2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
30 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
34 ASN1_TYPE
*opaqueBlob
;
37 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
39 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
) = {
40 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, kxBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
41 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
, opaqueBlob
, ASN1_ANY
),
42 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
44 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE
)
46 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
49 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
50 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
51 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
52 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
54 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
55 * (transition not allowed)
57 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
59 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
62 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
63 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
64 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
66 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
70 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
71 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
72 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
73 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
77 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
78 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
79 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
86 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
87 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
88 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
89 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
90 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
94 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
95 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
102 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
103 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
104 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
108 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
109 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
115 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
116 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
117 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
124 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
125 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
127 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
130 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
131 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
132 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
136 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
137 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
143 /* No valid transition found */
148 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
149 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
150 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
151 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
153 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
154 * (transition not allowed)
156 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
158 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
160 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
161 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
166 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
173 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
174 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
184 * 2) If we did request one then
185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
188 * list if we requested a certificate)
190 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
191 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
192 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
193 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
194 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
197 * not going to accept it because we require a client
200 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
208 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
211 } else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
212 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
213 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
221 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
247 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
248 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
255 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
256 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s
->s3
.npn_seen
) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
270 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
281 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
289 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
290 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
306 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
307 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
317 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
319 * Valid return values are:
323 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
325 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
328 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
329 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
330 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
331 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
332 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
335 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
337 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
341 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
342 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
343 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
344 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
345 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
348 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
349 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
359 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
361 * Valid return values are:
365 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
368 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
371 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
372 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
374 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
375 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
377 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
380 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
381 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
383 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
384 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
387 && (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
389 * ... except when the application insists on
390 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
393 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
394 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
395 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
397 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
400 && !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
408 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
409 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
412 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
414 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
417 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
418 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
421 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
425 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
428 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
432 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
433 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
440 /* Try to read from the client instead */
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
448 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
449 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
451 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
458 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
461 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
466 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
467 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
475 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
476 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
488 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
492 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
504 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
505 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
506 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
509 * handshake at this point.
511 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
514 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
517 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
528 * been configured for.
530 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0) {
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 } else if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
533 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
541 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
542 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
544 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
546 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
549 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
550 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
554 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
556 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
558 /* Shouldn't happen */
559 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
563 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
566 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
586 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
587 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
588 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
590 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
602 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
608 /* normal PSK or SRP */
609 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
610 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
611 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
615 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
617 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
623 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
624 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
637 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
638 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
644 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
654 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
655 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
657 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
662 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
666 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
673 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
680 * the server to the client.
682 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
684 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
686 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
688 /* No pre work to be done */
691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0
727 && s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
== 0) {
729 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
730 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
731 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
733 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
735 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
739 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
740 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
746 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
749 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
750 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
751 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
752 } else if (s
->session
->cipher
!= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
) {
753 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
756 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
762 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
763 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
764 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
765 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
769 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
771 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
772 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
773 && (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
778 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
785 static ossl_inline
int conn_is_closed(void)
787 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
792 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
796 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
806 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
807 * server to the client.
