
1938
1939 /*
1940 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1941 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1942 */
1943 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s, int *al)
1944 {
1945 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1946 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1947
1948 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1949 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1950 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1951 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1952 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
1953
1954 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1955 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1956 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1957 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1958 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 return 0;
1960 }
1961 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1963 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1964 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1965 #endif
1966
1967 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
1968 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1969 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
1970 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
1971 selected_len) != 0) {
1972 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
1973 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1974
1975 if (!s->hit) {
1976 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
1977 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
1978 selected_len);
1979 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1980 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 return 0;
1982 }
1983 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1984 }
1985 }
1986
1987 return 1;
1988 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992 /*
1993 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
1994 * present.
1995 */
1996 }
1997
1998 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
1999 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2000 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2001 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2002 }
2003
2004 return 1;
2005 }
2006
2007 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2008 {
2009 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2010 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2011
2012 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2013 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
2014 if (rv == 0) {
2015 /* SSLErr() was already called */
2016 goto f_err;
2017 }
2018 if (rv < 0)
2019 return WORK_MORE_A;
2020 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2021 }
2022 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2023 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2024 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2025 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2026 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2027 if (rv == 0) {
2028 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2030 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2031 goto f_err;
2032 }
2033 if (rv < 0) {
2034 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2035 return WORK_MORE_B;
2036 }
2037 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2038 }
2039
2040 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2041 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2042 cipher =
2043 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2044
2045 if (cipher == NULL) {
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2047 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2048 goto f_err;
2049 }
2050 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2051 }
2052 if (!s->hit) {
2053 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
2054 goto f_err;
2055 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2056 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2057 s->session->not_resumable =
2058 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2059 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2060 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2061 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2062 /* do not send a session ticket */
2063 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2064 }
2065 } else {
2066 /* Session-id reuse */
2067 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2068 }
2069
2070 /*-
2071 * we now have the following setup.
2072 * client_random
2073 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2074 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2075 * compression - basically ignored right now
2076 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2077 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2078 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2079 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2080 */
2081
2082 /*
2083 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2084 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2085 */
2086 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2088 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2089 goto f_err;
2090 }
2091 /*
2092 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2093 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2094 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2095 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2096 */
2097 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s, &al)) {
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2099 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2100 goto f_err;
2101 }
2102
2103 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2104 }
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2106 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2107 int ret;
2108 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2109 /*
2110 * callback indicates further work to be done
2111 */
2112 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2113 return WORK_MORE_C;
2114 }
2115 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2116 /*
2117 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2118 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2119 */
2120 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2122 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2123 else
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2125 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2126 goto f_err;
2127 }
2128 }
2129 #endif
2130
2131 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2132 f_err:
2133 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2134 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2135 return WORK_ERROR;
2136 }
2137
2138 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2139 {
2140 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 size_t sl, len;
2142 int version;
2143
2144 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2145 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2146 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2147 /*
2148 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2149 * tls_process_client_hello()
2150 */
2151 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2153 goto err;
2154 }
2155
2156 /*-
2157 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2158 * back in the server hello:
2159 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2160 * we send back the old session ID.
2161 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2162 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2163 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2164 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2165 * session ID.
2166 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2167 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2168 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2169 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2170 * to send back.
