]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Ignore EPIPE when sending NewSessionTickets in TLSv1.3
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
28
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30
31 /*
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
36 *
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
39 */
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
41 {
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43
44 /*
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
48 */
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
50 default:
51 break;
52
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
57 return 1;
58 }
59 break;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
63 return 1;
64 }
65 break;
66 }
67 /* Fall through */
68
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
74 return 1;
75 }
76 } else {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
79 return 1;
80 }
81 }
82 break;
83
84 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
88 return 1;
89 }
90 } else {
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
93 return 1;
94 }
95 }
96 break;
97
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
101 return 1;
102 }
103 break;
104
105 case TLS_ST_OK:
106 /*
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
109 */
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
111 break;
112
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
116 return 1;
117 }
118
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 break;
124 }
125
126 /* No valid transition found */
127 return 0;
128 }
129
130 /*
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
135 *
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
138 */
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
140 {
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
142
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
145 goto err;
146 return 1;
147 }
148
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
150 default:
151 break;
152
153 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
154 case TLS_ST_OK:
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
158 return 1;
159 }
160 break;
161
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
163 /*
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
166 * OR
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
169 * AND
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
172 */
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
178 /*
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
181 * cert.
182 */
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
186 return 0;
187 }
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
189 return 1;
190 }
191 } else {
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
193 return 1;
194 }
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
198 return 1;
199 }
200 }
201 break;
202
203 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
206 return 1;
207 }
208 break;
209
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
211 /*
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
217 * set.
218 */
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
221 /*
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
226 */
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
228 return 1;
229 }
230 } else {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
233 return 1;
234 }
235 }
236 break;
237
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
241 return 1;
242 }
243 break;
244
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
250 return 1;
251 }
252 } else {
253 #endif
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 }
260 #endif
261 break;
262
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
267 return 1;
268 }
269 break;
270 #endif
271
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
275 return 1;
276 }
277 break;
278 }
279
280 err:
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
283 BIO *rbio;
284
285 /*
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
288 */
289 s->init_num = 0;
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
294 return 0;
295 }
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
299 return 0;
300 }
301
302 /*
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
304 *
305 * Valid return values are:
306 * 1: Yes
307 * 0: No
308 */
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
310 {
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
312
313 /*
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
319 * key exchange.
320 */
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
322 /*
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
324 * provided
325 */
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
332 #endif
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
336 #endif
337 ) {
338 return 1;
339 }
340
341 return 0;
342 }
343
344 /*
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
346 *
347 * Valid return values are:
348 * 1: Yes
349 * 0: No
350 */
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
352 {
353 if (
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
356 /*
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
359 */
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
362 /*
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
364 * a second time:
365 */
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
368 /*
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
371 * RFC 2246):
372 */
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
374 /*
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
377 * this for SSL 3)
378 */
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
382 /*
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
384 * are omitted
385 */
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
387 return 1;
388 }
389
390 return 0;
391 }
392
393 /*
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
396 * client.
397 */
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
399 {
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
401
402 /*
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
405 */
406
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
408 default:
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
414
415 case TLS_ST_OK:
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 }
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423 }
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
426
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
437 else
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
444 else
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
449 if (s->hit)
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
453 else
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
455
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
462 } else {
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
464 }
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466
467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
483 /*
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
486 * immediately.
487 */
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
491 /*
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
494 */
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
497 }
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
500 else
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 }
509 /* Fall through */
510
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
519 */
520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
523 }
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 }
526 }
527
528 /*
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
531 */
532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
533 {
534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
535
536 /*
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
539 */
540
541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
543
544 switch (st->hand_state) {
545 default:
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
551
552 case TLS_ST_OK:
553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 }
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
563 }
564 /* Fall through */
565
566 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
569
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 } else {
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
584 }
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
589
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
591 if (s->hit) {
592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
594 else
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
596 } else {
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
606 } else {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
608 }
609 }
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611
612 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
613 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
616 }
617 /* Fall through */
618
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 }
624 /* Fall through */
625
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 }
631 /* Fall through */
632
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
639
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
641 if (s->hit) {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
646 } else {
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
648 }
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
658
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
660 if (s->hit) {
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
662 }
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 }
666 }
667
668 /*
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
671 */
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
673 {
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
675
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
677 default:
678 /* No pre work to be done */
679 break;
680
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
682 s->shutdown = 0;
683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
685 break;
686
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
688 s->shutdown = 0;
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
692 st->use_timer = 0;
693 }
694 break;
695
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
698 /*
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
701 */
702 st->use_timer = 1;
703 }
704 break;
705
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
711 }
712 #endif
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
714
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
717 /*
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
721 *
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
723 */
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
726 /*
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
729 */
730 st->use_timer = 0;
731 }
732 break;
733
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
735 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
736 break;
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
740 return WORK_ERROR;
741 }
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
743 /*
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
748 */
749 st->use_timer = 0;
750 }
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
752
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
757 /* Fall through */
758
759 case TLS_ST_OK:
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
762 }
763
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
765 }
766
767 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
768 {
769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
770 #if defined(EPIPE)
771 case EPIPE:
772 return 1;
773 #endif
774 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
775 case ECONNRESET:
776 return 1;
777 #endif
778 default:
779 return 0;
780 }
781 }
782
783 /*
784 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
785 * server to the client.
786 */
787 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
788 {
789 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
790
791 s->init_num = 0;
792
793 switch (st->hand_state) {
794 default:
795 /* No post work to be done */
796 break;
797
798 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
799 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
800 return WORK_MORE_A;
801 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
803 return WORK_ERROR;
804 }
805 break;
806
807 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
808 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
809 return WORK_MORE_A;
810 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
811 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 return WORK_ERROR;
814 }
815 /*
816 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
817 * treat like it was the first packet
818 */
819 s->first_packet = 1;
820 break;
821
822 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
824 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
825 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
826 return WORK_MORE_A;
827 break;
828 }
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
830 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
831 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
832 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
833
834 /*
835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
836 * SCTP used.
