2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
40 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
52 if (s
->hello_retry_request
) {
53 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
54 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
58 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
59 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
60 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
69 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
70 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
71 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
75 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
76 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
83 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
84 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
85 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
89 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
90 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
97 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
98 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
117 /* No valid transition found */
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
132 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
140 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
147 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
165 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
166 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
167 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
168 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
175 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
176 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
179 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
183 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
186 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
195 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
196 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
203 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
204 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
205 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
206 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
207 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
210 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
211 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
213 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
214 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
215 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
216 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
230 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
231 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
238 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
240 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
245 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
255 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
256 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
257 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
263 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
272 /* No valid transition found */
273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
274 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
275 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
282 * Valid return values are:
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
288 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
298 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
306 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
324 * Valid return values are:
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
337 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 ||
338 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
344 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
350 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
357 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
369 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
371 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
378 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
382 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
384 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
387 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
388 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
391 /* Try to read from the client instead */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
395 if (s
->hello_retry_request
)
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
398 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
401 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
402 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
405 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
406 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
409 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
411 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
412 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
413 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
415 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
419 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
427 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
432 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
435 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
436 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
438 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
440 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
441 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
443 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
444 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
450 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
451 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
465 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
466 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
468 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
470 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
473 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
474 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
478 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
480 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
482 /* Shouldn't happen */
483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
484 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
489 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
490 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
492 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
496 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
497 /* SSLfatal() already called */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
503 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
506 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
512 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
513 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
521 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
523 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
524 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
526 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
528 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
529 /* normal PSK or SRP */
530 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
531 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
533 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
535 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
536 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
538 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
551 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
558 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
568 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
571 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
575 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
576 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
583 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
586 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
587 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
592 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the server to the client.
603 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
605 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
607 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
618 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
621 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
622 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
627 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
630 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
631 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
640 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
641 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
649 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
650 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
651 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
653 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
655 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0);
656 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
658 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
659 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
666 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
667 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
673 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
674 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
675 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
676 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
682 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
683 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
688 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * server to the client.
699 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
701 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
705 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
711 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
715 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
716 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
718 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
724 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
725 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
727 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
728 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
733 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
734 * treat like it was the first packet
739 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
742 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
743 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
746 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
749 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
750 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
752 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
753 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
754 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
757 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
762 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
763 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
767 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
768 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
769 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
770 * something clever in the record layer for this.
772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
773 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
774 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
775 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
781 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
789 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
793 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
796 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
800 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
808 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
812 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
816 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
817 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
822 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
830 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
831 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
832 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
833 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
834 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
841 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
843 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
855 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
859 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
862 * Valid return values are:
866 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
867 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
869 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
871 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
873 /* Shouldn't happen */
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
875 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
876 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
879 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
881 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
883 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
884 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
887 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
888 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
889 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
892 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
893 /* No construction function needed */
895 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
899 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
900 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
904 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
905 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
908 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
909 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
910 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
914 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
915 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
916 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
919 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
920 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
921 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
924 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
925 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
926 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
930 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
931 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
935 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
936 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
940 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
941 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
944 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
949 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
950 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
951 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
955 *confunc
= tls_construct_hello_retry_request
;
956 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
959 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
960 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
961 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
969 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
970 * calculated as follows:
972 * 2 + # client_version
973 * 32 + # only valid length for random
974 * 1 + # length of session_id
975 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
976 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
977 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
978 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
979 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
980 * 2 + # length of extensions
981 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
983 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
985 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
986 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
989 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
990 * reading. Excludes the message header.
