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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 #endif
127
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176 static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205 static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
210 #endif
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
215 #endif
216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
220 #endif
221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
227 #endif
228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
233 #endif
234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 #endif
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 };
245
246 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
247 {
248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
250 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
251 return 0;
252 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
253 }
254
255 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
256 {
257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
258 switch (nid)
259 {
260 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
261 return 1;
262 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
263 return 2;
264 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
265 return 3;
266 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
267 return 4;
268 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
269 return 5;
270 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 return 6;
272 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 return 7;
274 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
275 return 8;
276 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
277 return 9;
278 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
279 return 10;
280 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 return 11;
282 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 return 12;
284 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 return 13;
286 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
287 return 14;
288 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 return 15;
290 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
291 return 16;
292 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 return 17;
294 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 return 18;
296 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
297 return 19;
298 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
299 return 20;
300 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
301 return 21;
302 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
303 return 22;
304 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
305 return 23;
306 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
307 return 24;
308 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
309 return 25;
310 default:
311 return 0;
312 }
313 }
314 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
315
316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
317
318 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
320 */
321
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
324 #else
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
326 #endif
327
328 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
329 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
330 #else
331 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
332 #endif
333
334 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
335 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
336 #else
337 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
338 #endif
339
340 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
341 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
342 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
343 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
344
345 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
347 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
349 #endif
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
351 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
353 #endif
354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
355 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
356 #endif
357 };
358
359 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
360 {
361 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
362 if (p)
363 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
364 return (int)slen;
365 }
366
367 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
368 {
369 int extdatalen=0;
370 unsigned char *orig = buf;
371 unsigned char *ret = buf;
372
373 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
374 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
375 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
376 return orig;
377
378 ret+=2;
379
380 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
381
382 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
383 {
384 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
385 unsigned long size_str;
386 long lenmax;
387
388 /* check for enough space.
389 4 for the servername type and entension length
390 2 for servernamelist length
391 1 for the hostname type
392 2 for hostname length
393 + hostname length
394 */
395
396 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
397 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
398 return NULL;
399
400 /* extension type and length */
401 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
402 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
403
404 /* length of servername list */
405 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
406
407 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
408 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
409 s2n(size_str,ret);
410 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
411 ret+=size_str;
412 }
413
414 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
415 if (s->renegotiate)
416 {
417 int el;
418
419 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
420 {
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
422 return NULL;
423 }
424
425 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
426
427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
428 s2n(el,ret);
429
430 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
431 {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 return NULL;
434 }
435
436 ret += el;
437 }
438
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
442 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
443
444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
446 {
447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 return NULL;
449 }
450
451 /* check for enough space.
452 4 for the srp type type and entension length
453 1 for the srp user identity
454 + srp user identity length
455 */
456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
457
458 /* fill in the extension */
459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
460 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
461 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
462 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
463 ret+=login_len;
464 }
465 #endif
466
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
468 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
469 {
470 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
471 long lenmax;
472
473 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
474 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
475 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
476 {
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
478 return NULL;
479 }
480
481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
482 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
483 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
484 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
485 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
486 }
487 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
488 {
489 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
490 long lenmax;
491
492 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
493 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
494 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
495 {
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 return NULL;
498 }
499
500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
501 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
502
503 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
504 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
505 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
506 }
507 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
508
509 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
510 {
511 int ticklen;
512 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
513 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
514 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
516 {
517 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