837 */
838 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
840
841 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
842 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
843 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
844 0) <= 0) {
845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
846 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 return WORK_ERROR;
849 }
850
851 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
852 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
853 }
854 #endif
855 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
856 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
857 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
858 break;
859 /* Fall through */
860
861 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
862 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
863 if (!statem_flush(s))
864 return WORK_MORE_A;
865 break;
866 }
867
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
869 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
870 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
871 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
873 return WORK_ERROR;
874 }
875
876 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
877 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
878 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 return WORK_ERROR;
881 }
882 /*
883 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
884 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
885 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
886 */
887 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
888 break;
889 }
890
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
893 /*
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
895 * no SCTP used.
896 */
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
898 0, NULL);
899 }
900 #endif
901 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
902 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
903 {
904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
905 return WORK_ERROR;
906 }
907
908 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
909 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
910 break;
911
912 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
913 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
914 return WORK_MORE_A;
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
918 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
919 return WORK_MORE_A;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
922 /*
923 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
924 * no SCTP used.
925 */
926 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
927 0, NULL);
928 }
929 #endif
930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
931 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
932 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
933 &s->session->master_key_length)
934 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
935 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 return WORK_ERROR;
938 }
939 break;
940
941 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
942 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
943 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
944 return WORK_MORE_A;
945 }
946 break;
947
948 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
949 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
950 return WORK_MORE_A;
951 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
952 /* SSLfatal() already called */
953 return WORK_ERROR;
954 }
955 break;
956
957 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
958 clear_sys_error();
959 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
960 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
961 && conn_is_closed()) {
962 /*
963 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
964 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
965 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
966 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
967 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
968 */
969 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
970 break;
971 }
972
973 return WORK_MORE_A;
974 }
975 break;
976 }
977
978 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
979 }
980
981 /*
982 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
983 * server
984 *
985 * Valid return values are:
986 * 1: Success
987 * 0: Error
988 */
989 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
990 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
991 {
992 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
993
994 switch (st->hand_state) {
995 default:
996 /* Shouldn't happen */
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
998 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
999 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1000 return 0;
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1003 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1004 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1005 else
1006 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1007 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1008 break;
1009
1010 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1011 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1012 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1013 break;
1014
1015 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1016 /* No construction function needed */
1017 *confunc = NULL;
1018 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1019 break;
1020
1021 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1022 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1024 break;
1025
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1029 break;
1030
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1034 break;
1035
1036
1037 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1038 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1039 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1040 break;
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1043 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1045 break;
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1050 break;
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1055 break;
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1060 break;
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1065 break;
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1068 *confunc = NULL;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1070 break;
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1075 break;
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1080 break;
1081 }
1082
1083 return 1;
1084 }
1085
1086 /*
1087 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1088 * calculated as follows:
1089 *
1090 * 2 + # client_version
1091 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1092 * 1 + # length of session_id
1093 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1094 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1095 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1096 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1097 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1098 * 2 + # length of extensions
1099 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1100 */
1101 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1102
1103 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1104 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1105
1106 /*
1107 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1108 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1109 */
1110 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1111 {
1112 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1113
1114 switch (st->hand_state) {
1115 default:
1116 /* Shouldn't happen */
1117 return 0;
1118
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1120 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1121
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1123 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1124
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1126 return s->max_cert_list;
1127
1128 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1129 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1130
1131 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1132 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1133
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1135 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1136 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1137 #endif
1138
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1140 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1141
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1143 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1144
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1146 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1147 }
1148 }
1149
1150 /*
1151 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1152 */
1153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1154 {
1155 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1156
1157 switch (st->hand_state) {
1158 default:
1159 /* Shouldn't happen */
1160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1161 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1164
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1166 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1167
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1169 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1170
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1172 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1173
1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1175 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1176
1177 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1178 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1179
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1182 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1183 #endif
1184
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1186 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1187
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1189 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1190
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1192 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1193
1194 }
1195 }
1196
1197 /*
1198 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1199 * from the client
1200 */
1201 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1202 {
1203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1204
1205 switch (st->hand_state) {
1206 default:
1207 /* Shouldn't happen */
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1209 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1211 return WORK_ERROR;
1212
1213 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1214 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1215
1216 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1217 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1218 }
1219 }
1220
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1222 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1223 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1224 {
1225 int ret;
1226 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1227
1228 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1229 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1230 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1231 /*
1232 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1233 * login name
1234 */
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1236 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1237 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1238 return -1;
1239 } else {
1240 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1241 if (ret < 0)
1242 return 0;
1243 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1244 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1245 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1246 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1247 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1248 return -1;
1249 }
1250 }
1251 }
1252 return 1;
1253 }
1254 #endif
1255
1256 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1257 size_t cookie_len)
1258 {
1259 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1261 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1262 return 0;
1263
1264 return 1;
1265 }
1266
1267 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1268 {
1269 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1270 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1271 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1272 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1273 cookie_leni > 255) {
1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1275 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1276 return 0;
1277 }
1278 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1279
1280 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1281 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 return 0;
1285 }
1286
1287 return 1;
1288 }
1289
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1291 /*-
1292 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1293 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1294 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1295 * SNI,
1296 * elliptic_curves
1297 * ec_point_formats
1298 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1299 *
1300 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1301 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1302 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1303 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1304 */
1305 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1306 {
1307 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1308 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1309 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1310 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1311 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1312 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1313 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1314
1315 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1316 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1317 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1318 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1319 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1320 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1321 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1322 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1323 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1324 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1325 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1326 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1327 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1328 };
1329 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1330 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1331 unsigned int type;
1332 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1333 size_t ext_len;
1334
1335 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1336
1337 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1338 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1339 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1340 return;
1341 }
1342
1343 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1344 return;
1345
1346 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1347 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1348
1349 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1350 ext_len);
1351 }
1352 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1353
1354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1355 {
1356 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1357 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1358 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1359 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1360
1361 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1362 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1363 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 goto err;
1367 }
1368 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1369 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1370 && (s->options
1371 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1373 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1374 }
1375 s->renegotiate = 1;
1376 s->new_session = 1;
1377 }
1378
1379 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1380 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 goto err;
1384 }
1385
1386 /*
1387 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1388 */
1389 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1390 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1391
1392 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1393 unsigned int mt;
1394
1395 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1396 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1399 goto err;
1400 }
1401
1402 /*-
1403 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1404 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1405 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1406 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1407 * Byte Content
1408 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1409 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1410 * 3-4 version
1411 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1412 * 7-8 session_id_length
1413 * 9-10 challenge_length
1414 * ... ...