2171 */
2172 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2173 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2174 && !s->hit))
2175 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2176
2177 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2178 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2180 goto err;
2181 }
2182
2183 /* set up the compression method */
2184 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2185 compm = 0;
2186 #else
2187 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2188 compm = 0;
2189 else
2190 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2191 #endif
2192
2193 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2194 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2195 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2196 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2197 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2198 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2199 SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2200 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2201 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2202 NULL, 0, &al)) {
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2204 goto err;
2205 }
2206
2207 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2208 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2209 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2210 goto err;
2211 }
2212
2213 return 1;
2214 err:
2215 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218
2219 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2220 {
2221 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2222 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2223 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226 }
2227 return 1;
2228 }
2229
2230 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2231 {
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2233 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2234 #endif
2235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2236 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2237 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2238 int curve_id = 0;
2239 #endif
2240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2241 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2242 unsigned long type;
2243 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2244 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2245 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2246 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2247
2248 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2250 goto f_err;
2251 }
2252
2253 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2255 goto f_err;
2256 }
2257
2258 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2259
2260 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2262 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2263 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2264 } else
2265 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2267 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2268 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2269
2270 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2271 DH *dh;
2272
2273 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2274 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2275 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2276 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2277 DH_free(dhp);
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2280 goto f_err;
2281 }
2282 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2283 pkdhp = pkdh;
2284 } else {
2285 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2286 }
2287 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2288 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2289 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2290 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2293 goto f_err;
2294 }
2295 pkdhp = pkdh;
2296 }
2297 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2301 goto f_err;
2302 }
2303 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2304 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2305 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2308 goto f_err;
2309 }
2310 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2313 goto err;
2314 }
2315
2316 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2317
2318 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2320 goto err;
2321 }
2322
2323 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2324
2325 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2326 pkdh = NULL;
2327
2328 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2329 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2330 } else
2331 #endif
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2333 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2334 int nid;
2335
2336 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 goto err;
2340 }
2341
2342 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2343 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2344 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2345 if (curve_id == 0) {
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2348 goto err;
2349 }
2350 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2351 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2352 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2354 goto f_err;
2355 }
2356
2357 /* Encode the public key. */
2358 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2359 &encodedPoint);
2360 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364
2365 /*
2366 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2367 * can set these to NULLs
2368 */
2369 r[0] = NULL;
2370 r[1] = NULL;
2371 r[2] = NULL;
2372 r[3] = NULL;
2373 } else
2374 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2376 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2377 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2378 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2379 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2382 goto err;
2383 }
2384 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2385 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2386 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2387 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2388 } else
2389 #endif
2390 {
2391 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2393 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2394 goto f_err;
2395 }
2396
2397 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2398 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2399 lu = NULL;
2400 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 goto f_err;
2403 }
2404
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2406 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2407 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2408 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2409
2410 /*
2411 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2412 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2413 */
2414 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2415 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2416 len)) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 goto f_err;
2420 }
2421 }
2422 #endif
2423
2424 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2425 unsigned char *binval;
2426 int res;
2427
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2429 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2430 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2431 } else
2432 #endif
2433 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2434
2435 if (!res) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2438 goto f_err;
2439 }
2440
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2442 /*-
2443 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2444 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2445 * as the prime
2446 */
2447 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2448 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2449
2450 if (len > 0) {
2451 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 goto f_err;
2455 }
2456 memset(binval, 0, len);
2457 }
2458 }
2459 #endif
2460 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2461 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2464 goto f_err;
2465 }
2466
2467 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2468 }
2469
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2471 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2472 /*
2473 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2474 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2475 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2476 * point itself
2477 */
2478 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2480 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2481 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2484 goto f_err;
2485 }
2486 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2487 encodedPoint = NULL;
2488 }
2489 #endif
2490
2491 /* not anonymous */
2492 if (lu != NULL) {
2493 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2494 const EVP_MD *md;
2495 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2496 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2497 int rv;
2498
2499 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2500 /* Should never happen */
2501 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2503 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2504 goto f_err;
2505 }
2506 /*
2507 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2508 * points to the space at the end.
2509 */
2510
2511 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2512 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 goto f_err;
2516 }
2517 /* send signature algorithm */
2518 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2519 return 0;
2520 /*
2521 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2522 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2523 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2524 * afterwards.
