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Delay setting the sig algs until after the cert_cb has been called
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
28
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30
31 /*
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
36 *
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
39 */
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
41 {
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43
44 /*
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
48 */
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
50 default:
51 break;
52
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
57 return 1;
58 }
59 break;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
63 return 1;
64 }
65 break;
66 }
67 /* Fall through */
68
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
74 return 1;
75 }
76 } else {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
79 return 1;
80 }
81 }
82 break;
83
84 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
88 return 1;
89 }
90 } else {
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
93 return 1;
94 }
95 }
96 break;
97
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
101 return 1;
102 }
103 break;
104
105 case TLS_ST_OK:
106 /*
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
109 */
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 break;
112
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
116 return 1;
117 }
118
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 break;
124 }
125
126 /* No valid transition found */
127 return 0;
128 }
129
130 /*
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
135 *
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
138 */
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
140 {
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
142
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
145 goto err;
146 return 1;
147 }
148
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
150 default:
151 break;
152
153 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
154 case TLS_ST_OK:
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
158 return 1;
159 }
160 break;
161
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
163 /*
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
166 * OR
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
169 * AND
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
172 */
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
178 /*
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 * cert.
182 */
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 return 0;
187 }
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
189 return 1;
190 }
191 } else {
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 return 1;
194 }
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
198 return 1;
199 }
200 }
201 break;
202
203 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
206 return 1;
207 }
208 break;
209
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
211 /*
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 * set.
218 */
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
221 /*
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
226 */
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
228 return 1;
229 }
230 } else {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
233 return 1;
234 }
235 }
236 break;
237
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
241 return 1;
242 }
243 break;
244
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
250 return 1;
251 }
252 } else {
253 #endif
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 }
260 #endif
261 break;
262
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
267 return 1;
268 }
269 break;
270 #endif
271
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
275 return 1;
276 }
277 break;
278 }
279
280 err:
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
283 BIO *rbio;
284
285 /*
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
288 */
289 s->init_num = 0;
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
294 return 0;
295 }
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
299 return 0;
300 }
301
302 /*
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
304 *
305 * Valid return values are:
306 * 1: Yes
307 * 0: No
308 */
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
310 {
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
312
313 /*
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
319 * key exchange.
320 */
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
322 /*
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
324 * provided
325 */
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
332 #endif
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
336 #endif
337 ) {
338 return 1;
339 }
340
341 return 0;
342 }
343
344 /*
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
346 *
347 * Valid return values are:
348 * 1: Yes
349 * 0: No
350 */
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
352 {
353 if (
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
356 /*
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
359 */
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
362 /*
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
364 * a second time:
365 */
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
368 /*
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
371 * RFC 2246):
372 */
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
374 /*
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
377 * this for SSL 3)
378 */
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
382 /*
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
384 * are omitted
385 */
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
387 return 1;
388 }
389
390 return 0;
391 }
392
393 /*
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
396 * client.
397 */
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
399 {
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
401
402 /*
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
405 */
406
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
408 default:
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
414
415 case TLS_ST_OK:
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 }
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423 }
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
426
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
437 else
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
444 else
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
449 if (s->hit)
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
453 else
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
455
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
462 } else {
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
464 }
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466
467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
483 /*
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
486 * immediately.
487 */
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
491 /*
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
494 */
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
497 }
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
500 else
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 }
509 /* Fall through */
510
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
519 */
520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
523 }
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 }
526 }
527
528 /*
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
531 */
532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
533 {
534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
535
536 /*
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
539 */
540
541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
543
544 switch (st->hand_state) {
545 default:
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
551
552 case TLS_ST_OK:
553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 }
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
563 }
564 /* Fall through */
565
566 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
569
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 } else {
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
584 }
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
589
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
591 if (s->hit) {
592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
594 else
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
596 } else {
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
606 } else {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
608 }
609 }
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611
612 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
613 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
616 }
617 /* Fall through */
618
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 }
624 /* Fall through */
625
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 }
631 /* Fall through */
632
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
639
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
641 if (s->hit) {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
646 } else {
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
648 }
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
658
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
660 if (s->hit) {
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
662 }
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 }
666 }
667
668 /*
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
671 */
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
673 {
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
675
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
677 default:
678 /* No pre work to be done */
679 break;
680
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
682 s->shutdown = 0;
683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
685 break;
686
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
688 s->shutdown = 0;
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
692 st->use_timer = 0;
693 }
694 break;
695
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
698 /*
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
701 */
702 st->use_timer = 1;
703 }
704 break;
705
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
711 }
712 #endif
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
714
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
717 /*
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
721 *
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
723 */
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
726 /*
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
729 */
730 st->use_timer = 0;
731 }
732 break;
733
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
736 break;
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
740 return WORK_ERROR;
741 }
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
743 /*
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
748 */
749 st->use_timer = 0;
750 }
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
752
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
757 /* Fall through */
758
759 case TLS_ST_OK:
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
762 }
763
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
765 }
766
767 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
768 {
769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
770 #if defined(EPIPE)
771 case EPIPE:
772 return 1;
773 #endif
774 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
775 case ECONNRESET:
776 return 1;
777 #endif
778 default:
779 return 0;
780 }
781 }
782
783 /*
784 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
785 * server to the client.
786 */
787 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
788 {
789 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
790
791 s->init_num = 0;
792
793 switch (st->hand_state) {
794 default:
795 /* No post work to be done */
796 break;
797
798 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
799 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
800 return WORK_MORE_A;
801 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
803 return WORK_ERROR;
804 }
805 break;
806
807 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
808 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
809 return WORK_MORE_A;
810 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
811 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 return WORK_ERROR;
814 }
815 /*
816 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
817 * treat like it was the first packet
818 */
819 s->first_packet = 1;
820 break;
821
822 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
824 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
825 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
826 return WORK_MORE_A;
827 break;
828 }
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
830 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
831 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
832 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
833
834 /*
835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
836 * SCTP used.
