2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
33 ASN1_TYPE
*opaqueBlob
;
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, kxBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, opaqueBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
58 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
70 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
71 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
72 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
76 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
77 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
78 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
87 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
88 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
89 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
93 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
94 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
101 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
107 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
108 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
115 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
116 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
135 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
136 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
142 /* No valid transition found */
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
157 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
165 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
190 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
191 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
192 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
193 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
200 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
203 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
207 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
210 } else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
211 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
212 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
219 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
220 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
225 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
227 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
228 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
229 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
230 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
231 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
234 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
235 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
237 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
238 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
239 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
240 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
246 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
247 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
253 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
260 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 if (s
->s3
.npn_seen
) {
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
269 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
270 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
280 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
281 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
287 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
288 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
296 /* No valid transition found */
297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
301 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
302 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
305 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
306 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
307 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
308 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
316 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
318 * Valid return values are:
322 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
324 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
327 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
328 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
329 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
330 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
331 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
334 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
336 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
340 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
341 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
342 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
343 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
344 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
347 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
348 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
358 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
360 * Valid return values are:
364 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
367 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
368 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
370 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
371 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
373 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
374 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
376 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
379 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
380 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
382 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
383 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
386 && (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
388 * ... except when the application insists on
389 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
392 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
393 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
394 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
396 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
399 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
407 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
408 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
411 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
413 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
416 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
417 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
420 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
422 /* Shouldn't happen */
423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
427 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
432 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
435 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
439 /* Try to read from the client instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
442 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
446 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
447 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
448 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
450 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
451 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
453 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
456 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
457 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
458 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
465 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
466 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
467 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
469 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
474 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
475 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
478 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
483 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
487 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
490 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
494 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
497 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
499 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
500 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
503 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
504 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
505 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
507 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
508 * handshake at this point.
510 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
513 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
516 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
520 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
521 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
524 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
525 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
526 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
527 * been configured for.
529 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
531 } else if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
532 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
533 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
540 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
541 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
543 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
545 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
548 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
549 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
553 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
555 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
557 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
559 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
562 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
563 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
564 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
565 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
568 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
569 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
570 /* SSLfatal() already called */
571 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
576 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
577 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
579 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
584 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
585 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
586 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
587 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
588 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
592 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
596 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
597 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
601 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
602 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
606 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
607 /* normal PSK or SRP */
608 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
609 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
610 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
611 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
612 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
613 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
622 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
623 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
629 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
630 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
635 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
636 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
637 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
642 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
643 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
647 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
649 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
651 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
653 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
654 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
658 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
660 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
661 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
664 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
665 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
668 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
670 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
672 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
678 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
679 * the server to the client.
681 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
683 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
685 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
687 /* No pre work to be done */
690 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
693 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
696 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
699 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
700 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
705 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
708 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
709 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
719 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
725 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0
726 && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
== 0) {
728 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
729 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
730 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
738 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
739 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
745 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
748 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
749 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
750 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
751 } else if (s
->session
->cipher
!= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
) {
752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
755 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
756 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
761 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
762 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
763 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
764 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
770 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
771 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
772 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
773 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
784 static ossl_inline
int conn_is_closed(void)
786 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
791 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
795 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
805 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
806 * server to the client.
