2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
42 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
54 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
55 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
56 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
60 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
61 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
62 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
71 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
72 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
73 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
77 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
78 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
85 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
86 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
87 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
91 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
92 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
99 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
100 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
113 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
115 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
141 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
149 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
156 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
157 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
174 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
175 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
176 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
177 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
192 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
195 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
196 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
197 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
204 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
205 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
231 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
232 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
240 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
291 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
311 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
329 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
361 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
367 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
400 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
416 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
432 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
433 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
435 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
442 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
459 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
460 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
461 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
463 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
489 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
490 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
498 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
499 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
505 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
506 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
512 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
520 if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
532 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
534 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
544 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
553 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
556 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
577 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
578 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
592 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
600 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
607 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
613 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
621 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
628 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
634 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
644 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
645 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
647 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
663 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
672 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
674 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
676 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0) {
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
737 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
738 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
754 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
768 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
769 * server to the client.
771 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
773 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
777 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
779 /* No post work to be done */
782 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
783 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
785 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
791 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
792 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
794 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
795 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
800 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
801 * treat like it was the first packet
806 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
807 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
808 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
809 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
814 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
815 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
816 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
819 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
822 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
823 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
825 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
826 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
827 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
830 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
835 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
836 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
840 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
841 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
845 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
846 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
847 if (!statem_flush(s
))
852 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
853 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
854 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
855 * something clever in the record layer for this.
857 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
858 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
859 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
860 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
866 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
867 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
875 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
877 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
880 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
884 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
885 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
887 /* SSLfatal() already called */
892 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
895 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
896 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
900 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
901 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
904 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
906 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
909 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
913 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
914 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
915 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
916 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
917 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
918 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
924 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
925 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
926 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
931 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
932 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
934 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
935 /* SSLfatal() already called */
940 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
941 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
946 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
950 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
953 * Valid return values are:
957 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
958 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
960 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
962 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
964 /* Shouldn't happen */
965 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
966 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
967 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
970 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
972 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
974 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
975 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
978 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
979 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
980 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
983 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
984 /* No construction function needed */
986 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
989 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
990 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
991 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
995 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
996 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
999 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1000 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1001 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1005 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1006 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1007 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1010 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1011 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1012 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1015 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1016 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1017 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1020 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1021 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1022 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1025 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1026 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1027 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1030 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1031 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1032 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1035 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1037 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1041 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1042 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1045 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1046 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1047 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1055 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1056 * calculated as follows:
1058 * 2 + # client_version
1059 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1060 * 1 + # length of session_id
1061 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1062 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1063 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1064 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1065 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1066 * 2 + # length of extensions
1067 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1069 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1071 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1072 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1075 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1076 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1078 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1080 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1082 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1084 /* Shouldn't happen */
1087 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1088 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1090 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1091 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1093 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1094 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1096 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1097 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1099 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1100 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1103 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1104 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1108 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1110 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1111 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1113 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1114 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1119 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1121 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1123 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1125 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1127 /* Shouldn't happen */
1128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1129 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1131 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1133 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1134 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1136 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1137 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1140 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1143 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1146 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1150 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1153 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1154 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1156 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1157 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1159 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1160 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1166 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1169 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1171 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1173 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1175 /* Shouldn't happen */
1176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1177 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1182 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1184 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1185 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1190 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1194 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1196 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1197 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1198 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1200 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1203 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1204 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1205 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1208 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1211 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1212 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1213 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1214 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1215 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1224 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1227 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1228 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1229 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1235 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1237 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1238 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1239 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1240 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1241 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1243 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1246 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1248 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1249 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1260 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1261 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1262 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1266 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1268 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1269 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1270 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1271 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1273 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1275 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1276 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1277 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1278 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1279 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1280 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1281 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1283 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1284 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1285 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1286 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1287 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1288 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1289 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1290 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1291 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1292 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1293 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1294 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1295 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1297 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1298 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1303 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1305 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1306 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1307 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1311 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1314 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1315 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1317 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1320 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1322 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1324 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1325 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1326 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1327 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1329 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1330 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1331 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1336 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) != 0
1337 || (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
1339 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1340 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1341 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1347 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1348 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1355 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1357 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1358 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1360 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1363 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1364 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1365 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1366 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1371 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1372 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1373 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1374 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1376 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1377 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1379 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1380 * 7-8 session_id_length
1381 * 9-10 challenge_length
1385 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1386 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1388 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1389 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1390 * in the first place
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1400 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1404 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1405 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1407 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1408 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1409 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1411 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1415 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1416 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1418 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1422 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1428 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1430 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1431 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1432 /* No extensions. */
1433 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1435 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1438 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1440 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1441 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1442 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1443 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1445 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1446 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1447 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1448 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1449 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1450 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1451 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1452 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1458 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1460 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1461 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1462 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1463 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1464 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1465 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1467 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1477 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1478 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1479 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1481 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1485 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1486 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1487 * So check cookie length...
