2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include "quic/quic_local.h"
28 #include <openssl/ct.h>
30 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
31 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
35 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
36 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
37 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
41 tls1_export_keying_material
,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
44 tls_close_construct_packet
,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
56 tls1_export_keying_material
,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
59 tls_close_construct_packet
,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
71 tls1_export_keying_material
,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
75 tls_close_construct_packet
,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
80 tls13_setup_key_block
,
81 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
82 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
83 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
84 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
85 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
87 tls13_export_keying_material
,
88 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
89 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
90 tls_close_construct_packet
,
94 OSSL_TIME
tls1_default_timeout(void)
97 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
98 * http, the cache would over fill
100 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
107 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
113 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
115 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
120 OPENSSL_free(sc
->ext
.session_ticket
);
124 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
126 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
134 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
135 sc
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
137 sc
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
142 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
143 static const struct {
147 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
148 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
149 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
150 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
151 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
152 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
153 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
154 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
155 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
156 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
157 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
158 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
159 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
160 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
161 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
162 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
163 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
164 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
165 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
166 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
167 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
168 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
169 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
170 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
171 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
172 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
173 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
174 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
176 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
177 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
},
178 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
},
179 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
},
187 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
188 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
189 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
190 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
191 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
194 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
200 /* The default curves */
201 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
, /* X25519 (29) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, /* secp256r1 (23) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
, /* X448 (30) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
, /* secp521r1 (25) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, /* secp384r1 (24) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
, /* GC256A (34) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
, /* GC256B (35) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
, /* GC256C (36) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
, /* GC256D (37) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
, /* GC512A (38) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
, /* GC512B (39) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
, /* GC512C (40) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
221 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
,
223 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
,
226 struct provider_ctx_data_st
{
228 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
231 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
232 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
233 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
235 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
236 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
237 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
239 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
240 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
242 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
245 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
246 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
248 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
249 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
250 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
252 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
253 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
254 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
255 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
258 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
259 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
261 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
262 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
265 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
267 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
268 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
269 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
272 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
273 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
)
276 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
277 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
278 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
281 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
282 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
)
285 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
286 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
290 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
292 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
293 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
297 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
298 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
)
301 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
302 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
303 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
307 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
308 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
312 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
314 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
315 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
320 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
321 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
322 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
326 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
327 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
332 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
333 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
338 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
339 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
340 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
345 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
346 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
348 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
349 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
351 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
352 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
353 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
354 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
355 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
356 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
359 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
360 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
361 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
364 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
372 ginf
->algorithm
= ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
379 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
382 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
389 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
395 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
396 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
397 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
404 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
407 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
410 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
)
413 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
415 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
416 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
421 #define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
422 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs
;
423 static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
425 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
426 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
427 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
429 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*sinf
= NULL
;
430 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
432 unsigned int code_point
= 0;
435 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== ctx
->sigalg_list_len
) {
436 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
438 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== 0)
439 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
)
440 * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