808 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
810 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
814 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
816 /* No post work to be done */
819 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
820 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
822 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
829 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
831 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
832 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
838 * treat like it was the first packet
843 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
845 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
846 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
851 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
852 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
853 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
857 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
860 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
861 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
863 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
864 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
865 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
868 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
869 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
876 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
877 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
881 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
882 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
886 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
887 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
888 if (!statem_flush(s
))
893 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
894 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
895 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
896 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
902 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
903 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
909 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
910 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
912 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS
;
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
917 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
919 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
922 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
926 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
927 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
929 /* SSLfatal() already called */
934 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
937 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
938 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
942 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
943 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
946 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
948 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
951 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
955 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
956 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
958 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
959 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
961 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
962 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
968 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
969 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
970 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
975 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
976 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
978 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
979 /* SSLfatal() already called */
984 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
986 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1) {
987 if (SSL_get_error(s
, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
988 && conn_is_closed()) {
990 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
991 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
992 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
993 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
994 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
996 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1005 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1009 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1012 * Valid return values are:
1016 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1017 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
1019 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1021 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
1027 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
1029 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1031 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1032 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1035 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1036 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
1037 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
1041 /* No construction function needed */
1043 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
1046 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
1047 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
1048 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT
:
1052 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
1053 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
1056 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1057 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1058 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1063 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1064 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1068 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1069 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1073 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1074 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1078 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1079 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1083 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1084 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1087 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1088 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1089 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1092 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1094 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1097 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1098 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1099 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1102 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1103 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1104 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1112 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1113 * calculated as follows:
1115 * 2 + # client_version
1116 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1117 * 1 + # length of session_id
1118 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1119 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1120 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1121 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1122 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1123 * 2 + # length of extensions
1124 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1126 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1128 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1129 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1132 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1133 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1135 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1137 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1139 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1141 /* Shouldn't happen */
1144 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1145 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1148 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1151 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1153 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1154 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1156 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1157 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1161 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1165 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1167 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1168 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1170 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1171 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1176 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1178 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1180 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1182 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1184 /* Shouldn't happen */
1185 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1189 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1192 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1194 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1195 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1197 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1198 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1200 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1201 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1204 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1205 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1208 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1209 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1211 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1212 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1214 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1215 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1221 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1224 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1226 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1228 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1230 /* Shouldn't happen */
1231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1235 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1237 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1238 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1243 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1244 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1247 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1249 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1250 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1251 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1253 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1256 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1257 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1260 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1263 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1265 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1266 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1267 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1276 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1279 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1280 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1281 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1287 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1289 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1290 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1291 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1292 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1293 cookie_leni
> DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
) {
1294 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1297 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1299 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1300 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1301 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1310 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1311 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1312 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1316 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1318 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1319 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1320 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1321 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1323 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1325 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1327 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1328 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1329 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1330 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1331 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1333 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1334 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1335 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1336 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1337 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1338 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1339 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1340 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1341 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1342 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1343 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1344 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1345 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1347 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1348 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1353 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1355 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1356 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1361 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1364 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1365 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1367 s
->s3
.is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1370 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1372 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1374 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1375 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1376 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1377 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1379 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1380 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1381 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1385 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) != 0
1386 || (!s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
1388 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1389 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1390 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1396 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1397 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1403 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1405 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1406 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1408 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1411 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1412 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1413 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1418 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1419 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1420 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1421 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1423 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1424 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1426 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1427 * 7-8 session_id_length
1428 * 9-10 challenge_length
1432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1433 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1435 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1436 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1437 * in the first place
1439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1444 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1449 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1450 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1452 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1453 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1454 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1456 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1460 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1461 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1466 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1471 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1473 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1474 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1475 /* No extensions. */
1476 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1480 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1482 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1484 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1485 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1487 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1488 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1489 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1490 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1491 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1492 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1493 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1494 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1499 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1501 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1502 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1503 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1504 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1505 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1506 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1507 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1516 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1517 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1518 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1523 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1524 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1525 * So check cookie length...
1527 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1528 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0) {
1529 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1530 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1535 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1540 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1545 /* Could be empty. */
1546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1547 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1550 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1557 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1558 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1559 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1560 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1564 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1565 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1566 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1567 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1568 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1569 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1572 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1577 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1578 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1579 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1584 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1587 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1592 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1594 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1595 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1596 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1597 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1598 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1600 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1601 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1602 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1603 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1604 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1605 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1607 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1608 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1612 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1617 /* Set up the client_random */
1618 memcpy(s
->s3
.client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1620 /* Choose the version */
1622 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1623 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1624 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1625 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1627 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1630 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1634 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1637 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1638 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1640 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1641 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1642 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1643 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1644 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1650 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1651 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1652 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1658 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1659 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1664 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1665 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1666 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1667 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1668 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1669 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1671 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1673 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1675 /* default verification */
1676 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1677 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1678 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1682 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1684 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1685 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1686 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1687 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1696 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1697 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1698 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1699 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1704 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 0;
1705 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1706 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1707 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1708 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1709 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1710 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1711 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1713 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1716 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1717 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1718 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1720 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1721 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1722 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1723 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1724 * an insecure downgrade.