518 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
519 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
520 return NULL;
521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
523 ticklen);
524 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
525 }
526 else
527 ticklen = 0;
528 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
529 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
530 goto skip_ext;
531 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
532 * rest for ticket
533 */
534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
536 s2n(ticklen,ret);
537 if (ticklen)
538 {
539 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
540 ret += ticklen;
541 }
542 }
543 skip_ext:
544
545 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
546 {
547 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
548 return NULL;
549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
550 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
551 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
552 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
553 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
554 }
555
556 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
557 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
558 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
559 {
560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
561
562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
563 return NULL;
564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
565 return NULL;
566
567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
568 s2n(col + 2, ret);
569 s2n(col, ret);
570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
571 ret += col;
572 }
573 #endif
574
575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
577 {
578 int i;
579 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
580 OCSP_RESPID *id;
581
582 idlen = 0;
583 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
584 {
585 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
586 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
587 if (itmp <= 0)
588 return NULL;
589 idlen += itmp + 2;
590 }
591
592 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
593 {
594 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
595 if (extlen < 0)
596 return NULL;
597 }
598 else
599 extlen = 0;
600
601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
603 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
604 return NULL;
605 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
606 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
607 s2n(idlen, ret);
608 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
609 {
610 /* save position of id len */
611 unsigned char *q = ret;
612 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
613 /* skip over id len */
614 ret += 2;
615 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
616 /* write id len */
617 s2n(itmp, q);
618 }
619 s2n(extlen, ret);
620 if (extlen > 0)
621 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
622 }
623
624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
625 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
627 return NULL;
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
629 s2n(1,ret);
630 /* Set mode:
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
633 */
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
636 else
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
638 #endif
639
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
642 {
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
646 return NULL;
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
648 s2n(0,ret);
649 }
650 #endif
651
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
653 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
654 {
655 int el;
656
657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
658
659 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
660
661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
662 s2n(el,ret);
663
664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
665 {
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
667 return NULL;
668 }
669 ret += el;
670 }
671 #endif
672 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
673 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
674 *
675 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
676 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
677 */
678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
679 {
680 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
681 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
682 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
683 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
684 */
685 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
686 hlen -= 5;
687 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
688 {
689 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
690 if (hlen >= 4)
691 hlen -= 4;
692 else
693 hlen = 0;
694
695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
696 s2n(hlen, ret);
697 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
698 ret += hlen;
699 }
700 }
701
702 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
703 return orig;
704
705 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
706 return ret;
707 }
708
709 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
710 {
711 int extdatalen=0;
712 unsigned char *orig = buf;
713 unsigned char *ret = buf;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
715 int next_proto_neg_seen;
716 #endif
717
718 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
719 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
720 return orig;
721
722 ret+=2;
723 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
724
725 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
726 {
727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
728
729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
730 s2n(0,ret);
731 }
732
733 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
734 {
735 int el;
736
737 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
738 {
739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 return NULL;
741 }
742
743 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
744
745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
746 s2n(el,ret);
747
748 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
749 {
750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
751 return NULL;
752 }
753
754 ret += el;
755 }
756
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
759 {
760 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
761 long lenmax;
762
763 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
764 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
766 {
767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
768 return NULL;
769 }
770
771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
772 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
773 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
774 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
775 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
776
777 }
778 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
780
781 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
782 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
783 {
784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
786 s2n(0,ret);
787 }
788
789 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
790 {
791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
793 s2n(0,ret);
794 }
795
796 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
797 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
798 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
799 {
800 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
801
802 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
803 return NULL;
804 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
805 return NULL;
806
807 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
808 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
809 s2n(sol, ret);
810 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
811 ret += sol;
812 }
813 #endif
814
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
816 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
817 {
818 int el;
819
820 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
821
822 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
823
824 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
825 s2n(el,ret);
826
827 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
828 {
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
830 return NULL;
831 }
832 ret+=el;
833 }
834 #endif
835
836 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
837 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
838 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
839 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
840 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
841 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
842 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