2525 */
2526 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2527 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2528 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2531 goto f_err;
2532 }
2533 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2534 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2535 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2538 goto f_err;
2539 }
2540 }
2541 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2542 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2543 paramlen);
2544 if (tbslen == 0) {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 goto f_err;
2548 }
2549 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2550 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2551 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2552 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 goto f_err;
2556 }
2557 }
2558
2559 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2560 return 1;
2561 f_err:
2562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2563 err:
2564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2565 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2566 #endif
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2568 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2569 #endif
2570 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2571 return 0;
2572 }
2573
2574 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2575 {
2576 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2577
2578 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2579 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2580 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2582 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2583 goto err;
2584 }
2585
2586 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2587 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2588 0, &al)) {
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2591 goto err;
2592 }
2593 goto done;
2594 }
2595
2596 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2597 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2598 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2600 goto err;
2601 }
2602
2603 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2604 const uint16_t *psigs;
2605 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2606
2607 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2608 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2609 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2610 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2612 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 goto err;
2614 }
2615 }
2616
2617 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2619 goto err;
2620 }
2621
2622 done:
2623 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2624 return 1;
2625 err:
2626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2627 return 0;
2628 }
2629
2630 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2631 {
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2633 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2634 size_t psklen;
2635 PACKET psk_identity;
2636
2637 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2640 return 0;
2641 }
2642 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2645 return 0;
2646 }
2647 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2648 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2650 return 0;
2651 }
2652
2653 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2654 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2656 return 0;
2657 }
2658
2659 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2660 psk, sizeof(psk));
2661
2662 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2663 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2665 return 0;
2666 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2667 /*
2668 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2669 */
2670 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2672 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2673 return 0;
2674 }
2675
2676 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2677 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2678 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2679
2680 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2681 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2683 return 0;
2684 }
2685
2686 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2687
2688 return 1;
2689 #else
2690 /* Should never happen */
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2693 return 0;
2694 #endif
2695 }
2696
2697 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2698 {
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2700 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2701 int decrypt_len;
2702 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2703 size_t j, padding_len;
2704 PACKET enc_premaster;
2705 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2706 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2707 int ret = 0;
2708
2709 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2710 if (rsa == NULL) {
2711 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2713 return 0;
2714 }
2715
2716 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2718 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2719 } else {
2720 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2721 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2722 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2724 return 0;
2725 }
2726 }
2727
2728 /*
2729 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2730 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2731 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2732 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2733 */
2734 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2735 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739
2740 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2741 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2742 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2744 return 0;
2745 }
2746
2747 /*
2748 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2749 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2750 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2751 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2752 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2753 */
2754
2755 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2756 goto err;
2757
2758 /*
2759 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2760 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2761 */
2762 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2763 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2764 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2765 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2766 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2767 goto err;
2768
2769 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2770
2771 /*
2772 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2773 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2774 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2775 */
2776 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2777 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2779 goto err;
2780 }
2781
2782 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2783 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2784 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2785 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2786 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2787 }
2788 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2789
2790 /*
2791 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2792 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2793 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2794 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2795 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2796 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2797 */
2798 version_good =
2799 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2800 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2801 version_good &=
2802 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2803 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2804
2805 /*
2806 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2807 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2808 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2809 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2810 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2811 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2812 * clients.