809 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
811 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
815 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
817 /* No post work to be done */
820 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
821 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
823 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
829 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
830 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
832 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
833 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
839 * treat like it was the first packet
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
845 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
846 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
847 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
852 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
853 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
854 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
858 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
861 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
862 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
864 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
865 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
866 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
869 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
870 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
873 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
877 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
878 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
882 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
883 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
887 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
888 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
889 if (!statem_flush(s
))
894 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
895 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
896 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
897 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
898 /* SSLfatal() already called */
902 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
903 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
904 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
905 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
910 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
911 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
913 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS
;
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
918 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
920 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
923 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
927 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
928 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
930 /* SSLfatal() already called */
935 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
938 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
939 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
943 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
944 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
947 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
949 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
952 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
956 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
957 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
959 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
960 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
962 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
963 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
964 /* SSLfatal() already called */
969 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
970 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
971 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
976 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
977 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
979 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
985 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
987 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1) {
988 if (SSL_get_error(s
, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
989 && conn_is_closed()) {
991 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
992 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
993 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
994 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
995 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
997 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1006 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1010 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1013 * Valid return values are:
1017 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
,
1018 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
1020 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1022 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1024 /* Shouldn't happen */
1025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
1028 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
1030 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1032 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1033 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1036 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1037 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
1038 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
1042 /* No construction function needed */
1044 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
1048 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
1049 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT
:
1053 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
1054 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1058 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1059 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1063 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1064 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1065 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1068 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1069 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1070 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1073 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1074 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1075 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1078 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1079 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1080 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1083 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1084 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1085 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1088 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1089 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1090 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1093 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1095 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1098 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1099 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1100 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1103 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1104 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1105 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1113 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1114 * calculated as follows:
1116 * 2 + # client_version
1117 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1118 * 1 + # length of session_id
1119 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1120 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1121 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1122 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1123 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1124 * 2 + # length of extensions
1125 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1127 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1129 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1130 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1133 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1134 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1136 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1138 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1140 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1142 /* Shouldn't happen */
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1146 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1148 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1149 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1151 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1152 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1154 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1155 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1158 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1162 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1166 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1169 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1172 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1177 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1183 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1185 /* Shouldn't happen */
1186 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1189 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1190 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1192 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1193 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1196 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1198 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1199 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1201 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1202 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1205 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1206 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1209 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1210 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1212 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1213 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1215 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1216 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1222 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1225 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1227 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1229 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1231 /* Shouldn't happen */
1232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1236 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1239 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1244 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1245 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1248 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1250 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1251 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1252 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1254 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1258 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1261 ret
= ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s
, &al
);
1264 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1266 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1267 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1268 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1277 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1280 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1282 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1288 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1290 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1291 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1292 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1293 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1294 cookie_leni
> DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
) {
1295 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1298 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1300 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1301 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1310 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1311 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1312 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1316 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1318 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1319 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1320 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1321 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1323 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1325 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1327 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1328 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1329 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1330 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1331 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1333 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1334 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1335 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1336 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1337 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1338 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1339 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1340 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1341 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1342 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1343 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1344 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1345 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1347 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1348 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1353 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1355 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1356 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1361 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1364 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1365 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1367 s
->s3
.is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1371 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1372 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1373 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1375 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1377 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1378 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1379 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1380 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1382 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1383 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1384 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1388 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s
->options
)
1389 || (!s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
1391 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1392 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1393 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1399 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1400 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1406 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1408 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1409 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1411 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1414 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1415 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1421 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1422 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1423 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1424 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1426 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1427 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1429 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1430 * 7-8 session_id_length
1431 * 9-10 challenge_length
1435 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1436 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1438 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1439 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1440 * in the first place
1442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1447 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1448 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1452 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1453 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1455 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1456 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1457 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1459 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1462 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1463 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1464 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1465 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1469 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1474 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1476 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1477 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1478 /* No extensions. */
1479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1483 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1485 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1486 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1487 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1488 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1490 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1491 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1492 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1494 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1495 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1496 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1497 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1502 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1504 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1505 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1506 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1507 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1508 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1509 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1514 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1519 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1520 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1521 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1526 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1527 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1528 * So check cookie length...
1530 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1531 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0) {
1532 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1533 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1538 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1548 /* Could be empty. */
1549 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1550 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1560 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1561 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1562 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1563 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1567 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1568 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1569 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1570 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1571 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1575 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1580 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1582 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1587 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1590 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1595 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1597 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1600 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1601 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1603 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1604 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1605 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1606 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1607 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1611 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1613 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1615 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1620 /* Set up the client_random */
1621 memcpy(s
->s3
.client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1623 /* Choose the version */
1625 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1626 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1627 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1628 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1630 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1637 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1640 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1641 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1643 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1644 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1645 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1646 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1647 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1653 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1654 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1655 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1661 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1663 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1667 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1668 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1669 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1670 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1671 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1672 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1673 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1674 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1676 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1678 /* default verification */
1679 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1680 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1681 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1682 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1685 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1687 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1688 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1689 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1690 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1691 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, protverr
);
1699 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1700 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1701 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1702 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1707 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 0;
1708 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1709 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1710 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1711 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1712 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1713 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1714 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1716 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1719 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1720 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1721 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1723 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1724 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1725 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1726 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1727 * an insecure downgrade.