992 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
994 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
996 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
998 /* Shouldn't happen */
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1002 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1005 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1007 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1008 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1010 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1011 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1013 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1014 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1017 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1018 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1022 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1025 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1028 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1033 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1035 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1037 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1039 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1041 /* Shouldn't happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1043 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1048 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1050 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1051 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1054 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1057 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1060 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1063 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1064 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1068 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1074 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1080 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1083 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1085 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1087 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1091 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1095 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1096 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1098 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1099 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1101 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1105 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1106 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1109 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1111 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1112 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1113 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1115 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1119 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1120 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1123 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1126 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1127 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1128 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1129 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1130 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1139 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1142 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1144 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1150 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1152 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1153 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1154 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1155 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1156 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1158 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1161 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1163 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1164 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1175 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1176 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1177 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1181 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1183 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1184 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1185 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1186 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1188 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1190 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1191 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1192 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1193 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1194 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1195 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1196 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1198 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1199 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1200 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1201 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1202 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1203 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1204 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1205 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1206 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1207 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1208 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1209 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1210 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1212 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1213 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1218 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1220 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1221 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1222 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1226 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1229 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1230 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1232 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1235 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1237 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1239 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1240 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1241 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1242 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
;
1244 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1245 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1250 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1251 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1252 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1253 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1261 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1263 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1264 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1266 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1269 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
) {
1270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1271 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1276 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1277 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1278 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1279 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1281 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1282 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1284 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1285 * 7-8 session_id_length
1286 * 9-10 challenge_length
1290 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1291 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1293 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1294 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1295 * in the first place
1297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1303 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1309 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1310 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1312 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1313 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1314 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1316 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1319 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1320 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1321 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1323 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1327 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1329 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1333 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1335 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1336 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1337 /* No extensions. */
1338 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1340 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1343 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1345 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1346 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1347 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1348 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1350 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1351 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1352 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1353 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1354 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1355 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1356 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1357 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1363 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1365 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1366 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1367 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1368 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1369 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1370 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1371 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1372 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1382 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1383 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1384 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1386 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1390 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1391 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1392 * So check cookie length...
1394 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1395 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1396 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1402 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1412 /* Could be empty. */
1413 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1414 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1416 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1417 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1425 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1426 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1427 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1433 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1434 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1435 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1436 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1437 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1438 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1441 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1446 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1447 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1448 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1453 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1456 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1461 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1463 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1464 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1465 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1466 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1467 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1469 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1470 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1471 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1472 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1473 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1474 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1476 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1477 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1479 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1482 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1483 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1488 /* Set up the client_random */
1489 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1491 /* Choose the version */
1493 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1494 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1495 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1496 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1498 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1501 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1503 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1507 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1510 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1511 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1513 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1514 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1515 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1516 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1517 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1523 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1524 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1525 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1528 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1532 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1535 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1536 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1541 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1542 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1543 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1544 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1545 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1547 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1548 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1550 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1552 /* default verification */
1553 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1554 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1555 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1557 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1558 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1561 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1563 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1564 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1565 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1566 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1567 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1568 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1576 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1577 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1578 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1579 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1584 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1585 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1586 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1587 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1588 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1589 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1590 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1591 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1593 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1594 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1597 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1598 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1599 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1601 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1602 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1603 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1604 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1605 * an insecure downgrade.
1607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1608 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1609 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1615 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1616 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1617 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1618 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1620 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1622 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1623 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1626 if (s
->hello_retry_request
1627 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1628 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1630 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1631 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1634 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1638 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1641 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1642 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1643 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1644 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1651 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1653 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1654 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1655 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1656 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1657 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1658 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1659 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1660 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1661 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1662 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1665 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1667 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1668 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1673 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1675 /* previous session */
1677 } else if (i
== -1) {
1678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1682 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1689 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1690 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1691 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1692 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1696 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1697 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1699 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1701 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1704 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1706 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1707 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1709 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1710 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1719 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1723 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1724 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1729 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1730 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1734 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1737 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1738 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1743 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1744 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1745 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1747 /* TLS extensions */
1748 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1749 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1755 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1756 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1757 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1758 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1762 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1763 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1764 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1765 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1766 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1772 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1775 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1776 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1778 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1779 * backwards compat reasons
1781 int master_key_length
;
1783 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1784 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1785 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1787 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1788 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1789 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1791 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1792 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1796 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1797 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1798 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1799 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1800 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1801 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1802 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1803 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1807 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1808 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1809 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1810 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1811 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1816 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1817 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1818 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1820 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1821 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1823 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1824 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1825 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1827 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1828 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1829 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1830 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1835 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1836 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1837 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1839 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1840 /* Can't disable compression */
1841 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1843 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1844 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1847 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1848 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1849 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1850 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1851 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1855 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1858 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1861 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1862 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1863 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1866 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1867 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1868 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1869 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1872 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1874 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1875 /* See if we have a match */
1876 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1879 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1880 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1881 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1883 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1884 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1893 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1899 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1900 * using compression.