2813 */
2814 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2815 unsigned char workaround_good;
2816 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2817 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2818 workaround_good &=
2819 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2820 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2821 version_good |= workaround_good;
2822 }
2823
2824 /*
2825 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2826 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2827 */
2828 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2829
2830 /*
2831 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2832 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2833 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2834 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2835 */
2836 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2837 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2838 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2839 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2840 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2841 }
2842
2843 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2844 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2845 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 goto err;
2848 }
2849
2850 ret = 1;
2851 err:
2852 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2853 return ret;
2854 #else
2855 /* Should never happen */
2856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 return 0;
2859 #endif
2860 }
2861
2862 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2863 {
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2865 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2866 DH *cdh;
2867 unsigned int i;
2868 BIGNUM *pub_key;
2869 const unsigned char *data;
2870 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2871 int ret = 0;
2872
2873 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2874 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2876 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2877 goto err;
2878 }
2879 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2880 if (skey == NULL) {
2881 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2883 goto err;
2884 }
2885
2886 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2887 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2889 goto err;
2890 }
2891 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2892 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2893 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2895 goto err;
2896 }
2897 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2898 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2900 goto err;
2901 }
2902 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2903 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2904
2905 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2907 if (pub_key != NULL)
2908 BN_free(pub_key);
2909 goto err;
2910 }
2911
2912 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2913 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 goto err;
2916 }
2917
2918 ret = 1;
2919 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2920 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2921 err:
2922 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2923 return ret;
2924 #else
2925 /* Should never happen */
2926 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2928 return 0;
2929 #endif
2930 }
2931
2932 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2933 {
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2935 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2936 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2937 int ret = 0;
2938
2939 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2940 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2941 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2943 goto err;
2944 } else {
2945 unsigned int i;
2946 const unsigned char *data;
2947
2948 /*
2949 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2950 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2951 */
2952
2953 /* Get encoded point length */
2954 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2955 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2958 goto err;
2959 }
2960 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2961 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2963 goto err;
2964 }
2965 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2966 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2968 goto err;
2969 }
2970 }
2971
2972 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2973 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 goto err;
2976 }
2977
2978 ret = 1;
2979 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2980 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2981 err:
2982 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2983
2984 return ret;
2985 #else
2986 /* Should never happen */
2987 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2989 return 0;
2990 #endif
2991 }
2992
2993 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2994 {
2995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2996 unsigned int i;
2997 const unsigned char *data;
2998
2999 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3000 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3003 return 0;
3004 }
3005 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3006 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3008 return 0;
3009 }
3010 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3011 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3013 return 0;
3014 }
3015 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3016 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3017 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3019 return 0;
3020 }
3021
3022 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3024 return 0;
3025 }
3026
3027 return 1;
3028 #else
3029 /* Should never happen */
3030 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3032 return 0;
3033 #endif
3034 }
3035
3036 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
3037 {
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3039 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3040 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3041 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3042 const unsigned char *start;
3043 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3044 unsigned long alg_a;
3045 int Ttag, Tclass;
3046 long Tlen;
3047 size_t sess_key_len;
3048 const unsigned char *data;
3049 int ret = 0;
3050
3051 /* Get our certificate private key */
3052 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3053 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3054 /*
3055 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3056 */
3057 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3058 if (pk == NULL) {
3059 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3060 }
3061 if (pk == NULL) {
3062 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3063 }
3064 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3065 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3066 }
3067
3068 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3069 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3072 return 0;
3073 }
3074 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3075 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 return 0;
3078 }
3079 /*
3080 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3081 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3082 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3083 * client certificate for authorization only.
3084 */
3085 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3086 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3087 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3088 ERR_clear_error();
3089 }
3090 /* Decrypt session key */
3091 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3092 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3093 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3095 goto err;
3096 }
3097 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3098 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3099 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3100 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3103 goto err;
3104 }
3105 start = data;
3106 inlen = Tlen;
3107 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3108 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3111 goto err;
3112 }
3113 /* Generate master secret */
3114 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3115 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3116 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 goto err;
3119 }
3120 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3121 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3122 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3123 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3124
3125 ret = 1;
3126 err:
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3128 return ret;
3129 #else
3130 /* Should never happen */
3131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 return 0;
3134 #endif
3135 }
3136
3137 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3138 {
3139 int al = -1;
3140 unsigned long alg_k;
3141
3142 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3143
3144 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3145 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3146 goto err;
3147
3148 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3149 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3150 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3153 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3154 goto err;
3155 }
3156 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3157 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3158 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 goto err;
3161 }
3162 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3163 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3164 goto err;
3165 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3166 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3167 goto err;
3168 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3169 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3170 goto err;
3171 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3172 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3173 goto err;
3174 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3175 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3176 goto err;
3177 } else {
3178 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3180 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3181 goto err;
3182 }
3183
3184 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3185 err:
3186 if (al != -1)
3187 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3189 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3190 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3191 #endif
3192 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3193 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3194 }
3195
3196 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3197 {
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3199 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3201 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3202 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3203 /*
3204 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3205 * used.