837 */
838 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
840
841 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
842 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
843 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
844 0) <= 0) {
845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
846 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 return WORK_ERROR;
849 }
850
851 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
852 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
853 }
854 #endif
855 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
856 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
857 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
858 break;
859 /* Fall through */
860
861 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
862 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
863 if (!statem_flush(s))
864 return WORK_MORE_A;
865 break;
866 }
867
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
869 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
870 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
871 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
873 return WORK_ERROR;
874 }
875
876 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
877 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
878 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 return WORK_ERROR;
881 }
882 /*
883 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
884 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
885 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
886 */
887 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
888 break;
889 }
890
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
893 /*
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
895 * no SCTP used.
896 */
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
898 0, NULL);
899 }
900 #endif
901 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
902 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
903 {
904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
905 return WORK_ERROR;
906 }
907
908 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
909 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
910 break;
911
912 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
913 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
914 return WORK_MORE_A;
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
918 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
919 return WORK_MORE_A;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
922 /*
923 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
924 * no SCTP used.
925 */
926 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
927 0, NULL);
928 }
929 #endif
930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
931 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
932 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
933 &s->session->master_key_length)
934 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
935 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 return WORK_ERROR;
938 }
939 break;
940
941 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
942 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
943 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
944 return WORK_MORE_A;
945 }
946 break;
947
948 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
949 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
950 return WORK_MORE_A;
951 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
952 /* SSLfatal() already called */
953 return WORK_ERROR;
954 }
955 break;
956
957 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
958 clear_sys_error();
959 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
960 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
961 && conn_is_closed()) {
962 /*
963 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
964 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
965 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
966 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
967 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
968 */
969 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
970 break;
971 }
972
973 return WORK_MORE_A;
974 }
975 break;
976 }
977
978 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
979 }
980
981 /*
982 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
983 * server
984 *
985 * Valid return values are:
986 * 1: Success
987 * 0: Error
988 */
989 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
990 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
991 {
992 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
993
994 switch (st->hand_state) {
995 default:
996 /* Shouldn't happen */
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
998 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
999 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1000 return 0;
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1003 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1004 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1005 else
1006 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1008 break;
1009
1010 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1011 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1012 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1013 break;
1014
1015 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1016 /* No construction function needed */
1017 *confunc = NULL;
1018 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1019 break;
1020
1021 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1022 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1024 break;
1025
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1029 break;
1030
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1034 break;
1035
1036
1037 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1038 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1039 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1040 break;
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1043 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1045 break;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1060 break;
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1065 break;
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1068 *confunc = NULL;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1070 break;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1075 break;
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1080 break;
1081 }
1082
1083 return 1;
1084 }
1085
1086 /*
1087 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1088 * calculated as follows:
1089 *
1090 * 2 + # client_version
1091 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1092 * 1 + # length of session_id
1093 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1094 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1095 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1096 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1097 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1098 * 2 + # length of extensions
1099 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1100 */
1101 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1102
1103 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1104 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1105
1106 /*
1107 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1108 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1109 */
1110 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1111 {
1112 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1113
1114 switch (st->hand_state) {
1115 default:
1116 /* Shouldn't happen */
1117 return 0;
1118
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1120 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1121
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1123 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1124
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1126 return s->max_cert_list;
1127
1128 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1129 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1130
1131 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1132 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1133
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1135 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1136 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1137 #endif
1138
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1140 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1141
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1143 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1144
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1146 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1147 }
1148 }
1149
1150 /*
1151 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1152 */
1153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1154 {
1155 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1156
1157 switch (st->hand_state) {
1158 default:
1159 /* Shouldn't happen */
1160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1161 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1164
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1166 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1167
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1169 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1170
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1172 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1173
1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1175 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1176
1177 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1178 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1179
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1182 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1183 #endif
1184
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1186 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1187
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1189 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1190
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1192 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1193
1194 }
1195 }
1196
1197 /*
1198 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1199 * from the client
1200 */
1201 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1202 {
1203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1204
1205 switch (st->hand_state) {
1206 default:
1207 /* Shouldn't happen */
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1209 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1211 return WORK_ERROR;
1212
1213 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1214 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1215
1216 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1217 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1218 }
1219 }
1220
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1222 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1223 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1224 {
1225 int ret;
1226 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1227
1228 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1229 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1230 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1231 /*
1232 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1233 * login name
1234 */
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1236 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1237 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1238 return -1;
1239 } else {
1240 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1241 if (ret < 0)
1242 return 0;
1243 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1244 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1245 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1246 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1247 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1248 return -1;
1249 }
1250 }
1251 }
1252 return 1;
1253 }
1254 #endif
1255
1256 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1257 size_t cookie_len)
1258 {
1259 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1261 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1262 return 0;
1263
1264 return 1;
1265 }
1266
1267 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1268 {
1269 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1270 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1271 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1272 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1273 cookie_leni > 255) {
1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1275 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1276 return 0;
1277 }
1278 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1279
1280 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1281 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 return 0;
1285 }
1286
1287 return 1;
1288 }
1289
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1291 /*-
1292 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1293 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1294 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1295 * SNI,
1296 * elliptic_curves
1297 * ec_point_formats
1298 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1299 *
1300 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1301 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1302 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1303 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1304 */
1305 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1306 {
1307 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1308 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1309 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1310 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1311 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1312 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1313 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1314
1315 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1316 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1317 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1318 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1319 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1320 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1321 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1322 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1323 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1324 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1325 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1326 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1327 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1328 };
1329 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1330 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1331 unsigned int type;
1332 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1333 size_t ext_len;
1334
1335 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1336
1337 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1338 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1339 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1340 return;
1341 }
1342
1343 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1344 return;
1345
1346 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1347 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1348
1349 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1350 ext_len);
1351 }
1352 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1353
1354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1355 {
1356 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1357 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1358 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1359 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1360
1361 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1362 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1363 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 goto err;
1367 }
1368 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1369 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1370 && (s->options
1371 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1373 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1374 }
1375 s->renegotiate = 1;
1376 s->new_session = 1;
1377 }
1378
1379 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1380 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 goto err;
1384 }
1385
1386 /*
1387 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1388 */
1389 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1390 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1391
1392 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1393 unsigned int mt;
1394
1395 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1396 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1399 goto err;
1400 }
1401
1402 /*-
1403 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1404 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1405 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1406 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1407 * Byte Content
1408 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1409 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1410 * 3-4 version
1411 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1412 * 7-8 session_id_length
1413 * 9-10 challenge_length
1414 * ... ...