1415 */
1416
1417 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1418 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1419 /*
1420 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1421 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1422 * in the first place
1423 */
1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 goto err;
1427 }
1428 }
1429
1430 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1433 goto err;
1434 }
1435
1436 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1437 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1438 /*
1439 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1440 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1441 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1442 */
1443 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1444 PACKET challenge;
1445
1446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1448 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1450 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 goto err;
1452 }
1453
1454 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459
1460 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1461 ciphersuite_len)
1462 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1463 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1464 /* No extensions. */
1465 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1467 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 goto err;
1469 }
1470 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1471
1472 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1473 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1474 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1475 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1476 */
1477 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1478 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1479 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1480 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1481 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1482 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1483 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1484 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 goto err;
1488 }
1489
1490 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1491 } else {
1492 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1495 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1496 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1497 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1499 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1500 goto err;
1501 }
1502
1503 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1506 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 goto err;
1508 }
1509 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1510 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1511 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 goto err;
1515 }
1516 /*
1517 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1518 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1519 * So check cookie length...
1520 */
1521 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1522 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1523 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1524 }
1525 }
1526
1527 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1529 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1530 goto err;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1536 goto err;
1537 }
1538
1539 /* Could be empty. */
1540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1541 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1542 } else {
1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1544 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1546 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1547 goto err;
1548 }
1549 }
1550 }
1551
1552 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1553 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1554 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 goto err;
1558 }
1559
1560 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1561 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1562 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1563 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1564 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1565 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1566 goto err;
1567 }
1568 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1569
1570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1571
1572 err:
1573 if (clienthello != NULL)
1574 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1575 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1576
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1578 }
1579
1580 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1581 {
1582 unsigned int j;
1583 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1584 int protverr;
1585 size_t loop;
1586 unsigned long id;
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1588 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1589 #endif
1590 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1591 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1592 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1593 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1594 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1595
1596 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1597 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1598 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1599 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1600 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1601 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1602 break;
1603 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1604 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1605 return -1;
1606 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1607 default:
1608 SSLfatal(s, al,
1609 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1610 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1611 goto err;
1612 }
1613 }
1614
1615 /* Set up the client_random */
1616 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1617
1618 /* Choose the version */
1619
1620 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1621 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1622 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1623 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1624 /*
1625 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1626 * support it.
1627 */
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1629 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1630 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1631 goto err;
1632 }
1633 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1634 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1635 }
1636 /*
1637 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1638 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1639 */
1640 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1641 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1642 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1643 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1644 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1645 } else {
1646 protverr = 0;
1647 }
1648
1649 if (protverr) {
1650 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1651 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1652 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1653 }
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1655 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1656 goto err;
1657 }
1658
1659 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1660 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1662 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1663 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1668 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1669 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1670 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1671 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1672 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1674 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1675 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1676 goto err;
1677 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1678 }
1679 /* default verification */
1680 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1681 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1682 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1686 goto err;
1687 }
1688 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1689 }
1690 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1691 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1692 if (protverr != 0) {
1693 s->version = s->client_version;
1694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1695 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698 }
1699 }
1700
1701 s->hit = 0;
1702
1703 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1704 clienthello->isv2) ||
1705 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1706 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1708 goto err;
1709 }
1710
1711 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1712 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1713 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1714 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1715 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1716 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1717 if (s->renegotiate) {
1718 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1720 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1721 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1725 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1726 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1727 /*
1728 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1729 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1730 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1731 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1732 * an insecure downgrade.
1733 */
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1735 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1736 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 }
1740 }
1741
1742 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1744 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1745 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1746
1747 if (cipher == NULL) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1749 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1750 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1751 goto err;
1752 }
1753 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1754 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1755 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1756 /*
1757 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1758 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1759 */
1760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1761 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1762 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1763 goto err;
1764 }
1765 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1766 }
1767
1768 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1769 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1770 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1771 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775
1776 /*
1777 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1778 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1779 *
1780 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1781 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1782 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1783 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1784 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1785 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1786 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1787 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1788 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1789 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1790 * ignored.