1489 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1490 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1491 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1495 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1496 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1497 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1503 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1507 /* Could be empty. */
1508 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1509 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1511 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1512 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1514 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1520 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1521 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1522 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1528 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1529 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1530 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1531 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1532 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1533 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1536 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1538 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1541 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1542 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1543 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1548 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1551 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1556 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1558 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1559 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1560 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1561 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1562 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1564 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1565 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1566 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1567 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1568 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1569 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1571 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1572 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1574 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1577 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1578 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1583 /* Set up the client_random */
1584 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1586 /* Choose the version */
1588 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1589 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1590 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1591 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1593 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1597 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1598 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1602 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1605 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1606 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1608 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1609 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1610 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1611 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1612 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1618 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1619 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1620 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1623 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1627 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1630 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1631 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1636 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1637 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1638 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1639 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1640 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1641 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1642 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1643 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1645 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1647 /* default verification */
1648 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1649 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1650 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1652 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1653 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1656 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1658 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1659 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1660 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1661 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1663 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1671 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1672 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1673 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1674 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1679 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1680 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1681 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1682 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1683 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1684 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1685 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1686 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1688 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1689 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1692 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1693 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1694 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1696 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1697 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1698 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1699 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1700 * an insecure downgrade.
1702 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1703 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1704 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1710 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1712 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1713 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1715 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1718 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1721 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1722 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1723 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1725 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1726 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1728 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1729 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1733 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1736 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1737 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1738 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1739 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1745 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1746 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1748 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1749 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1750 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1751 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1752 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1753 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1754 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1755 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1756 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1757 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1760 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1762 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1763 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1768 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1770 /* previous session */
1772 } else if (i
== -1) {
1773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1777 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1784 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1785 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1786 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1787 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1791 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1792 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1796 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1799 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1801 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1802 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1804 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1805 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1814 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1818 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1819 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1824 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1825 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1829 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1831 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1832 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1833 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1838 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1839 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1842 /* TLS extensions */
1843 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1844 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1850 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1851 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1852 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1853 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1857 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1858 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1860 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1867 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1870 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1871 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1873 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1874 * backwards compat reasons
1876 int master_key_length
;
1878 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1879 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1880 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1882 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1883 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1884 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1886 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1887 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1891 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1892 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1893 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1894 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1895 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1897 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1898 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1902 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1903 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1904 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1905 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1906 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1911 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1912 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1913 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1915 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1916 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1918 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1919 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1920 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1922 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1923 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1924 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1925 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1930 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1931 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1932 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1934 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1935 /* Can't disable compression */
1936 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1939 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1942 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1943 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1944 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1945 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1946 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1950 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1953 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1956 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1957 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1958 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1961 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1962 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1963 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1964 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1967 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1969 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1970 /* See if we have a match */
1971 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1974 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1975 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1976 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1978 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1979 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1988 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1994 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1995 * using compression.
1997 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1999 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2000 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2006 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2009 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2010 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
2011 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
2012 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2013 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2014 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2015 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2022 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2023 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2025 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2027 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2033 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2034 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2035 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2036 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2037 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2042 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2043 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2044 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2050 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2051 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2053 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2055 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2058 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2059 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2060 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2061 * influence which certificate is sent
2063 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2064 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2067 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2068 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2070 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2071 * et al can pick it up.