1415 */
1416
1417 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1418 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1419 /*
1420 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1421 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1422 * in the first place
1423 */
1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 goto err;
1427 }
1428 }
1429
1430 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1433 goto err;
1434 }
1435
1436 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1437 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1438 /*
1439 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1440 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1441 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1442 */
1443 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1444 PACKET challenge;
1445
1446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1448 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1450 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 goto err;
1452 }
1453
1454 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459
1460 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1461 ciphersuite_len)
1462 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1463 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1464 /* No extensions. */
1465 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1467 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 goto err;
1469 }
1470 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1471
1472 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1473 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1474 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1475 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1476 */
1477 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1478 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1479 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1480 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1481 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1482 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1483 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1484 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 goto err;
1488 }
1489
1490 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1491 } else {
1492 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1495 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1496 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1497 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1499 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1500 goto err;
1501 }
1502
1503 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1506 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 goto err;
1508 }
1509 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1510 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1511 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 goto err;
1515 }
1516 /*
1517 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1518 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1519 * So check cookie length...
1520 */
1521 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1522 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1523 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1524 }
1525 }
1526
1527 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1529 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1530 goto err;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1536 goto err;
1537 }
1538
1539 /* Could be empty. */
1540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1541 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1542 } else {
1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1544 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1546 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1547 goto err;
1548 }
1549 }
1550 }
1551
1552 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1553 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1554 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 goto err;
1558 }
1559
1560 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1561 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1562 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1563 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1564 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1565 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1566 goto err;
1567 }
1568 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1569
1570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1571
1572 err:
1573 if (clienthello != NULL)
1574 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1575 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1576
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1578 }
1579
1580 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1581 {
1582 unsigned int j;
1583 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1584 int protverr;
1585 size_t loop;
1586 unsigned long id;
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1588 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1589 #endif
1590 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1591 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1592 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1593 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1594 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1595
1596 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1597 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1598 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1599 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1600 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1601 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1602 break;
1603 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1604 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1605 return -1;
1606 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1607 default:
1608 SSLfatal(s, al,
1609 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1610 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1611 goto err;
1612 }
1613 }
1614
1615 /* Set up the client_random */
1616 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1617
1618 /* Choose the version */
1619
1620 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1621 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1622 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1623 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1624 /*
1625 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1626 * support it.
1627 */
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1629 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1630 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1631 goto err;
1632 }
1633 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1634 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1635 }
1636 /*
1637 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1638 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1639 */
1640 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1641 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1642 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1643 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1644 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1645 } else {
1646 protverr = 0;
1647 }
1648
1649 if (protverr) {
1650 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1651 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1652 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1653 }
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1655 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1656 goto err;
1657 }
1658
1659 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1660 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1662 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1663 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1668 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1669 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1670 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1671 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1672 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1674 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1675 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1676 goto err;
1677 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1678 }
1679 /* default verification */
1680 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1681 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1682 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1686 goto err;
1687 }
1688 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1689 }
1690 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1691 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1692 if (protverr != 0) {
1693 s->version = s->client_version;
1694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1695 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698 }
1699 }
1700
1701 s->hit = 0;
1702
1703 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1704 clienthello->isv2) ||
1705 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1706 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1708 goto err;
1709 }
1710
1711 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1712 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1713 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1714 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1715 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1716 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1717 if (s->renegotiate) {
1718 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1720 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1721 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1725 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1726 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1727 /*
1728 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1729 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1730 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1731 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1732 * an insecure downgrade.
1733 */
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1735 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1736 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 }
1740 }
1741
1742 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1744 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1745 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1746
1747 if (cipher == NULL) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1749 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1750 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1751 goto err;
1752 }
1753 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1754 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1755 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1756 /*
1757 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1758 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1759 */
1760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1761 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1762 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1763 goto err;
1764 }
1765 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1766 }
1767
1768 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1769 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1770 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1771 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775
1776 /*
1777 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1778 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1779 *
1780 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1781 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1782 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1783 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1784 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1785 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1786 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1787 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1788 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1789 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1790 * ignored.