1729 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1730 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1736 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1737 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1738 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1739 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1741 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1745 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1746 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1747 || s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1749 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1750 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER
);
1755 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1758 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1759 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1760 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1761 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1767 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1768 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1770 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1771 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1772 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1773 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1774 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1775 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1776 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1777 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1778 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1779 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1782 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1784 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1785 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1790 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1792 /* previous session */
1794 } else if (i
== -1) {
1795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1799 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1807 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1808 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1809 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1813 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1814 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1816 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1818 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1820 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER
) {
1821 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1822 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1824 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1825 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1826 if (trc_out
!= NULL
)
1827 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i
,
1828 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1836 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1840 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1841 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER
);
1844 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER
);
1847 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1848 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1852 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1854 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1858 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1859 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1861 /* TLS extensions */
1862 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1863 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1869 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1870 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1871 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1872 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1876 pos
= s
->s3
.server_random
;
1877 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1878 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1884 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1887 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1888 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1890 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1891 * backwards compat reasons
1893 int master_key_length
;
1895 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1896 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1897 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1899 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1900 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1901 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1903 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
1904 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1908 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1909 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1910 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
,
1911 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1912 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1917 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1918 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1919 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1920 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1921 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->peer_ciphers
);
1926 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1927 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1928 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1930 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1931 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1933 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1934 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1935 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1937 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1939 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1944 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1945 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1946 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1948 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1949 /* Can't disable compression */
1950 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1952 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1955 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1956 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1957 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1958 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1959 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1963 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1965 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1968 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1969 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1970 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1973 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1974 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1975 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1978 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1980 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1981 /* See if we have a match */
1982 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1985 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1986 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1987 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1989 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1990 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1999 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2005 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2006 * using compression.
2008 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2009 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2015 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2018 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2019 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->peer_ciphers
);
2020 s
->peer_ciphers
= ciphers
;
2021 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2029 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2030 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2032 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2034 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2035 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2042 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2043 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2044 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2047 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2048 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2049 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2050 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2051 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2057 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2058 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2060 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2062 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2065 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2066 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2067 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2068 * influence which certificate is sent
2070 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2071 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2074 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2075 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2077 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2078 * et al can pick it up.
2080 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2081 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2085 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2087 /* status request response should be sent */
2088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2089 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2090 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2092 /* something bad happened */
2093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2105 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2106 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2108 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2110 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2111 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2113 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2114 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2115 s
->s3
.alpn_proposed
,
2116 (unsigned int)s
->s3
.alpn_proposed_len
,
2117 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2119 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2120 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
2121 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2122 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2123 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= 0;
2124 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2127 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2129 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2133 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2134 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2135 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2136 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2137 selected_len
) != 0) {
2138 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2139 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2143 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2144 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2147 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2152 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2154 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2159 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2164 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
,
2166 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2170 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2175 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2176 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2177 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2178 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2184 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2186 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2188 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2189 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2191 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2198 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2199 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2200 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2201 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2202 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2204 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2208 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2211 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2214 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2215 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2217 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->peer_ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2219 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2221 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2224 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2227 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal already called */
2231 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2232 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2233 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2234 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2235 ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2236 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2237 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2238 /* do not send a session ticket */
2239 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2242 /* Session-id reuse */
2243 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2247 * we now have the following setup.