3206 */
3207 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3208 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3209
3210 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3211 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3212 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3213 0) <= 0) {
3214 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3215 return WORK_ERROR;
3216 }
3217
3218 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3219 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3220 }
3221 }
3222 #endif
3223
3224 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3225 /*
3226 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3227 * the handshake_buffer
3228 */
3229 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3230 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3231 return WORK_ERROR;
3232 }
3233 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3234 } else {
3235 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3238 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3239 return WORK_ERROR;
3240 }
3241 /*
3242 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3243 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3244 */
3245 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3246 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3247 return WORK_ERROR;
3248 }
3249 }
3250
3251 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3252 }
3253
3254 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3255 {
3256 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3257 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3258 X509 *x = NULL;
3259 unsigned long l, llen;
3260 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3261 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3262 PACKET spkt, context;
3263 size_t chainidx;
3264
3265 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3267 goto f_err;
3268 }
3269
3270 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3271 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3272 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3273 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3274 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3275 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3277 goto f_err;
3278 }
3279
3280 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3281 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3282 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3285 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3286 goto f_err;
3287 }
3288
3289 certstart = certbytes;
3290 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3291 if (x == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3293 goto f_err;
3294 }
3295 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3296 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3298 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3299 goto f_err;
3300 }
3301
3302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3303 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3304 PACKET extensions;
3305
3306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3309 goto f_err;
3310 }
3311 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3312 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3313 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
3314 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3315 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
3316 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3317 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3318 goto f_err;
3319 }
3320 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3321 }
3322
3323 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3325 goto f_err;
3326 }
3327 x = NULL;
3328 }
3329
3330 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3331 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3332 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3333 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3335 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3336 goto f_err;
3337 }
3338 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3339 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3340 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3342 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3343 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3344 goto f_err;
3345 }
3346 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3347 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3348 goto f_err;
3349 }
3350 } else {
3351 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3352 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3353 if (i <= 0) {
3354 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3356 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3357 goto f_err;
3358 }
3359 if (i > 1) {
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3362 goto f_err;
3363 }
3364 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3365 if (pkey == NULL) {
3366 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3368 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3369 goto f_err;
3370 }
3371 }
3372
3373 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3374 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3375 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3376
3377 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3378 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3379
3380 /*
3381 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3382 * message
3383 */
3384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3387 goto f_err;
3388 }
3389
3390 /*
3391 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3392 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3393 */
3394 sk = NULL;
3395
3396 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3397 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3398 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3399 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3400 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3401 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3403 goto f_err;
3404 }
3405
3406 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3407 goto done;
3408
3409 f_err:
3410 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3411 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3412 done:
3413 X509_free(x);
3414 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3415 return ret;
3416 }
3417
3418 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3419 {
3420 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3421 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3422
3423 if (cpk == NULL) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3425 return 0;
3426 }
3427
3428 /*
3429 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3430 * for the server Certificate message
3431 */
3432 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3433 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3435 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3436 return 0;
3437 }
3438
3439 return 1;
3440 }
3441
3442 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3443 {
3444 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3445 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3446 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3447 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3448 const unsigned char *const_p;
3449 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3450 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3451 unsigned int hlen;
3452 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3453 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3454 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3455 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3456 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3457 union {
3458 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3459 uint32_t age_add;
3460 } age_add_u;
3461
3462 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3463 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3464 goto err;
3465 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3466 /*
3467 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3468 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3469 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3470 */
3471 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3472 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3473 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3475 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3476 goto err;
3477 }
3478 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3479 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3480 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3481 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3482 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3483 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3484 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3486 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3487 goto err;
3488 }
3489 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3490 }
3491 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3492 }
3493
3494 /* get session encoding length */
3495 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3496 /*
3497 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3498 * long
3499 */
3500 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3502 goto err;
3503 }
3504 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3505 if (senc == NULL) {
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3507 goto err;
3508 }
3509
3510 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3511 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3512 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3514 goto err;
3515 }
3516
3517 p = senc;
3518 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3519 goto err;
3520
3521 /*
3522 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3523 */
3524 const_p = senc;
3525 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3526 if (sess == NULL)
3527 goto err;
3528 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3529
3530 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3531 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3532 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3533 goto err;
3534 }
3535 p = senc;
3536 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3537 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3538 goto err;
3539 }
3540 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3541
3542 /*
3543 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3544 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3545 */
3546 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3547 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3548 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3549 hctx, 1);
3550
3551 if (ret == 0) {
3552
3553 /* Put timeout and length */
3554 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3555 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3558 goto err;
3559 }
3560 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3561 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3562 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3563 return 1;
3564 }
3565 if (ret < 0)
3566 goto err;
3567 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3568 } else {
3569 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3570
3571 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3572 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3573 goto err;
3574 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3575 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3576 goto err;
3577 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3578 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3579 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3580 goto err;
3581 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3582 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3583 }
3584
3585 /*
3586 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3587 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3588 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3589 * timeout.