843 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
844 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
845 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
846 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
847 ret+=36;
848
849 }
850
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
854 {
855 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
856 return NULL;
857 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
858 s2n(1,ret);
859 /* Set mode:
860 * 1: peer may send requests
861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
862 */
863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
865 else
866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
867
868 }
869 #endif
870
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
875 {
876 const unsigned char *npa;
877 unsigned int npalen;
878 int r;
879
880 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
881 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
882 {
883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
884 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
885 s2n(npalen,ret);
886 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
887 ret += npalen;
888 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
889 }
890 }
891 #endif
892
893 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
894 return orig;
895
896 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
897 return ret;
898 }
899
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
901 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
902 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
903 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
904 * SNI,
905 * elliptic_curves
906 * ec_point_formats
907 *
908 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
909 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
910 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
911 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
912 */
913 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
914 unsigned short type, size;
915 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
916 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
917 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
918 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
919 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
920 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
921 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
922
923 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
924 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
925 0x01, /* 1 point format */
926 0x00, /* uncompressed */
927 };
928
929 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
930 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
931 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
932 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
933 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
934 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
935 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
936 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
937 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
938 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
939 };
940
941 if (data >= (d+n-2))
942 return;
943 data += 2;
944
945 if (data > (d+n-4))
946 return;
947 n2s(data,type);
948 n2s(data,size);
949
950 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
951 return;
952
953 if (data+size > d+n)
954 return;
955 data += size;
956
957 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
958 {
959 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
960 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
961
962 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
963 return;
964 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
965 return;
966 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
967 return;
968 }
969 else
970 {
971 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
972
973 if (data + len != d+n)
974 return;
975 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
976 return;
977 }
978
979 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
980 }
981 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
982
983 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
984 {
985 unsigned short type;
986 unsigned short size;
987 unsigned short len;
988 unsigned char *data = *p;
989 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
990 int sigalg_seen = 0;
991
992 s->servername_done = 0;
993 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
995 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
996 #endif
997
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
999 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1000 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1001 #endif
1002
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1004 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1005 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1006 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1007
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1009 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1010 {
1011 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1012 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1013 }
1014 #endif
1015
1016 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1017
1018 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1019 goto ri_check;
1020 n2s(data,len);
1021
1022 if (data > (d+n-len))
1023 goto ri_check;
1024
1025 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1026 {
1027 n2s(data,type);
1028 n2s(data,size);
1029
1030 if (data+size > (d+n))
1031 goto ri_check;
1032 #if 0
1033 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1034 #endif
1035 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1036 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1037 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1038 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1039
1040 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1041 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1042 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1043 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1044 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1045 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1046 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1047 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1048 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1049 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1050 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1051 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1052 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1053 the value of the Host: field.
1054 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1055 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1056 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1057 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1058
1059 */
1060
1061 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1062 {
1063 unsigned char *sdata;
1064 int servname_type;
1065 int dsize;
1066
1067 if (size < 2)
1068 {
1069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 return 0;
1071 }
1072 n2s(data,dsize);
1073 size -= 2;
1074 if (dsize > size )
1075 {
1076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1077 return 0;
1078 }
1079
1080 sdata = data;
1081 while (dsize > 3)
1082 {
1083 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1084 n2s(sdata,len);
1085 dsize -= 3;
1086
1087 if (len > dsize)
1088 {
1089 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 return 0;
1091 }
1092 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1093 switch (servname_type)
1094 {
1095 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1096 if (!s->hit)
1097 {
1098 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1099 {
1100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 return 0;
1102 }
1103 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1104 {
1105 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1109 {
1110 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1111 return 0;
1112 }
1113 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1114 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1115 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1116 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1117 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1118 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1119 return 0;
1120 }
1121 s->servername_done = 1;
1122
1123 }
1124 else
1125 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1126 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1127 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1128
1129 break;
1130
1131 default:
1132 break;
1133 }
1134
1135 dsize -= len;
1136 }
1137 if (dsize != 0)
1138 {
1139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 return 0;
1141 }
1142
1143 }
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1146 {