1726 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1727 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1733 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1734 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1735 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1736 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1738 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1742 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1743 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1744 || s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1746 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1747 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1749 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER
);
1752 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1755 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1756 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1757 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1758 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1764 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1765 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1767 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1768 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1769 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1770 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1771 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1772 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1773 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1774 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1775 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1776 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1779 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1781 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1782 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1787 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1789 /* previous session */
1791 } else if (i
== -1) {
1792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1796 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1803 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1804 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1805 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1806 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1810 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1811 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1813 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1815 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1817 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER
) {
1818 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1819 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1821 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1822 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1823 if (trc_out
!= NULL
)
1824 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i
,
1825 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1833 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1837 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1838 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER
);
1841 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER
);
1844 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1845 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1849 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1856 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1857 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1858 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1860 /* TLS extensions */
1861 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1862 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1868 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1869 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1870 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1871 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1875 pos
= s
->s3
.server_random
;
1876 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1883 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1886 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1887 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1889 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1890 * backwards compat reasons
1892 int master_key_length
;
1894 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1895 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1896 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1898 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1899 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1900 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1902 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
1903 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1907 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1908 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1909 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
,
1910 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1911 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1912 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1916 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1917 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1918 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1919 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1920 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1925 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1926 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1927 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1929 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1932 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1933 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1934 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1936 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1938 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1943 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1944 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1945 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1947 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1948 /* Can't disable compression */
1949 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1950 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1951 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1954 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1955 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1956 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1957 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1958 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1962 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1963 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1964 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1967 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1968 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1969 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1972 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1974 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1977 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1979 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1980 /* See if we have a match */
1981 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1984 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1985 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1986 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1988 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1989 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1998 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2004 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2005 * using compression.
2007 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2014 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2017 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2018 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2019 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
2020 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2028 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2029 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2031 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2033 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2034 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2039 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2041 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2042 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2043 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2046 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2047 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2048 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2049 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2050 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2056 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2057 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2059 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2061 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2064 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2065 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2066 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2067 * influence which certificate is sent
2069 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2070 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2073 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2074 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2076 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2077 * et al can pick it up.
2079 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2080 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2082 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2084 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2086 /* status request response should be sent */
2087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2088 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2089 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2091 /* something bad happened */
2092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2094 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2104 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2105 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2107 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2109 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2110 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2112 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2113 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2114 s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
,
2115 (unsigned int)s
->s3
.alpn_proposed_len
,
2116 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2118 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2119 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
2120 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2121 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2122 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2125 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2127 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2131 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2132 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2133 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2134 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2135 selected_len
) != 0) {
2136 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2137 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2141 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2142 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2145 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2146 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2150 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2152 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2157 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2162 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
,
2164 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2168 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2173 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2174 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2175 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2176 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2182 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2184 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2186 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2187 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2189 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2196 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2197 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2198 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2199 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2200 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2206 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2209 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2212 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2213 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2215 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2217 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2219 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2222 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2225 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2226 /* SSLfatal already called */
2229 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2230 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2231 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2232 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2233 ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2234 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2235 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2236 /* do not send a session ticket */
2237 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2240 /* Session-id reuse */
2241 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2245 * we now have the following setup.
2247 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2248 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2249 * compression - basically ignored right now
2250 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2251 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2252 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2253 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2257 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2258 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2260 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2265 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2266 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2267 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2268 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2270 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2278 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2280 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2282 * callback indicates further work to be done
2284 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2299 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2304 unsigned char *session_id
;
2305 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2307 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2310 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2311 * tls_process_client_hello()
2313 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2314 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2315 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
.server_random
,
2316 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2322 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2323 * back in the server hello:
2324 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2325 * we send back the old session ID.
2326 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2327 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2328 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2329 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2331 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2332 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2333 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2335 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2336 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2339 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2340 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2342 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2345 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2346 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2348 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2349 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2352 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2357 /* set up the compression method */
2358 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2361 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2364 compm
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2367 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2368 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)) {
2370 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2374 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2375 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2376 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2378 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2379 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2385 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2386 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2387 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2392 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2393 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2395 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2399 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2400 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2401 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2408 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2410 if (!s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
2411 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2419 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2422 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2425 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2426 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2429 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
2433 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2434 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2435 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2437 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2438 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2442 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2443 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2447 type
