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Rename EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint to EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
28
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
30
31 typedef struct {
32 ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
33 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
34 } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
35
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
37
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
42
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
44
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
46
47 /*
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
52 *
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
55 */
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
57 {
58 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
59
60 /*
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
64 */
65 switch (st->hand_state) {
66 default:
67 break;
68
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
70 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
71 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
72 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
73 return 1;
74 }
75 break;
76 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
79 return 1;
80 }
81 break;
82 }
83 /* Fall through */
84
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
87 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
90 return 1;
91 }
92 } else {
93 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
94 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
95 return 1;
96 }
97 }
98 break;
99
100 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
101 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
104 return 1;
105 }
106 } else {
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
108 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
109 return 1;
110 }
111 }
112 break;
113
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
117 return 1;
118 }
119 break;
120
121 case TLS_ST_OK:
122 /*
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
125 */
126 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
127 break;
128
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
132 return 1;
133 }
134
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
137 return 1;
138 }
139 break;
140 }
141
142 /* No valid transition found */
143 return 0;
144 }
145
146 /*
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
151 *
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
154 */
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
156 {
157 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
158
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
161 goto err;
162 return 1;
163 }
164
165 switch (st->hand_state) {
166 default:
167 break;
168
169 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
170 case TLS_ST_OK:
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
174 return 1;
175 }
176 break;
177
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
179 /*
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
182 * OR
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
185 * AND
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
188 */
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
190 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
192 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
193 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
194 /*
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
197 * cert.
198 */
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
200 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
202 return 0;
203 }
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
205 return 1;
206 }
207 } else {
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
209 return 1;
210 }
211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
214 return 1;
215 }
216 }
217 break;
218
219 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 return 1;
223 }
224 break;
225
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
227 /*
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
233 * set.
234 */
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
237 /*
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 */
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
244 return 1;
245 }
246 } else {
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
249 return 1;
250 }
251 }
252 break;
253
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 return 1;
258 }
259 break;
260
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 return 1;
267 }
268 } else {
269 #endif
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 return 1;
273 }
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 }
276 #endif
277 break;
278
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 break;
286 #endif
287
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
291 return 1;
292 }
293 break;
294 }
295
296 err:
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
299 BIO *rbio;
300
301 /*
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
304 */
305 s->init_num = 0;
306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
310 return 0;
311 }
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
313 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
314 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
315 return 0;
316 }
317
318 /*
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
320 *
321 * Valid return values are:
322 * 1: Yes
323 * 0: No
324 */
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
326 {
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
328
329 /*
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
335 * key exchange.
336 */
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
338 /*
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
340 * provided
341 */
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
348 #endif
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
352 #endif
353 ) {
354 return 1;
355 }
356
357 return 0;
358 }
359
360 /*
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
362 *
363 * Valid return values are:
364 * 1: Yes
365 * 0: No
366 */
367 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
368 {
369 if (
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
372 /*
373 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
374 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
375 */
376 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
377 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
378 /*
379 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
380 * a second time:
381 */
382 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
383 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
384 /*
385 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
386 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
387 * RFC 2246):
388 */
389 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
390 /*
391 * ... except when the application insists on
392 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
393 * this for SSL 3)
394 */
395 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
396 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
397 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
398 /*
399 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
400 * are omitted
401 */
402 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
403 return 1;
404 }
405
406 return 0;
407 }
408
409 /*
410 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
412 * client.
413 */
414 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
415 {
416 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
417
418 /*
419 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
421 */
422
423 switch (st->hand_state) {
424 default:
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
430
431 case TLS_ST_OK:
432 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 }
436 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 }
440 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 }
444 /* Try to read from the client instead */
445 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
446
447 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450
451 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
453 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
455 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
457 else
458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
459 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460
461 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
462 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
464 else
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467
468 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
469 if (s->hit)
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
471 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
473 else
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
475
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477
478 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
479 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
480 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
482 } else {
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
484 }
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490
491 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494
495 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498
499 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
500 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
501
502 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
503 /*
504 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
505 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
506 * immediately.
507 */
508 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
509 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
510 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
511 /*
512 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
513 * handshake at this point.
514 */
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 }
518 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
520 else
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523
524 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
525 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
527 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528
529 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
530 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
531 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
532 * been configured for.
533 */
534 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
537 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
539 }
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 }
542 }
543
544 /*
545 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
546 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
547 */
548 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
549 {
550 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
551
552 /*
553 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
554 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
555 */
556
557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
558 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
559
560 switch (st->hand_state) {
561 default:
562 /* Shouldn't happen */
563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
564 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
566 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
567
568 case TLS_ST_OK:
569 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
570 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
572 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 }
575 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
576 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
577 /* SSLfatal() already called */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
579 }
580 /* Fall through */
581
582 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
583 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
584 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
585
586 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589
590 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
591 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
592 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
593 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
594 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
595 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
598 } else {
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
600 }
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602
603 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
604 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
605
606 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
607 if (s->hit) {
608 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
610 else
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
612 } else {
613 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
614 /* normal PSK or SRP */
615 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
616 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
618 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
620 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
622 } else {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
624 }
625 }
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
629 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 }
633 /* Fall through */
634
635 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
636 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 }
640 /* Fall through */
641
642 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
643 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 }
647 /* Fall through */
648
649 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
650 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
651 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
652
653 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
654 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
655
656 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
657 if (s->hit) {
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
662 } else {
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
664 }
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
666
667 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
668 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
669 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
670
671 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
674
675 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
676 if (s->hit) {
677 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
678 }
679 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
680 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
681 }
682 }
683
684 /*
685 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
686 * the server to the client.