2249 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2250 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2251 * compression - basically ignored right now
2252 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2254 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2255 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2259 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2260 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2262 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2267 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2268 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2269 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2270 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2280 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2282 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2284 * callback indicates further work to be done
2286 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2301 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2306 unsigned char *session_id
;
2307 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2309 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2312 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2313 * tls_process_client_hello()
2315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2316 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2317 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
.server_random
,
2318 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2324 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2325 * back in the server hello:
2326 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2327 * we send back the old session ID.
2328 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2329 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2330 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2331 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2333 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2334 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2335 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2337 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2338 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2341 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2342 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2344 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2347 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2348 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2350 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2351 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2354 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2355 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2359 /* set up the compression method */
2360 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2363 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2366 compm
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2369 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2370 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2371 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)) {
2372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2376 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2377 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2378 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2380 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2381 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2387 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2388 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2389 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2394 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2395 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2397 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2401 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2402 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2403 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2410 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2412 if (!s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
) {
2413 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2414 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2421 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2423 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2424 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2425 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2427 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
;
2431 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2432 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2433 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2434 int freer
= 0, ret
= 0;
2436 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2441 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2446 type
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2448 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2450 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2451 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2453 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2454 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2455 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2456 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2458 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2459 pkdh
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2466 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2468 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2469 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2470 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024));
2472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2478 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2482 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2483 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2487 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2492 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, pkdhp
);
2493 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2498 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2501 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2503 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
,
2505 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
,
2507 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2508 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
, &r
[2])) {
2509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2512 } else if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2514 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2515 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2519 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2520 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2521 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2523 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2526 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2527 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2528 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2529 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2530 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2531 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2535 /* Encode the public key. */
2536 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
,
2538 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2544 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2545 * can set these to NULLs
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2553 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2554 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2555 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2556 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2560 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2561 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2562 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2563 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2567 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2571 if (((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2572 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2574 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2575 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2580 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2581 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2582 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2585 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2586 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2588 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2589 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2597 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2598 unsigned char *binval
;
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2602 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2603 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2606 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2614 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2615 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2618 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2619 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2622 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2626 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2630 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2631 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2632 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2636 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2639 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2641 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2642 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2643 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2648 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2649 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2650 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2653 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2654 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2659 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2661 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2662 size_t siglen
= 0, tbslen
;
2664 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
2665 /* Should never happen */
2666 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2669 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2670 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2671 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2674 /* send signature algorithm */
2675 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2680 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2681 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2682 s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->ctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2684 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2687 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2688 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2689 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2690 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2694 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2695 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2702 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, NULL
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <=0
2703 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2704 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
) <= 0
2705 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2706 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2708 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2716 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2717 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2718 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2728 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2730 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2731 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2732 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2733 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2734 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2735 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
) {
2736 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2737 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2740 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->pha_context
,
2741 s
->pha_context_len
, 0) <= 0
2742 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
,
2743 s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2744 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2747 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2748 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2753 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2754 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2759 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2760 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2768 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2769 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2770 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2775 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2776 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2777 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2779 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2780 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2781 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2782 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2788 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, get_ca_names(s
), pkt
)) {
2789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2795 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2799 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2802 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2804 PACKET psk_identity
;
2806 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2810 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2814 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2819 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2820 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2824 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2827 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2828 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2830 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2832 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2834 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2838 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2839 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2840 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2842 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2843 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
2844 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2848 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2852 /* Should never happen */
2853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2858 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2861 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2862 EVP_PKEY
*rsa
= NULL
;
2863 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2865 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2866 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
2868 rsa
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
;
2870 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2874 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2875 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2876 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2878 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2879 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2880 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2885 outlen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2886 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(outlen
);
2887 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2888 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2892 ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, rsa
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
2894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2899 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2900 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2901 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
2902 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
2903 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
2904 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
2905 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
2906 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
2907 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2909 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx
) <= 0
2910 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx
, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING
) <= 0) {
2911 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2915 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION
,
2916 (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
);
2917 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) != 0)
2918 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
2919 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION
,
2920 (unsigned int *)&s
->version
);
2921 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
2923 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx
, params
)
2924 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx
, rsa_decrypt
, &outlen
,
2925 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2926 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
)) <= 0) {
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2932 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
2933 * we double check anyway.
