1 /* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "statem_locl.h"
155 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #include <openssl/md5.h>
168 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
169 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
170 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
171 int sslv2format
, int *al
);
174 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
175 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
176 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
177 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
179 * Valid return values are:
180 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
181 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
183 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
185 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
187 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
189 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
190 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
191 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
196 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
198 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
199 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
201 * 2) If we did request one then
202 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
204 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
205 * list if we requested a certificate)
207 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
208 && (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
209 || (!((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
210 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
211 && (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)))) {
212 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
214 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
215 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
216 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
231 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
232 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
233 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
234 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
235 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
238 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
241 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
242 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
243 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
244 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
246 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
258 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
264 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
266 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
267 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
268 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
283 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
284 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
285 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
291 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
292 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
293 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
302 /* No valid transition found */
307 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
309 * Valid return values are:
313 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
315 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
318 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
319 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
320 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
321 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
322 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
325 if ( (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
)
326 || (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
328 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
332 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
333 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
334 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
335 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
336 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
339 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
340 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
350 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
352 * Valid return values are:
356 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
359 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
360 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
362 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
363 * during re-negotiation:
365 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
366 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
368 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
369 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
372 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
374 * ... except when the application insists on
375 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
378 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
379 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
380 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
382 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
385 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
393 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
394 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
396 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
398 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
400 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
402 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
406 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
407 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
411 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
412 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
417 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
418 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
423 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
424 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
428 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or SRP */
435 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
436 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
438 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
440 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
441 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
449 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
456 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
457 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
463 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
464 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
476 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
478 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
479 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
481 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
493 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
496 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
501 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 /* Shouldn't happen */
506 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
511 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
512 * the server to the client.
514 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
516 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
518 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
519 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
522 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
525 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
527 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
528 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
529 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
534 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
535 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
537 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
538 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
544 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
546 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
547 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
549 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
554 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
555 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
561 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
562 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
563 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
564 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
569 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
570 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
571 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
572 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
576 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
579 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
582 /* No pre work to be done */
586 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
590 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
591 * server to the client.
593 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
595 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
599 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
600 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
601 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
603 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
606 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
607 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
609 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
610 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
611 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
613 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
614 * treat like it was the first packet
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
622 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
623 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
626 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
629 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
630 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
632 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
633 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
634 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
635 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
639 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
640 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
645 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
649 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
652 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
656 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
657 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
658 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
663 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
666 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
667 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
671 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
672 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
677 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
680 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
687 /* No post work to be done */
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
695 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
697 * Valid return values are:
701 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
703 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
705 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
706 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
707 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s
);
709 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
710 return tls_construct_hello_request(s
);
712 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
713 return tls_construct_server_hello(s
);
716 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s
);
718 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
719 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s
);
721 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
722 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s
);
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
725 return tls_construct_server_done(s
);
727 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
728 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s
);
730 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
731 return tls_construct_cert_status(s
);
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
735 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
737 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
739 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
740 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
742 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
744 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
747 /* Shouldn't happen */
754 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
755 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
758 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
759 * reading. Excludes the message header.