687 */
688 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
689 {
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
691
692 switch (st->hand_state) {
693 default:
694 /* No pre work to be done */
695 break;
696
697 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
698 s->shutdown = 0;
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
701 break;
702
703 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
704 s->shutdown = 0;
705 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
706 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
707 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
708 st->use_timer = 0;
709 }
710 break;
711
712 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
714 /*
715 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
716 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
717 */
718 st->use_timer = 1;
719 }
720 break;
721
722 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
725 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
726 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
727 }
728 #endif
729 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
730
731 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
732 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
733 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
734 /*
735 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
736 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
737 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
738 *
739 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
740 */
741 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
742 }
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 /*
745 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
746 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
747 */
748 st->use_timer = 0;
749 }
750 break;
751
752 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
753 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
754 break;
755 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
756 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
757 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
758 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
760 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 return WORK_ERROR;
763 }
764 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 return WORK_ERROR;
767 }
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
769 /*
770 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
771 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
772 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
773 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
774 */
775 st->use_timer = 0;
776 }
777 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
778
779 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
780 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
781 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
783 /* Fall through */
784
785 case TLS_ST_OK:
786 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
787 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
788 }
789
790 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
791 }
792
793 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
794 {
795 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
796 #if defined(EPIPE)
797 case EPIPE:
798 return 1;
799 #endif
800 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
801 case ECONNRESET:
802 return 1;
803 #endif
804 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
805 case WSAECONNRESET:
806 return 1;
807 #endif
808 default:
809 return 0;
810 }
811 }
812
813 /*
814 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
815 * server to the client.
816 */
817 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
818 {
819 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
820
821 s->init_num = 0;
822
823 switch (st->hand_state) {
824 default:
825 /* No post work to be done */
826 break;
827
828 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
829 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
830 return WORK_MORE_A;
831 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
832 /* SSLfatal() already called */
833 return WORK_ERROR;
834 }
835 break;
836
837 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
839 return WORK_MORE_A;
840 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
841 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
843 return WORK_ERROR;
844 }
845 /*
846 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
847 * treat like it was the first packet
848 */
849 s->first_packet = 1;
850 break;
851
852 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
853 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
854 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
855 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
856 return WORK_MORE_A;
857 break;
858 }
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
860 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
861 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
862 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
863 size_t labellen;
864
865 /*
866 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
867 * SCTP used.
868 */
869 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
870 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
871
872 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
873 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
874 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
875 labellen += 1;
876
877 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
878 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
879 labellen, NULL, 0,
880 0) <= 0) {
881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
882 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
884 return WORK_ERROR;
885 }
886
887 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
888 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
889 }
890 #endif
891 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
892 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
893 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
894 break;
895 /* Fall through */
896
897 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
898 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
899 if (!statem_flush(s))
900 return WORK_MORE_A;
901 break;
902 }
903
904 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
905 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
906 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
907 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
908 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 return WORK_ERROR;
910 }
911
912 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
913 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
914 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
915 /* SSLfatal() already called */
916 return WORK_ERROR;
917 }
918 /*
919 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
920 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
921 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
922 */
923 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
924 break;
925 }
926
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
928 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
929 /*
930 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
931 * no SCTP used.
932 */
933 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
934 0, NULL);
935 }
936 #endif
937 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
938 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
939 {
940 /* SSLfatal() already called */
941 return WORK_ERROR;
942 }
943
944 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
945 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
946 break;
947
948 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
949 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
950 return WORK_MORE_A;
951 break;
952
953 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
954 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
955 return WORK_MORE_A;
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
958 /*
959 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
960 * no SCTP used.
961 */
962 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
963 0, NULL);
964 }
965 #endif
966 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
967 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
968 size_t dummy;
969 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
970 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
971 &dummy)
972 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
973 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
975 return WORK_ERROR;
976 }
977 break;
978
979 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
980 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
981 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
982 return WORK_MORE_A;
983 }
984 break;
985
986 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
987 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
988 return WORK_MORE_A;
989 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
991 return WORK_ERROR;
992 }
993 break;
994
995 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
996 clear_sys_error();
997 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
998 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
999 && conn_is_closed()) {
1000 /*
1001 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1002 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1003 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1004 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1005 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1006 */
1007 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1008 break;
1009 }
1010
1011 return WORK_MORE_A;
1012 }
1013 break;
1014 }
1015
1016 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1017 }
1018
1019 /*
1020 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1021 * server
1022 *
1023 * Valid return values are:
1024 * 1: Success
1025 * 0: Error
1026 */
1027 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1028 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1029 {
1030 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1031
1032 switch (st->hand_state) {
1033 default:
1034 /* Shouldn't happen */
1035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1036 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1037 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1038 return 0;
1039
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1041 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1042 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1043 else
1044 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1045 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1046 break;
1047
1048 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1049 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1050 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1051 break;
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1054 /* No construction function needed */
1055 *confunc = NULL;
1056 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1057 break;
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1060 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1061 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1062 break;
1063
1064 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1065 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1066 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1067 break;
1068
1069 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1070 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1071 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1072 break;
1073
1074
1075 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1076 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1077 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1078 break;
1079
1080 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1081 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1082 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1083 break;
1084
1085 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1086 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1087 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1088 break;
1089
1090 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1091 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1092 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1093 break;
1094
1095 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1096 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1097 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1098 break;
1099
1100 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1101 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1102 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1103 break;
1104
1105 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1106 *confunc = NULL;
1107 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1108 break;
1109
1110 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1111 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1112 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1113 break;
1114
1115 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1116 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1117 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1118 break;
1119 }
1120
1121 return 1;
1122 }
1123
1124 /*
1125 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1126 * calculated as follows:
1127 *
1128 * 2 + # client_version
1129 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1130 * 1 + # length of session_id
1131 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1132 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1133 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1134 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1135 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1136 * 2 + # length of extensions
1137 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1138 */
1139 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1140
1141 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1142 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1143
1144 /*
1145 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1146 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1147 */
1148 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1149 {
1150 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1151
1152 switch (st->hand_state) {
1153 default:
1154 /* Shouldn't happen */
1155 return 0;
1156
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1158 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1159
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1161 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1162
1163 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1164 return s->max_cert_list;
1165
1166 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1167 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1168
1169 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1170 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1171
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1173 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1174 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1175 #endif
1176
1177 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1178 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1179
1180 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1181 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1182
1183 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1184 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1185 }
1186 }
1187
1188 /*
1189 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1190 */
1191 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1192 {
1193 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1194
1195 switch (st->hand_state) {
1196 default:
1197 /* Shouldn't happen */
1198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1199 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1200 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1202
1203 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1204 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1205
1206 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1207 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1208
1209 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1210 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1211
1212 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1213 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1214
1215 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1216 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1217
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1219 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1220 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1221 #endif
1222
1223 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1224 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1225
1226 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1227 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1228
1229 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1230 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1231
1232 }
1233 }
1234
1235 /*
1236 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1237 * from the client
1238 */
1239 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1240 {
1241 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1242
1243 switch (st->hand_state) {
1244 default:
1245 /* Shouldn't happen */