1902 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1903 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1904 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1905 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1911 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1914 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1915 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1916 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1917 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1918 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1919 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1928 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1930 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1932 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1938 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1940 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1941 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1942 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1945 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1946 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1947 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1948 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1949 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1955 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1956 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1958 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
1960 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1963 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1964 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1965 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1966 * influence which certificate is sent
1968 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1969 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1972 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1973 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
1975 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1976 * et al can pick it up.
1978 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
1979 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1981 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1983 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1985 /* status request response should be sent */
1986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1987 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1988 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1990 /* something bad happened */
1991 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1994 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
1995 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2005 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2006 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2008 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2010 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2011 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2013 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2014 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2015 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
2016 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
2017 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2019 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2020 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2021 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2022 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2023 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2027 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2029 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2030 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
2033 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2034 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2035 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2036 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2037 selected_len
) != 0) {
2038 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2039 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2042 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2043 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2045 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2047 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2051 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2056 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2057 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2058 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2062 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2067 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2068 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2069 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2070 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2076 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2078 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2080 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2081 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2083 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2090 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2091 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2092 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2093 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2094 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2096 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2097 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2098 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2102 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2105 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2108 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2109 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2111 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2113 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2115 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2116 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2119 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2122 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2123 /* SSLfatal already called */
2126 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2127 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2128 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2129 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2130 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2131 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2132 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2133 /* do not send a session ticket */
2134 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2137 /* Session-id reuse */
2138 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2142 * we now have the following setup.
2144 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2145 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2146 * compression - basically ignored right now
2147 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2148 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2149 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2150 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2154 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2155 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2157 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2158 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2162 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2163 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2164 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2165 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2167 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2168 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2175 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2177 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2179 * callback indicates further work to be done
2181 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2185 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2191 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2196 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2201 unsigned char *session_id
;
2203 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2206 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2207 * tls_process_client_hello()
2209 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2217 * back in the server hello:
2218 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2219 * we send back the old session ID.
2220 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2221 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2222 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2223 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2225 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2226 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2227 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2229 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2230 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2233 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2234 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2236 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2238 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2239 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2240 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2242 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2243 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2246 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2252 /* set up the compression method */
2253 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2256 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2259 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2262 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2263 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2264 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)
2265 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2267 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2268 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
2270 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2274 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2275 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2276 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2283 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2285 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2286 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2297 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2300 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2301 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2304 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2308 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2309 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2310 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2312 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2314 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2318 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2320 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2324 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2326 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2328 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2329 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2331 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2333 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2334 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2336 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2339 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2340 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2341 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2342 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2345 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2349 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2352 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2354 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2355 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2356 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2359 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2365 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2371 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2372 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2374 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2375 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2378 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2379 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2380 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2381 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2385 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2386 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2391 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2393 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2396 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2397 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2401 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2403 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2405 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2406 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2410 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2411 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2412 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2413 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2414 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2415 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2418 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2419 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2420 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2425 /* Encode the public key. */
2426 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2428 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2435 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2436 * can set these to NULLs
2443 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2445 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2446 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2447 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2448 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2450 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2451 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2454 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2455 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2456 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2457 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2462 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2463 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2467 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2468 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2470 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2472 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2477 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2478 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2479 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2482 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2483 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2485 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2486 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2489 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2496 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2497 unsigned char *binval
;
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2501 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2502 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2505 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2509 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2516 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2517 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2520 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2521 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2524 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2526 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2527 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2530 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2534 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2535 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2537 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2542 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2546 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2548 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2549 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2550 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2553 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2554 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2555 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2556 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2558 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2562 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2563 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2569 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2571 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2572 size_t siglen
, tbslen
;
2575 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
2576 /* Should never happen */
2577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2578 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2583 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2584 * points to the space at the end.