2073 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2074 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2076 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2077 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2078 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2080 /* status request response should be sent */
2081 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2082 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2083 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2085 /* something bad happened */
2086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2088 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2089 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
2090 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2100 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2101 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2103 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2105 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2106 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2108 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2109 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2110 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
2111 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
2112 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2114 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2115 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2116 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2117 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2122 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2124 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2125 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
2128 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2129 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2130 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2131 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2132 selected_len
) != 0) {
2133 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2134 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2138 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2139 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2142 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2144 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2148 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2150 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2152 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2156 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2161 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2163 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2167 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2172 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2173 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2174 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2175 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2181 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2183 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2185 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2186 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2188 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2195 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2196 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2197 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2198 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2199 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2202 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2203 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2207 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2210 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2213 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2214 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2216 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2218 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2220 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2221 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2224 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2227 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal already called */
2231 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2232 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2233 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2234 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2235 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2236 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2237 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2238 /* do not send a session ticket */
2239 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2242 /* Session-id reuse */
2243 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2247 * we now have the following setup.
2249 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2250 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2251 * compression - basically ignored right now
2252 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2254 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2255 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2259 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2260 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2262 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2267 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2268 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2269 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2270 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2280 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2282 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2284 * callback indicates further work to be done
2286 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2301 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2306 unsigned char *session_id
;
2307 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2309 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2312 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2313 * tls_process_client_hello()
2315 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2316 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2317 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
->server_random
,
2318 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2325 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2326 * back in the server hello:
2327 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2328 * we send back the old session ID.
2329 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2330 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2331 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2332 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2334 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2335 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2336 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2338 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2339 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2342 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2343 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2345 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2348 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2349 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2351 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2352 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2355 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2361 /* set up the compression method */
2362 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2365 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2368 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2371 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2372 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2373 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)
2374 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2375 s
->hello_retry_request
2377 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2379 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2380 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2386 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2387 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2388 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2393 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2394 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2396 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2401 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2409 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2411 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2412 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2420 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2423 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2426 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2427 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2430 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2434 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2435 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2436 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2438 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2440 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2444 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2446 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2450 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2452 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2454 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2455 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2457 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2459 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2460 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2462 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2465 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2466 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2467 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2468 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2471 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2472 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2475 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2478 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2480 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2481 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2482 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2491 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2492 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2494 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2497 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2498 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2501 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2504 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2507 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2511 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2512 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2517 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2521 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2525 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2528 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2529 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2533 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2535 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2537 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2542 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2543 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2544 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2547 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2550 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2551 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2552 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2557 /* Encode the public key. */
2558 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2560 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2567 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2568 * can set these to NULLs
2575 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2577 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2578 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2579 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2580 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2581 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2583 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2586 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2587 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2588 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2589 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2593 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2594 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2595 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2599 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2600 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2602 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2603 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2604 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2609 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2610 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2611 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2614 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2615 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2617 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2618 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2621 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2628 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2629 unsigned char *binval
;
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2633 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2634 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2637 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2640 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2641 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2648 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2649 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2652 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2653 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2656 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2658 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2659 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2662 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2666 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2667 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2668 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2669 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2674 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2678 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2680 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2681 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2682 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2685 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2686 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2687 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2688 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2689 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2690 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2691 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2694 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2695 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2701 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2703 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2704 size_t siglen
, tbslen
;
2707 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
2708 /* Should never happen */
2709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2710 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2711 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2714 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2715 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2717 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2721 /* send signature algorithm */
2722 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2723 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2724 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2729 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2730 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2731 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2734 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2735 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2736 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2737 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2738 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2742 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2743 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2744 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2745 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2746 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2751 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2752 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2758 rv
= EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
);
2760 if (rv
<= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2761 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2763 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2769 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2773 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2776 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2778 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2782 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2784 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2785 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2786 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2787 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2788 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2789 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
2790 || RAND_bytes(s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
) <= 0