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1247 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 return WORK_ERROR;
1250
1251 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1252 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1253
1254 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1255 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1256 }
1257 }
1258
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1260 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1261 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1262 {
1263 int ret;
1264 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1265
1266 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1267 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1268 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1269 /*
1270 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1271 * login name
1272 */
1273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1274 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1275 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1276 return -1;
1277 } else {
1278 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1279 if (ret < 0)
1280 return 0;
1281 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1283 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1284 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1285 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1286 return -1;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 }
1290 return 1;
1291 }
1292 #endif
1293
1294 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1295 size_t cookie_len)
1296 {
1297 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1298 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1300 return 0;
1301
1302 return 1;
1303 }
1304
1305 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1306 {
1307 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1308 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1309 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1310 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1311 cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1313 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1314 return 0;
1315 }
1316 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1317
1318 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1319 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1321 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324
1325 return 1;
1326 }
1327
1328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1329 /*-
1330 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1331 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1332 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1333 * SNI,
1334 * elliptic_curves
1335 * ec_point_formats
1336 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1337 *
1338 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1339 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1340 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1341 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1342 */
1343 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1344 {
1345 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1346 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1347 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1348 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1349 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1350 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1351 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1352
1353 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1354 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1355 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1356 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1357 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1358 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1359 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1360 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1361 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1362 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1363 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1364 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1365 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1366 };
1367 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1368 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1369 unsigned int type;
1370 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1371 size_t ext_len;
1372
1373 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1374
1375 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1376 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1377 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1378 return;
1379 }
1380
1381 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1382 return;
1383
1384 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1385 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1386
1387 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1388 ext_len);
1389 }
1390 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1391
1392 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1393 {
1394 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1395 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1396 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1397 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1398
1399 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1400 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1401 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 goto err;
1405 }
1406 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1407 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1408 && (s->options
1409 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1410 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1411 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1412 }
1413 s->renegotiate = 1;
1414 s->new_session = 1;
1415 }
1416
1417 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1418 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 goto err;
1422 }
1423
1424 /*
1425 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1426 */
1427 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1428 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1429
1430 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1431 unsigned int mt;
1432
1433 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1434 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1436 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1437 goto err;
1438 }
1439
1440 /*-
1441 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1442 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1443 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1444 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1445 * Byte Content
1446 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1447 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1448 * 3-4 version
1449 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1450 * 7-8 session_id_length
1451 * 9-10 challenge_length
1452 * ... ...
1453 */
1454
1455 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1456 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1457 /*
1458 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1459 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1460 * in the first place
1461 */
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1464 goto err;
1465 }
1466 }
1467
1468 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1471 goto err;
1472 }
1473
1474 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1475 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1476 /*
1477 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1478 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1479 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1480 */
1481 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1482 PACKET challenge;
1483
1484 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1485 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1486 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1488 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1489 goto err;
1490 }
1491
1492 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1495 goto err;
1496 }
1497
1498 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1499 ciphersuite_len)
1500 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1501 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1502 /* No extensions. */
1503 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1505 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1506 goto err;
1507 }
1508 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1509
1510 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1511 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1512 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1513 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1514 */
1515 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1516 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1517 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1518 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1519 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1520 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1521 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1522 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 goto err;
1526 }
1527
1528 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1529 } else {
1530 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1531 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1532 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1533 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1534 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1535 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1538 goto err;
1539 }
1540
1541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1542 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1545 goto err;
1546 }
1547 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1548 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1549 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1551 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 goto err;
1553 }
1554 /*
1555 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1556 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1557 * So check cookie length...
1558 */
1559 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1560 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1561 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1562 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1563 }
1564 }
1565 }
1566
1567 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1569 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1570 goto err;
1571 }
1572
1573 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1575 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1576 goto err;
1577 }
1578
1579 /* Could be empty. */
1580 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1581 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1582 } else {
1583 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1584 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1586 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1587 goto err;
1588 }
1589 }
1590 }
1591
1592 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1593 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1594 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1596 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 goto err;
1598 }
1599
1600 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1601 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1602 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1603 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1604 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1605 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1606 goto err;
1607 }
1608 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1609
1610 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1611
1612 err:
1613 if (clienthello != NULL)
1614 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1615 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1616
1617 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1618 }
1619
1620 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1621 {
1622 unsigned int j;
1623 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1624 int protverr;
1625 size_t loop;
1626 unsigned long id;
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1628 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1629 #endif
1630 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1631 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1632 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1633 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1634 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1635
1636 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1637 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1638 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1639 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1640 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1641 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1642 break;
1643 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1644 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1645 return -1;
1646 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1647 default:
1648 SSLfatal(s, al,
1649 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1650 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653 }
1654
1655 /* Set up the client_random */
1656 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1657
1658 /* Choose the version */
1659
1660 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1661 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1662 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1663 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1664 /*
1665 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1666 * support it.
1667 */
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1669 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1674 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1675 }
1676 /*
1677 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1678 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1679 */
1680 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1681 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1682 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1683 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1684 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1685 } else {
1686 protverr = 0;
1687 }
1688
1689 if (protverr) {
1690 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1691 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1692 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1693 }
1694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1695 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698
1699 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1702 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1703 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1704 goto err;
1705 }
1706
1707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1708 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1709 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1710 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1711 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1712 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1714 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1715 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1716 goto err;
1717 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1718 }
1719 /* default verification */
1720 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1721 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1722 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1724 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1725 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1726 goto err;
1727 }
1728 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1729 }
1730 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1731 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1732 if (protverr != 0) {
1733 s->version = s->client_version;
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1735 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1736 goto err;
1737 }
1738 }
1739 }
1740
1741 s->hit = 0;
1742
1743 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1744 clienthello->isv2) ||
1745 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1746 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750
1751 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1752 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1753 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1754 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1755 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1756 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1757 if (s->renegotiate) {
1758 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1760 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1761 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1762 goto err;
1763 }
1764 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1765 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1766 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1767 /*
1768 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1769 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1770 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1771 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1772 * an insecure downgrade.