2587 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2588 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2594 /* send signature algorithm */
2595 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2597 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2598 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2602 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2603 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2604 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2607 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2608 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2609 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2611 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2612 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2615 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2616 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2617 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2618 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2619 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2624 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2625 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2631 rv
= EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
);
2633 if (rv
<= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2634 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2636 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2637 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2642 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2646 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2649 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2651 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2655 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2657 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2658 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2659 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2666 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2667 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2675 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2676 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2677 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2679 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2683 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2684 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2685 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2687 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2688 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2689 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2690 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2691 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2692 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2693 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2698 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2704 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2708 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2711 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2713 PACKET psk_identity
;
2715 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2717 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2720 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2722 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2725 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2726 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2727 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2731 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2732 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2737 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2740 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2741 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2742 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2744 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2746 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2749 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2750 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2754 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2755 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2756 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2758 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2760 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2764 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2768 /* Should never happen */
2769 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2775 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2778 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2780 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2781 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2782 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2784 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2787 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2789 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2790 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2794 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2795 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2796 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2798 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2799 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2800 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2801 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2807 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2808 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2809 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2810 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2812 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2814 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2818 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2819 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2820 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2821 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2826 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2827 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2828 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2829 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2830 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2833 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, rand_premaster_secret
,
2834 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2841 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2842 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2844 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2845 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2846 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2847 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2848 if (decrypt_len
< 0) {
2849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2850 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2854 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2857 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2858 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2859 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2861 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2863 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2867 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2868 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2869 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2870 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2871 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2873 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2876 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2877 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2878 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2879 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2880 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2881 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2884 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2885 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2887 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2888 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2891 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2892 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2893 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2894 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2895 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2896 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2899 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2900 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2901 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2902 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2904 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2905 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2906 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2910 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2911 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2913 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2916 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2917 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2918 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2919 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2921 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2922 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2923 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2924 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2925 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2928 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2929 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2930 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2936 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2939 /* Should never happen */
2940 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2946 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2949 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2953 const unsigned char *data
;
2954 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2957 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2959 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2962 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2965 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2969 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2971 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2974 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2975 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2976 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2980 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2981 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2982 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2986 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2987 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2989 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2990 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2991 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2992 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2997 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2998 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3003 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3004 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3006 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3009 /* Should never happen */
3010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3016 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3019 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3020 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3023 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3024 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3026 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3030 const unsigned char *data
;
3033 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3034 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3037 /* Get encoded point length */
3038 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3039 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3040 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3041 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3044 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3045 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3050 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3051 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3057 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3058 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3063 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3064 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3066 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3070 /* Should never happen */
3071 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3072 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3077 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3081 const unsigned char *data
;
3083 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3084 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3086 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3089 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3094 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3096 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3099 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3100 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3101 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3103 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3107 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3108 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3114 /* Should never happen */
3115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3116 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3121 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3125 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3126 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3127 const unsigned char *start
;
3128 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3129 unsigned long alg_a
;
3132 size_t sess_key_len
;
3133 const unsigned char *data
;
3136 /* Get our certificate private key */
3137 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3138 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3140 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3142 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3144 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3147 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3149 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3150 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3153 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
3154 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3156 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3159 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3160 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3165 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3166 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3167 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3168 * client certificate for authorization only.