1791 */
1792 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1793 (s->new_session &&
1794 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1795 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1797 goto err;
1798 }
1799 } else {
1800 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1801 if (i == 1) {
1802 /* previous session */
1803 s->hit = 1;
1804 } else if (i == -1) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 goto err;
1807 } else {
1808 /* i == 0 */
1809 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813 }
1814 }
1815
1816 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1817 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1818 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1819 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1820 }
1821
1822 /*
1823 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1824 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1825 */
1826 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1827 j = 0;
1828 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1829
1830 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1831 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1832 #endif
1833 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1834 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1835 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1836 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1837 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1838 #endif
1839 if (c->id == id) {
1840 j = 1;
1841 break;
1842 }
1843 }
1844 if (j == 0) {
1845 /*
1846 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1847 * to reuse it
1848 */
1849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1850 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1851 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1852 goto err;
1853 }
1854 }
1855
1856 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1857 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1858 break;
1859 }
1860
1861 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1862 /* no compress */
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1865 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1866 goto err;
1867 }
1868
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1871 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1872 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1873
1874 /* TLS extensions */
1875 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1876 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1878 goto err;
1879 }
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1883 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1884 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1885 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1886 */
1887 {
1888 unsigned char *pos;
1889 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1890 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1892 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1894 goto err;
1895 }
1896 }
1897
1898 if (!s->hit
1899 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1900 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1901 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1902 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1903 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1904 /*
1905 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1906 * backwards compat reasons
1907 */
1908 int master_key_length;
1909
1910 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1911 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1912 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1913 &pref_cipher,
1914 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1915 && master_key_length > 0) {
1916 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1917 s->hit = 1;
1918 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1919 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1920
1921 ciphers = NULL;
1922
1923 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1924 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1925 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1926 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1927 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1929 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1930 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1931 goto err;
1932 }
1933
1934 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1935 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1936 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1937 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1938 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1939 }
1940 }
1941
1942 /*
1943 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1944 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1945 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1946 */
1947 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1948 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1949 /*
1950 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1951 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1952 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1953 */
1954 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1956 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1957 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1958 goto err;
1959 }
1960 }
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1962 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1963 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1964 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1965 unsigned int k;
1966 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1967 /* Can't disable compression */
1968 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1970 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1971 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1975 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1976 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1977 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1978 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1979 break;
1980 }
1981 }
1982 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1984 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1985 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1989 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1990 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1991 break;
1992 }
1993 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1995 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1996 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1997 goto err;
1998 }
1999 } else if (s->hit) {
2000 comp = NULL;
2001 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2002 /* See if we have a match */
2003 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2004 unsigned int o;
2005
2006 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2007 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2008 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2009 v = comp->id;
2010 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2011 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2012 done = 1;
2013 break;
2014 }
2015 }
2016 if (done)
2017 break;
2018 }
2019 if (done)
2020 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2021 else
2022 comp = NULL;
2023 }
2024 #else
2025 /*
2026 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2027 * using compression.
2028 */
2029 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2031 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2032 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2033 goto err;
2034 }
2035 #endif
2036
2037 /*
2038 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2039 */
2040
2041 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2042 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
2043 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
2044 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2046 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2047 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 goto err;
2049 }
2050 ciphers = NULL;
2051 }
2052
2053 if (!s->hit) {
2054 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2055 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2056 #else
2057 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2058 #endif
2059 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2060 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2061 goto err;
2062 }
2063 }
2064
2065 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2066 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2067 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2068 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2069 s->clienthello = NULL;
2070 return 1;
2071 err:
2072 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2074 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2075 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2076 s->clienthello = NULL;
2077
2078 return 0;
2079 }
2080
2081 /*
2082 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2083 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2084 */
2085 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2086 {
2087 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2088
2089 /*
2090 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2091 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2092 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2093 * influence which certificate is sent
2094 */
2095 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2096 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2097 int ret;
2098
2099 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2100 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2101 /*
2102 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2103 * et al can pick it up.
2104 */
2105 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2106 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2107 switch (ret) {
2108 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2109 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2110 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2111 break;
2112 /* status request response should be sent */
2113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2114 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2115 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2116 break;
2117 /* something bad happened */
2118 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2119 default:
2120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2121 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2122 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2123 return 0;
2124 }
2125 }
2126 }
2127
2128 return 1;
2129 }
2130
2131 /*
2132 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2133 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2134 */
2135 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2136 {
2137 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2138 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2139
2140 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2141 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2142 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2143 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2144 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2145
2146 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2148 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2149 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2152 return 0;
2153 }
2154 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2156 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2157 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2158 #endif
2159
2160 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2161 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2162 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2163 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2164 selected_len) != 0) {
2165 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2166 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2167
2168 if (!s->hit) {
2169 /*
2170 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2171 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2172 * selected ALPN.
2173 */
2174 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2176 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2178 return 0;
2179 }
2180 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2181 selected_len);
2182 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2184 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2186 return 0;
2187 }
2188 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2189 }
2190 }
2191
2192 return 1;
2193 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2195 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 /*
2199 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2200 * present.
2201 */
2202 }
2203
2204 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2205 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2206 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2207 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2208 }
2209
2210 return 1;
2211 }
2212
2213 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2214 {
2215 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2216
2217 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2218 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2219 if (rv == 0) {
2220 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2221 goto err;
2222 }
2223 if (rv < 0)
2224 return WORK_MORE_A;
2225 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
2226 }
2227 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2228 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2229 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2230 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2231 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2232 if (rv == 0) {
2233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2234 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2235 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2236 goto err;
2237 }
2238 if (rv < 0) {
2239 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2240 return WORK_MORE_B;
2241 }
2242 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2243 }
2244
2245 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2246 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2247 cipher =
2248 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2249
2250 if (cipher == NULL) {
2251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2252 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2253 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2254 goto err;
2255 }
2256 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2257 }
2258 if (!s->hit) {
2259 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2260 /* SSLfatal already called */
2261 goto err;
2262 }
2263 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2264 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2265 s->session->not_resumable =
2266 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2267 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2268 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2269 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2270 /* do not send a session ticket */
2271 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2272 }
2273 } else {
2274 /* Session-id reuse */
2275 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2276 }
2277
2278 /*-
2279 * we now have the following setup.
2280 * client_random
2281 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2282 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2283 * compression - basically ignored right now
2284 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2285 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2286 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2287 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2288 */
2289
2290 /*
2291 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2292 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2293 */
2294 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 goto err;
2297 }
2298 /*
2299 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2300 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2301 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2302 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2303 */
2304 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2306 goto err;
2307 }
2308
2309 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2310 }
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2312 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2313 int ret;
2314 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2315 /*
2316 * callback indicates further work to be done
2317 */
2318 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2319 return WORK_MORE_C;
2320 }
2321 if (ret < 0) {
2322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2323 goto err;
2324 }
2325 }
2326 #endif
2327
2328 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2329 err:
2330 return WORK_ERROR;
2331 }
2332
2333 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2334 {
2335 int compm;
2336 size_t sl, len;
2337 int version;
2338 unsigned char *session_id;
2339 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2340
2341 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2343 /*
2344 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2345 * tls_process_client_hello()
2346 */
2347 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2348 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2349 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2350 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 return 0;
2354 }
2355
2356 /*-
2357 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2358 * back in the server hello:
2359 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2360 * we send back the old session ID.