1773 */
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1775 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1776 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1777 goto err;
1778 }
1779 }
1780 }
1781
1782 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1783 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1784 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1785 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1786
1787 if (cipher == NULL) {
1788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1789 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1790 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1794 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1795 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1796 /*
1797 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1798 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1799 */
1800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1801 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1802 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1803 goto err;
1804 }
1805 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1806 }
1807
1808 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1809 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1810 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1811 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1813 goto err;
1814 }
1815
1816 /*
1817 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1818 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1819 *
1820 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1821 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1822 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1823 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1824 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1825 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1826 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1827 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1828 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1829 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1830 * ignored.
1831 */
1832 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1833 (s->new_session &&
1834 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1835 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839 } else {
1840 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1841 if (i == 1) {
1842 /* previous session */
1843 s->hit = 1;
1844 } else if (i == -1) {
1845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1846 goto err;
1847 } else {
1848 /* i == 0 */
1849 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1851 goto err;
1852 }
1853 }
1854 }
1855
1856 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1857 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1858 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1859 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1860 }
1861
1862 /*
1863 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1864 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1865 */
1866 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1867 j = 0;
1868 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1869
1870 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1871 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1873 }
1874 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1875 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1876 if (trc_out != NULL)
1877 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1878 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1879 if (c->id == id) {
1880 j = 1;
1881 break;
1882 }
1883 }
1884 if (j == 0) {
1885 /*
1886 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1887 * to reuse it
1888 */
1889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1890 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1891 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1892 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1896 }
1897
1898 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1899 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1900 break;
1901 }
1902
1903 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1904 /* no compress */
1905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1906 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1907 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1908 goto err;
1909 }
1910
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1912 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1913 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1914 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1915
1916 /* TLS extensions */
1917 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1918 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1920 goto err;
1921 }
1922
1923 /*
1924 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1925 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1926 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1927 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1928 */
1929 {
1930 unsigned char *pos;
1931 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1932 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1934 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1936 goto err;
1937 }
1938 }
1939
1940 if (!s->hit
1941 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1942 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1943 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1944 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1945 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1946 /*
1947 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1948 * backwards compat reasons
1949 */
1950 int master_key_length;
1951
1952 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1953 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1954 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1955 &pref_cipher,
1956 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1957 && master_key_length > 0) {
1958 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1959 s->hit = 1;
1960 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1961 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1962
1963 ciphers = NULL;
1964
1965 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1966 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1967 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1968 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1969 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1971 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1972 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1973 goto err;
1974 }
1975
1976 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1977 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1978 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1979 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1980 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1981 }
1982 }
1983
1984 /*
1985 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1986 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1987 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1988 */
1989 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1990 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1991 /*
1992 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1993 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1994 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1995 */
1996 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1998 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1999 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2000 goto err;
2001 }
2002 }
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2004 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2005 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2006 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
2007 unsigned int k;
2008 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2009 /* Can't disable compression */
2010 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2012 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2013 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2014 goto err;
2015 }
2016 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2017 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2018 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2019 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2020 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2021 break;
2022 }
2023 }
2024 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2026 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2027 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2028 goto err;
2029 }
2030 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2031 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2032 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2033 break;
2034 }
2035 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2037 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2038 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2039 goto err;
2040 }
2041 } else if (s->hit) {
2042 comp = NULL;
2043 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2044 /* See if we have a match */
2045 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2046 unsigned int o;
2047
2048 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2049 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2050 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2051 v = comp->id;
2052 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2053 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2054 done = 1;
2055 break;
2056 }
2057 }
2058 if (done)
2059 break;
2060 }
2061 if (done)
2062 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2063 else
2064 comp = NULL;
2065 }
2066 #else
2067 /*
2068 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2069 * using compression.
2070 */
2071 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2073 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2074 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2075 goto err;
2076 }
2077 #endif
2078
2079 /*
2080 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2081 */
2082
2083 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2084 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2085 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2086 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2088 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2090 goto err;
2091 }
2092 ciphers = NULL;
2093 }
2094
2095 if (!s->hit) {
2096 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2097 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2098 #else
2099 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2100 #endif
2101 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2102 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2103 goto err;
2104 }
2105 }
2106
2107 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2108 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2109 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2110 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2111 s->clienthello = NULL;
2112 return 1;
2113 err:
2114 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2116 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2118 s->clienthello = NULL;
2119
2120 return 0;
2121 }
2122
2123 /*
2124 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2125 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2126 */
2127 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2128 {
2129 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2130
2131 /*
2132 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2133 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2134 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2135 * influence which certificate is sent
2136 */
2137 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2138 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2139 int ret;
2140
2141 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2142 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2143 /*
2144 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2145 * et al can pick it up.
2146 */
2147 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2148 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2149 switch (ret) {
2150 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2151 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2152 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2153 break;
2154 /* status request response should be sent */
2155 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2156 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2157 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2158 break;
2159 /* something bad happened */
2160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2161 default:
2162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2163 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2164 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2165 return 0;
2166 }
2167 }
2168 }
2169
2170 return 1;
2171 }
2172
2173 /*
2174 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2175 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2176 */
2177 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2178 {
2179 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2180 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2181
2182 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2183 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2184 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2185 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2186 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2187
2188 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2189 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2190 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2191 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2194 return 0;
2195 }
2196 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2198 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2199 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
2200 #endif
2201
2202 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2203 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2204 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2205 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2206 selected_len) != 0) {
2207 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2208 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2209
2210 if (!s->hit) {
2211 /*
2212 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2213 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2214 * selected ALPN.
2215 */
2216 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2218 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2223 selected_len);
2224 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2226 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2227 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2228 return 0;
2229 }
2230 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2231 }
2232 }
2233
2234 return 1;
2235 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2237 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240 /*
2241 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2242 * present.
2243 */
2244 }
2245
2246 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2247 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2248 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2249 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2250 }
2251
2252 return 1;
2253 }
2254
2255 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2256 {
2257 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2258
2259 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2260 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2261 if (rv == 0) {
2262 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2263 goto err;
2264 }
2265 if (rv < 0)
2266 return WORK_MORE_A;
2267 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2268 }
2269 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2270 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2271 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2272 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2273 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2274 if (rv == 0) {
2275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2276 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2277 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2278 goto err;
2279 }
2280 if (rv < 0) {
2281 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2282 return WORK_MORE_B;
2283 }
2284 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2285 }
2286
2287 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2288 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2289 cipher =
2290 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2291
2292 if (cipher == NULL) {
2293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2294 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2295 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2296 goto err;
2297 }
2298 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2299 }
2300 if (!s->hit) {
2301 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2302 /* SSLfatal already called */
2303 goto err;
2304 }
2305 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2306 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2307 s->session->not_resumable =
2308 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2309 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2310 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2311 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2312 /* do not send a session ticket */
2313 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2314 }
2315 } else {
2316 /* Session-id reuse */
2317 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2318 }
2319
2320 /*-
2321 * we now have the following setup.