1791 */
1792 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1793 (s->new_session &&
1794 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1795 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1797 goto err;
1798 }
1799 } else {
1800 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1801 if (i == 1) {
1802 /* previous session */
1803 s->hit = 1;
1804 } else if (i == -1) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 goto err;
1807 } else {
1808 /* i == 0 */
1809 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813 }
1814 }
1815
1816 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1817 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1818 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1819 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1820 }
1821
1822 /*
1823 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1824 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1825 */
1826 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1827 j = 0;
1828 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1829
1830 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1831 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1832 #endif
1833 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1834 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1835 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1836 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1837 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1838 #endif
1839 if (c->id == id) {
1840 j = 1;
1841 break;
1842 }
1843 }
1844 if (j == 0) {
1845 /*
1846 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1847 * to reuse it
1848 */
1849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1850 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1851 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1852 goto err;
1853 }
1854 }
1855
1856 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1857 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1858 break;
1859 }
1860
1861 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1862 /* no compress */
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1865 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1866 goto err;
1867 }
1868
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1871 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1872 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1873
1874 /* TLS extensions */
1875 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1876 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1878 goto err;
1879 }
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1883 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1884 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1885 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1886 */
1887 {
1888 unsigned char *pos;
1889 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1890 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1892 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1894 goto err;
1895 }
1896 }
1897
1898 if (!s->hit
1899 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1900 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1901 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1902 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1903 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1904 /*
1905 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1906 * backwards compat reasons
1907 */
1908 int master_key_length;
1909
1910 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1911 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1912 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1913 &pref_cipher,
1914 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1915 && master_key_length > 0) {
1916 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1917 s->hit = 1;
1918 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1919 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1920
1921 ciphers = NULL;
1922
1923 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1924 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1925 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1926 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1927 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1929 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1930 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1931 goto err;
1932 }
1933
1934 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1935 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1936 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1937 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1938 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1939 }
1940 }
1941
1942 /*
1943 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1944 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1945 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1946 */
1947 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1948 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1949 /*
1950 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1951 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1952 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1953 */
1954 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1956 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1957 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1958 goto err;
1959 }
1960 }
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1962 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1963 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1964 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1965 unsigned int k;
1966 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1967 /* Can't disable compression */
1968 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1970 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1971 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1975 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1976 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1977 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1978 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1979 break;
1980 }
1981 }
1982 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1984 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1985 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1989 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1990 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1991 break;
1992 }
1993 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1995 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1996 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1997 goto err;
1998 }
1999 } else if (s->hit) {
2000 comp = NULL;
2001 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2002 /* See if we have a match */
2003 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2004 unsigned int o;
2005
2006 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2007 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2008 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2009 v = comp->id;
2010 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2011 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2012 done = 1;
2013 break;
2014 }
2015 }
2016 if (done)
2017 break;
2018 }
2019 if (done)
2020 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2021 else
2022 comp = NULL;
2023 }
2024 #else
2025 /*
2026 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2027 * using compression.
2028 */
2029 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2031 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2032 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2033 goto err;
2034 }
2035 #endif
2036
2037 /*
2038 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2039 */
2040
2041 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2042 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
2043 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
2044 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2046 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2047 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 goto err;
2049 }
2050 ciphers = NULL;
2051 }
2052
2053 if (!s->hit) {
2054 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2055 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2056 #else
2057 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2058 #endif
2059 }
2060
2061 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2062 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2063 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2064 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2065 s->clienthello = NULL;
2066 return 1;
2067 err:
2068 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2069 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2070 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2072 s->clienthello = NULL;
2073
2074 return 0;
2075 }
2076
2077 /*
2078 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2079 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2080 */
2081 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2082 {
2083 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2084
2085 /*
2086 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2087 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2088 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2089 * influence which certificate is sent
2090 */
2091 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2092 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2093 int ret;
2094
2095 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2096 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2097 /*
2098 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2099 * et al can pick it up.
2100 */
2101 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2102 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2103 switch (ret) {
2104 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2105 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2106 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2107 break;
2108 /* status request response should be sent */
2109 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2110 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2111 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2112 break;
2113 /* something bad happened */
2114 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2115 default:
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2117 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2118 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2119 return 0;
2120 }
2121 }
2122 }
2123
2124 return 1;
2125 }
2126
2127 /*
2128 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2129 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2130 */
2131 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2132 {
2133 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2134 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2135
2136 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2137 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2138 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2139 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2140 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2141
2142 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2143 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2144 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2145 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2148 return 0;
2149 }
2150 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2152 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2153 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2154 #endif
2155
2156 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2157 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2158 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2159 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2160 selected_len) != 0) {
2161 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2162 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2163
2164 if (!s->hit) {
2165 /*
2166 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2167 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2168 * selected ALPN.
2169 */
2170 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2172 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2174 return 0;
2175 }
2176 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2177 selected_len);
2178 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2180 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2182 return 0;
2183 }
2184 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2185 }
2186 }
2187
2188 return 1;
2189 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2191 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2192 return 0;
2193 }
2194 /*
2195 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2196 * present.
2197 */
2198 }
2199
2200 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2201 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2202 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2203 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2204 }
2205
2206 return 1;
2207 }
2208
2209 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2210 {
2211 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2212
2213 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2214 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2215 if (rv == 0) {
2216 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2217 goto err;
2218 }
2219 if (rv < 0)
2220 return WORK_MORE_A;
2221 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2222 }
2223 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2224 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2225 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2226 if (!s->hit) {
2227 if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2228 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2229 if (rv == 0) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2231 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2232 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2233 goto err;
2234 }
2235 if (rv < 0) {
2236 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2237 return WORK_MORE_B;
2238 }
2239 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2240 }
2241 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2242 /* SSLfatal already called */
2243 goto err;
2244 }
2245 }
2246
2247 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2248 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2249 cipher =
2250 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2251
2252 if (cipher == NULL) {
2253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2254 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2255 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2256 goto err;
2257 }
2258 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2259 }
2260 if (!s->hit) {
2261 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2262 /* SSLfatal already called */
2263 goto err;
2264 }
2265 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2266 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2267 s->session->not_resumable =
2268 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2269 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2270 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2271 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2272 /* do not send a session ticket */
2273 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2274 }
2275 } else {
2276 /* Session-id reuse */
2277 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2278 }
2279
2280 /*-
2281 * we now have the following setup.
2282 * client_random
2283 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2284 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2285 * compression - basically ignored right now
2286 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2287 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2288 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2289 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2290 */
2291
2292 /*
2293 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2294 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2295 */
2296 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2297 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2298 goto err;
2299 }
2300 /*
2301 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2302 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2303 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2304 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2305 */
2306 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2307 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2308 goto err;
2309 }
2310
2311 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2312 }
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2314 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2315 int ret;
2316 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2317 /*
2318 * callback indicates further work to be done
2319 */
2320 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2321 return WORK_MORE_C;
2322 }
2323 if (ret < 0) {
2324 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2325 goto err;
2326 }
2327 }
2328 #endif
2329
2330 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2331 err:
2332 return WORK_ERROR;
2333 }
2334
2335 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2336 {
2337 int compm;
2338 size_t sl, len;
2339 int version;
2340 unsigned char *session_id;
2341 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2342
2343 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2344 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2345 /*
2346 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2347 * tls_process_client_hello()
2348 */
2349 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2350 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2351 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2352 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2354 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2355 return 0;
2356 }
2357
2358 /*-
2359 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2360 * back in the server hello:
2361 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2362 * we send back the old session ID.