442 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->sigalg_list
,
443 (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
444 + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
445 * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
));
448 ctx
->sigalg_list
= tmp
;
449 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
, 0,
450 sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
451 ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
+= TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
454 sinf
= &ctx
->sigalg_list
[ctx
->sigalg_list_len
];
456 /* First, mandatory parameters */
457 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME
);
458 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
459 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
462 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
463 sinf
->sigalg_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
464 if (sinf
->sigalg_name
== NULL
)
467 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME
);
468 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
469 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
472 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
473 sinf
->name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
474 if (sinf
->name
== NULL
)
477 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
478 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT
);
480 || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &code_point
)
481 || code_point
> UINT16_MAX
) {
482 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
485 sinf
->code_point
= (uint16_t)code_point
;
487 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
488 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS
);
489 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &sinf
->secbits
)) {
490 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
494 /* Now, optional parameters */
495 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID
);
497 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
498 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
501 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
502 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
503 if (sinf
->sigalg_oid
== NULL
)
507 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME
);
509 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
510 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
513 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
514 sinf
->sig_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
515 if (sinf
->sig_name
== NULL
)
519 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID
);
521 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
522 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
525 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
526 sinf
->sig_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
527 if (sinf
->sig_oid
== NULL
)
531 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME
);
533 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
534 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
537 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
538 sinf
->hash_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
539 if (sinf
->hash_name
== NULL
)
543 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID
);
545 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
546 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
549 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
550 sinf
->hash_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
551 if (sinf
->hash_oid
== NULL
)
555 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE
);
557 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
558 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
561 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
562 sinf
->keytype
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
563 if (sinf
->keytype
== NULL
)
567 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID
);
569 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
570 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
573 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
574 sinf
->keytype_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
575 if (sinf
->keytype_oid
== NULL
)
579 /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
580 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS
);
581 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->mintls
)) {
582 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
585 if ((sinf
->mintls
!= 0) && (sinf
->mintls
!= -1) &&
586 ((sinf
->mintls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
587 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
592 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS
);
593 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->maxtls
)) {
594 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
597 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
598 ((sinf
->maxtls
< sinf
->mintls
))) {
599 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
602 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
603 ((sinf
->maxtls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
604 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
610 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
611 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
612 * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
617 keytype
= (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
619 : (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
621 : sinf
->sigalg_name
));
622 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, keytype
, ctx
->propq
);
623 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
625 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
626 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
628 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
629 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
630 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
631 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
632 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
633 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
636 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
638 * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
639 * Check proper object registration first, though.
640 * Don't care about return value as this may have been
641 * done within providers or previous calls to
642 * add_provider_sigalgs.
644 OBJ_create(sinf
->sigalg_oid
, sinf
->sigalg_name
, NULL
);
645 /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
646 if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
) == NID_undef
) ||
647 (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
)) == NULL
)) {
648 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
651 if (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
)
652 OBJ_create(sinf
->sig_oid
, sinf
->sig_name
, NULL
);
653 if (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
)
654 OBJ_create(sinf
->keytype_oid
, sinf
->keytype
, NULL
);
655 if (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
)
656 OBJ_create(sinf
->hash_oid
, sinf
->hash_name
, NULL
);
657 OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
),
658 (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
659 ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->hash_name
)
661 OBJ_txt2nid(keytype
));
662 ctx
->sigalg_list_len
++;
665 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
670 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
672 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
673 sinf
->sigalg_name
= NULL
;
674 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
675 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
676 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
677 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
678 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
679 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
680 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
681 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
682 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
683 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
684 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
685 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
686 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
687 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
692 static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
694 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
697 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
698 OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-SIGALG",
699 add_provider_sigalgs
, &pgd
);
701 * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
702 * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
707 int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
712 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_sigalgs
, ctx
))
715 /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
716 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_len
> 0) {
717 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->ssl_cert_info
);
718 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu
) * ctx
->sigalg_list_len
);
719 if (ctx
->ssl_cert_info
== NULL
)
721 for(i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
722 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].nid
= OBJ_txt2nid(ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].sigalg_name
);
723 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].amask
= SSL_aANY
;
728 * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
729 * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
735 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
739 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
740 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
741 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
742 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
748 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
752 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
753 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
754 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
760 const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
762 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls_group_info
= tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx
, group_id
);
764 if (tls_group_info
== NULL
)
767 return tls_group_info
->tlsname
;
770 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
778 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
779 * work for groups we don't know about.
781 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
783 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
784 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
786 if (!include_unknown
)
788 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
791 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
796 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
797 * work for groups we don't know about.
799 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
801 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
802 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
809 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
810 * the number of groups supported.