2322 * client_random
2323 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2324 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2325 * compression - basically ignored right now
2326 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2327 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2328 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2329 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2330 */
2331
2332 /*
2333 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2334 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2335 */
2336 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340 /*
2341 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2342 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2343 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2344 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2345 */
2346 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2348 goto err;
2349 }
2350
2351 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2352 }
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2354 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2355 int ret;
2356 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2357 /*
2358 * callback indicates further work to be done
2359 */
2360 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2361 return WORK_MORE_C;
2362 }
2363 if (ret < 0) {
2364 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2365 goto err;
2366 }
2367 }
2368 #endif
2369
2370 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2371 err:
2372 return WORK_ERROR;
2373 }
2374
2375 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2376 {
2377 int compm;
2378 size_t sl, len;
2379 int version;
2380 unsigned char *session_id;
2381 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2382
2383 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2384 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2385 /*
2386 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2387 * tls_process_client_hello()
2388 */
2389 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2390 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2391 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2392 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 /*-
2399 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2400 * back in the server hello:
2401 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2402 * we send back the old session ID.
2403 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2404 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2405 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2406 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2407 * session ID.
2408 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2409 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2410 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2411 * regardless
2412 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2413 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2414 * to send back.
2415 */
2416 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2417 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2418 && !s->hit))
2419 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2420
2421 if (usetls13) {
2422 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2423 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2424 } else {
2425 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2426 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2427 }
2428
2429 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 return 0;
2433 }
2434
2435 /* set up the compression method */
2436 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2437 compm = 0;
2438 #else
2439 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2440 compm = 0;
2441 else
2442 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2443 #endif
2444
2445 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2446 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2447 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2449 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 return 0;
2451 }
2452
2453 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2454 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2455 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2456 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2457 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2458 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2459 NULL, 0)) {
2460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2461 return 0;
2462 }
2463
2464 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2465 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2466 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2467 s->session = NULL;
2468 s->hit = 0;
2469
2470 /*
2471 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2472 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2473 */
2474 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2476 return 0;
2477 }
2478 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2479 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2480 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2481 return 0;
2482 }
2483
2484 return 1;
2485 }
2486
2487 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2488 {
2489 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2490 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2492 return 0;
2493 }
2494 }
2495 return 1;
2496 }
2497
2498 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2499 {
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2501 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2502 #endif
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2504 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2505 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2506 int curve_id = 0;
2507 #endif
2508 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2509 int i;
2510 unsigned long type;
2511 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2512 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2513 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2514 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2515
2516 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2518 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2519 goto err;
2520 }
2521
2522 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2525 goto err;
2526 }
2527
2528 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2529
2530 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2532 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2533 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2534 } else
2535 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2537 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2538 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2539
2540 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2541 DH *dh;
2542
2543 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2544 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2545 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2546 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2547 DH_free(dhp);
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2554 pkdhp = pkdh;
2555 } else {
2556 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2557 }
2558 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2559 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2560 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2561 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2563 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2565 goto err;
2566 }
2567 pkdhp = pkdh;
2568 }
2569 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2571 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2573 goto err;
2574 }
2575 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2576 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2578 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2579 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2580 goto err;
2581 }
2582 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 goto err;
2587 }
2588
2589 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2590 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2592 goto err;
2593 }
2594
2595 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2596 if (dh == NULL) {
2597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2600 goto err;
2601 }
2602
2603 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2604 pkdh = NULL;
2605
2606 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2607 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2608 } else
2609 #endif
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2611 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2612
2613 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2615 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2616 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2617 goto err;
2618 }
2619
2620 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2621 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2622 if (curve_id == 0) {
2623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2624 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2625 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2626 goto err;
2627 }
2628 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2629 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2630 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2631 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2632 goto err;
2633 }
2634
2635 /* Encode the public key. */
2636 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2637 &encodedPoint);
2638 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2640 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2641 goto err;
2642 }
2643
2644 /*
2645 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2646 * can set these to NULLs
2647 */
2648 r[0] = NULL;
2649 r[1] = NULL;
2650 r[2] = NULL;
2651 r[3] = NULL;
2652 } else
2653 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2655 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2656 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2657 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2658 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2660 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2661 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2662 goto err;
2663 }
2664 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2665 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2666 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2667 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2668 } else
2669 #endif
2670 {
2671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2672 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2673 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2674 goto err;
2675 }
2676
2677 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2678 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2679 lu = NULL;
2680 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2682 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2683 goto err;
2684 }
2685
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2687 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2688 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2689 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2690
2691 /*
2692 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2693 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2694 */
2695 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2696 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2697 len)) {
2698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2699 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 goto err;
2702 }
2703 }
2704 #endif
2705
2706 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2707 unsigned char *binval;
2708 int res;
2709
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2711 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2712 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2713 } else
2714 #endif
2715 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2716
2717 if (!res) {
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2719 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2721 goto err;
2722 }
2723
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2725 /*-
2726 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2727 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2728 * as the prime
2729 */
2730 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2731 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2732
2733 if (len > 0) {
2734 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2736 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 goto err;
2739 }
2740 memset(binval, 0, len);
2741 }
2742 }
2743 #endif
2744 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2745 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2747 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751
2752 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2753 }
2754
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2756 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2757 /*
2758 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2759 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2760 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2761 * point itself
2762 */
2763 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2764 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2765 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2766 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2768 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2770 goto err;
2771 }
2772 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2773 encodedPoint = NULL;
2774 }
2775 #endif
2776
2777 /* not anonymous */
2778 if (lu != NULL) {
2779 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2780 const EVP_MD *md;
2781 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2782 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2783
2784 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2785 /* Should never happen */
2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2787 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2789 goto err;
2790 }
2791 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2792 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2794 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2795 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 goto err;
2797 }
2798 /* send signature algorithm */
2799 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2801 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2803 goto err;
2804 }
2805
2806 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2807 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2808 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey) <= 0) {
2809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2810 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 goto err;
2813 }
2814 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2815 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2816 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2818 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2819 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2820 goto err;
2821 }
2822 }