761 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
763 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
765 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
770 return s
->max_cert_list
;
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
773 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
776 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
780 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
784 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
787 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
790 /* Shouldn't happen */
798 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
800 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
802 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
804 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
805 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
806 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
809 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
811 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
812 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
814 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
815 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
818 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
819 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
822 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
823 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
825 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
826 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
837 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
840 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
842 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
844 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
845 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
846 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
848 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
849 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
851 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
853 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
854 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
855 /* Are we renegotiating? */
857 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
858 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
859 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
860 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
861 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
862 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
865 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
868 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
874 /* Shouldn't happen */
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
879 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
881 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
883 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
885 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
886 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
887 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
889 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
893 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
895 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
902 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
904 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0)) {
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
906 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
913 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf
,
914 unsigned char *cookie
,
915 unsigned char cookie_len
)
917 unsigned int msg_len
;
921 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
922 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
923 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xFF;
925 *(p
++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len
;
926 memcpy(p
, cookie
, cookie_len
);
933 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
)
938 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
940 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
941 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
942 &(s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) == 0 ||
943 s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 255) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
945 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
946 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
950 len
= dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf
[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
],
951 s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
953 dtls1_set_message_header(s
, buf
, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, len
, 0,
955 len
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
957 /* number of bytes to write */
964 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
966 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
967 unsigned int j
, complen
= 0;
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
971 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
973 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
975 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
976 PACKET session_id
, cipher_suites
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
979 is_v2_record
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
981 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
982 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
984 unsigned int version
;
987 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
988 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
989 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
990 * the rest right through. Its format is:
992 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
993 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
995 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
996 * 7-8 session_id_length
997 * 9-10 challenge_length
1001 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1002 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1004 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1005 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1006 * in the first place
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)) {
1013 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1017 if (version
== 0x0002) {
1018 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1021 } else if ((version
& 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1023 s
->client_version
= version
;
1025 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1031 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1032 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1034 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
)) {
1035 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1041 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
1042 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1043 if (s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1044 if (s
->client_version
>= s
->version
) {
1047 } else if (s
->client_version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1048 switch(s
->client_version
) {
1050 case TLS1_2_VERSION
:
1051 if(!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1052 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1053 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_server_method();
1057 /* Deliberately fall through */
1058 case TLS1_1_VERSION
:
1059 if(!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1060 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
1061 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_server_method();
1065 /* Deliberately fall through */
1067 if(!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1068 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
1069 s
->method
= TLSv1_server_method();
1073 /* Deliberately fall through */
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1076 if(!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
1077 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1078 s
->method
= SSLv3_server_method();
1087 } else if (s
->client_version
<= s
->version
1088 || s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1090 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1091 * negotiation comes later.
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1098 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1100 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1103 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1105 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1109 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1112 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1113 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1114 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1116 unsigned int cipher_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1119 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &cipher_len
)
1120 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1121 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1123 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1124 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1128 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &cipher_suites
, cipher_len
)
1129 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &session_id
, session_id_len
)
1130 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1131 /* No extensions. */
1132 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1134 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1135 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1139 /* Load the client random */
1140 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
:
1142 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1144 s
->s3
->client_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1145 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1147 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1151 PACKET_null_init(&compression
);
1152 PACKET_null_init(&extensions
);
1154 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1155 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1156 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1157 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1162 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1163 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1164 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1169 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1170 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1171 * So check cookie length...
1173 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1174 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) == 0)
1179 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cipher_suites
)
1180 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1185 /* Could be empty. */
1192 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1193 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1195 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1196 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1197 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1198 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1199 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1200 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1201 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1202 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1203 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1204 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1209 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1210 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1213 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &extensions
, &session_id
);
1215 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1217 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1218 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1219 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1220 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1221 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1223 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1224 /* previous session */
1226 } else if (i
== -1) {
1230 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1235 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1236 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1237 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1238 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1239 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&cookie
),
1240 PACKET_remaining(&cookie
)) == 0) {
1241 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1243 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1245 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1247 /* default verification */
1248 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1249 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1250 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1254 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1256 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1257 /* Select version to use */
1258 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1259 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
)) {
1260 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1261 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1262 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1264 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1265 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1266 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1268 } else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1269 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)) {
1270 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1271 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1274 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1275 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1276 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1279 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1283 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &cipher_suites
, &(ciphers
),
1284 is_v2_record
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1288 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1291 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1294 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1297 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1298 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1300 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1301 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1310 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1313 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1315 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1320 complen
= PACKET_remaining(&compression
);
1321 for (j
= 0; j
< complen
; j
++) {
1322 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[j
] == 0)
1328 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1333 /* TLS extensions */
1334 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1335 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &extensions
)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1342 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1343 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1344 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1345 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1349 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1350 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1355 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1356 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1358 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1359 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1360 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1362 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1364 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1365 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1369 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1371 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1376 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1377 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1382 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1383 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1384 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1385 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1386 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1391 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1392 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1393 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1395 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1397 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1398 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1399 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1401 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1402 /* Can't disable compression */
1403 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1405 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1408 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1409 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1410 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1411 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1412 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1416 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1418 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1421 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1422 for (k
= 0; k
< complen
; k
++) {
1423 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[k
] == comp_id
)
1427 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1429 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1434 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1435 /* See if we have a match */
1436 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1439 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1440 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1441 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1443 for (o
= 0; o
< complen
; o
++) {
1444 if (v
== PACKET_data(&compression
)[o
]) {
1453 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1459 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1460 * using compression.