2363 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2364 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2365 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2366 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2367 * session ID.
2368 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2369 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2370 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2371 * regardless
2372 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2373 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2374 * to send back.
2375 */
2376 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2377 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2378 && !s->hit))
2379 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2380
2381 if (usetls13) {
2382 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2383 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2384 } else {
2385 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2386 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2387 }
2388
2389 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 return 0;
2393 }
2394
2395 /* set up the compression method */
2396 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2397 compm = 0;
2398 #else
2399 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2400 compm = 0;
2401 else
2402 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2403 #endif
2404
2405 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2406 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2407 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2409 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 return 0;
2411 }
2412
2413 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2414 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2415 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2416 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2417 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2418 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2419 NULL, 0)) {
2420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2421 return 0;
2422 }
2423
2424 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2425 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2426 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2427 s->session = NULL;
2428 s->hit = 0;
2429
2430 /*
2431 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2432 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2433 */
2434 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2436 return 0;
2437 }
2438 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2439 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2440 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2441 return 0;
2442 }
2443
2444 return 1;
2445 }
2446
2447 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2448 {
2449 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2450 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2451 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2452 return 0;
2453 }
2454 }
2455 return 1;
2456 }
2457
2458 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2459 {
2460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2461 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2462 #endif
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2464 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2465 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2466 int curve_id = 0;
2467 #endif
2468 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2469 int i;
2470 unsigned long type;
2471 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2472 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2473 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2474 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2475
2476 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2479 goto err;
2480 }
2481
2482 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2484 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2485 goto err;
2486 }
2487
2488 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2489
2490 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2492 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2493 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2494 } else
2495 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2497 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2498 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2499
2500 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2501 DH *dh;
2502
2503 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2504 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2505 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2506 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2507 DH_free(dhp);
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2509 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2511 goto err;
2512 }
2513 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2514 pkdhp = pkdh;
2515 } else {
2516 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2517 }
2518 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2519 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2520 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2521 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2523 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 goto err;
2526 }
2527 pkdhp = pkdh;
2528 }
2529 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2531 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2536 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2544 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 goto err;
2547 }
2548
2549 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2550 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2552 goto err;
2553 }
2554
2555 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2556 if (dh == NULL) {
2557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2558 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2560 goto err;
2561 }
2562
2563 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2564 pkdh = NULL;
2565
2566 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2567 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2568 } else
2569 #endif
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2571 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2572
2573 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2575 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2577 goto err;
2578 }
2579
2580 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2581 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2582 if (curve_id == 0) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2586 goto err;
2587 }
2588 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2589 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2590 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2592 goto err;
2593 }
2594
2595 /* Encode the public key. */
2596 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2597 &encodedPoint);
2598 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2600 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2601 goto err;
2602 }
2603
2604 /*
2605 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2606 * can set these to NULLs
2607 */
2608 r[0] = NULL;
2609 r[1] = NULL;
2610 r[2] = NULL;
2611 r[3] = NULL;
2612 } else
2613 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2615 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2616 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2617 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2618 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2620 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2622 goto err;
2623 }
2624 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2625 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2626 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2627 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2628 } else
2629 #endif
2630 {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636
2637 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2638 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2639 lu = NULL;
2640 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2642 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2643 goto err;
2644 }
2645
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2647 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2648 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2649 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2650
2651 /*
2652 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2653 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2654 */
2655 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2656 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2657 len)) {
2658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2659 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 goto err;
2662 }
2663 }
2664 #endif
2665
2666 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2667 unsigned char *binval;
2668 int res;
2669
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2671 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2672 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2673 } else
2674 #endif
2675 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2676
2677 if (!res) {
2678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2679 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 goto err;
2682 }
2683
2684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2685 /*-
2686 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2687 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2688 * as the prime
2689 */
2690 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2691 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2692
2693 if (len > 0) {
2694 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2696 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2697 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 goto err;
2699 }
2700 memset(binval, 0, len);
2701 }
2702 }
2703 #endif
2704 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2705 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2707 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2708 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 goto err;
2710 }
2711
2712 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2713 }
2714
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2716 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2717 /*
2718 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2719 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2720 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2721 * point itself
2722 */
2723 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2724 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2725 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2726 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2728 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2730 goto err;
2731 }
2732 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2733 encodedPoint = NULL;
2734 }
2735 #endif
2736
2737 /* not anonymous */
2738 if (lu != NULL) {
2739 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2740 const EVP_MD *md;
2741 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2742 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2743 int rv;
2744
2745 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2746 /* Should never happen */
2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2748 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 goto err;
2751 }
2752 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2753 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2755 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2757 goto err;
2758 }
2759 /* send signature algorithm */
2760 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2762 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2764 goto err;
2765 }
2766 /*
2767 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2768 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2769 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2770 * afterwards.