2823 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2824 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2825 paramlen);
2826 if (tbslen == 0) {
2827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2828 goto err;
2829 }
2830
2831 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2832 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2833 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2834 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2835 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2836 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2838 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 goto err;
2841 }
2842 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2843 }
2844
2845 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2846 return 1;
2847 err:
2848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2849 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2850 #endif
2851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2852 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2853 #endif
2854 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2855 return 0;
2856 }
2857
2858 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2859 {
2860 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2861 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2862 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2863 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2864 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2865 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2866 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2867 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2868 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2870 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 return 0;
2873 }
2874 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2875 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2877 return 0;
2878 }
2879 } else {
2880 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2882 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 return 0;
2885 }
2886 }
2887
2888 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2889 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2890 0)) {
2891 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2892 return 0;
2893 }
2894 goto done;
2895 }
2896
2897 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2898 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2899 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2901 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 return 0;
2903 }
2904
2905 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2906 const uint16_t *psigs;
2907 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2908
2909 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2910 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2911 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2912 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2914 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918 }
2919
2920 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2921 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2922 return 0;
2923 }
2924
2925 done:
2926 s->certreqs_sent++;
2927 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2928 return 1;
2929 }
2930
2931 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2932 {
2933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2934 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2935 size_t psklen;
2936 PACKET psk_identity;
2937
2938 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2940 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2941 return 0;
2942 }
2943 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2945 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2946 return 0;
2947 }
2948 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2950 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2951 return 0;
2952 }
2953
2954 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 return 0;
2958 }
2959
2960 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2961 psk, sizeof(psk));
2962
2963 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 return 0;
2967 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2968 /*
2969 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2970 */
2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2972 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2973 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2974 return 0;
2975 }
2976
2977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2978 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2979 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2980
2981 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2983 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2984 return 0;
2985 }
2986
2987 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2988
2989 return 1;
2990 #else
2991 /* Should never happen */
2992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 return 0;
2995 #endif
2996 }
2997
2998 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2999 {
3000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3001 size_t outlen;
3002 PACKET enc_premaster;
3003 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
3004 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
3005 int ret = 0;
3006 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3007 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3008
3009 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
3010 if (rsa == NULL) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3012 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
3013 return 0;
3014 }
3015
3016 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
3017 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
3018 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3019 } else {
3020 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3021 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3023 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3024 return 0;
3025 }
3026 }
3027
3028 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3029 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3030 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3032 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3033 return 0;
3034 }
3035
3036 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
3037 if (ctx == NULL) {
3038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3039 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3040 goto err;
3041 }
3042
3043 /*
3044 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3045 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3046 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3047 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3048 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3049 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3050 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3051 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3052 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3053 */
3054 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3055 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3057 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3058 goto err;
3059 }
3060
3061 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3062 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3063 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3064 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3065 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3066 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3067 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3068
3069 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3070 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3071 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3072 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3074 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3075 goto err;
3076 }
3077
3078 /*
3079 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3080 * we double check anyway.
3081 */
3082 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3083 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3085 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3090 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
3091 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
3092 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3093 goto err;
3094 }
3095
3096 ret = 1;
3097 err:
3098 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3099 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3100 return ret;
3101 #else
3102 /* Should never happen */
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 return 0;
3106 #endif
3107 }
3108
3109 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3110 {
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3112 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3113 DH *cdh;
3114 unsigned int i;
3115 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3116 const unsigned char *data;
3117 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3118 int ret = 0;
3119
3120 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3122 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3123 goto err;
3124 }
3125 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3126 if (skey == NULL) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3128 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3129 goto err;
3130 }
3131
3132 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3134 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3135 goto err;
3136 }
3137 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3138 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3140 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3141 goto err;
3142 }
3143 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3144 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3146 SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3147 goto err;
3148 }
3149
3150 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3151 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3152 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 BN_free(pub_key);
3156 goto err;
3157 }
3158
3159 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3160 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3161 goto err;
3162 }
3163
3164 ret = 1;
3165 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3166 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3167 err:
3168 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3169 return ret;
3170 #else
3171 /* Should never happen */
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 return 0;
3175 #endif
3176 }
3177
3178 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3179 {
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3181 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3182 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3183 int ret = 0;
3184
3185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3186 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3188 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3189 goto err;
3190 } else {
3191 unsigned int i;
3192 const unsigned char *data;
3193
3194 /*
3195 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3196 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3197 */
3198
3199 /* Get encoded point length */
3200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3201 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3203 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3204 goto err;
3205 }
3206 if (skey == NULL) {
3207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3208 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3209 goto err;
3210 }
3211
3212 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3213 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3215 SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3216 goto err;
3217 }
3218
3219 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3221 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3222 goto err;
3223 }
3224 }
3225
3226 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3228 goto err;
3229 }
3230
3231 ret = 1;
3232 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3233 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3234 err:
3235 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3236
3237 return ret;
3238 #else
3239 /* Should never happen */
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3242 return 0;
3243 #endif
3244 }
3245
3246 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3247 {
3248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3249 unsigned int i;
3250 const unsigned char *data;
3251
3252 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3253 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3255 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3256 return 0;
3257 }
3258 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3260 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3261 return 0;
3262 }
3263 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3265 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3266 return 0;
3267 }
3268 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3269 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3270 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3272 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3273 return 0;
3274 }
3275
3276 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3278 return 0;
3279 }
3280
3281 return 1;
3282 #else
3283 /* Should never happen */
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 return 0;
3287 #endif
3288 }
3289
3290 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3291 {
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3293 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3294 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3295 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3296 const unsigned char *start;
3297 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3298 unsigned long alg_a;
3299 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3300 const unsigned char *ptr;
3301 int ret = 0;
3302
3303 /* Get our certificate private key */
3304 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3305 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3306 /*
3307 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3308 */
3309 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3310 if (pk == NULL) {
3311 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3312 }
3313 if (pk == NULL) {
3314 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3315 }
3316 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3317 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3318 }
3319
3320 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3321 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3323 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3324 return 0;
3325 }
3326 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3328 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3329 return 0;
3330 }
3331 /*
3332 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3333 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3334 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3335 * client certificate for authorization only.