3170 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3171 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3172 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3175 /* Decrypt session key */
3176 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3177 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
3178 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3182 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3183 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
3184 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3185 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
3186 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3187 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3192 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3194 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3195 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3198 /* Generate master secret */
3199 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3200 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3201 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3204 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3205 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3207 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3211 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3214 /* Should never happen */
3215 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3221 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3223 unsigned long alg_k
;
3225 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3227 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3228 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3229 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3233 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3234 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3235 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3237 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3238 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3241 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3242 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3246 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3247 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3248 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3251 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3252 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3256 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3257 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3261 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3262 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3266 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3267 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3273 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3274 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3278 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3281 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3282 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3284 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3287 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3290 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3291 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3292 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3293 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3295 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3298 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3299 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3301 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3302 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3303 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3306 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3311 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3312 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3317 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3319 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3320 * the handshake_buffer
3322 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3323 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3326 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3328 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3330 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3331 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3335 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3336 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3338 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3344 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3347 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3350 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3352 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3353 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3354 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3355 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3358 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3360 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3364 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3365 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3366 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3367 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3368 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3370 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3374 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3375 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3376 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3378 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3379 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3383 certstart
= certbytes
;
3384 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3387 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3390 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3393 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3397 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3398 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3401 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3403 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3407 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3408 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3409 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3410 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3411 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3412 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3413 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3416 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3419 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3420 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3421 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3422 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3428 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3429 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3430 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3431 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3432 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3433 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3436 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3437 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3438 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3441 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3444 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3445 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3446 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3451 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3453 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
3454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3455 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3459 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3463 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3465 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3467 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3472 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3473 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3474 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3476 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3477 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3480 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3483 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3489 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3490 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3494 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3496 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3497 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3498 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3503 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3507 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3511 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3513 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3516 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3517 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3522 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3523 * for the server Certificate message
3525 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3526 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3527 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3530 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3531 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3538 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3540 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3541 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3542 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3543 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3544 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3545 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3548 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3549 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3550 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3552 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3554 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3558 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3559 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
3560 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3561 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3562 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3565 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3567 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3568 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3569 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3571 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
);
3572 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3573 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
== NULL
) {
3574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3575 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3576 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3579 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
= 1;
3580 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
3581 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3582 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3583 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3584 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
3585 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3586 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3591 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
3593 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3596 /* get session encoding length */
3597 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3599 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3602 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3603 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3604 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3607 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3610 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3614 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3615 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3616 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3618 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3623 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3624 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3625 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3630 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3633 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3639 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3641 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3642 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3643 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3644 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3645 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3646 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3650 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3652 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3653 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3656 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3659 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3660 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3662 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3663 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3664 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3669 /* Put timeout and length */
3670 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3671 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3673 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3678 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3679 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3684 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3685 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3688 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3690 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3692 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3693 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3694 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3695 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3696 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3697 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3698 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
3699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3704 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3705 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3709 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3710 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3711 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3714 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3715 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3716 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3718 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
)
3719 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
3720 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
3721 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3722 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3723 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3724 /* Output key name */
3725 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3727 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3728 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3730 /* Encrypt session data */
3731 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3732 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3733 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3734 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3735 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3736 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3737 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3738 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3739 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3740 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3741 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3742 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3743 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3744 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3745 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3746 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3747 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3749 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3753 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3754 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3756 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3759 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3760 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3766 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3767 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3772 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3773 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3775 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3777 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3778 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3779 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3780 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
3781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3788 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3790 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3800 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3801 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3803 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3805 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3806 size_t next_proto_len
;
3809 * The payload looks like:
3811 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3812 * uint8 padding_len;
3813 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3815 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3816 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3817 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3819 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3820 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3823 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3825 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3827 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3830 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3832 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3836 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3838 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3847 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3852 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3853 * (should be s->version)
3855 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
3856 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
,
3858 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3859 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3863 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
3865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3869 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3870 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3875 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3876 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3878 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
3879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3886 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3888 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3890 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3891 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3894 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3895 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
3896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3897 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3898 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3902 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3903 * a record boundary.
3905 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
3906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
3907 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3908 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
3909 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3912 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
3913 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3914 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
3915 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3916 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3919 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;