2791 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2793 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2794 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2797 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2798 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2803 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2805 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2811 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2812 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2820 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2821 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2822 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2823 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2824 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2828 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2829 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2830 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2832 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2833 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2834 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2835 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2837 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2843 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2850 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2854 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2857 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2859 PACKET psk_identity
;
2861 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2863 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2866 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2867 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2868 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2871 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2873 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2877 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2878 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2879 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2883 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2886 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2887 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2888 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2890 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2892 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2895 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2896 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2900 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2901 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2902 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2904 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2906 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2910 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2914 /* Should never happen */
2915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2916 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2921 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2924 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2926 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2927 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2928 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2930 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2933 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2936 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2940 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2941 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2942 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2944 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2945 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2947 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2953 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2954 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2955 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2956 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2958 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2960 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2964 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2965 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2966 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2967 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2972 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2973 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2974 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2975 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2976 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2979 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2980 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2987 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2988 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2990 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2991 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2992 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2993 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2994 if (decrypt_len
< 0) {
2995 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2996 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3003 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3004 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3005 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3007 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
3008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3009 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3013 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
3014 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
3015 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
3016 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
3017 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
3019 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
3022 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3023 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3024 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3025 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3026 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3027 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3030 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
3031 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
3033 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
3034 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
3037 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3038 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3039 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3040 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3041 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3042 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3045 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
3046 unsigned char workaround_good
;
3047 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
3048 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
3050 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
3051 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
3052 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
3056 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3057 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3059 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
3062 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3063 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3064 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3065 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3067 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
3068 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
3069 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
3070 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
3071 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
3074 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
3075 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3076 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3082 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
3085 /* Should never happen */
3086 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3092 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3095 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
3099 const unsigned char *data
;
3100 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3103 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
3104 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3105 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
3108 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3110 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3111 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3115 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3117 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3120 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3121 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3122 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3123 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3126 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3127 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
3128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3133 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3134 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
3135 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| cdh
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
3136 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3142 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3143 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3148 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3149 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3151 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3154 /* Should never happen */
3155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3161 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3164 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3165 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3168 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3169 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3171 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3175 const unsigned char *data
;
3178 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3179 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3182 /* Get encoded point length */
3183 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3184 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3185 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3186 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3189 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3190 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3195 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3196 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3202 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3203 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3208 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3209 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3211 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3215 /* Should never happen */
3216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3222 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3226 const unsigned char *data
;
3228 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3229 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3231 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3234 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3235 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3239 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3241 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3244 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3245 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3246 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3248 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3252 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3259 /* Should never happen */
3260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3266 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3269 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3270 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3271 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3272 const unsigned char *start
;
3273 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3274 unsigned long alg_a
;
3275 unsigned int asn1id
, asn1len
;
3279 /* Get our certificate private key */
3280 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3281 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3283 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3285 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3287 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3290 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3292 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3293 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3296 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
3297 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3299 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3302 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3304 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3308 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3309 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3310 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3311 * client certificate for authorization only.
3313 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3314 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3315 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3318 /* Decrypt session key */
3319 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &asn1id
)
3320 || asn1id
!= (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3321 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt
, &asn1len
)) {
3322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3323 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3326 if (asn1len
== 0x81) {
3328 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3330 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3332 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 1)) {
3333 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3334 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3337 } else if (asn1len
>= 0x80) {
3339 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3343 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3345 } /* else short form length */
3347 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encdata
)) {
3348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3349 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3352 inlen
= PACKET_remaining(&encdata
);
3353 start
= PACKET_data(&encdata
);
3355 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3358 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3361 /* Generate master secret */
3362 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3363 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3364 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3367 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3368 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3370 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3374 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3377 /* Should never happen */
3378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3386 unsigned long alg_k
;
3388 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3390 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3391 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3396 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3397 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3398 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3400 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3401 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3404 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3405 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3406 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3409 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3410 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3414 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3415 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3419 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3420 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3424 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3425 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3429 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3430 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3431 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3435 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3436 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3437 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3441 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3444 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3445 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3447 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3450 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3453 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3454 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3455 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3456 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3458 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3461 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3462 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3464 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3465 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3466 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3468 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3469 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3470 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3474 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3475 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3480 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3482 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3483 * the handshake_buffer
3485 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3489 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3491 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3492 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3493 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3494 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3498 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3499 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3501 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3502 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3507 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3510 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3513 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3516 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3517 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3518 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3520 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3522 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3524 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3528 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3529 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3530 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3531 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3533 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3537 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3538 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3540 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3544 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3545 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3546 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3548 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3549 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3553 certstart