1147 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1148 {
1149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1150 return 0;
1151 }
1152 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1153 {
1154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 return 0;
1156 }
1157 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1158 return -1;
1159 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1160 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1161
1162 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1163 {
1164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 return 0;
1166 }
1167 }
1168 #endif
1169
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1171 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1172 {
1173 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1174 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1175
1176 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1177 {
1178 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1179 return 0;
1180 }
1181 if (!s->hit)
1182 {
1183 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1184 {
1185 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1187 }
1188 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1189 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1190 {
1191 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1192 return 0;
1193 }
1194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1195 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1196 }
1197 #if 0
1198 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1199 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1200 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1201 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1202 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1203 #endif
1204 }
1205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1206 {
1207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1208 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1209 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1210
1211 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1212 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
1213 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
1214 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
1215 {
1216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 return 0;
1218 }
1219 if (!s->hit)
1220 {
1221 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1222 {
1223 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1224 return 0;
1225 }
1226 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1227 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1228 {
1229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1230 return 0;
1231 }
1232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1233 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1234 }
1235 #if 0
1236 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1237 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1238 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1239 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1240 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1241 #endif
1242 }
1243 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1244 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1246 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1247 {
1248 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1249
1250 if (size < 2)
1251 {
1252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 return 0;
1254 }
1255 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1257 {
1258 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1259 return 0;
1260 }
1261
1262 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1263 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1264 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1265 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1266 else
1267 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1268 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1269 {
1270 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1271 return 0;
1272 }
1273 }
1274 #endif
1275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1276 {
1277 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1278 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1279 {
1280 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1281 return 0;
1282 }
1283 }
1284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1285 {
1286 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1287 return 0;
1288 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1289 }
1290 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1291 {
1292 int dsize;
1293 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1294 {
1295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298 sigalg_seen = 1;
1299 n2s(data,dsize);
1300 size -= 2;
1301 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1302 {
1303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1304 return 0;
1305 }
1306 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1307 {
1308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1309 return 0;
1310 }
1311 }
1312 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1313 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1314 {
1315
1316 if (size < 5)
1317 {
1318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1319 return 0;
1320 }
1321
1322 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1323 size--;
1324 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1325 {
1326 const unsigned char *sdata;
1327 int dsize;
1328 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1329 n2s(data,dsize);
1330 size -= 2;
1331 if (dsize > size )
1332 {
1333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1334 return 0;
1335 }
1336 while (dsize > 0)
1337 {
1338 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1339 int idsize;
1340 if (dsize < 4)
1341 {
1342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1343 return 0;
1344 }
1345 n2s(data, idsize);
1346 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1347 size -= 2 + idsize;
1348 if (dsize < 0)
1349 {
1350 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1351 return 0;
1352 }
1353 sdata = data;
1354 data += idsize;
1355 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1356 &sdata, idsize);
1357 if (!id)
1358 {
1359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 return 0;
1361 }
1362 if (data != sdata)
1363 {
1364 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1366 return 0;
1367 }
1368 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1369 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1370 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1371 {
1372 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 return 0;
1375 }
1376 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1377 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1378 {
1379 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1380 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1381 return 0;
1382 }
1383 }
1384
1385 /* Read in request_extensions */
1386 if (size < 2)
1387 {
1388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391 n2s(data,dsize);
1392 size -= 2;
1393 if (dsize != size)
1394 {
1395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 sdata = data;
1399 if (dsize > 0)
1400 {
1401 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1402 {
1403 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1404 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1405 }
1406
1407 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1408 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1409 &sdata, dsize);
1410 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1411 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1412 {
1413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1414 return 0;
1415 }
1416 }
1417 }
1418 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1419 * so ignore it.
1420 */
1421 else
1422 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1423 }
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1426 {
1427 switch(data[0])
1428 {
1429 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1430 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1431 break;
1432 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1433 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1435 break;
1436 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1437 return 0;
1438 }
1439 }
1440 #endif
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1443 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1444 {
1445 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1446 * renegotiation.
1447 *
1448 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1449 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1450 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1451 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1452 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1453 * anything like that, but this might change).