3590 */
3591 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3592 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3593 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3594 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3595 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3596 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3597 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3598 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3600 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3601 /* Output key name */
3602 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3603 /* output IV */
3604 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3605 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3606 &encdata1)
3607 /* Encrypt session data */
3608 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3609 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3610 || encdata1 != encdata2
3611 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3612 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3613 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3614 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3615 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3616 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3617 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3618 macendoffset - macoffset)
3619 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3620 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3621 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3622 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3623 || macdata1 != macdata2
3624 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3625 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3626 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3627 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3628 NULL, 0, &al))) {
3629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3630 goto err;
3631 }
3632 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3633 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3634 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3635
3636 return 1;
3637 err:
3638 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3639 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3640 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3641 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3642 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3643 return 0;
3644 }
3645
3646 /*
3647 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3648 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3649 */
3650 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3651 {
3652 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3653 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3654 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3656 return 0;
3657 }
3658
3659 return 1;
3660 }
3661
3662 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3663 {
3664 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3666 return 0;
3667 }
3668
3669 return 1;
3670 }
3671
3672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3673 /*
3674 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3675 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3676 */
3677 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3678 {
3679 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3680 size_t next_proto_len;
3681 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3682
3683 /*-
3684 * The payload looks like:
3685 * uint8 proto_len;
3686 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3687 * uint8 padding_len;
3688 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3689 */
3690 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3691 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3692 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3693 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3695 goto err;
3696 }
3697
3698 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3699 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
3700 goto err;
3701 }
3702
3703 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3704
3705 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3706 err:
3707 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3708 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3709 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3710 }
3711 #endif
3712
3713 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3714 {
3715 int al;
3716
3717 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3718 NULL, 0, &al)) {
3719 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3721 return 0;
3722 }
3723
3724 return 1;
3725 }
3726
3727 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3728 {
3729 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3730 size_t len = 0;
3731
3732 /*
3733 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3734 * (should be s->version)
3735 */
3736 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3737 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3738 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3739 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3740 NULL, 0, &al)) {
3741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3742 goto err;
3743 }
3744
3745 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3746 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3747 s->session = NULL;
3748 s->hit = 0;
3749
3750 /*
3751 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3752 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3753 */
3754 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3755 goto err;
3756
3757 return 1;
3758 err:
3759 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3760 return 0;
3761 }
3762
3763 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3764 {
3765 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3766
3767 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3768 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3770 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3772 }
3773
3774 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3775 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3777 goto err;
3778 }
3779
3780 /*
3781 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3782 * a record boundary.
3783 */
3784 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3785 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3787 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3788 goto err;
3789 }
3790
3791 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3792 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3793 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3795 goto err;
3796 }
3797
3798 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3799 err:
3800 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3801 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3802 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3803 }
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