2361 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2362 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2363 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2364 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2365 * session ID.
2366 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2367 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2368 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2369 * regardless
2370 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2371 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2372 * to send back.
2373 */
2374 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2375 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2376 && !s->hit))
2377 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2378
2379 if (usetls13) {
2380 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2381 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2382 } else {
2383 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2384 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2385 }
2386
2387 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2389 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2390 return 0;
2391 }
2392
2393 /* set up the compression method */
2394 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2395 compm = 0;
2396 #else
2397 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2398 compm = 0;
2399 else
2400 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2401 #endif
2402
2403 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2404 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2405 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 return 0;
2409 }
2410
2411 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2412 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2413 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2414 : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2415 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2416 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2417 NULL, 0)) {
2418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2419 return 0;
2420 }
2421
2422 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2423 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2424 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2425 s->session = NULL;
2426 s->hit = 0;
2427
2428 /*
2429 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2430 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2431 */
2432 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2434 return 0;
2435 }
2436 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2437 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2438 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2439 return 0;
2440 }
2441
2442 return 1;
2443 }
2444
2445 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2446 {
2447 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2448 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2449 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2450 return 0;
2451 }
2452 }
2453 return 1;
2454 }
2455
2456 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2457 {
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2459 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2460 #endif
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2462 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2463 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2464 int curve_id = 0;
2465 #endif
2466 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2467 int i;
2468 unsigned long type;
2469 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2470 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2471 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2472 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2473
2474 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2476 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2477 goto err;
2478 }
2479
2480 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2483 goto err;
2484 }
2485
2486 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2487
2488 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2490 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2491 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2492 } else
2493 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2495 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2496 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2497
2498 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2499 DH *dh;
2500
2501 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2502 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2503 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2504 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2505 DH_free(dhp);
2506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2507 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 goto err;
2510 }
2511 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2512 pkdhp = pkdh;
2513 } else {
2514 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2515 }
2516 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2517 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2518 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2519 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525 pkdhp = pkdh;
2526 }
2527 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2529 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2531 goto err;
2532 }
2533 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2534 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2536 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2538 goto err;
2539 }
2540 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2544 goto err;
2545 }
2546
2547 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2548 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2549 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2550 goto err;
2551 }
2552
2553 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2554 if (dh == NULL) {
2555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2558 goto err;
2559 }
2560
2561 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2562 pkdh = NULL;
2563
2564 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2565 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2566 } else
2567 #endif
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2569 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2570
2571 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2573 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577
2578 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2579 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2580 if (curve_id == 0) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2584 goto err;
2585 }
2586 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2587 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2588 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2589 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592
2593 /* Encode the public key. */
2594 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2595 &encodedPoint);
2596 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2599 goto err;
2600 }
2601
2602 /*
2603 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2604 * can set these to NULLs
2605 */
2606 r[0] = NULL;
2607 r[1] = NULL;
2608 r[2] = NULL;
2609 r[3] = NULL;
2610 } else
2611 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2613 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2614 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2615 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2616 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2618 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2620 goto err;
2621 }
2622 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2623 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2624 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2625 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2626 } else
2627 #endif
2628 {
2629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2630 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2631 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2632 goto err;
2633 }
2634
2635 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2636 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2637 lu = NULL;
2638 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2640 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2641 goto err;
2642 }
2643
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2645 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2646 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2647 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2648
2649 /*
2650 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2651 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2652 */
2653 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2654 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2655 len)) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2657 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2659 goto err;
2660 }
2661 }
2662 #endif
2663
2664 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2665 unsigned char *binval;
2666 int res;
2667
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2669 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2670 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2671 } else
2672 #endif
2673 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2674
2675 if (!res) {
2676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2683 /*-
2684 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2685 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2686 * as the prime
2687 */
2688 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2689 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2690
2691 if (len > 0) {
2692 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2694 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 goto err;
2697 }
2698 memset(binval, 0, len);
2699 }
2700 }
2701 #endif
2702 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2703 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2706 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 goto err;
2708 }
2709
2710 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2711 }
2712
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2714 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2715 /*
2716 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2717 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2718 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2719 * point itself
2720 */
2721 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2722 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2724 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2726 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 goto err;
2729 }
2730 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2731 encodedPoint = NULL;
2732 }
2733 #endif
2734
2735 /* not anonymous */
2736 if (lu != NULL) {
2737 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2738 const EVP_MD *md;
2739 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2740 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2741 int rv;
2742
2743 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2744 /* Should never happen */
2745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2746 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2747 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 goto err;
2749 }
2750 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2751 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2753 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 goto err;
2756 }
2757 /* send signature algorithm */
2758 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2760 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 goto err;
2763 }
2764 /*
2765 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2766 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2767 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2768 * afterwards.