2771 */
2772 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2773 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2774 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2776 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 goto err;
2779 }
2780 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2781 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2782 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2785 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2786 goto err;
2787 }
2788 }
2789 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2790 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2791 paramlen);
2792 if (tbslen == 0) {
2793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2794 goto err;
2795 }
2796 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2797 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2798 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2799 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2801 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2803 goto err;
2804 }
2805 }
2806
2807 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2808 return 1;
2809 err:
2810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2811 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2812 #endif
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2814 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2815 #endif
2816 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2817 return 0;
2818 }
2819
2820 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2821 {
2822 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2823 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2824 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2825 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2826 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2827 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2828 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2829 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2832 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 return 0;
2834 }
2835 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2836 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2837 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2838 return 0;
2839 }
2840 } else {
2841 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 return 0;
2846 }
2847 }
2848
2849 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2850 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2851 0)) {
2852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2853 return 0;
2854 }
2855 goto done;
2856 }
2857
2858 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2859 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2860 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2862 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 return 0;
2864 }
2865
2866 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2867 const uint16_t *psigs;
2868 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2869
2870 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2871 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2872 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2873 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2875 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2876 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2877 return 0;
2878 }
2879 }
2880
2881 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2883 return 0;
2884 }
2885
2886 done:
2887 s->certreqs_sent++;
2888 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2889 return 1;
2890 }
2891
2892 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2893 {
2894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2895 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2896 size_t psklen;
2897 PACKET psk_identity;
2898
2899 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2901 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2902 return 0;
2903 }
2904 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2906 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2907 return 0;
2908 }
2909 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2911 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2912 return 0;
2913 }
2914
2915 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 return 0;
2919 }
2920
2921 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2922 psk, sizeof(psk));
2923
2924 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 return 0;
2928 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2929 /*
2930 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2931 */
2932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2933 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2934 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2935 return 0;
2936 }
2937
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2939 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2940 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2941
2942 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2944 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2945 return 0;
2946 }
2947
2948 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2949
2950 return 1;
2951 #else
2952 /* Should never happen */
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 return 0;
2956 #endif
2957 }
2958
2959 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2960 {
2961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2962 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2963 int decrypt_len;
2964 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2965 size_t j, padding_len;
2966 PACKET enc_premaster;
2967 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2968 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2969 int ret = 0;
2970
2971 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2972 if (rsa == NULL) {
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2974 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2975 return 0;
2976 }
2977
2978 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2979 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2980 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2981 } else {
2982 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2983 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2985 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2986 return 0;
2987 }
2988 }
2989
2990 /*
2991 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2992 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2993 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2994 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2995 */
2996 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2998 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2999 return 0;
3000 }
3001
3002 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3003 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3005 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3006 return 0;
3007 }
3008
3009 /*
3010 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3011 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3012 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3013 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3014 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3015 */
3016
3017 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3018 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 goto err;
3022 }
3023
3024 /*
3025 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3026 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3027 */
3028 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3029 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3030 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3031 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3032 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 goto err;
3036 }
3037
3038 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3039
3040 /*
3041 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3042 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3043 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3044 */
3045 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3047 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3048 goto err;
3049 }
3050
3051 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3052 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3053 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3054 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3055 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3056 }
3057 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3058
3059 /*
3060 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3061 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3062 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3063 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3064 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3065 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3066 */
3067 version_good =
3068 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3069 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3070 version_good &=
3071 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3072 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3073
3074 /*
3075 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3076 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3077 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3078 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3079 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3080 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3081 * clients.
3082 */
3083 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3084 unsigned char workaround_good;
3085 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3086 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3087 workaround_good &=
3088 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3089 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3090 version_good |= workaround_good;
3091 }
3092
3093 /*
3094 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3095 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3096 */
3097 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3098
3099 /*
3100 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3101 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3102 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3103 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3104 */
3105 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3106 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3107 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3108 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3109 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3110 }
3111
3112 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3113 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3115 goto err;
3116 }
3117
3118 ret = 1;
3119 err:
3120 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3121 return ret;
3122 #else
3123 /* Should never happen */
3124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3126 return 0;
3127 #endif
3128 }
3129
3130 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3131 {
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3133 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3134 DH *cdh;
3135 unsigned int i;
3136 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3137 const unsigned char *data;
3138 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3139 int ret = 0;
3140
3141 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3143 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3144 goto err;
3145 }
3146 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3147 if (skey == NULL) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3149 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3150 goto err;
3151 }
3152
3153 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3155 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3156 goto err;
3157 }
3158 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3159 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3162 goto err;
3163 }
3164 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3165 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3167 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3168 goto err;
3169 }
3170
3171 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3172 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3173 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3176 BN_free(pub_key);
3177 goto err;
3178 }
3179
3180 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3182 goto err;
3183 }
3184
3185 ret = 1;
3186 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3187 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3188 err:
3189 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3190 return ret;
3191 #else
3192 /* Should never happen */
3193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3195 return 0;
3196 #endif
3197 }
3198
3199 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3200 {
3201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3202 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3203 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3204 int ret = 0;
3205
3206 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3207 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3209 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3210 goto err;
3211 } else {
3212 unsigned int i;
3213 const unsigned char *data;
3214
3215 /*
3216 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3217 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3218 */
3219
3220 /* Get encoded point length */
3221 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3222 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3225 goto err;
3226 }
3227 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3228 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3230 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3231 goto err;
3232 }
3233 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3235 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3236 goto err;
3237 }
3238 }
3239
3240 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3241 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3242 goto err;
3243 }
3244
3245 ret = 1;
3246 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3247 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3248 err:
3249 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3250
3251 return ret;
3252 #else
3253 /* Should never happen */
3254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3256 return 0;
3257 #endif
3258 }
3259
3260 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3261 {
3262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3263 unsigned int i;
3264 const unsigned char *data;
3265
3266 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3267 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3269 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3270 return 0;
3271 }
3272 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3274 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3275 return 0;
3276 }
3277 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3279 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3280 return 0;
3281 }
3282 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3283 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3284 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3286 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3287 return 0;
3288 }
3289
3290 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3292 return 0;
3293 }
3294
3295 return 1;
3296 #else
3297 /* Should never happen */
3298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3300 return 0;
3301 #endif
3302 }
3303
3304 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3305 {
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3307 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3308 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3309 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3310 const unsigned char *start;
3311 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3312 unsigned long alg_a;
3313 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3314 int ret = 0;
3315 PACKET encdata;
3316
3317 /* Get our certificate private key */
3318 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3319 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3320 /*
3321 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3322 */
3323 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3324 if (pk == NULL) {
3325 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3326 }
3327 if (pk == NULL) {
3328 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3329 }
3330 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3331 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3332 }
3333
3334 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3335 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3337 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3338 return 0;
3339 }
3340 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3343 return 0;
3344 }
3345 /*
3346 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3347 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3348 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3349 * client certificate for authorization only.