2935 if (outlen
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2936 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2941 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
2942 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
2943 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
, 0)) {
2944 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2950 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2951 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx
);
2955 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2957 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2959 const unsigned char *data
;
2960 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2963 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2967 skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
2969 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2973 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2974 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2977 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2978 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2979 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2982 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2983 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2984 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
2988 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, data
, i
)) {
2989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2993 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2994 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2999 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3000 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3002 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3006 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3008 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
3009 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3012 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3013 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3018 const unsigned char *data
;
3021 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3022 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3025 /* Get encoded point length */
3026 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3027 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3036 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3037 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
3042 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, data
, i
) <= 0) {
3043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3048 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3049 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3054 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
3055 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3057 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3062 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3066 const unsigned char *data
;
3068 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3069 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3070 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3073 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
3077 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3078 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3081 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3082 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3083 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3084 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3088 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3095 /* Should never happen */
3096 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3101 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3104 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3105 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3106 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3107 const unsigned char *start
;
3108 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3109 unsigned long alg_a
;
3110 GOST_KX_MESSAGE
*pKX
= NULL
;
3111 const unsigned char *ptr
;
3114 /* Get our certificate private key */
3115 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3116 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3118 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3120 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3122 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3125 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3127 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3128 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3131 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pk
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3132 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3133 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3136 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3141 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3142 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3143 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3144 * client certificate for authorization only.
3146 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3147 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3148 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3152 ptr
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3153 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3154 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3155 pKX
= d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL
, &ptr
, PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
3157 || pKX
->kxBlob
== NULL
3158 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX
->kxBlob
) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
) {
3159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3163 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, ptr
- PACKET_data(pkt
))) {
3164 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3168 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3169 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3173 inlen
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->length
;
3174 start
= pKX
->kxBlob
->value
.sequence
->data
;
3176 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3178 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3181 /* Generate master secret */
3182 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3183 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3187 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3188 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3190 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3194 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3195 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX
);
3198 /* Should never happen */
3199 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3204 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3207 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3208 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3209 EVP_PKEY
*pk
= NULL
;
3210 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3211 const unsigned char *start
= NULL
;
3212 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
= 0;
3214 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3216 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3221 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3222 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3226 /* Get our certificate private key */
3227 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
!= NULL
?
3228 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
:
3229 s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
3235 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s
->ctx
->libctx
, pk
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3236 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3240 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3241 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3245 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3247 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3252 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT
,
3253 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3257 inlen
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3258 start
= PACKET_data(pkt
);
3260 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
3261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3264 /* Generate master secret */
3265 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3266 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3273 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3276 /* Should never happen */
3277 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3282 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3284 unsigned long alg_k
;
3286 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3288 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3289 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3294 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3295 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3296 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3300 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3301 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3302 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3305 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3306 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3307 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3310 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3311 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3315 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3316 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3317 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3320 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3321 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3325 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3326 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3330 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3331 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
)) {
3332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3340 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3343 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3344 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3345 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3347 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3350 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3353 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3354 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3355 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3356 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3359 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3362 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3363 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3365 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3366 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3367 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3370 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3371 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3378 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3379 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3384 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3386 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3387 * the handshake_buffer
3389 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3390 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3393 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3395 if (!s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
) {
3396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3400 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3401 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3403 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3409 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3412 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3415 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3418 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3419 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3420 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3422 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3425 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3426 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3429 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
3431 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3436 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3437 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3438 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3439 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3444 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3445 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3450 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3451 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3452 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3453 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3457 certstart
= certbytes
;
3458 x
= X509_new_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, s
->ctx
->propq
);
3460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3463 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
) == NULL
) {
3464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3468 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3473 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3474 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3478 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3481 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3482 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3483 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3484 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3485 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3486 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3487 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3490 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3493 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3500 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3501 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3502 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3504 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3507 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3508 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3509 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3511 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3514 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3515 if (s
->s3
.handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3521 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3523 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3524 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3527 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3529 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3530 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3536 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3537 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3538 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3539 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3540 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3543 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3544 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3549 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3550 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3553 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3554 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3555 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3557 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
3558 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3562 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3565 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3566 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3571 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3572 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3575 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3577 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3578 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3579 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3584 /* Resend session tickets */
3585 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3588 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3592 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk
);
3596 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3598 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3606 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3607 * for the server Certificate message
3609 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3613 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3621 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3622 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3625 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3626 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3627 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3631 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3632 ? 0 : (uint32_t)s
->session
->timeout
)) {
3633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3637 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3638 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3639 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3640 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3645 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3646 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3654 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3655 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3657 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3658 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3659 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
3660 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3661 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3662 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3665 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3666 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3667 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3669 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3671 /* get session encoding length */
3672 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3674 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3677 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3681 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3687 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3688 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
3689 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3690 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3695 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3696 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3701 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3704 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3706 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3710 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3711 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3712 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3714 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3718 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3720 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3723 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3726 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3727 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3730 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3732 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3737 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
3738 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3739 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3742 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
3743 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3744 ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3745 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 1);
3750 /* Put timeout and length */
3751 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3752 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3753 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3757 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3758 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
3762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3765 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
3767 EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
3770 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
3771 /* Error is already recorded */
3772 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3776 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher
);
3778 || RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, iv
, iv_len
, 0) <= 0
3779 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3780 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3781 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
3782 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
3784 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3785 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3788 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher
);
3789 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3790 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3793 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3798 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3799 /* Output key name */
3800 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3802 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3803 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3805 /* Encrypt session data */
3806 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3807 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3808 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3809 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3810 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3811 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3812 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3813 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3814 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx
,
3815 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3816 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3817 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3818 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)
3819 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3820 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3821 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
3822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3826 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3827 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3828 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3835 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3836 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
3840 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3841 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3843 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3848 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
3849 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
3850 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3858 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3860 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3861 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
3863 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3867 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
3869 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3872 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
3873 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
3874 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
3876 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3877 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
3878 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3881 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
3884 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
3885 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
3886 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
3888 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
3889 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
3891 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
3892 /* SSLfatal already called */
3896 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3897 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3900 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
3901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3904 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s
->ctx
->libctx
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
,
3905 sizeof(age_add_u
), 0) <= 0) {
3906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3909 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3911 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
3912 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
3913 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
3917 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
3919 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
3922 s
->session
->master_key
,
3924 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3927 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
3929 s
->session
->time
= time(NULL
);
3930 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
3931 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3932 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3933 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3934 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
3935 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3936 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= 0;
3937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3940 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
3942 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3945 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
3946 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(s
, tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0) {
3947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3951 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
3952 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
3953 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
3956 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
3957 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
3958 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
3959 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3960 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3963 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
3965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3969 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3970 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3971 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3973 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3977 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
3978 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
3979 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
3980 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
3983 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
3984 if (s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0)
3985 s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
--;
3986 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
3995 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3996 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3998 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4001 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4002 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4010 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4012 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4013 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4022 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4023 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4025 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4027 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4028 size_t next_proto_len
;
4031 * The payload looks like:
4033 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4034 * uint8 padding_len;
4035 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4037 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4038 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4039 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4040 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4041 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4044 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4047 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4050 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4052 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4056 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4058 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4060 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4067 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4069 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4070 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4071 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4074 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4075 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4077 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4081 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4082 * a record boundary.
4084 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4086 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4089 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4090 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4091 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4092 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4093 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4096 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;