1462 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1469 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1473 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1474 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1476 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1478 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1479 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1480 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1481 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1486 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1495 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1497 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1499 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1500 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1504 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1506 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1509 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1511 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1512 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1513 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1515 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1520 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1523 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1525 cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1527 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1531 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1532 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1533 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1534 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1535 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1536 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1537 /* do not send a session ticket */
1538 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1540 /* Session-id reuse */
1541 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1544 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1545 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1546 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1552 * we now have the following setup.
1554 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1555 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1556 * compression - basically ignored right now
1557 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1558 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1559 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1560 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1563 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1564 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1565 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1567 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1575 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1577 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1579 * callback indicates further work to be done
1581 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1584 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1586 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1587 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1589 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1591 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1598 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1600 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1601 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1605 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1608 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1613 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1615 /* Do the message type and length last */
1616 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1618 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1619 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1622 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1623 * tls_process_client_hello()
1625 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1626 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1629 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1630 * back in the server hello:
1631 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1632 * we send back the old session ID.
1633 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1634 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1635 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1636 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1638 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1639 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1640 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1641 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1644 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1645 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1647 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1649 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1650 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1652 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1656 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1659 /* put the cipher */
1660 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1663 /* put the compression method */
1664 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1667 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1670 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1673 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1675 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1679 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1681 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1683 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1689 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
)) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1691 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1698 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1700 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0)) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1702 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1706 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1707 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1708 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1715 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1718 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1721 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1724 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1727 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1728 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1738 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1740 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1745 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1748 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1750 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1753 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
1754 n
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1756 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1757 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1759 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1761 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1762 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1763 dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1765 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1772 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1773 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1775 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1777 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1780 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1781 DH_security_bits(dhp
), 0, dhp
)) {
1782 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1784 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1787 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1793 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1795 else if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1801 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1802 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1803 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1804 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1809 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1810 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1811 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1822 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1823 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1824 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1826 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1827 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1828 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1829 ecdh
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1831 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1833 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1837 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1843 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1844 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1845 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1846 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1847 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1854 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1855 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1856 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1862 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1863 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1867 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1870 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1875 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1876 * allocate memory accordingly.
1878 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1879 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1880 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1883 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1884 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1885 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1886 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1892 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1893 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1894 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1895 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1897 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1902 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1906 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1907 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1908 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1911 n
+= 4 + encodedlen
;
1914 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1915 * can set these to NULLs
1922 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1925 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1926 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1927 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1929 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1932 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1933 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1934 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1935 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1939 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1941 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1944 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1945 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1947 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1954 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
|SSL_aSRP
))
1955 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1956 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1958 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1961 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1967 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1971 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1974 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1975 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1976 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
) {
1977 s2n(strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1978 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
1979 strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
));
1980 p
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1987 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1989 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2000 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2002 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2003 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2004 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2005 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2007 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
2015 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
2016 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2017 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2025 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2026 * points to the space at the end.
