2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
65 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
67 **skp
, int sslv2format
,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
82 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
84 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
90 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
91 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
108 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
109 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
110 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
111 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
130 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
131 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
132 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
139 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
140 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
174 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
175 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
184 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
190 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
200 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
201 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
208 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
209 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
230 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
248 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
280 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
312 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
314 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
336 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
338 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
346 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
347 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
349 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
354 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
357 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
359 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
361 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
367 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
368 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
375 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
382 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
388 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
399 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
400 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
402 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
407 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
411 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
418 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
430 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
432 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
480 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
481 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
509 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
513 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
519 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
528 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
546 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
580 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
592 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
597 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
624 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
626 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
628 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
630 /* Shouldn't happen */
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
635 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
637 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
638 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
641 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
642 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
643 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
647 /* No construction function needed */
649 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
653 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
654 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
658 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
659 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
663 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
664 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
667 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
668 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
669 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
673 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
674 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
677 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
678 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
679 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
682 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
683 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
684 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
687 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
688 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
689 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
697 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
698 * calculated as follows:
700 * 2 + # client_version
701 * 32 + # only valid length for random
702 * 1 + # length of session_id
703 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
704 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
705 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
706 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
707 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
708 * 2 + # length of extensions
709 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
711 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
713 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
714 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
717 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
718 * reading. Excludes the message header.
720 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
722 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
724 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
729 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
730 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
733 return s
->max_cert_list
;
735 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
736 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
738 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
739 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
742 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
743 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
746 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
747 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
749 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
750 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
755 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
759 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
761 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
763 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
767 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
770 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
773 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
776 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
780 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
784 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
787 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
792 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
795 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
797 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
799 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
805 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
808 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
813 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
814 /* Are we renegotiating? */
815 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
816 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
817 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
818 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
819 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
820 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
823 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
826 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
832 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
834 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
836 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
838 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
839 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
840 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
842 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
846 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
848 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
855 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
866 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
868 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
869 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
870 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
871 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
877 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
879 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
880 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
888 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
890 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
891 unsigned int j
, complen
= 0;
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
895 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
897 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
899 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
900 PACKET session_id
, cipher_suites
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
902 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
904 is_v2_record
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
906 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
907 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
909 unsigned int version
;
912 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
913 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
914 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
915 * the rest right through. Its format is:
917 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
918 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
920 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
921 * 7-8 session_id_length
922 * 9-10 challenge_length
926 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
927 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
929 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
930 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
937 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)) {
938 /* No protocol version supplied! */
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
942 if (version
== 0x0002) {
943 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
946 } else if ((version
& 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
948 s
->client_version
= version
;
950 /* No idea what protocol this is */
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
956 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
957 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
959 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
)) {
960 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
967 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
968 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
970 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
971 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
972 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
973 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->client_version
, s
->version
)) {
974 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
981 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
983 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
986 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
988 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
992 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
995 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
996 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
997 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
999 unsigned int cipher_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &cipher_len
)
1003 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1004 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1006 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1007 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1011 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1012 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1017 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &cipher_suites
, cipher_len
)
1018 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &session_id
, session_id_len
)
1019 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1020 /* No extensions. */
1021 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1023 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1024 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1028 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1029 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
:
1031 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1032 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1033 s
->s3
->client_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1034 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1035 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1036 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1038 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1042 PACKET_null_init(&extensions
);
1044 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1045 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1046 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1047 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1052 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id
) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1053 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1058 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1059 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1060 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1065 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1066 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1067 * So check cookie length...