= certbytes
;
3554 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3557 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3560 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3562 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3563 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3567 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3568 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3571 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3572 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3573 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3577 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3578 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3579 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3580 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3581 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3582 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3583 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3586 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3589 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3590 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3592 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3598 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3599 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3600 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3603 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3606 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3607 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3608 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3611 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3614 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3615 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3621 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3623 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3624 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3625 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3630 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3633 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3637 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3643 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3644 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3645 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3646 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3647 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3650 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3651 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3653 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3654 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3658 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3659 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3662 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3663 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3664 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3666 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3667 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3670 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3673 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3674 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3679 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3680 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3684 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3685 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3686 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3687 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3688 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3693 /* Resend session tickets */
3694 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3697 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3701 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3705 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3707 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3710 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3716 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3717 * for the server Certificate message
3719 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3720 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3721 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3724 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3725 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3732 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3733 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3736 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3737 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3738 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3741 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3742 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3743 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)) {
3744 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3749 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3750 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3751 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3753 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3758 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3759 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3768 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3769 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3771 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3772 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3773 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3774 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3775 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3776 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3779 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3780 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3781 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3783 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3785 /* get session encoding length */
3786 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3788 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3791 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3796 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3799 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3803 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3804 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3805 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3806 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3807 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3812 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3819 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3822 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3825 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3829 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3830 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3831 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3832 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3833 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3834 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3838 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3840 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3841 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3844 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3847 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3848 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3850 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3851 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3852 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3857 /* Put timeout and length */
3858 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3859 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3861 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3866 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3867 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3872 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3875 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3877 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3879 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3880 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3881 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3882 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3883 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
3884 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
3885 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
3886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3890 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3891 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3894 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3895 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3899 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3900 /* Output key name */
3901 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3903 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3904 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3906 /* Encrypt session data */
3907 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3908 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3909 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3910 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3911 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3912 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3913 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3914 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3915 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3916 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3917 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3918 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3919 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3920 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3921 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3922 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
3923 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3924 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3928 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3929 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3938 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3939 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3943 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3944 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3946 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3947 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3951 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
3952 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
3953 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET
,
3955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3962 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3964 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3965 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
3967 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3971 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
3973 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3976 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
3977 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
3978 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
3979 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
3981 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3982 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
3983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3984 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3988 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
3990 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
3991 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
3992 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
3993 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
3997 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
3998 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4001 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0) {
4002 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
4003 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
4004 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
4006 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
4009 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4010 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4011 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4013 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
4014 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
4016 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
4017 /* SSLfatal already called */
4021 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
4022 s
->session
= new_sess
;
4025 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
4026 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4029 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
4030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4031 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4035 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
4037 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
4038 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
4039 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
4043 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
4045 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
4048 s
->session
->master_key
,
4050 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4053 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
4055 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
4056 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
4057 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
4058 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
4059 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
4060 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
4061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4062 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4063 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
4066 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
4068 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
4071 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
4072 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(s
, tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0)
4076 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4077 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4078 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4081 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
4082 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
4083 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
4084 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4088 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
4090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4094 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4095 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
4096 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4098 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4102 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4103 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4104 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4107 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
4108 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
4117 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4118 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4120 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4122 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4123 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4124 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
4126 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4133 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4135 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4136 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4145 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4146 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4148 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4150 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4151 size_t next_proto_len
;
4154 * The payload looks like:
4156 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4157 * uint8 padding_len;
4158 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4160 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4161 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4162 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4164 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4165 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4168 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4172 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4175 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4177 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4181 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4183 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4185 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4192 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4194 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4196 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4197 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4200 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4201 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4204 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4208 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4209 * a record boundary.
4211 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4212 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
4213 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4214 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4215 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4218 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4219 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4220 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4222 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4225 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;