3350 */
3351 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3352 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3353 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3354 ERR_clear_error();
3355 }
3356 /* Decrypt session key */
3357 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3358 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3359 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3361 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3362 goto err;
3363 }
3364 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3365 /*
3366 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3367 * isn't supported.
3368 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3369 */
3370 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3372 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3373 goto err;
3374 }
3375 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3376 /*
3377 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3378 * support it
3379 */
3380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3381 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3382 goto err;
3383 } /* else short form length */
3384
3385 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3387 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3388 goto err;
3389 }
3390 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3391 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3392
3393 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3394 inlen) <= 0) {
3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3396 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3397 goto err;
3398 }
3399 /* Generate master secret */
3400 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3401 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3403 goto err;
3404 }
3405 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3406 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3407 NULL) > 0)
3408 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3409
3410 ret = 1;
3411 err:
3412 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3413 return ret;
3414 #else
3415 /* Should never happen */
3416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3417 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3418 return 0;
3419 #endif
3420 }
3421
3422 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3423 {
3424 unsigned long alg_k;
3425
3426 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3427
3428 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3429 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3430 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3431 goto err;
3432 }
3433
3434 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3435 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3436 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3438 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3439 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3440 goto err;
3441 }
3442 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3443 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3444 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3445 goto err;
3446 }
3447 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3448 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3449 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3450 goto err;
3451 }
3452 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3453 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3454 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3455 goto err;
3456 }
3457 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3458 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3459 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3460 goto err;
3461 }
3462 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3463 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3465 goto err;
3466 }
3467 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3468 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 goto err;
3471 }
3472 } else {
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3475 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3476 goto err;
3477 }
3478
3479 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3480 err:
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3482 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3483 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3484 #endif
3485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3486 }
3487
3488 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3489 {
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3491 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3492 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3493 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3494 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3495 /*
3496 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3497 * used.
3498 */
3499 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3500 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3501
3502 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3503 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3504 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3505 0) <= 0) {
3506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3507 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3509 return WORK_ERROR;
3510 }
3511
3512 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3513 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3514 }
3515 }
3516 #endif
3517
3518 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3519 /*
3520 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3521 * the handshake_buffer
3522 */
3523 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3524 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 return WORK_ERROR;
3526 }
3527 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3528 } else {
3529 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3531 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3533 return WORK_ERROR;
3534 }
3535 /*
3536 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3537 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3538 */
3539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3540 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3541 return WORK_ERROR;
3542 }
3543 }
3544
3545 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3546 }
3547
3548 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3549 {
3550 int i;
3551 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3552 X509 *x = NULL;
3553 unsigned long l;
3554 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3555 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3556 PACKET spkt, context;
3557 size_t chainidx;
3558 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3559
3560 /*
3561 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3562 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3563 * TLSv1.3
3564 */
3565 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3566
3567 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3569 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3570 goto err;
3571 }
3572
3573 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3574 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3575 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3576 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3578 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3579 goto err;
3580 }
3581
3582 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3583 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3585 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3586 goto err;
3587 }
3588
3589 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3590 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3591 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3593 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3594 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3595 goto err;
3596 }
3597
3598 certstart = certbytes;
3599 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3600 if (x == NULL) {
3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3603 goto err;
3604 }
3605 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3607 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3608 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3609 goto err;
3610 }
3611
3612 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3613 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3614 PACKET extensions;
3615
3616 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3619 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3620 goto err;
3621 }
3622 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3623 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3624 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3625 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3626 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3627 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3628 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3629 goto err;
3630 }
3631 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3632 }
3633
3634 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3637 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3638 goto err;
3639 }
3640 x = NULL;
3641 }
3642
3643 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3644 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3645 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3647 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3648 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3649 goto err;
3650 }
3651 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3652 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3653 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3655 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3656 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3657 goto err;
3658 }
3659 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3660 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3661 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3662 goto err;
3663 }
3664 } else {
3665 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3666 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3667 if (i <= 0) {
3668 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3670 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3671 goto err;
3672 }
3673 if (i > 1) {
3674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3675 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3676 goto err;
3677 }
3678 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3679 if (pkey == NULL) {
3680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3681 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3682 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3683 goto err;
3684 }
3685 }
3686
3687 /*
3688 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3689 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3690 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3691 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3692 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3693 */
3694
3695 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3696 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3698 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3699 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3700 goto err;
3701 }
3702
3703 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3704 s->session = new_sess;
3705 }
3706
3707 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3708 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3709 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3710
3711 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3712 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3713
3714 /*
3715 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3716 * message
3717 */
3718 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3720 goto err;
3721 }
3722
3723 /*
3724 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3725 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3726 */
3727 sk = NULL;
3728
3729 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3730 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3731 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3732 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3733 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3735 goto err;
3736 }
3737
3738 /* Resend session tickets */
3739 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3740 }
3741
3742 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3743
3744 err:
3745 X509_free(x);
3746 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3747 return ret;
3748 }
3749
3750 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3751 {
3752 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3753
3754 if (cpk == NULL) {
3755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3756 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3757 return 0;
3758 }
3759
3760 /*
3761 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3762 * for the server Certificate message
3763 */
3764 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3766 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3767 return 0;
3768 }
3769 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3770 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3771 return 0;
3772 }
3773
3774 return 1;
3775 }
3776
3777 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3778 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3779 {
3780 /*
3781 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3782 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3783 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3784 * timeout.