1069 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1070 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) == 0)
1075 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cipher_suites
)
1076 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1077 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1081 /* Could be empty. */
1085 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1086 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1087 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1088 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1089 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&cookie
),
1090 PACKET_remaining(&cookie
)) ==
1092 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1094 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1096 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1098 /* default verification */
1099 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1100 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1104 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1106 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1107 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1108 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1110 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1111 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1120 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1121 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1123 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1124 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1125 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1126 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1127 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1128 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1129 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1130 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1131 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1132 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1137 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1138 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1141 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &extensions
, &session_id
);
1143 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1145 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1146 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1147 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1148 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1149 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1151 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1152 /* previous session */
1154 } else if (i
== -1) {
1158 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1163 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &cipher_suites
, &(ciphers
),
1164 is_v2_record
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1168 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1171 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1174 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1176 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1177 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1179 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1180 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1189 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1192 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1194 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1199 complen
= PACKET_remaining(&compression
);
1200 for (j
= 0; j
< complen
; j
++) {
1201 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[j
] == 0)
1207 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1212 /* TLS extensions */
1213 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1214 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &extensions
)) {
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1221 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1222 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1223 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1224 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1228 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1229 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1234 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1235 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1237 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1238 * backwards compat reasons
1240 int master_key_length
;
1242 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1243 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1244 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1246 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)
1247 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1248 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1250 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1251 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1255 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1257 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1262 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1263 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1268 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1269 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1270 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1271 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1272 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1277 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1278 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1279 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1281 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1283 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1284 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1285 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1287 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1288 /* Can't disable compression */
1289 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1291 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1294 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1295 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1296 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1297 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1298 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1302 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1304 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1307 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1308 for (k
= 0; k
< complen
; k
++) {
1309 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[k
] == comp_id
)
1313 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1315 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1320 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1321 /* See if we have a match */
1322 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1325 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1326 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1327 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1329 for (o
= 0; o
< complen
; o
++) {
1330 if (v
== PACKET_data(&compression
)[o
]) {
1339 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1345 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1346 * using compression.
1348 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1355 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1359 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1360 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1362 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1364 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1365 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1366 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1367 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1372 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1378 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1379 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1381 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1383 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1385 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1386 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1390 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1392 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1393 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1395 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1397 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1398 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1399 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1401 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1403 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1407 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1410 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1413 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1415 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1417 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1420 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1421 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1422 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1423 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1424 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1425 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1426 /* do not send a session ticket */
1427 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1429 /* Session-id reuse */
1430 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1433 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1435 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1441 * we now have the following setup.
1443 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1444 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1445 * compression - basically ignored right now
1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1449 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1453 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1454 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
, &al
)) {
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1456 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1464 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1466 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1468 * callback indicates further work to be done
1470 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1473 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1475 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1476 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1478 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1480 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1487 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1489 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1490 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1494 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1496 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1499 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->version
)
1501 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1502 * tls_process_client_hello()
1504 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1510 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1511 * back in the server hello:
1512 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1513 * we send back the old session ID.
1514 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1515 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1516 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1517 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1519 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1520 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1521 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1522 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1525 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1526 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1528 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1530 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1531 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1536 /* set up the compression method */
1537 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1540 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1543 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1546 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
)
1547 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
1548 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)
1549 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
)
1550 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1557 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1561 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1563 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1564 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1565 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1572 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1575 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1583 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1584 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
1587 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1588 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
1590 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1595 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1600 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1602 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1604 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1605 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1607 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1609 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1610 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1612 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1615 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1616 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1617 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1618 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1624 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1627 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1629 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1630 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1631 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1634 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1639 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
1640 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1642 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1645 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1646 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
1647 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1649 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1652 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1654 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1658 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
1660 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1665 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1667 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1670 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
1671 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1675 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1678 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1684 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1685 nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1686 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
1687 if (curve_id
== 0) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1689 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1692 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
1693 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1694 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1699 /* Encode the public key. */
1700 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
1702 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1708 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1709 * can set these to NULLs
1716 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1718 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1719 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1720 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1721 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1723 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1726 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1727 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1728 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1729 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1733 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1735 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1739 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1740 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1741 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1743 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1751 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1752 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
1753 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1756 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1757 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1759 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1760 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1769 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1770 unsigned char *binval
;
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1774 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1775 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
1778 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1782 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1788 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1789 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1792 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
1793 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
1796 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1801 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
1805 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
1806 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1808 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1812 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1816 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1818 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1819 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1820 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1823 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
1824 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
1825 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
1826 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1828 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1831 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1832 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1839 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1840 * points to the space at the end.