3336 */
3337 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3338 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3339 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3340 ERR_clear_error();
3341 }
3342
3343 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3344 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3345 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3346 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3347 if (pKX == NULL
3348 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3349 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3351 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3352 goto err;
3353 }
3354
3355 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3357 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3358 goto err;
3359 }
3360
3361 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3363 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3364 goto err;
3365 }
3366
3367 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3368 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3369
3370 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3371 inlen) <= 0) {
3372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3373 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3374 goto err;
3375 }
3376 /* Generate master secret */
3377 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3378 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3379 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3380 goto err;
3381 }
3382 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3383 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3384 NULL) > 0)
3385 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3386
3387 ret = 1;
3388 err:
3389 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3390 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3391 return ret;
3392 #else
3393 /* Should never happen */
3394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3396 return 0;
3397 #endif
3398 }
3399
3400 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3401 {
3402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3403 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3404 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3405 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3406 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3407 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3408 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
3409 int ret = 0;
3410 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3411
3412 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3414 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3415 return 0;
3416 }
3417
3418 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3421 goto err;
3422 }
3423
3424 /* Get our certificate private key */
3425 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3426 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3427 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3428 if (pk == NULL) {
3429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3430 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3431 goto err;
3432 }
3433
3434 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3435 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3437 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3438 goto err;
3439 }
3440 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3442 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3443 goto err;
3444 }
3445
3446 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3447 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3448 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3450 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3451 goto err;
3452 }
3453
3454 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3455 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3457 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3458 goto err;
3459 }
3460 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3461 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3462
3463 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3465 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3466 goto err;
3467 }
3468 /* Generate master secret */
3469 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3470 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3471 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3472 goto err;
3473 }
3474 ret = 1;
3475
3476 err:
3477 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3478 return ret;
3479 #else
3480 /* Should never happen */
3481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST18,
3482 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3483 return 0;
3484 #endif
3485 }
3486
3487 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3488 {
3489 unsigned long alg_k;
3490
3491 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3492
3493 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3494 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3495 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3496 goto err;
3497 }
3498
3499 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3500 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3501 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3505 goto err;
3506 }
3507 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3508 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3509 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3510 goto err;
3511 }
3512 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3513 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3514 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3515 goto err;
3516 }
3517 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3518 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3519 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3520 goto err;
3521 }
3522 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3523 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3524 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 goto err;
3526 }
3527 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3528 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3529 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3530 goto err;
3531 }
3532 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3533 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3535 goto err;
3536 }
3537 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3538 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3539 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3540 goto err;
3541 }
3542 } else {
3543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3545 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3546 goto err;
3547 }
3548
3549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3550 err:
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3552 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3553 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3554 #endif
3555 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3556 }
3557
3558 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3559 {
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3561 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3562 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3563 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3564 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3565 size_t labellen;
3566 /*
3567 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3568 * used.
3569 */
3570 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3571 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3572
3573 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3574 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3575 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3576 labellen += 1;
3577
3578 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3579 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3580 labellen, NULL, 0,
3581 0) <= 0) {
3582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3583 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3585 return WORK_ERROR;
3586 }
3587
3588 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3589 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3590 }
3591 }
3592 #endif
3593
3594 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3595 /*
3596 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3597 * the handshake_buffer
3598 */
3599 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3601 return WORK_ERROR;
3602 }
3603 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3604 } else {
3605 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3607 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3608 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3609 return WORK_ERROR;
3610 }
3611 /*
3612 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3613 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3614 */
3615 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3617 return WORK_ERROR;
3618 }
3619 }
3620
3621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3622 }
3623
3624 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3625 {
3626 int i;
3627 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3628 X509 *x = NULL;
3629 unsigned long l;
3630 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3631 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3632 PACKET spkt, context;
3633 size_t chainidx;
3634 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3635
3636 /*
3637 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3638 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3639 * TLSv1.3
3640 */
3641 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3642
3643 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3645 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3646 goto err;
3647 }
3648
3649 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3650 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3651 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3652 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3654 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3655 goto err;
3656 }
3657
3658 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3659 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3662 goto err;
3663 }
3664
3665 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3666 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3667 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3670 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3671 goto err;
3672 }
3673
3674 certstart = certbytes;
3675 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
3676 if (x == NULL) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3678 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3679 goto err;
3680 }
3681 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3683 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3684 goto err;
3685 }
3686
3687 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3689 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3690 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3691 goto err;
3692 }
3693
3694 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3695 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3696 PACKET extensions;
3697
3698 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3700 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3701 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3702 goto err;
3703 }
3704 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3705 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3706 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3707 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3708 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3709 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3710 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3711 goto err;
3712 }
3713 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3714 }
3715
3716 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3718 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3719 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3720 goto err;
3721 }
3722 x = NULL;
3723 }
3724
3725 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3726 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3727 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3729 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3730 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3731 goto err;
3732 }
3733 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3734 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3735 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3737 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3738 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3739 goto err;
3740 }
3741 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3742 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3744 goto err;
3745 }
3746 } else {
3747 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3748 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3749 if (i <= 0) {
3750 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3751 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3752 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3753 goto err;
3754 }
3755 if (i > 1) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3757 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3758 goto err;
3759 }
3760 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3761 if (pkey == NULL) {
3762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3763 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3764 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3765 goto err;
3766 }
3767 }
3768
3769 /*
3770 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3771 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3772 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3773 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3774 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3775 */
3776
3777 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3778 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3780 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3781 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3782 goto err;
3783 }
3784
3785 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3786 s->session = new_sess;
3787 }
3788
3789 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3790 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3791 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3792
3793 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3794 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3795
3796 /*
3797 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3798 * message
3799 */
3800 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3802 goto err;
3803 }
3804
3805 /*
3806 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3807 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3808 */
3809 sk = NULL;
3810
3811 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3813 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3814 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3815 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3817 goto err;
3818 }
3819
3820 /* Resend session tickets */
3821 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3822 }
3823
3824 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3825
3826 err:
3827 X509_free(x);
3828 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3829 return ret;
3830 }
3831
3832 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3833 {
3834 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3835
3836 if (cpk == NULL) {
3837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3838 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3839 return 0;
3840 }
3841
3842 /*
3843 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3844 * for the server Certificate message
3845 */
3846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3848 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3849 return 0;
3850 }
3851 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3853 return 0;
3854 }
3855
3856 return 1;
3857 }
3858
3859 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3860 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3861 {
3862 /*
3863 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3864 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3865 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3866 * timeout.