812 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
815 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
817 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
818 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
819 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
820 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
821 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
824 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
825 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
829 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
830 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
835 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
836 *pgroups
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
837 *pgroupslen
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
839 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
840 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
846 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
847 int minversion
, int maxversion
,
848 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
850 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
853 int group_minversion
, group_maxversion
;
855 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
861 group_minversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? ginfo
->mindtls
: ginfo
->mintls
;
862 group_maxversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? ginfo
->maxdtls
: ginfo
->maxtls
;
864 if (group_minversion
< 0 || group_maxversion
< 0)
866 if (group_maxversion
== 0)
869 ret
= (ssl_version_cmp(s
, minversion
, group_maxversion
) <= 0);
870 if (group_minversion
> 0)
871 ret
&= (ssl_version_cmp(s
, maxversion
, group_minversion
) >= 0);
873 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
874 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
875 *okfortls13
= (group_maxversion
== 0)
876 || (group_maxversion
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
879 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
880 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
881 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
886 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
887 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
889 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
891 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
896 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
897 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
898 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
899 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
902 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
903 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
906 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
913 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
914 * if there is no match.
915 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
916 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
917 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
919 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int nmatch
)
921 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
922 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
924 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
926 /* Can't do anything on client side */
930 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
932 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
933 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
935 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
937 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
938 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
;
939 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
940 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
;
941 /* Should never happen */
944 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
948 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
949 * otherwise peer decides.
951 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
952 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
953 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
955 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
956 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
959 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
960 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
961 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*inf
;
962 int minversion
, maxversion
;
964 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
965 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
967 inf
= tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx
, id
);
968 if (!ossl_assert(inf
!= NULL
))
971 minversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
972 ? inf
->mindtls
: inf
->mintls
;
973 maxversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
974 ? inf
->maxdtls
: inf
->maxtls
;
975 if (maxversion
== -1)
977 if ((minversion
!= 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s
, s
->version
, minversion
) < 0)
979 && ssl_version_cmp(s
, s
->version
, maxversion
) > 0))
988 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
992 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
993 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
998 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
999 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
1001 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
1002 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
1003 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
1006 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1009 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
)
1011 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
1012 unsigned long idmask
;
1014 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
1015 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
1017 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
1018 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
1019 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
1021 *dup_list
|= idmask
;
1024 OPENSSL_free(*pext
);
1029 OPENSSL_free(glist
);
1033 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
1034 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
1042 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1044 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
1047 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
1048 int ignore_unknown
= 0;
1052 if (elem
[0] == '?') {
1057 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
1059 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
,
1060 (garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
) * sizeof(*garg
->gid_arr
));
1063 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1064 garg
->gid_arr
= tmp
;
1066 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1068 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1071 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
1073 /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
1074 return ignore_unknown
;
1076 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
1077 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
) {
1078 /* Duplicate group - ignore */
1081 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
1085 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
1086 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
1094 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1095 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
1096 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
1099 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
1101 if (gcb
.gidcnt
== 0) {
1102 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
,
1103 "No valid groups in '%s'", str
);
1112 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
1115 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
1118 OPENSSL_free(*pext
);
1120 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
1123 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
1127 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
1128 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
1129 int check_own_groups
)
1131 const uint16_t *groups
;
1137 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
1138 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
1139 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
1141 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
1142 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1144 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
1145 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1148 /* Should never happen */
1153 if (check_own_groups
) {
1154 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
1155 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1156 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
1160 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
1163 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
1167 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
1168 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1171 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
1172 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
1173 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
1174 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
1176 if (groups_len
== 0)
1178 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
1181 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
1182 size_t *num_formats
)
1185 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
1187 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
1188 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
1189 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
1191 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
1192 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
1194 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
1196 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
1200 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
1201 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1203 unsigned char comp_id
;
1207 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
1208 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1212 /* Get required compression id */
1213 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
1214 if (point_conv
== 0)
1216 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
1217 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
1218 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1220 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
1225 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
1227 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
1228 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
1229 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
1230 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
1235 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
1236 * supported (see RFC4492).
1238 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
1241 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
1242 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
1248 /* Return group id of a key */
1249 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1251 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1253 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
1255 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
1259 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
1260 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
1262 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
1266 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1269 /* If not EC nothing to do */
1270 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1272 /* Check compression */
1273 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
1275 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
1277 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
1280 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
1283 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
1286 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1290 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
1291 if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1292 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
1293 else if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1294 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
1296 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1297 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1298 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1307 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1308 * @s: SSL connection
1309 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1311 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1312 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1314 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1316 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
1318 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1319 if (!tls1_suiteb(s
))
1320 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
1322 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1325 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
1326 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, 1);
1327 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
1328 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, 1);
1333 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1334 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
1335 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1336 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1337 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1338 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1339 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1340 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1341 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1342 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1344 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1345 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1346 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1347 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1348 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1349 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1351 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1352 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1353 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1355 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1356 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1358 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1359 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1361 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1362 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1364 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1365 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1366 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1369 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1370 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1371 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1372 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1373 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1378 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1379 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1380 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1383 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1384 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1385 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1386 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1387 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1388 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1389 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1390 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1391 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1392 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1393 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1394 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1395 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1396 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1397 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1398 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1399 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1400 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1401 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1402 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1403 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1404 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1405 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1406 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1407 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 1},
1408 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1409 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1410 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 1},
1411 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1412 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1413 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 1},
1414 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1415 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1416 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1417 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1418 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1419 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1420 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1421 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1422 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1423 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1424 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1425 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1426 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1427 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1428 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1429 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1430 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1431 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1432 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1433 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1434 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1435 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1436 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1437 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1438 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1439 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1440 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1441 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1442 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1443 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1444 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1445 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1446 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1447 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1448 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1449 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1450 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1451 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1452 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1453 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1454 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1455 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1456 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1457 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1458 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1459 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1460 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1461 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1463 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1464 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1465 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1466 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1467 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1468 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1469 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1470 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1471 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1472 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1473 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1474 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1475 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1476 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1477 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1478 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1479 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1480 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1481 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1482 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1485 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1486 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1487 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1488 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1489 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1490 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1494 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1495 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1497 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1498 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1499 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1500 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1501 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1502 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1503 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1504 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1505 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1506 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1509 int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1511 size_t i
, cache_idx
, sigalgs_len
;
1512 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1513 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
= NULL
;
1514 uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1515 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1521 sigalgs_len
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
) + ctx
->sigalg_list_len
;
1523 cache
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
) * sigalgs_len
);
1524 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1527 tls12_sigalgs_list
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len
);
1528 if (tls12_sigalgs_list
== NULL
)
1532 /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
1533 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1534 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1538 tls12_sigalgs_list
[i
] = tls12_sigalgs
[i
];
1541 * Check hash is available.
1542 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1543 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1544 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1545 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1546 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1548 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1549 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1550 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1554 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1555 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1558 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1559 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1561 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1562 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1565 /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
1566 cache_idx
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1567 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
1568 TLS_SIGALG_INFO si
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
];
1569 cache
[cache_idx
].name
= si
.name
;
1570 cache
[cache_idx
].sigalg
= si
.code_point
;
1571 tls12_sigalgs_list
[cache_idx
] = si
.code_point
;
1572 cache
[cache_idx
].hash
= si
.hash_name
?OBJ_txt2nid(si
.hash_name
):NID_undef
;
1573 cache
[cache_idx
].hash_idx
= ssl_get_md_idx(cache
[cache_idx
].hash
);
1574 cache
[cache_idx
].sig
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1575 cache
[cache_idx
].sig_idx
= i
+ SSL_PKEY_NUM
;
1576 cache
[cache_idx
].sigandhash
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1577 cache
[cache_idx
].curve
= NID_undef
;
1578 /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
1579 cache
[cache_idx
].enabled
= 1;
1583 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1584 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs
= tls12_sigalgs_list
;
1585 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs_len
= sigalgs_len
;
1587 tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1591 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1592 OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list
);
1593 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1597 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1598 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1602 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1604 for (i
= 0, lu
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1605 i
< SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1607 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1615 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1616 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1622 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1623 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1626 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1636 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1638 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1639 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1640 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1642 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1643 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1644 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1650 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1652 if (EVP_MD_get_size(md
) <= 0)
1654 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1660 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1661 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1662 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1663 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1664 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1666 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1673 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1674 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
1675 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
1676 = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
1680 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1687 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1689 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1692 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1694 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1701 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1702 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1704 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1707 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1709 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1716 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1719 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1722 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1723 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1727 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, NULL
))
1729 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1733 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1735 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1737 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1738 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1741 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1743 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
1745 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1748 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1752 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1755 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1758 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1759 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1760 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1761 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1763 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1764 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1767 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1768 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1772 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1773 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1774 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1776 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1777 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1778 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1779 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1780 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1781 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1783 *psigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1784 return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1789 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1790 * specified EC curve.
1792 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int curve
)
1794 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1797 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1798 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1799 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1801 sigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1802 siglen
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1805 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1806 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1810 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1811 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1812 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1820 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1823 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1825 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1828 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1832 int md_type
= EVP_MD_get_type(md
);
1834 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1835 secbits
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
) * 4;
1839 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1840 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1841 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1843 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1844 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1845 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1846 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1848 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1850 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1852 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1855 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1856 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1858 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1862 * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
1863 * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
1865 if ((secbits
== 0) && (lu
->sig_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_NUM
)
1866 && ((lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
) < (int)ctx
->sigalg_list_len
)) {
1867 secbits
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
].secbits
;
1873 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1874 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1877 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1879 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1880 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1882 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1884 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1887 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
1889 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1890 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1891 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1895 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1896 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1897 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1899 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1900 /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
1901 if ((pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT
) && (lu
!= NULL
))
1904 /* Should never happen */
1909 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1910 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1913 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1914 && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1915 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1916 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1920 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1921 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
1922 (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) : pkeyid
,
1923 &cidx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
))
1924 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1925 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1929 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1931 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1932 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1933 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1934 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1938 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1939 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1940 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1942 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1943 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1947 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1948 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1949 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1950 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1953 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1954 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1955 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1956 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1958 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1963 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1968 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1969 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1970 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1971 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1974 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1975 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1976 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1980 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, &md
)) {
1981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1985 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1986 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1988 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1989 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1990 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
1992 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1993 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_get_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1994 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1995 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1998 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1999 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
2003 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
2005 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
2010 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
2012 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
2016 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
2018 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
2023 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
2025 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
2030 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
2031 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
2032 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
2034 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
2037 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
2039 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2041 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
2042 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
2043 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
2044 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
2045 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2048 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
2049 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
2050 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
2051 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
2053 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2055 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2056 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
2057 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
2064 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
2065 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
2066 * @c: cipher to check
2067 * @op: Security check that you want to do
2068 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
2070 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
2072 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
,
2075 int minversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? c
->min_dtls
: c
->min_tls
;
2076 int maxversion
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) ? c
->max_dtls
: c
->max_tls
;
2078 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
2079 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
2081 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
2084 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2085 /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
2086 switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
)) {
2087 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
:
2088 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
:
2089 case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
:
2096 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
2097 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
2099 if (minversion
== TLS1_VERSION
2101 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
2102 minversion
= SSL3_VERSION
;
2104 if (ssl_version_cmp(s
, minversion
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) > 0
2105 || ssl_version_cmp(s
, maxversion
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
) < 0)
2108 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
2111 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2113 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
2115 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
2118 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2122 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2123 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2124 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2125 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2127 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2128 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
)
2129 memset(s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
, 0, s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2131 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
= OPENSSL_zalloc(s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2132 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
== NULL
)
2135 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
2136 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
2138 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
2139 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
2140 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2141 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2143 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
2144 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
2149 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
2150 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
2151 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
2152 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2160 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2161 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2164 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
2167 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
2168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2169 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2174 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2176 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2177 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2178 * point to the resulting session.
2180 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2181 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
2185 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
2188 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2191 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
2192 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2195 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
2196 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2198 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
2199 if (!ticketext
->present
)
2200 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2202 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
2204 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
2205 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
2209 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2211 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
2212 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
2213 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
2214 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
2217 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2218 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2219 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2220 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2221 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2222 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
2224 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2225 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2226 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2227 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2228 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2229 * point to the resulting session.
2231 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2232 const unsigned char *etick
,
2234 const unsigned char *sess_id
,
2235 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
2237 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
2238 unsigned char *sdec
;
2239 const unsigned char *p
;
2240 int slen
, ivlen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
2241 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2243 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2244 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
2245 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2246 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
2247 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2249 if (eticklen
== 0) {
2251 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2252 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
2254 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
2257 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
2259 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2260 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2261 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2262 * calculate the master secret later.
2264 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2268 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
2269 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
2270 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2274 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2275 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
2277 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2280 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2282 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2286 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2288 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2291 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
2294 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2295 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2296 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2298 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
2300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2301 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2302 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2303 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2304 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2305 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
2308 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2312 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2318 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
2320 /* Check key name matches */
2321 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
2322 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
2323 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2327 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
2329 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
2330 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
2331 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
2333 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
2334 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
2335 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
2336 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2337 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2340 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2341 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2345 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2348 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
2350 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2354 ivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
2356 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2360 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2361 if (eticklen
<= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
+ mlen
) {
2362 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2366 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2367 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
2368 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
2369 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2373 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
2374 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2377 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2378 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2379 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2380 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2381 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
2382 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
2383 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
2385 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2388 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
2390 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2396 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL
, &p
, slen
, sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
2400 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2402 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2404 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2408 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2409 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2410 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2414 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
2415 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
2418 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2420 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2425 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2427 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2431 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
2434 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2435 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2436 * performs any action
2438 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
2439 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2440 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2441 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2442 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
2443 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2446 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2447 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2448 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2449 sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2451 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2453 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2454 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2457 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2458 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2459 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2463 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2464 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2465 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2466 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2467 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2471 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2472 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2473 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2474 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2475 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2476 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2477 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2479 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2483 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2487 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2489 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2490 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2491 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2492 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2501 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2502 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
,
2503 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2505 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2508 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2510 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2511 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2514 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2517 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2518 && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2519 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2520 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2521 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2524 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2525 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
->sig_idx
))
2528 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2529 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2530 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2531 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2532 if (s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2535 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2536 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2538 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2541 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2542 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2543 * ciphersuites enabled.
2546 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2549 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
2550 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2551 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2552 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2554 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2555 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2556 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2559 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2567 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2568 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
2569 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2570 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2571 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2575 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2576 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2580 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
)
2582 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2583 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2584 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2586 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2589 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2590 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2591 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2592 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2597 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
,
2598 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
2602 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2603 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2604 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2605 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2607 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2610 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2611 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2616 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2617 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2620 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2622 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2625 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2626 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2628 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2629 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2630 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2631 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2635 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2639 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2640 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2641 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2642 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2643 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2645 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2646 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2647 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2648 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2650 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2652 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2654 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2655 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2666 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2667 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2669 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2670 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2674 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2676 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2677 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2678 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2679 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2680 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2681 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2682 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2683 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2684 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2685 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2687 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2688 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2691 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2692 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2696 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2697 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2699 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2701 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
)
2703 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2707 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2708 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2712 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2718 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2720 /* Invalid data length */
2721 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2726 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
)
2728 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2736 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2743 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2745 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2746 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2748 /* Should never happen */
2749 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2753 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2754 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2756 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2757 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2761 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2763 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2766 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2768 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2771 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++)
2774 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2775 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2776 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2778 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2779 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2781 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2782 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0
2783 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), idx
))
2784 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2789 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2790 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2791 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2795 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2800 psig
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2801 numsigalgs
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2803 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2806 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2808 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2812 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2814 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2815 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc
, *psig
);
2817 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2819 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2820 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2821 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2823 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2826 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2827 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2828 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2830 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2831 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2836 if (sc
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2838 || idx
>= (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
2839 || sc
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2841 shsigalgs
= sc
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2843 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2845 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2846 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2847 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2849 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2851 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2852 return (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2855 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2856 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2860 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2861 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2865 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2867 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2868 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2869 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2870 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2871 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2872 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2873 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2874 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2876 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2877 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2878 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2881 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2882 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2884 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2886 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2888 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2889 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2890 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2891 int ignore_unknown
= 0;
2895 if (elem
[0] == '?') {
2900 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2902 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2904 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2906 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2908 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2909 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2910 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2911 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2912 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2913 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2917 /* Load provider sigalgs */
2918 if (sarg
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
2919 /* Check if a provider supports the sigalg */
2920 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
2921 if (sarg
->ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].sigalg_name
!= NULL
2923 sarg
->ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].sigalg_name
) == 0) {
2924 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] =
2925 sarg
->ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].code_point
;
2930 /* Check the built-in sigalgs */
2931 if (sarg
->ctx
== NULL
|| i
== sarg
->ctx
->sigalg_list_len
) {
2932 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
2933 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); i
++, s
++) {
2934 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2935 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2939 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
)) {
2940 /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
2941 return ignore_unknown
;
2949 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2950 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2951 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
) {
2952 /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
2953 return ignore_unknown
;
2955 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2957 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2958 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2962 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
)) {
2963 /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
2964 return ignore_unknown
;
2968 /* Ignore duplicates */
2969 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2970 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2979 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2980 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2982 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2987 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ssl_load_sigalgs(ctx
)) {
2990 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2992 if (sig
.sigalgcnt
== 0) {
2993 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
,
2994 "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str
);
2999 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
3002 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
3007 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
3009 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
3012 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3013 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3014 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3016 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3017 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3018 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3024 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
3026 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
3031 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
3033 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
3035 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
3036 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
3037 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
3039 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
3041 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
3042 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
3047 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
3052 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3053 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3054 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
3056 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3057 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3058 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
3064 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
3068 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
3070 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
3072 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
3075 if (default_nid
== -1)
3077 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
3079 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
3081 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3083 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
3084 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
3085 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
3087 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
3090 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3092 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3093 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
3094 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
3095 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3096 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
3102 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3103 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3105 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
3107 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3108 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3109 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3116 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3117 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3118 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3119 * attempting to use them.
3122 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3124 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3125 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3126 /* Strict mode flags */
3127 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3128 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3129 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3131 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
3132 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
, int idx
)
3136 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3137 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3140 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3144 * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
3145 * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
3146 * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
3148 * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
3153 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
3155 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3156 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3158 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3160 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3161 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, idx
)) {
3162 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pk
))
3164 *pvalid
= rv
= CERT_PKEY_RPK
;
3167 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3168 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3173 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3176 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
,
3177 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3180 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3182 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
3183 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
3185 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
3192 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3193 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
3194 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
3195 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3196 else if (!check_flags
)
3201 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3202 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3204 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
3209 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
3210 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3212 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3216 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3217 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
3220 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
3221 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3222 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
3226 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3227 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
3230 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
3231 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
3232 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
3235 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
3236 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
3237 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
3240 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
3241 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
3242 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
3251 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3252 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3254 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
3256 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3257 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
3258 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
3260 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
3263 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
3270 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3271 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3273 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
3274 * so check_flags is always set.
3276 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
3277 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3278 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
3282 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3283 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3284 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3285 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
3287 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3294 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3295 else if (check_flags
)
3296 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3298 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3299 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
3300 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
3301 else if (!check_flags
)
3304 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3305 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3306 else if (strict_mode
) {
3307 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3308 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3309 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3310 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
3312 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3319 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
3320 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
3323 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
3324 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
3325 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
3326 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
3327 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
3328 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
3331 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
3334 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
3335 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
3336 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3340 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
3343 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3346 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
3349 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
) == 0
3350 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
3351 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3353 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3354 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3356 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
3357 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3362 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
3365 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3367 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
3368 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
3372 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3373 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
3375 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3378 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3382 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
3385 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3386 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3393 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3394 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3396 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
3397 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
3398 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
3399 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
3400 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
3401 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
3402 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
3403 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
3404 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
3407 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
3408 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
3410 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
3415 return tls1_check_chain(sc
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
3418 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3420 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
3422 int dh_secbits
= 80, sec_level_bits
;
3423 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3424 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
3425 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
3426 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3428 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
3429 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
3430 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
3435 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
3437 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
3441 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3442 sec_level_bits
= ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
3444 if (dh_secbits
< sec_level_bits
)
3445 dh_secbits
= sec_level_bits
;
3447 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
3448 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
3449 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
3450 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
3451 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
3452 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
3453 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
3454 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
3456 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
3460 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
3462 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
3465 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3467 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
3468 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
3471 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
3473 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
3477 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
3478 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
3479 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3484 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3488 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3492 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3493 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3494 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3495 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3497 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
);
3500 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3502 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3505 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3508 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3509 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
3511 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3512 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
3514 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3516 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3517 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
3520 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3522 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3525 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
,
3529 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3531 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3532 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3534 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3535 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3537 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3538 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3543 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3544 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3545 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3548 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
,
3551 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3554 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3556 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3561 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3565 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3566 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3567 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3575 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3576 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3579 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3580 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3582 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3583 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
,
3584 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
3586 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3588 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3589 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3590 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3593 /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
3594 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, sig_idx
))
3595 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_RPK
? sig_idx
: -1;
3597 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3601 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3602 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3604 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3606 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
,
3607 X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3609 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3610 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3612 const char *mdname
= NULL
;
3613 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3616 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3617 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3619 if (sig
->hash
!= NID_undef
)
3620 mdname
= OBJ_nid2sn(sig
->hash
);
3621 supported
= EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey
, sctx
->libctx
,
3628 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3629 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3631 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3632 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3634 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3635 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3640 * This does not differentiate between the
3641 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3642 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3643 * signing certificate.
3645 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3652 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3653 * a viable public key is permitted.
3659 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3660 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3661 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3662 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3663 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3665 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3667 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3670 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3673 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3674 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3678 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3679 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3681 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3686 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3689 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3690 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3693 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3697 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3698 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3699 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3701 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
,
3704 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3708 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3710 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3711 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3712 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3714 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3715 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3716 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3717 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3718 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3720 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3721 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3723 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3724 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3727 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3728 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3730 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3732 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3733 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3735 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3736 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3737 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3743 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3750 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3751 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3753 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3754 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3756 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3757 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3758 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3760 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3762 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3765 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3766 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3768 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3769 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3774 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3778 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3779 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3781 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3784 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3786 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3788 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3790 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3792 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3796 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3799 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3800 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3803 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3806 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3808 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3809 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3812 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3813 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3815 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3816 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3817 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3819 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3822 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3827 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3828 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3829 * we have to assume GOST support.
3831 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
3832 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
3833 & (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) != 0) {
3834 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3837 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3838 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3842 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3846 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3850 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3855 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3857 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3858 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3860 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3864 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3868 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3869 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3870 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3871 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3872 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3875 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3878 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3879 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3884 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3887 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3888 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3894 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3895 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3896 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3897 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3901 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3903 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3904 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3905 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3909 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3913 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3915 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl
);
3918 || (IS_QUIC(ssl
) && mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
))
3921 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3922 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3923 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3927 sc
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3931 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3933 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3937 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3939 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3941 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3942 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3947 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3948 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3949 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3954 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3955 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3960 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3966 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3969 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3971 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3977 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3982 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3984 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3986 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3987 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3988 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3989 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3993 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3994 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3999 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
4001 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
4002 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
4003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4004 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
4005 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
4010 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
4013 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
4014 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
4015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4016 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
4017 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
4022 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
4024 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
4025 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
4026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4027 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
4028 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
4033 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
4035 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
4037 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
4038 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);
4043 __owur
int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
4044 const unsigned char *enckey
,
4047 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "DH")) {
4048 int bits
= EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey
);
4050 if (bits
<= 0 || enckeylen
!= (size_t)bits
/ 8)
4051 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
4053 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC")) {
4054 if (enckeylen
< 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
4055 || enckey
[0] != 0x04)
4059 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey
, enckey
, enckeylen
);