1843 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
1844 unsigned int siglen
;
1846 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1847 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1852 /* send signature algorithm */
1853 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1854 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
1855 /* Should never happen */
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1862 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1865 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1866 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1867 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1870 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
),
1872 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1873 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1874 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1875 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1876 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1877 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
1879 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, pkey
) <= 0
1880 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
1881 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1887 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1888 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1890 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1895 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1898 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1901 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1904 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1906 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1910 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1913 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
1915 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1916 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1917 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
)
1918 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1923 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1924 const unsigned char *psigs
;
1925 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
1926 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1927 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
1928 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1935 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1936 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1941 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1943 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
1944 unsigned char *namebytes
;
1945 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
1949 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
1950 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
1952 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1959 /* else no CA names */
1961 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1966 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1974 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1977 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
1979 PACKET psk_identity
;
1981 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
1982 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1986 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1987 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1991 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
1992 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
1997 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
1998 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2003 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2006 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2007 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2010 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2012 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2014 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2016 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2020 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2021 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2022 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2024 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2025 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2030 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2034 /* Should never happen */
2035 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2041 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2044 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2046 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2047 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2048 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2050 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2053 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2055 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2060 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2061 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2062 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2064 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2065 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2066 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2073 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2074 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2075 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2076 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2078 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2079 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2084 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2085 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2086 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2092 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2093 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2094 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2095 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2096 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2099 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2103 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2104 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2106 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2107 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2108 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2109 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2112 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2115 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2116 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2117 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2119 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2120 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2125 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2126 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2127 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2128 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2129 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2131 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2134 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2135 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2136 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2137 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2138 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2139 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2142 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2143 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2145 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2146 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2149 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2150 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2151 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2152 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2153 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2154 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2157 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2158 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2159 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2160 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2162 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2163 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2164 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2168 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2169 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2171 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2174 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2175 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2176 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2177 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2179 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2180 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2181 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2182 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2183 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2186 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2187 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2188 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2195 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2198 /* Should never happen */
2199 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2205 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2208 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2212 const unsigned char *data
;
2213 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2216 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2217 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2219 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2222 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2224 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2229 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2230 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2234 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2235 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2236 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2240 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2241 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2245 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2246 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2248 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2250 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2255 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2256 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2262 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2263 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2265 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2268 /* Should never happen */
2269 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2275 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2278 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2279 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2282 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2283 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2284 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2289 const unsigned char *data
;
2292 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2293 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2296 /* Get encoded point length */
2297 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2298 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2299 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2303 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2304 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2308 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2309 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2315 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2316 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2322 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2323 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2325 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2329 /* Should never happen */
2330 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2336 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2340 const unsigned char *data
;
2342 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2343 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2344 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2348 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2352 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2353 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2357 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2358 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2359 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2364 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2371 /* Should never happen */
2372 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2378 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2381 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2382 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2383 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2384 const unsigned char *start
;
2385 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2386 unsigned long alg_a
;
2390 const unsigned char *data
;
2393 /* Get our certificate private key */
2394 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2395 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2397 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2399 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2401 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2404 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2406 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2407 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2410 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2411 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2412 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2416 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2417 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2422 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2423 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2424 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2425 * client certificate for authorization only.