2029 /* send signature algorithm */
2030 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2031 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2032 /* Should never happen */
2033 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2041 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2043 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
2044 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2045 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2046 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2047 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2048 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, d
, n
) <= 0
2049 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
2050 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2052 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2060 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2061 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2063 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2068 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2069 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2074 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2077 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2080 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2081 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2083 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2084 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2088 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2090 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2091 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2092 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2098 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2100 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2102 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2107 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2108 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2109 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2110 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2111 /* Skip over length for now */
2113 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2114 /* Now fill in length */
2124 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2127 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2128 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2129 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2130 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2131 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2136 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2138 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2143 /* else no CA names */
2144 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2147 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
)) {
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2152 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2156 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2160 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2164 unsigned long alg_k
;
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2167 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2171 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2174 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2175 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2176 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2177 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2179 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2180 unsigned char *data
, *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2182 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2185 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2186 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2187 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2189 PACKET psk_identity
;
2191 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2192 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2196 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2197 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2199 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2202 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2203 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2205 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2209 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2211 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2215 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2218 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2219 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2222 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2224 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2227 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2228 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2232 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2233 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= BUF_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2234 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2236 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2237 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2242 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2244 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2245 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2246 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2247 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2251 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2252 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2253 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2260 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2261 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2263 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2266 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2267 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2268 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2269 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2270 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2272 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2275 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2277 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2278 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2279 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2282 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2283 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2284 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2285 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
) {
2286 enc_premaster
= orig
;
2288 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2290 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2297 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2298 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2299 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2300 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2302 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2303 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2305 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2309 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2310 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2311 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2317 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2318 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2319 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2320 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2321 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2324 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2325 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2329 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2330 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2331 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2335 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2336 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2339 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2342 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2343 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2344 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2345 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2346 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2347 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2350 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0],
2351 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2353 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2354 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2357 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2358 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2359 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2360 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2361 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2362 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2365 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2366 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2368 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2370 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2371 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2372 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2376 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2377 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2379 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2382 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2383 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2384 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2385 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2387 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2389 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, rsa_decrypt
[j
],
2390 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2393 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
2394 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2395 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2399 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2404 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2406 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2407 PACKET bookmark
= *pkt
;
2408 unsigned char shared
[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+ 7) / 8];
2410 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)) {
2411 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2412 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2414 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2419 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2420 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2422 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2426 i
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2429 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2430 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2431 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2432 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2434 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2435 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2436 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) || (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
)) {
2437 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2439 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2442 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2443 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2444 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2446 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2449 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2451 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2452 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2453 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2455 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2456 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2458 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2459 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2461 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2464 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2465 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2467 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2468 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2469 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2471 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2474 pub
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2481 i
= DH_compute_key(shared
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2489 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2490 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2496 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, shared
, i
, 0)) {
2497 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2502 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2509 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2512 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2513 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2514 unsigned char *shared
;
2516 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2517 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2522 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2523 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2524 /* use the certificate */
2525 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2528 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2529 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2531 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2534 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2535 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2537 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2538 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2543 /* Let's get client's public key */
2544 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2549 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2550 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2552 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2553 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2555 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2558 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2559 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2561 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2562 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2563 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2564 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2565 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2566 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2568 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2570 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2574 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2575 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2580 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2583 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2584 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2586 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2592 /* Get encoded point length */
2593 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
)) {
2594 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2596 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2599 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2600 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2604 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, data
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2610 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2611 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2612 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2616 shared
= OPENSSL_malloc((field_size
+ 7) / 8);
2617 if (shared
== NULL
) {
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2621 i
= ECDH_compute_key(shared
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
,
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2625 OPENSSL_free(shared
);
2629 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2630 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2631 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2632 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2633 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2634 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2636 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, shared
, i
, 1)) {
2637 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2641 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2645 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2646 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2647 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2648 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2652 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2656 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2657 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2658 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2660 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2663 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2664 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2665 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2670 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2675 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2677 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2678 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2679 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2680 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2681 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2682 unsigned long alg_a
;
2687 /* Get our certificate private key */
2688 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2689 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2691 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2693 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2695 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2698 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2700 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2701 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2704 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2705 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2706 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2710 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2711 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2716 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2717 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2718 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2719 * client certificate for authorization only.