1454
1455 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1456 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1457 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1458 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1459 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1460 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1461 }
1462 #endif
1463
1464 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1466 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1467 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1468 {
1469 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1470 al))
1471 return 0;
1472 }
1473 #endif
1474
1475 data+=size;
1476 }
1477
1478 *p = data;
1479
1480 ri_check:
1481
1482 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1483
1484 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1485 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1486 {
1487 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1489 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1490 return 0;
1491 }
1492
1493 return 1;
1494 }
1495
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1497 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1498 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1499 * the length of the block. */
1500 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1501 {
1502 unsigned int off = 0;
1503
1504 while (off < len)
1505 {
1506 if (d[off] == 0)
1507 return 0;
1508 off += d[off];
1509 off++;
1510 }
1511
1512 return off == len;
1513 }
1514 #endif
1515
1516 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1517 {
1518 unsigned short length;
1519 unsigned short type;
1520 unsigned short size;
1521 unsigned char *data = *p;
1522 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1523 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1524
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1527 #endif
1528 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1529
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1531 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1532 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1533 #endif
1534
1535 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1536 goto ri_check;
1537
1538 n2s(data,length);
1539 if (data+length != d+n)
1540 {
1541 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1542 return 0;
1543 }
1544
1545 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1546 {
1547 n2s(data,type);
1548 n2s(data,size);
1549
1550 if (data+size > (d+n))
1551 goto ri_check;
1552
1553 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1554 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1555 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1556
1557 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1558 {
1559 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1560 {
1561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1562 return 0;
1563 }
1564 tlsext_servername = 1;
1565 }
1566
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1569 {
1570 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1571 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1572
1573 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1574 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1575 {
1576 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1577 return 0;
1578 }
1579 if (!s->hit)
1580 {
1581 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1582 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1583 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1584 {
1585 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1586 return 0;
1587 }
1588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1589 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1590 }
1591 #if 0
1592 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1593 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1594 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1595 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1596 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1597 #endif
1598 }
1599 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1600
1601 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1602 {
1603 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1604 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1605 {
1606 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1607 return 0;
1608 }
1609 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1610 || (size > 0))
1611 {
1612 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1613 return 0;
1614 }
1615 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1616 }
1617 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1618 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1619 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1620 {
1621 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1622
1623 if (size < 2)
1624 {
1625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1626 return 0;
1627 }
1628 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1630 {
1631 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1632 return 0;
1633 }
1634
1635 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1636 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1637 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1639 else
1640 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1641
1642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1643 {
1644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1645 return 0;
1646 }
1647 }
1648 #endif
1649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1650 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1651 {
1652 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1653 * a status request message.
1654 */
1655 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1656 {
1657 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1658 return 0;
1659 }
1660 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1661 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1662 }
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1664 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1665 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1666 {
1667 unsigned char *selected;
1668 unsigned char selected_len;
1669
1670 /* We must have requested it. */
1671 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1672 {
1673 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1674 return 0;
1675 }
1676 /* The data must be valid */
1677 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1678 {
1679 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1680 return 0;
1681 }
1682 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1683 {
1684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1685 return 0;
1686 }
1687 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1688 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1689 {
1690 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1691 return 0;
1692 }
1693 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1694 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1696 }
1697 #endif
1698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1699 {
1700 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1701 return 0;
1702 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1703 }
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1705 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1706 {
1707 switch(data[0])
1708 {
1709 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1710 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1711 break;
1712 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1713 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1714 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1715 break;
1716 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1717 return 0;
1718 }
1719 }
1720 #endif
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1722 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1723 {
1724 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1725 al))
1726 return 0;
1727 }
1728 #endif
1729
1730 data+=size;
1731 }
1732
1733 if (data != d+n)
1734 {
1735 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1736 return 0;
1737 }
1738
1739 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1740 {
1741 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1742 {
1743 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1744 {
1745 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1746 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1747 {
1748 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1749 return 0;
1750 }
1751 }
1752 else
1753 {
1754 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1755 return 0;
1756 }
1757 }
1758 }
1759
1760 *p = data;
1761
1762 ri_check:
1763
1764 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1765 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1766 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1767 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1768 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1769 * absence on initial connect only.
1770 */
1771 if (!renegotiate_seen
1772 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1773 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1774 {
1775 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1777 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1778 return 0;
1779 }
1780
1781 return 1;
1782 }
1783
1784
1785 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1786 {
1787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1788 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1789 * and elliptic curves we support.