3785 */
3786 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3787 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3788 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3791 return 0;
3792 }
3793
3794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3795 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3796 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3799 return 0;
3800 }
3801 }
3802
3803 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3804 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3807 return 0;
3808 }
3809
3810 return 1;
3811 }
3812
3813 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3814 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3815 {
3816 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3817 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3818 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3819 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3820 const unsigned char *const_p;
3821 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3822 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3823 unsigned int hlen;
3824 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3825 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3826 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3827 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3828 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3829
3830 /* get session encoding length */
3831 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3832 /*
3833 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3834 * long
3835 */
3836 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3839 goto err;
3840 }
3841 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3842 if (senc == NULL) {
3843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3844 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3845 goto err;
3846 }
3847
3848 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3849 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3850 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3852 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3853 goto err;
3854 }
3855
3856 p = senc;
3857 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3859 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3860 goto err;
3861 }
3862
3863 /*
3864 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3865 */
3866 const_p = senc;
3867 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3868 if (sess == NULL) {
3869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3871 goto err;
3872 }
3873
3874 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3875 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3876 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3879 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3880 goto err;
3881 }
3882 p = senc;
3883 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3886 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3887 goto err;
3888 }
3889 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3890
3891 /*
3892 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3893 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3894 */
3895 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3896 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3897 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3898 hctx, 1);
3899
3900 if (ret == 0) {
3901
3902 /* Put timeout and length */
3903 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3904 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3906 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3908 goto err;
3909 }
3910 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3911 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3912 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3913 return 1;
3914 }
3915 if (ret < 0) {
3916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3917 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3918 goto err;
3919 }
3920 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3921 } else {
3922 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3923
3924 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3925 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3926 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3927 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3928 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3929 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3930 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3932 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3933 goto err;
3934 }
3935 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3936 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3937 }
3938
3939 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3940 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3941 goto err;
3942 }
3943
3944 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3945 /* Output key name */
3946 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3947 /* output IV */
3948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3949 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3950 &encdata1)
3951 /* Encrypt session data */
3952 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3953 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3954 || encdata1 != encdata2
3955 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3956 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3957 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3958 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3959 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3960 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3961 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3962 macendoffset - macoffset)
3963 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3964 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3965 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3966 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3967 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3969 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3970 goto err;
3971 }
3972
3973 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3974 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3977 goto err;
3978 }
3979
3980 ok = 1;
3981 err:
3982 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3983 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3984 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3985 return ok;
3986 }
3987
3988 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3989 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3990 {
3991 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3992 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3993 return 0;
3994 }
3995
3996 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3997 s->session->session_id_length)
3998 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4001 return 0;
4002 }
4003
4004 return 1;
4005 }
4006
4007 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4008 {
4009 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4010 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4011 union {
4012 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4013 uint32_t age_add;
4014 } age_add_u;
4015
4016 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4017
4018 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4019 size_t i, hashlen;
4020 uint64_t nonce;
4021 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4022 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4023 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
4024 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4025
4026 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4027 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4029 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4031 goto err;
4032 }
4033 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4034
4035 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
4036 cb = s->info_callback;
4037 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
4038 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
4039
4040 if (cb != NULL) {
4041 /*
4042 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
4043 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4044 * callback.
4045 */
4046 if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
4047 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
4048 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
4049 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
4050 }
4051 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
4052 }
4053 /*
4054 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4055 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4056 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4057 */
4058 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4059 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4060
4061 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4062 /* SSLfatal already called */
4063 goto err;
4064 }
4065
4066 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4067 s->session = new_sess;
4068 }
4069
4070 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4071 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4072 goto err;
4073 }
4074 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4076 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4078 goto err;
4079 }
4080 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4081
4082 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4083 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4084 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4085 nonce >>= 8;
4086 }
4087
4088 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4089 nonce_label,
4090 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4091 tick_nonce,
4092 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4093 s->session->master_key,
4094 hashlen)) {
4095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4096 goto err;
4097 }
4098 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4099
4100 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4101 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4102 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4103 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4104 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4105 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4107 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4108 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4109 goto err;
4110 }
4111 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4112 }
4113 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4114 }
4115
4116 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4117 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4118 goto err;
4119
4120 /*
4121 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4122 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4123 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4124 */
4125 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4126 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4127 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4128 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4129 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4131 goto err;
4132 }
4133 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4134 tick_nonce)) {
4135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4136 goto err;
4137 }
4138
4139 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4140 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4141 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4142 NULL, 0)) {
4143 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4144 goto err;
4145 }
4146 /*
4147 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4148 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4149 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4150 */
4151 s->sent_tickets++;
4152 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4153 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4154 }
4155
4156 return 1;
4157 err:
4158 return 0;
4159 }
4160
4161 /*
4162 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4163 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4164 */
4165 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4166 {
4167 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4168 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4169 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4172 return 0;
4173 }
4174
4175 return 1;
4176 }
4177
4178 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4179 {
4180 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4182 return 0;
4183 }
4184
4185 return 1;
4186 }
4187
4188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4189 /*
4190 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4191 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4192 */
4193 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4194 {
4195 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4196 size_t next_proto_len;
4197
4198 /*-
4199 * The payload looks like:
4200 * uint8 proto_len;
4201 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4202 * uint8 padding_len;
4203 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4204 */
4205 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4206 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4207 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4209 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4210 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4211 }
4212
4213 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4214 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4217 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4218 }
4219
4220 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4221
4222 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4223 }
4224 #endif
4225
4226 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4227 {
4228 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4229 NULL, 0)) {
4230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4231 return 0;
4232 }
4233
4234 return 1;
4235 }
4236
4237 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4238 {
4239 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4241 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4242 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4243 }
4244
4245 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4246 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4249 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4250 }
4251
4252 /*
4253 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4254 * a record boundary.
4255 */
4256 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4258 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4259 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4260 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4261 }
4262
4263 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4264 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4265 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4266 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4267 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4268 }
4269
4270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4271 }
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