2427 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2428 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2429 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2432 /* Decrypt session key */
2433 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2434 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2435 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2439 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2440 &Tclass
, sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2441 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2442 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2448 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2449 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2450 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2454 /* Generate master secret */
2455 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2456 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2457 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2461 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2462 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2463 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2464 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2468 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2471 /* Should never happen */
2472 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2478 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2481 unsigned long alg_k
;
2483 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2485 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2486 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2489 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2490 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2491 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2492 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2494 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2497 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2498 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2499 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2503 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2504 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2506 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2507 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2509 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2510 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2512 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2513 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2515 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2516 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2519 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2521 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2528 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2530 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2531 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2533 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2534 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2537 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2540 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2542 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2543 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2545 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2548 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2549 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2551 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2552 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2553 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
2555 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2559 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2560 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2565 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2567 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2568 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2570 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2571 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2572 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2573 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2574 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2575 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2576 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2577 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2580 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2584 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
2586 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2587 * the handshake_buffer
2589 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2590 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2593 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2595 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2597 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2598 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2602 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2603 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2605 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2606 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2611 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2614 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2616 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2617 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2619 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2621 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2625 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2629 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2633 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2637 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2638 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
2639 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2641 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2643 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2644 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2648 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2650 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2651 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2654 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
2655 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2660 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2663 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2664 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2667 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2669 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2671 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2672 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2676 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2679 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2680 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2682 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2684 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2689 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2691 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2695 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2696 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2697 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2699 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2702 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2704 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2708 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2709 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2711 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2715 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2717 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2718 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2720 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2725 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2726 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2727 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2728 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2729 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2731 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2734 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
2740 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2741 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2742 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2743 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2745 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2749 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2750 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2755 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2758 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2759 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2761 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2762 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2763 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2765 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
2770 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2772 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2774 unsigned long l
, llen
;
2775 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
2776 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
2779 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2784 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
2785 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
2786 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2787 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2792 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
2793 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
2794 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
2795 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2797 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2801 certstart
= certbytes
;
2802 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2807 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
2808 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2810 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2813 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2820 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
2821 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2822 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2823 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2825 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2828 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2829 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2830 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2832 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2833 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2836 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2837 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2842 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
2844 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2846 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
2851 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2854 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
2856 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2858 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2863 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2864 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2865 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2867 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
2868 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
2870 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2871 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2874 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2878 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2879 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2882 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
2886 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2890 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2896 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2904 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2906 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
2907 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2908 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
2909 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
2910 const unsigned char *const_p
;
2911 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
2914 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
2915 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2916 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
2918 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
2920 /* get session encoding length */
2921 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2923 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2926 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
2927 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2930 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
2932 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2936 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2937 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
2938 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2944 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
2948 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2951 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
2954 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2956 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
2957 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2958 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2962 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
2963 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2966 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2969 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
2970 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
2972 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
2973 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2974 int ret
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
2979 /* Put timeout and length */
2980 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
2981 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2987 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2988 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
2993 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
2995 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
2997 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
2998 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3000 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3001 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3003 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
3004 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
3005 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3007 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
3008 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
));
3012 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3013 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3014 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3016 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3017 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3018 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3019 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3020 /* Output key name */
3021 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3023 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3024 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3026 /* Encrypt session data */
3027 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3028 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3029 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3030 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3031 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3032 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3033 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3034 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3035 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3036 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3037 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3038 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3039 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3040 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3041 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3042 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3043 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3048 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3054 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3055 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3060 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3062 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->tlsext_status_type
)
3063 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
,
3064 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3075 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3076 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3078 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3080 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3081 size_t next_proto_len
;
3084 * The payload looks like:
3086 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3087 * uint8 padding_len;
3088 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3090 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3091 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3092 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3097 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3098 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3102 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3104 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3106 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3107 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3111 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3114 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3115 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3116 int sslv2format
, int *al
)
3118 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3119 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3121 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3122 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3124 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3126 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3128 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3130 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3134 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3136 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3137 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3141 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3142 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3145 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3150 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3153 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3154 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3155 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3159 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3161 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3162 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3163 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3165 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3168 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3169 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3170 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3171 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3172 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3174 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3175 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3178 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3182 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3183 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3184 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3186 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3187 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3190 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3192 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3193 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3199 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3200 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3202 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3204 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3209 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3210 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3219 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3220 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);