1790 */
1791 int using_ecc = 0;
1792 int i;
1793 unsigned char *j;
1794 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1795 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1796
1797 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1798 {
1799 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1800
1801 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1802 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1803 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1804 {
1805 using_ecc = 1;
1806 break;
1807 }
1808 }
1809 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1810 if (using_ecc)
1811 {
1812 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1813 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1814 {
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1816 return -1;
1817 }
1818 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1819 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1820 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1821 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1822
1823 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
1824 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1825 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1826 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1827 {
1828 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1830 return -1;
1831 }
1832 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1833 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1834 {
1835 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1836 s2n(id,j);
1837 }
1838 }
1839 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1840
1841 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1842 {
1843 int r = 1;
1844
1845 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1846 {
1847 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1848 if (!r)
1849 return -1;
1850 }
1851
1852 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1853 {
1854 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1855 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1856
1857 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1858 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1859 else
1860 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1861 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1862 {
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1864 return -1;
1865 }
1866 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1867 }
1868
1869 if (r == 2)
1870 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1871 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1872 }
1873 #endif
1874
1875 return 1;
1876 }
1877
1878 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1879 {
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1881 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1882 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1883 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1884 */
1885
1886 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1887 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1888 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1889 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1890
1891 if (using_ecc)
1892 {
1893 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1894 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1895 {
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1897 return -1;
1898 }
1899 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1900 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1901 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1902 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1903 }
1904 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1905
1906 return 1;
1907 }
1908
1909 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1910 {
1911 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1912 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1913
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1915 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1916 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1917 */
1918 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1919 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1920 */
1921 #endif
1922
1923 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1924 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1925 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1926 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1927
1928 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1929 {
1930 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1931 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1932 * so this has to happen here in
1933 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1934
1935 int r = 1;
1936
1937 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1938 {
1939 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1940 if (!r)
1941 {
1942 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1943 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1944 goto err;
1945 }
1946 }
1947
1948 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1949 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1951
1952 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1953 {
1954 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1955 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1956 {
1957 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1958 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1959
1960 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1961 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1962 else
1963 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1964 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1965 {
1966 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1967 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 goto err;
1969 }
1970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1971 }
1972 }
1973
1974 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1975 {
1976 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1977 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1978 * abort the handshake.
1979 */
1980 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1981 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1982 }
1983 }
1984
1985 err:
1986 #endif
1987 switch (ret)
1988 {
1989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1990 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1991 return -1;
1992
1993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1994 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1995 return 1;
1996
1997 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1998 s->servername_done=0;
1999 default:
2000 return 1;
2001 }
2002 }
2003
2004 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2005 {
2006 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2007 int al;
2008
2009 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2010 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2011 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2012 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2013 */
2014 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2015 {
2016 int r;
2017 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2018 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2019 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2020 if (certpkey == NULL)
2021 {
2022 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2023 return 1;
2024 }
2025 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2026 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2027 */
2028 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2029 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2030 switch (r)
2031 {
2032 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2034 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2035 break;
2036 /* status request response should be sent */
2037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2038 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2039 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2040 else
2041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2042 break;
2043 /* something bad happened */
2044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2046 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2047 goto err;
2048 }
2049 }
2050 else
2051 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2052
2053 err:
2054 switch (ret)
2055 {
2056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2058 return -1;
2059
2060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2061 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2062 return 1;
2063
2064 default:
2065 return 1;
2066 }
2067 }
2068
2069 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2070 {
2071 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2072 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2075 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2076 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2077 * it must contain uncompressed.
2078 */
2079 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2080 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2081 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2082 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2083 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2084 {
2085 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2086 size_t i;
2087 unsigned char *list;
2088 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2089 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2090 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2091 {
2092 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2093 {
2094 found_uncompressed = 1;
2095 break;
2096 }
2097 }
2098 if (!found_uncompressed)
2099 {
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2101 return -1;
2102 }
2103 }
2104 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2105 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2106
2107 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2108 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2109 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2110 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2111
2112 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2113 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2114 {
2115 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2116 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2117
2118 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2119 {
2120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2121 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2122 }
2123
2124 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2125 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2126 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2127 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2128 {
2129 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2131 }
2132 }
2133 #endif
2134
2135 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2136 * tell the callback
2137 */
2138 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2139 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2140 {
2141 int r;
2142 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2143 * there is no response.
2144 */
2145 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2146 {
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2148 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2149 }
2150 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2151 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2152 if (r == 0)
2153 {
2154 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2156 }
2157 if (r < 0)
2158 {
2159 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2161 }
2162 }
2163
2164 switch (ret)
2165 {
2166 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2167 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2168 return -1;
2169
2170 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2171 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2172 return 1;
2173
2174 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2175 s->servername_done=0;
2176 default:
2177 return 1;
2178 }
2179 }
2180
2181 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2182 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2183 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2184 *
2185 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2186 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2187 * extension, if any.
2188 * len: the length of the session ID.
2189 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2190 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2191 * point to the resulting session.