2769 */
2770 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2771 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2772 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2776 goto err;
2777 }
2778 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2779 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2780 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2782 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2784 goto err;
2785 }
2786 }
2787 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2788 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2789 paramlen);
2790 if (tbslen == 0) {
2791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2792 goto err;
2793 }
2794 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2795 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2796 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2797 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2799 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803 }
2804
2805 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2806 return 1;
2807 err:
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2809 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2810 #endif
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2812 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2813 #endif
2814 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2815 return 0;
2816 }
2817
2818 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2819 {
2820 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2821 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2822 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2823 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2824 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2825 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2826 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2827 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2829 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 return 0;
2832 }
2833 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2834 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2836 return 0;
2837 }
2838 } else {
2839 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2841 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2842 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2843 return 0;
2844 }
2845 }
2846
2847 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2848 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2849 0)) {
2850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2851 return 0;
2852 }
2853 goto done;
2854 }
2855
2856 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2857 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2858 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2860 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2861 return 0;
2862 }
2863
2864 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2865 const uint16_t *psigs;
2866 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2867
2868 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2869 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2870 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2871 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2873 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2875 return 0;
2876 }
2877 }
2878
2879 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2880 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2881 return 0;
2882 }
2883
2884 done:
2885 s->certreqs_sent++;
2886 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2887 return 1;
2888 }
2889
2890 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2891 {
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2893 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2894 size_t psklen;
2895 PACKET psk_identity;
2896
2897 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2899 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2900 return 0;
2901 }
2902 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2904 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2905 return 0;
2906 }
2907 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2909 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2910 return 0;
2911 }
2912
2913 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918
2919 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2920 psk, sizeof(psk));
2921
2922 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 return 0;
2926 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2927 /*
2928 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2929 */
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2931 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2932 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2933 return 0;
2934 }
2935
2936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2937 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2938 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2939
2940 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2942 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 return 0;
2944 }
2945
2946 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2947
2948 return 1;
2949 #else
2950 /* Should never happen */
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 return 0;
2954 #endif
2955 }
2956
2957 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2958 {
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2960 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2961 int decrypt_len;
2962 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2963 size_t j, padding_len;
2964 PACKET enc_premaster;
2965 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2966 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2967 int ret = 0;
2968
2969 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2970 if (rsa == NULL) {
2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2972 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2973 return 0;
2974 }
2975
2976 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2977 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2978 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2979 } else {
2980 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2981 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2983 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2984 return 0;
2985 }
2986 }
2987
2988 /*
2989 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2990 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2991 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2992 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2993 */
2994 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2996 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2997 return 0;
2998 }
2999
3000 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3001 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3003 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 return 0;
3005 }
3006
3007 /*
3008 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3009 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3010 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3011 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3012 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3013 */
3014
3015 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3016 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021
3022 /*
3023 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3024 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3025 */
3026 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3027 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3028 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3029 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3030 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3033 goto err;
3034 }
3035
3036 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3037
3038 /*
3039 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3040 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3041 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3042 */
3043 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3045 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3046 goto err;
3047 }
3048
3049 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3050 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3051 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3052 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3053 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3054 }
3055 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3056
3057 /*
3058 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3059 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3060 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3061 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3062 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3063 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3064 */
3065 version_good =
3066 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3067 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3068 version_good &=
3069 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3070 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3071
3072 /*
3073 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3074 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3075 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3076 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3077 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3078 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3079 * clients.
3080 */
3081 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3082 unsigned char workaround_good;
3083 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3084 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3085 workaround_good &=
3086 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3087 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3088 version_good |= workaround_good;
3089 }
3090
3091 /*
3092 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3093 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3094 */
3095 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3096
3097 /*
3098 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3099 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3100 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3101 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3102 */
3103 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3104 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3105 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3106 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3107 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3108 }
3109
3110 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3111 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3112 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3113 goto err;
3114 }
3115
3116 ret = 1;
3117 err:
3118 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3119 return ret;
3120 #else
3121 /* Should never happen */
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3123 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 return 0;
3125 #endif
3126 }
3127
3128 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3129 {
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3131 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3132 DH *cdh;
3133 unsigned int i;
3134 BIGNUM *pub_key;
3135 const unsigned char *data;
3136 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3137 int ret = 0;
3138
3139 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3141 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3142 goto err;
3143 }
3144 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3145 if (skey == NULL) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3147 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3148 goto err;
3149 }
3150
3151 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3153 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3154 goto err;
3155 }
3156 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3157 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 goto err;
3161 }
3162 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3163 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3165 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
3166 goto err;
3167 }
3168
3169 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3170 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3171 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 BN_free(pub_key);
3175 goto err;
3176 }
3177
3178 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3180 goto err;
3181 }
3182
3183 ret = 1;
3184 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3185 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3186 err:
3187 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3188 return ret;
3189 #else
3190 /* Should never happen */
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3193 return 0;
3194 #endif
3195 }
3196
3197 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3198 {
3199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3200 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3201 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3202 int ret = 0;
3203
3204 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3205 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3207 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3208 goto err;
3209 } else {
3210 unsigned int i;
3211 const unsigned char *data;
3212
3213 /*
3214 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3215 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3216 */
3217
3218 /* Get encoded point length */
3219 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3220 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3222 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3223 goto err;
3224 }
3225 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3226 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3228 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3229 goto err;
3230 }
3231 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3233 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3234 goto err;
3235 }
3236 }
3237
3238 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3239 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3240 goto err;
3241 }
3242
3243 ret = 1;
3244 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3245 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3246 err:
3247 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3248
3249 return ret;
3250 #else
3251 /* Should never happen */
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3254 return 0;
3255 #endif
3256 }
3257
3258 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3259 {
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3261 unsigned int i;
3262 const unsigned char *data;
3263
3264 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3265 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3267 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3268 return 0;
3269 }
3270 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3272 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3273 return 0;
3274 }
3275 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3277 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3278 return 0;
3279 }
3280 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3281 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3282 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3284 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3285 return 0;
3286 }
3287
3288 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3290 return 0;
3291 }
3292
3293 return 1;
3294 #else
3295 /* Should never happen */
3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3298 return 0;
3299 #endif
3300 }
3301
3302 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3303 {
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3305 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3306 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3307 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3308 const unsigned char *start;
3309 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3310 unsigned long alg_a;
3311 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3312 int ret = 0;
3313 PACKET encdata;
3314
3315 /* Get our certificate private key */
3316 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3317 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3318 /*
3319 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3320 */
3321 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3322 if (pk == NULL) {
3323 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3324 }
3325 if (pk == NULL) {
3326 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3327 }
3328 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3329 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3330 }
3331
3332 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3333 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3335 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3336 return 0;
3337 }
3338 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 return 0;
3342 }
3343 /*
3344 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3345 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3346 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3347 * client certificate for authorization only.