2721 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2722 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2723 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2726 /* Decrypt session key */
2727 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2728 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2729 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2733 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2734 &Tclass
, sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2735 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2736 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2737 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2739 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2744 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2745 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2746 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2748 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2751 /* Generate master secret */
2752 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2753 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2754 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2758 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2759 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2760 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2761 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2763 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2764 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2765 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2767 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2768 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2773 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2778 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2781 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2785 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2786 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2787 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2788 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2789 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2792 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2793 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2795 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2796 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2799 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2802 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2804 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2805 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2807 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2810 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2811 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2813 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2814 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2815 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2816 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2820 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2821 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2826 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2828 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2829 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2831 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2832 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2833 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2834 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2835 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2836 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2837 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2838 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2841 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2845 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
) {
2846 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2847 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2848 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2849 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2851 if (!s
->session
->peer
) {
2852 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2853 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2854 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2856 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2859 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2863 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2864 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2866 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2867 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2872 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2875 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2877 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2878 unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2879 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2883 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2888 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2890 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2891 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2892 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2894 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2896 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2897 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2901 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2903 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2904 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2907 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64 && pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2912 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2915 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2916 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2919 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2921 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2923 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2924 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2928 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2931 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2932 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2934 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2936 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2941 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2943 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2947 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2948 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2949 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2951 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2954 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2956 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2960 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2961 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2963 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2967 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2969 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2970 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2972 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2977 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2978 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2979 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2980 BUF_reverse(data
, NULL
, len
);
2984 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2985 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(&mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2986 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2987 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2989 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2993 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2994 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2999 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3002 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3003 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3005 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3006 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3007 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3008 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3012 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3014 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3016 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3017 const unsigned char *certstart
;
3018 unsigned char *certbytes
;
3019 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3022 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3027 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3028 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3029 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3030 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3035 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
3036 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3037 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3038 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3040 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3044 certstart
= certbytes
;
3045 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3050 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3051 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3053 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3056 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3063 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3064 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3065 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3066 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3068 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3071 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3072 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3073 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3075 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3076 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3079 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3080 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3085 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3087 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3089 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3094 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3097 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3099 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3101 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3104 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3107 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3108 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3109 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3111 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3112 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3114 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3115 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3118 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3122 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3123 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3126 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3130 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3134 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3137 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3141 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3143 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3150 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3152 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3155 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3156 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3157 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3160 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3161 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3162 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3164 /* get session encoding length */
3165 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3167 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3170 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3171 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3174 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3176 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3180 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3181 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3184 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3188 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3191 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3194 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3196 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3197 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3198 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3202 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3203 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3206 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3209 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3210 * follows handshake_header_length +
3211 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3212 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3213 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3214 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3216 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3217 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3218 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3221 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3223 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3224 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3226 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3227 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3231 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3233 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3234 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3236 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3237 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3239 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3243 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3244 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3245 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3247 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3249 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3251 /* Output key name */
3253 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3256 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3257 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3258 /* Encrypt session data */
3259 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3262 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3266 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3268 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3271 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3272 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3275 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3277 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3278 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3279 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3281 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
))
3288 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3289 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3290 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3294 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3298 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3299 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3300 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3303 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3304 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3308 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3311 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3312 /* message length */
3313 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3315 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3316 /* length of OCSP response */
3317 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3318 /* actual response */
3319 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3320 /* number of bytes to write */
3321 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3329 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3330 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3332 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3334 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3335 size_t next_proto_len
;
3338 * The payload looks like:
3340 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3341 * uint8 padding_len;
3342 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3344 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3345 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3346 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3351 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
,
3353 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3357 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3359 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3361 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3362 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3366 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3368 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3369 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3370 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3371 int sslv2format
, int *al
3374 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3375 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3377 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3378 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3380 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3382 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3384 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3386 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3390 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3392 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3393 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3397 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3398 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3401 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3406 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3409 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3410 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3411 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3415 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3417 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3418 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3419 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3421 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3424 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3425 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3426 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3427 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3428 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3430 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3431 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3434 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3435 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3436 fprintf(stderr
, "SCSV received by server\n");
3441 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3442 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3443 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3445 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3446 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3449 if (!SSL_ctrl(s
, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION
, 0, NULL
)) {
3450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3451 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3452 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3458 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3459 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3461 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3463 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3468 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3469 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3478 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3479 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);