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2449 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2451 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2452 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2454 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2456 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2457 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2459 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2462 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2463 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2464 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2465 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2470 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2473 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2475 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2476 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2477 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2484 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2488 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2489 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2493 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2498 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, pkdhp
);
2499 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2504 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
2506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2510 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2513 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2514 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2518 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2520 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2525 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2526 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2527 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2529 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2532 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2533 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2534 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2535 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2539 /* Encode the public key. */
2540 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2542 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2543 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2548 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2549 * can set these to NULLs
2556 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2558 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2559 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2560 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2561 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2565 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2566 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2567 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2568 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2572 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2576 if (((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2577 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2579 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2585 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2586 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2587 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2590 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2591 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2593 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2594 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2602 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2603 unsigned char *binval
;
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2607 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2608 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2611 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2620 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2621 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2624 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2625 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2628 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2632 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2636 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2637 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2642 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2646 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2648 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2649 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2650 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2654 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2655 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2656 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2660 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2661 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2667 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2669 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2670 size_t siglen
= 0, tbslen
;
2672 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
2673 /* Should never happen */
2674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2677 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2678 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2682 /* send signature algorithm */
2683 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2684 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2688 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2689 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_name(md
),
2690 s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->ctx
->propq
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2691 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2694 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2695 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2696 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2697 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2701 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2702 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2709 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <=0
2710 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2711 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <= 0
2712 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2713 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2721 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2725 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2728 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2730 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2734 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2737 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2738 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2739 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2740 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2741 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
2742 || RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->pha_context
,
2743 s
->pha_context_len
) <= 0
2744 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2745 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2748 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2749 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2760 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2761 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2763 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2769 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2770 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2771 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2772 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2776 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2777 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2778 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2780 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2781 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2782 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2783 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2789 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, get_ca_names(s
), pkt
)) {
2790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2796 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2800 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2803 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2805 PACKET psk_identity
;
2807 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2808 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2811 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2815 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2816 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2820 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2825 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2828 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2831 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2833 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2839 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2840 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2841 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2843 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2844 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2848 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2852 /* Should never happen */
2853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2858 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2862 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2863 EVP_PKEY
*rsa
= NULL
;
2864 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2867 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
2869 rsa
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
;
2871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2875 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2876 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2877 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2879 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2880 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2881 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2886 outlen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2887 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(outlen
);
2888 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2893 ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, rsa
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
2895 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2900 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2901 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2902 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
2903 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
2904 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
2905 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
2906 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
2907 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
2908 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2910 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx
) <= 0
2911 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx
, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING
) <= 0) {
2912 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2916 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION
,
2917 (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
);
2918 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) != 0)
2919 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
2920 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION
,
2921 (unsigned int *)&s
->version
);
2922 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
2924 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx
, params
)
2925 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx
, rsa_decrypt
, &outlen
,
2926 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2927 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
)) <= 0) {
2928 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2933 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
2934 * we double check anyway.
2936 if (outlen
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2937 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2942 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
2943 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
2944 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
, 0)) {
2945 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2951 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2952 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx
);
2955 /* Should never happen */
2956 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2961 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2964 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2968 const unsigned char *data
;
2969 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2976 skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
2978 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2982 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2986 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2987 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2988 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2991 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2992 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
2997 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2998 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2999 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| cdh
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
3000 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3005 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3006 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3011 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3012 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3014 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3017 /* Should never happen */
3018 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3023 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3026 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3027 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3030 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3031 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3036 const unsigned char *data
;
3039 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3040 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3043 /* Get encoded point length */
3044 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3045 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3050 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3054 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3055 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3056 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
3060 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, data
, i
) <= 0) {
3061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3066 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3072 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3073 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3075 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3079 /* Should never happen */
3080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3085 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3089 const unsigned char *data
;
3091 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3092 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3096 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
3100 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3101 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3104 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3105 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3106 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3107 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3111 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3112 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3118 /* Should never happen */
3119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3124 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3128 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3129 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3130 const unsigned char *start
;
3131 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3132 unsigned long alg_a
;
3133 GOST_KX_MESSAGE
*pKX
= NULL
;
3134 const unsigned char *ptr
;
3137 /* Get our certificate private key */
3138 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3139 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3141 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3143 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3145 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3148 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3150 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3151 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3154 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pk
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3155 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3159 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3160 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3164 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3165 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3166 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3167 * client certificate for authorization only.
3169 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3170 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3171 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3175 ptr
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3176 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3177 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3178 pKX
= d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL
, &ptr
, PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
3180 || pKX
->kxBlob
== NULL
3181 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX
->kxBlob
) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
) {
3182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3186 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, ptr
- PACKET_data(pkt
))) {
3187 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3191 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3196 inlen
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->length
;
3197 start
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->data
;
3199 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3204 /* Generate master secret */
3205 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3206 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3210 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3211 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3213 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3217 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3218 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX
);
3221 /* Should never happen */
3222 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3227 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3230 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3231 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3232 EVP_PKEY
*pk
= NULL
;
3233 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3234 const unsigned char *start
= NULL
;
3235 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
= 0;
3237 int cipher_nid
= gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3239 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3244 if (gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3249 /* Get our certificate private key */
3250 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
!= NULL
?
3251 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
:
3252 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
3258 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pk
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3259 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3263 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3264 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3268 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3269 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3270 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) < 0) {
3271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3275 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3276 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) < 0) {
3277 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3280 inlen
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3281 start
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3283 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
3284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3287 /* Generate master secret */
3288 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3289 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3296 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3299 /* Should never happen */
3300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3305 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3307 unsigned long alg_k
;
3309 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3311 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3312 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3313 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3317 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3318 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3319 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3320 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3323 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3324 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3325 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3328 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3329 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3333 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3334 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3335 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3338 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3339 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3343 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3344 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3345 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3349 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3350 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3353 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3354 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
)) {
3355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3363 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3366 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3367 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3372 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3375 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3377 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3378 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3381 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3384 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3385 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3387 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3388 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3389 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3392 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3393 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3400 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3401 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3406 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3408 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3409 * the handshake_buffer
3411 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3415 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3417 if (!s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
) {
3418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3422 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3423 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3425 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3431 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3434 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3440 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3441 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3442 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3444 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3447 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3448 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3451 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
3453 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3458 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3459 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3460 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3461 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3466 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3467 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3472 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3473 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3474 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3475 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3479 certstart
= certbytes
;
3480 x
= X509_new_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3485 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
) == NULL
) {
3486 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3490 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3491 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3495 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3496 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3499 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3503 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3504 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3505 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3506 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3507 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3508 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3509 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3512 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3515 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3516 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3522 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3523 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3524 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3526 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3529 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3530 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3531 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3533 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3536 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3537 if (s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3543 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3545 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3546 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3550 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, i
);
3553 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3555 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3556 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3562 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3563 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3564 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3565 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3566 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3569 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3570 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3575 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3576 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3579 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3580 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3581 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3583 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3584 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3587 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3590 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3596 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3597 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3601 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3602 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3603 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3604 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3605 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3606 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3610 /* Resend session tickets */
3611 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3614 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3618 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3622 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3624 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3627 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3632 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3633 * for the server Certificate message
3635 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3639 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3640 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3647 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3648 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3651 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3652 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3653 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3657 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3658 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)) {
3659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3663 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3664 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3665 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3666 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3671 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3672 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3673 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3680 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3681 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3683 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3684 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3685 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
3686 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3687 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3688 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3691 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3692 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3693 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3695 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3697 /* get session encoding length */
3698 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3700 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3703 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3707 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3713 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3714 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
3715 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3721 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3727 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3730 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3732 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3736 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3737 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3738 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3740 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3744 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3745 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3746 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3749 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3752 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3753 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3756 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3758 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3763 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3764 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3765 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
3767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3768 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3769 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3770 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3771 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 1);
3776 /* Put timeout and length */
3777 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3778 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3783 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3784 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
3788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3791 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3793 EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
3796 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
3797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED
);
3801 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3802 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3803 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3804 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3805 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
3806 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
3808 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3809 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3812 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3813 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3814 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3817 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3822 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3823 /* Output key name */
3824 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3826 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3827 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3829 /* Encrypt session data */
3830 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3831 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3832 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3833 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3834 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3835 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3836 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3837 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3838 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx
,
3839 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3840 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3841 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3842 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)
3843 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3844 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3845 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
3846 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3850 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3851 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3852 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3859 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3860 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
3864 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3865 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3867 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3872 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
3873 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
3874 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3875 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3882 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3884 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3885 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
3887 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3891 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
3893 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3896 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
3897 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
3898 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
3900 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3901 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
3902 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3905 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
3908 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
3909 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
3910 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
3912 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
3913 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
3915 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
3916 /* SSLfatal already called */
3920 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3921 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3924 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
3925 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3928 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
,
3929 sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
3930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3933 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3935 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
3936 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
3937 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
3941 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
3943 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
3946 s
->session
->master_key
,
3948 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3951 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
3953 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
3954 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3955 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3956 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3957 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
3958 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3962 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
3964 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3967 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
3968 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(s
, tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0)
3972 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
3973 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
3974 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
3977 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
3978 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
3979 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
3980 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3981 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3984 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
3986 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3990 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3991 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3992 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3994 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3998 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
3999 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4000 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4001 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4004 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
4005 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0)
4006 s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
--;
4007 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
4016 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4017 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4019 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4021 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4022 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4023 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4024 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4031 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4033 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4034 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4043 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4044 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4046 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4048 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4049 size_t next_proto_len
;
4052 * The payload looks like:
4054 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4055 * uint8 padding_len;
4056 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4058 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4059 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4060 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4062 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4065 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4068 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4071 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4073 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4077 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4079 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4088 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4090 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4091 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4092 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4095 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4096 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4098 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4102 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4103 * a record boundary.
4105 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4107 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4110 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4111 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4112 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4113 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4114 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4117 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;