3348 */
3349 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3350 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3351 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3352 ERR_clear_error();
3353 }
3354 /* Decrypt session key */
3355 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3356 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3357 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3359 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3360 goto err;
3361 }
3362 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3363 /*
3364 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3365 * isn't supported.
3366 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3367 */
3368 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3370 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3371 goto err;
3372 }
3373 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3374 /*
3375 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3376 * support it
3377 */
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3379 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3380 goto err;
3381 } /* else short form length */
3382
3383 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3385 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3386 goto err;
3387 }
3388 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3389 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3390
3391 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3392 inlen) <= 0) {
3393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3394 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3395 goto err;
3396 }
3397 /* Generate master secret */
3398 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3399 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3400 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3401 goto err;
3402 }
3403 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3404 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3405 NULL) > 0)
3406 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3407
3408 ret = 1;
3409 err:
3410 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3411 return ret;
3412 #else
3413 /* Should never happen */
3414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 return 0;
3417 #endif
3418 }
3419
3420 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3421 {
3422 unsigned long alg_k;
3423
3424 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3425
3426 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3427 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3429 goto err;
3430 }
3431
3432 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3433 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3434 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3436 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3437 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3438 goto err;
3439 }
3440 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3441 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3443 goto err;
3444 }
3445 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3446 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3447 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3448 goto err;
3449 }
3450 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3451 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3452 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3453 goto err;
3454 }
3455 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3456 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3458 goto err;
3459 }
3460 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3461 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3463 goto err;
3464 }
3465 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3466 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3468 goto err;
3469 }
3470 } else {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3473 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3474 goto err;
3475 }
3476
3477 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3478 err:
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3480 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3481 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3482 #endif
3483 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3484 }
3485
3486 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3487 {
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3489 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3491 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3492 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3493 /*
3494 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3495 * used.
3496 */
3497 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3498 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3499
3500 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3501 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3502 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3503 0) <= 0) {
3504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3505 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3507 return WORK_ERROR;
3508 }
3509
3510 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3511 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3512 }
3513 }
3514 #endif
3515
3516 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3517 /*
3518 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3519 * the handshake_buffer
3520 */
3521 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3523 return WORK_ERROR;
3524 }
3525 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3526 } else {
3527 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3529 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3531 return WORK_ERROR;
3532 }
3533 /*
3534 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3535 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3536 */
3537 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3539 return WORK_ERROR;
3540 }
3541 }
3542
3543 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3544 }
3545
3546 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3547 {
3548 int i;
3549 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3550 X509 *x = NULL;
3551 unsigned long l;
3552 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3553 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3554 PACKET spkt, context;
3555 size_t chainidx;
3556 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3557
3558 /*
3559 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3560 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3561 * TLSv1.3
3562 */
3563 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3564
3565 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3567 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3568 goto err;
3569 }
3570
3571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3572 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3573 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3574 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3576 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3577 goto err;
3578 }
3579
3580 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3581 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3583 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3584 goto err;
3585 }
3586
3587 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3588 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3589 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3592 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3593 goto err;
3594 }
3595
3596 certstart = certbytes;
3597 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3598 if (x == NULL) {
3599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3600 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3601 goto err;
3602 }
3603 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3605 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3606 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3607 goto err;
3608 }
3609
3610 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3611 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3612 PACKET extensions;
3613
3614 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3616 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3617 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3618 goto err;
3619 }
3620 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3621 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3622 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3623 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3624 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3625 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3626 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3627 goto err;
3628 }
3629 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3630 }
3631
3632 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3634 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3635 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3636 goto err;
3637 }
3638 x = NULL;
3639 }
3640
3641 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3642 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3643 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3645 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3646 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3647 goto err;
3648 }
3649 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3650 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3651 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3653 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3654 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3655 goto err;
3656 }
3657 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3658 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3660 goto err;
3661 }
3662 } else {
3663 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3664 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3665 if (i <= 0) {
3666 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3667 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3668 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3669 goto err;
3670 }
3671 if (i > 1) {
3672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3673 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3674 goto err;
3675 }
3676 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3677 if (pkey == NULL) {
3678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3679 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3680 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3681 goto err;
3682 }
3683 }
3684
3685 /*
3686 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3687 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3688 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3689 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3690 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3691 */
3692
3693 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3694 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3696 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3697 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3698 goto err;
3699 }
3700
3701 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3702 s->session = new_sess;
3703 }
3704
3705 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3706 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3707 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3708
3709 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3710 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3711
3712 /*
3713 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3714 * message
3715 */
3716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3718 goto err;
3719 }
3720
3721 /*
3722 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3723 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3724 */
3725 sk = NULL;
3726
3727 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3728 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3729 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3730 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3731 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3732 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3733 goto err;
3734 }
3735
3736 /* Resend session tickets */
3737 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3738 }
3739
3740 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3741
3742 err:
3743 X509_free(x);
3744 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3745 return ret;
3746 }
3747
3748 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3749 {
3750 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3751
3752 if (cpk == NULL) {
3753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3754 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3755 return 0;
3756 }
3757
3758 /*
3759 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3760 * for the server Certificate message
3761 */
3762 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3765 return 0;
3766 }
3767 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3769 return 0;
3770 }
3771
3772 return 1;
3773 }
3774
3775 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3776 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3777 {
3778 /*
3779 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3780 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3781 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3782 * timeout.