3867 */
3868 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3869 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3870 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3872 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3873 return 0;
3874 }
3875
3876 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3877 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3878 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3881 return 0;
3882 }
3883 }
3884
3885 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3886 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3888 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3889 return 0;
3890 }
3891
3892 return 1;
3893 }
3894
3895 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3896 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3897 {
3898 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3899 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3900 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3901 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3902 const unsigned char *const_p;
3903 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3904 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3905 size_t hlen;
3906 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3907 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3908 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3909 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3910 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3911
3912 /* get session encoding length */
3913 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3914 /*
3915 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3916 * long
3917 */
3918 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3921 goto err;
3922 }
3923 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3924 if (senc == NULL) {
3925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3926 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3927 goto err;
3928 }
3929
3930 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3931 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3932 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3934 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3935 goto err;
3936 }
3937
3938 p = senc;
3939 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3942 goto err;
3943 }
3944
3945 /*
3946 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3947 */
3948 const_p = senc;
3949 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3950 if (sess == NULL) {
3951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3953 goto err;
3954 }
3955
3956 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3957 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3958 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3961 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3962 goto err;
3963 }
3964 p = senc;
3965 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3968 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3969 goto err;
3970 }
3971 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3972
3973 /*
3974 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3975 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3976 */
3977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3978 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3979 #else
3980 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3981 #endif
3982 {
3983 int ret = 0;
3984
3985 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3986 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3987 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3988 1);
3989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3990 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3991 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3992 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3993 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3994 #endif
3995
3996 if (ret == 0) {
3997
3998 /* Put timeout and length */
3999 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
4000 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
4001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4002 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4004 goto err;
4005 }
4006 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4007 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4008 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4009 return 1;
4010 }
4011 if (ret < 0) {
4012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4013 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
4014 goto err;
4015 }
4016 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
4017 } else {
4018 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
4019 s->ctx->propq);
4020
4021 if (cipher == NULL) {
4022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4023 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
4024 goto err;
4025 }
4026
4027 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
4028 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
4029 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
4030 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
4031 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
4032 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
4033 "SHA256")) {
4034 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4037 goto err;
4038 }
4039 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4040 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
4041 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
4042 }
4043
4044 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4045 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4046 goto err;
4047 }
4048
4049 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
4050 /* Output key name */
4051 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
4052 /* output IV */
4053 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4054 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4055 &encdata1)
4056 /* Encrypt session data */
4057 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4058 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4059 || encdata1 != encdata2
4060 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4061 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4062 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4063 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4064 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4065 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
4066 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4067 macendoffset - macoffset)
4068 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4069 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
4070 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4071 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4072 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4074 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4075 goto err;
4076 }
4077
4078 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4079 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
4081 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4082 goto err;
4083 }
4084
4085 ok = 1;
4086 err:
4087 OPENSSL_free(senc);
4088 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4089 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4090 return ok;
4091 }
4092
4093 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4094 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4095 {
4096 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4097 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4098 return 0;
4099 }
4100
4101 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4102 s->session->session_id_length)
4103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4105 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4106 return 0;
4107 }
4108
4109 return 1;
4110 }
4111
4112 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4113 {
4114 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4115 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4116 union {
4117 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4118 uint32_t age_add;
4119 } age_add_u;
4120
4121 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4122
4123 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4124 size_t i, hashlen;
4125 uint64_t nonce;
4126 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4127 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4128 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4129
4130 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4131 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4133 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4135 goto err;
4136 }
4137 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4138
4139 /*
4140 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4141 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4142 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4143 */
4144 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4145 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4146
4147 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4148 /* SSLfatal already called */
4149 goto err;
4150 }
4151
4152 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4153 s->session = new_sess;
4154 }
4155
4156 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4157 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4158 goto err;
4159 }
4160 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
4161 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4163 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4165 goto err;
4166 }
4167 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4168
4169 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4170 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4171 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4172 nonce >>= 8;
4173 }
4174
4175 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4176 nonce_label,
4177 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4178 tick_nonce,
4179 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4180 s->session->master_key,
4181 hashlen, 1)) {
4182 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4183 goto err;
4184 }
4185 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4186
4187 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4188 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4189 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4190 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4191 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4192 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4194 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4195 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4196 goto err;
4197 }
4198 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4199 }
4200 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4201 }
4202
4203 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4204 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4205 goto err;
4206
4207 /*
4208 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4209 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4210 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4211 */
4212 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4213 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4214 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4215 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4216 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4217 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4218 goto err;
4219 }
4220 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4221 tick_nonce)) {
4222 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4223 goto err;
4224 }
4225
4226 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4227 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4228 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4229 NULL, 0)) {
4230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4231 goto err;
4232 }
4233 /*
4234 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4235 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4236 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4237 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4238 */
4239 s->sent_tickets++;
4240 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4241 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4242 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4243 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4244 }
4245
4246 return 1;
4247 err:
4248 return 0;
4249 }
4250
4251 /*
4252 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4253 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4254 */
4255 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4256 {
4257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4258 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4259 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4262 return 0;
4263 }
4264
4265 return 1;
4266 }
4267
4268 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4269 {
4270 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4272 return 0;
4273 }
4274
4275 return 1;
4276 }
4277
4278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4279 /*
4280 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4281 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4282 */
4283 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4284 {
4285 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4286 size_t next_proto_len;
4287
4288 /*-
4289 * The payload looks like:
4290 * uint8 proto_len;
4291 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4292 * uint8 padding_len;
4293 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4294 */
4295 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4296 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4297 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4299 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4300 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4301 }
4302
4303 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4304 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4306 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4307 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4308 }
4309
4310 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4311
4312 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4313 }
4314 #endif
4315
4316 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4317 {
4318 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4319 NULL, 0)) {
4320 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4321 return 0;
4322 }
4323
4324 return 1;
4325 }
4326
4327 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4328 {
4329 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4331 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4332 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4333 }
4334
4335 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4336 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4338 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4339 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4340 }
4341
4342 /*
4343 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4344 * a record boundary.
4345 */
4346 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4348 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4349 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4350 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4351 }
4352
4353 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4354 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4355 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4356 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4357 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4358 }
4359
4360 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4361 }
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