2192 *
2193 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2194 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2195 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2196 *
2197 * Returns:
2198 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2199 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2200 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2201 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2202 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2203 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2204 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2205 *
2206 * Side effects:
2207 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2208 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2209 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2210 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2211 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2212 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2213 */
2214 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2215 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2216 {
2217 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2218 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2219 unsigned short i;
2220
2221 *ret = NULL;
2222 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2223
2224 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2225 * to permit stateful resumption.
2226 */
2227 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2228 return 0;
2229 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2230 return 0;
2231 if (p >= limit)
2232 return -1;
2233 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2234 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2235 {
2236 i = *(p++);
2237 p+= i;
2238 if (p >= limit)
2239 return -1;
2240 }
2241 /* Skip past cipher list */
2242 n2s(p, i);
2243 p+= i;
2244 if (p >= limit)
2245 return -1;
2246 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2247 i = *(p++);
2248 p += i;
2249 if (p > limit)
2250 return -1;
2251 /* Now at start of extensions */
2252 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2253 return 0;
2254 n2s(p, i);
2255 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2256 {
2257 unsigned short type, size;
2258 n2s(p, type);
2259 n2s(p, size);
2260 if (p + size > limit)
2261 return 0;
2262 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2263 {
2264 int r;
2265 if (size == 0)
2266 {
2267 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2268 * currently have one. */
2269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2270 return 1;
2271 }
2272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2273 {
2274 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2275 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2276 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2277 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2278 * calculate the master secret later. */
2279 return 2;
2280 }
2281 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2282 switch (r)
2283 {
2284 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2285 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2286 return 2;
2287 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2288 return r;
2289 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2290 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2291 return 3;
2292 default: /* fatal error */
2293 return -1;
2294 }
2295 }
2296 p += size;
2297 }
2298 return 0;
2299 }
2300
2301 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2302 *
2303 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2304 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2305 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2306 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2307 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2308 * point to the resulting session.
2309 *
2310 * Returns:
2311 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2312 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2313 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2314 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2315 */
2316 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2317 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2318 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2319 {
2320 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2321 unsigned char *sdec;
2322 const unsigned char *p;
2323 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2324 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2325 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2327 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2328 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2329 if (eticklen < 48)
2330 return 2;
2331 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2332 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2334 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2335 {
2336 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2337 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2338 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2339 if (rv < 0)
2340 return -1;
2341 if (rv == 0)
2342 return 2;
2343 if (rv == 2)
2344 renew_ticket = 1;
2345 }
2346 else
2347 {
2348 /* Check key name matches */
2349 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2350 return 2;
2351 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2352 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2353 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2354 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2355 }
2356 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2357 * integrity checks on ticket.
2358 */
2359 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2360 if (mlen < 0)
2361 {
2362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2363 return -1;
2364 }
2365 eticklen -= mlen;
2366 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2367 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2368 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2369 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2370 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2371 {
2372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2373 return 2;
2374 }
2375 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2376 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2377 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2378 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2379 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2380 if (!sdec)
2381 {
2382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2383 return -1;
2384 }
2385 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2386 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2387 {
2388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2389 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2390 return 2;
2391 }
2392 slen += mlen;
2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2394 p = sdec;
2395
2396 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2397 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2398 if (sess)
2399 {
2400 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2401 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2402 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2403 * as required by standard.
2404 */
2405 if (sesslen)
2406 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2407 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2408 *psess = sess;
2409 if (renew_ticket)
2410 return 4;
2411 else
2412 return 3;
2413 }
2414 ERR_clear_error();
2415 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2416 * ticket. */
2417 return 2;
2418 }
2419
2420 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2421
2422 typedef struct
2423 {
2424 int nid;
2425 int id;
2426 } tls12_lookup;
2427
2428 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2430 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2431 #endif
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2433 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2434 #endif
2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2436 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2437 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2438 #endif
2439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2440 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2441 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2442 #endif
2443 };
2444
2445 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2447 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2448 #endif
2449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2450 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2451 #endif
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2453 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2454 #endif
2455 };
2456
2457 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2458 {
2459 size_t i;
2460 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2461 {
2462 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2463 return table[i].id;
2464 }
2465 return -1;
2466 }
2467 #if 0
2468 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2469 {
2470 size_t i;
2471 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2472 {
2473 if (table[i].id == id)
2474 return table[i].nid;
2475 }
2476 return -1;
2477 }
2478 #endif
2479
2480 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2481 {
2482 int sig_id, md_id;
2483 if (!md)
2484 return 0;
2485 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2486 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2487 if (md_id == -1)
2488 return 0;
2489 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2490 if (sig_id == -1)
2491 return 0;
2492 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2493 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2494 return 1;
2495 }
2496
2497 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2498 {
2499 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2500 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2501 }
2502
2503 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2504 {
2505 switch(hash_alg)
2506 {
2507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2508 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2509 return EVP_sha1();
2510 #endif
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2512 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2513 return EVP_sha224();
2514
2515 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2516 return EVP_sha256();
2517 #endif
2518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2519 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2520 return EVP_sha384();
2521
2522 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2523 return EVP_sha512();
2524 #endif
2525 default:
2526 return NULL;
2527
2528 }
2529 }
2530
2531 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2532
2533 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2534 {
2535 int i, idx;
2536 const EVP_MD *md;
2537 CERT *c = s->cert;
2538 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2539 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2540 return 1;
2541 /* Should never happen */
2542 if (!c)
2543 return 0;
2544
2545 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2546 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2547 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2548 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2549
2550 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2551 {
2552 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2553
2554 switch(sig_alg)
2555 {
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2557 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2558 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2559 break;
2560 #endif
2561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2562 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2563 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2564 break;
2565 #endif
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2567 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2568 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2569 break;
2570 #endif
2571 default:
2572 continue;
2573 }
2574
2575 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2576 {
2577 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2578 if (md)
2579 {
2580 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2581 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2582 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2583 }
2584 }
2585
2586 }
2587
2588
2589 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2590 * supported it stays as NULL.
2591 */
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2593 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2594 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2595 #endif
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2597 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2598 {
2599 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2600 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2601 }
2602 #endif
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2604 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2605 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2606 #endif
2607 return 1;
2608 }
2609
2610 #endif
2611
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2613 int
2614 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2615 {
2616 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2617 unsigned short hbtype;
2618 unsigned int payload;
2619 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2620
2621 if (s->msg_callback)
2622 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2623 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2624 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2625
2626 /* Read type and payload length first */
2627 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2628 return 0; /* silently discard */
2629 hbtype = *p++;
2630 n2s(p, payload);
2631 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2632 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2633 pl = p;
2634
2635 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2636 {
2637 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2638 int r;
2639
2640 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2641 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2642 * payload, plus padding
2643 */
2644 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2645 bp = buffer;
2646
2647 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2648 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2649 s2n(payload, bp);
2650 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2651 bp += payload;
2652 /* Random padding */
2653 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2654
2655 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2656
2657 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2658 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2659 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2660 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2661
2662 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2663
2664 if (r < 0)
2665 return r;
2666 }
2667 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2668 {
2669 unsigned int seq;
2670
2671 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2672 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2673 * sequence number */
2674 n2s(pl, seq);
2675
2676 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2677 {
2678 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2679 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2680 }
2681 }
2682
2683 return 0;
2684 }
2685
2686 int
2687 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2688 {
2689 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2690 int ret;
2691 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2692 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2693
2694 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2695 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2696 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2697 {
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2699 return -1;
2700 }
2701
2702 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2703 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2704 {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2706 return -1;
2707 }
2708
2709 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2710 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2711 {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2713 return -1;
2714 }
2715
2716 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2717 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2718 */
2719 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2720
2721 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2722 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2723 * some random stuff.
2724 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2725 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2726 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2727 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2728 * - Padding
2729 */
2730 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2731 p = buf;
2732 /* Message Type */
2733 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2734 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2735 s2n(payload, p);
2736 /* Sequence number */
2737 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2738 /* 16 random bytes */
2739 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2740 p += 16;
2741 /* Random padding */
2742 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2743
2744 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2745 if (ret >= 0)
2746 {
2747 if (s->msg_callback)
2748 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2749 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2750 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2751
2752 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2753 }
2754
2755 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2756
2757 return ret;
2758 }
2759 #endif
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