3783 */
3784 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3785 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3786 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3789 return 0;
3790 }
3791
3792 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3793 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3794 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3797 return 0;
3798 }
3799 }
3800
3801 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3802 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3805 return 0;
3806 }
3807
3808 return 1;
3809 }
3810
3811 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3812 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3813 {
3814 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3815 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3816 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3817 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3818 const unsigned char *const_p;
3819 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3820 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3821 unsigned int hlen;
3822 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3823 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3824 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3825 int iv_len, ok = 0;
3826 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3827
3828 /* get session encoding length */
3829 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3830 /*
3831 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3832 * long
3833 */
3834 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 goto err;
3838 }
3839 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3840 if (senc == NULL) {
3841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3842 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3843 goto err;
3844 }
3845
3846 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3847 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3848 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3850 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3851 goto err;
3852 }
3853
3854 p = senc;
3855 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3857 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3858 goto err;
3859 }
3860
3861 /*
3862 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3863 */
3864 const_p = senc;
3865 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3866 if (sess == NULL) {
3867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3868 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3869 goto err;
3870 }
3871
3872 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3873 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3874 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3876 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3877 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3878 goto err;
3879 }
3880 p = senc;
3881 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3884 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3885 goto err;
3886 }
3887 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3888
3889 /*
3890 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3891 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3892 */
3893 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3894 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3895 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3896 hctx, 1);
3897
3898 if (ret == 0) {
3899
3900 /* Put timeout and length */
3901 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3902 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3904 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3906 goto err;
3907 }
3908 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3909 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3910 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3911 return 1;
3912 }
3913 if (ret < 0) {
3914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3915 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3916 goto err;
3917 }
3918 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3919 } else {
3920 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3921
3922 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3923 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3924 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3925 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3926 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3927 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3928 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3931 goto err;
3932 }
3933 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3934 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3935 }
3936
3937 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3938 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3939 goto err;
3940 }
3941
3942 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3943 /* Output key name */
3944 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3945 /* output IV */
3946 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3947 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3948 &encdata1)
3949 /* Encrypt session data */
3950 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3951 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3952 || encdata1 != encdata2
3953 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3954 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3955 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3956 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3957 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3958 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3959 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3960 macendoffset - macoffset)
3961 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3962 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3963 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3964 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3965 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3967 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3968 goto err;
3969 }
3970
3971 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3972 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3975 goto err;
3976 }
3977
3978 ok = 1;
3979 err:
3980 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3981 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3982 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3983 return ok;
3984 }
3985
3986 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3987 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3988 {
3989 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3991 return 0;
3992 }
3993
3994 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3995 s->session->session_id_length)
3996 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3999 return 0;
4000 }
4001
4002 return 1;
4003 }
4004
4005 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4006 {
4007 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4008 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4009 union {
4010 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4011 uint32_t age_add;
4012 } age_add_u;
4013
4014 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4015
4016 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4017 size_t i, hashlen;
4018 uint64_t nonce;
4019 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4020 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4021 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
4022 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4023
4024 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4025 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4027 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4029 goto err;
4030 }
4031 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4032
4033 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
4034 cb = s->info_callback;
4035 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
4036 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
4037
4038 if (cb != NULL) {
4039 /*
4040 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
4041 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4042 * callback.
4043 */
4044 if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
4045 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
4046 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
4047 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
4048 }
4049 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
4050 }
4051 /*
4052 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4053 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4054 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4055 */
4056 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4057 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4058
4059 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4060 /* SSLfatal already called */
4061 goto err;
4062 }
4063
4064 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4065 s->session = new_sess;
4066 }
4067
4068 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4069 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4070 goto err;
4071 }
4072 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4074 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4076 goto err;
4077 }
4078 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4079
4080 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4081 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4082 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4083 nonce >>= 8;
4084 }
4085
4086 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4087 nonce_label,
4088 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4089 tick_nonce,
4090 TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
4091 s->session->master_key,
4092 hashlen)) {
4093 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4094 goto err;
4095 }
4096 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4097
4098 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4099 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4100 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4101 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4102 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4103 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4105 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4106 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4107 goto err;
4108 }
4109 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4110 }
4111 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4112 }
4113
4114 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4115 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4116 goto err;
4117
4118 /*
4119 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4120 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4121 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4122 */
4123 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
4124 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4125 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4126 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4127 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4128 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4129 goto err;
4130 }
4131 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4132 tick_nonce)) {
4133 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4134 goto err;
4135 }
4136
4137 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4138 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4139 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4140 NULL, 0)) {
4141 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4142 goto err;
4143 }
4144 /*
4145 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4146 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4147 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4148 */
4149 s->sent_tickets++;
4150 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4151 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4152 }
4153
4154 return 1;
4155 err:
4156 return 0;
4157 }
4158
4159 /*
4160 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4161 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4162 */
4163 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4164 {
4165 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4166 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4167 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4170 return 0;
4171 }
4172
4173 return 1;
4174 }
4175
4176 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4177 {
4178 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4180 return 0;
4181 }
4182
4183 return 1;
4184 }
4185
4186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4187 /*
4188 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4189 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4190 */
4191 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4192 {
4193 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4194 size_t next_proto_len;
4195
4196 /*-
4197 * The payload looks like:
4198 * uint8 proto_len;
4199 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4200 * uint8 padding_len;
4201 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4202 */
4203 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4204 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4205 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4207 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4208 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4209 }
4210
4211 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4212 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
4213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4215 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4216 }
4217
4218 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4219
4220 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4221 }
4222 #endif
4223
4224 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4225 {
4226 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4227 NULL, 0)) {
4228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4229 return 0;
4230 }
4231
4232 return 1;
4233 }
4234
4235 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4236 {
4237 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4239 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4240 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4241 }
4242
4243 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4244 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4247 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4248 }
4249
4250 /*
4251 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4252 * a record boundary.
4253 */
4254 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4256 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4257 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4258 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4259 }
4260
4261 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4262 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4263 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4265 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4266 }
4267
4268 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4269 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository