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1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
118
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
120
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
125 #endif
126
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
128 tls1_enc,
129 tls1_mac,
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 tls1_alert_code,
139 };
140
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
142 {
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
145 return(60*60*2);
146 }
147
148 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
149 {
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
152 return(1);
153 }
154
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
156 {
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
159 {
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
161 }
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
163 ssl3_free(s);
164 }
165
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
167 {
168 ssl3_clear(s);
169 s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
170 }
171
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
174 {
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 };
201
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
203 {
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
207 return 0;
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
209 }
210
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
212 {
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
214 switch (nid)
215 {
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
217 return 1;
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
219 return 2;
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
221 return 3;
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 return 4;
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
225 return 5;
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
227 return 6;
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 return 7;
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 return 8;
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
233 return 9;
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
235 return 10;
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 return 11;
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
239 return 12;
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
241 return 13;
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 return 14;
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
245 return 15;
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
247 return 16;
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
249 return 17;
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
251 return 18;
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
253 return 19;
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 return 20;
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
257 return 21;
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 return 22;
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
261 return 23;
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
263 return 24;
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
265 return 25;
266 default:
267 return 0;
268 }
269 }
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
271
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
274 {
275 int extdatalen=0;
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
277
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
281 return p;
282
283 ret+=2;
284
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
286
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
288 {
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
291 long lenmax;
292
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
298 + hostname length
299 */
300
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
303 return NULL;
304
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
307 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
308
309 /* length of servername list */
310 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
311
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
314 s2n(size_str,ret);
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
316 ret+=size_str;
317 }
318
319 /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
320 {
321 int el;
322
323 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
324 {
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
326 return NULL;
327 }
328
329 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
330
331 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
332 s2n(el,ret);
333
334 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
335 {
336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
337 return NULL;
338 }
339
340 ret += el;
341 }
342
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
344 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
345 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
346 {
347 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
348 long lenmax;
349
350 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
351 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
353 {
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
355 return NULL;
356 }
357
358 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
359 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
360 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
361 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
362 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
363 }
364 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
365 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
366 {
367 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
368 long lenmax;
369
370 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
371 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
373 {
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
375 return NULL;
376 }
377
378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
379 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
380
381 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
382 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
383 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
384 * resolves this to two bytes.
385 */
386 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
387 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
388 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
389 }
390 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
391
392 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
393 {
394 int ticklen;
395 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
396 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
397 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
398 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
399 {
400 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
401 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
402 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
403 return NULL;
404 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
405 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
406 ticklen);
407 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
408 }
409 else
410 ticklen = 0;
411 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
413 goto skip_ext;
414 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
415 * rest for ticket
416 */
417 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
419 s2n(ticklen,ret);
420 if (ticklen)
421 {
422 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
423 ret += ticklen;
424 }
425 }
426 skip_ext:
427
428 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
429 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
430 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
431 {
432 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
433
434 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
435 return NULL;
436 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
437 return NULL;
438
439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
440 s2n(col + 2, ret);
441 s2n(col, ret);
442 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
443 ret += col;
444 }
445 #endif
446
447 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
448 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
449 {
450 int i;
451 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
452 OCSP_RESPID *id;
453
454 idlen = 0;
455 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
456 {
457 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
458 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
459 if (itmp <= 0)
460 return NULL;
461 idlen += itmp + 2;
462 }
463
464 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
465 {
466 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
467 if (extlen < 0)
468 return NULL;
469 }
470 else
471 extlen = 0;
472
473 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
475 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
476 return NULL;
477 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
478 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
479 s2n(idlen, ret);
480 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
481 {
482 /* save position of id len */
483 unsigned char *q = ret;
484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
485 /* skip over id len */
486 ret += 2;
487 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
488 /* write id len */
489 s2n(itmp, q);
490 }
491 s2n(extlen, ret);
492 if (extlen > 0)
493 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
494 }
495
496 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
497 return p;
498
499 s2n(extdatalen,p);
500 return ret;
501 }
502
503 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
504 {
505 int extdatalen=0;
506 unsigned char *ret = p;
507
508 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
509 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
510 return p;
511
512 ret+=2;
513 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
514
515 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
516 {
517 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
518
519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
520 s2n(0,ret);
521 }
522
523 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
524 {
525 int el;
526
527 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
528 {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 return NULL;
531 }
532
533 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
534
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
536 s2n(el,ret);
537
538 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
539 {
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
541 return NULL;
542 }
543
544 ret += el;
545 }
546
547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
548 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
549 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
550 {
551 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
552 long lenmax;
553
554 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
555 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
556 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
557 {
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
559 return NULL;
560 }
561
562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
563 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
564 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
566 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
567
568 }
569 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
570 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
571
572 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
573 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
574 {
575 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
577 s2n(0,ret);
578 }
579
580 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
581 {
582 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
583 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
584 s2n(0,ret);
585 }
586
587 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
588 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
589 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
590 {
591 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
592
593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
594 return NULL;
595 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
596 return NULL;
597
598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
599 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
600 s2n(sol, ret);
601 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
602 ret += sol;
603 }
604 #endif
605 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
606 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
607 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
608 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
609 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
610 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
611 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
612 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
613 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
614 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
615 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
616 ret+=36;
617
618 }
619
620 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
621 return p;
622
623 s2n(extdatalen,p);
624 return ret;
625 }
626
627 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
628 {
629 unsigned short type;
630 unsigned short size;
631 unsigned short len;
632 unsigned char *data = *p;
633 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
634
635 s->servername_done = 0;
636 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
637
638 if (data >= (d+n-2))
639 goto ri_check;
640 n2s(data,len);
641
642 if (data > (d+n-len))
643 goto ri_check;
644
645 while (data <= (d+n-4))
646 {
647 n2s(data,type);
648 n2s(data,size);
649
650 if (data+size > (d+n))
651 goto ri_check;
652 #if 0
653 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
654 #endif
655 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
656 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
657 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
658 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
659
660 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
661 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
662 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
663 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
664 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
665 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
666 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
667 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
668 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
669 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
670 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
671 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
672 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
673 the value of the Host: field.
674 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
675 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
676 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
677 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
678
679 */
680
681 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
682 {
683 unsigned char *sdata;
684 int servname_type;
685 int dsize;
686
687 if (size < 2)
688 {
689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
690 return 0;
691 }
692 n2s(data,dsize);
693 size -= 2;
694 if (dsize > size )
695 {
696 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
697 return 0;
698 }
699
700 sdata = data;
701 while (dsize > 3)
702 {
703 servname_type = *(sdata++);
704 n2s(sdata,len);
705 dsize -= 3;
706
707 if (len > dsize)
708 {
709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
710 return 0;
711 }
712 if (s->servername_done == 0)
713 switch (servname_type)
714 {
715 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
716 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
717 {
718 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
719 ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
720 {
721 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
722 return 0;
723 }
724 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
725 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
726 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
727 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
728 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
729 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
730 return 0;
731 }
732 s->servername_done = 1;
733
734 }
735 else
736 s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
737 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
738
739 break;
740
741 default:
742 break;
743 }
744
745 dsize -= len;
746 }
747 if (dsize != 0)
748 {
749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
750 return 0;
751 }
752
753 }
754
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
756 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
757 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
758 {
759 unsigned char *sdata = data;
760 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
761
762 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
763 {
764 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
765 return 0;
766 }
767 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
768 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
769 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
770 {
771 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
772 return 0;
773 }
774 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
775 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
776 #if 0
777 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
778 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
779 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
780 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
781 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
782 #endif
783 }
784 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
785 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
786 {
787 unsigned char *sdata = data;
788 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
789 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
790
791 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
792 {
793 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
794 return 0;
795 }
796 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
797 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
798 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
799 {
800 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
801 return 0;
802 }
803 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
804 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
805 #if 0
806 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
807 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
808 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
809 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
810 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
811 #endif
812 }
813 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
814 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
816 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
817 {
818 unsigned char *sdata = data;
819
820 if (size < 2)
821 {
822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
823 return 0;
824 }
825 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
826 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
827 {
828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
829 return 0;
830 }
831
832 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
833 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
835 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
836 else
837 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
838 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
839 {
840 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
841 return 0;
842 }
843 }
844 #endif
845 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
846 {
847 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
848 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
849 {
850 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
851 return 0;
852 }
853 }
854 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
855 {
856 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
857 return 0;
858 renegotiate_seen = 1;
859 }
860 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
861 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
862 {
863
864 if (size < 5)
865 {
866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
867 return 0;
868 }
869
870 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
871 size--;
872 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
873 {
874 const unsigned char *sdata;
875 int dsize;
876 /* Read in responder_id_list */
877 n2s(data,dsize);
878 size -= 2;
879 if (dsize > size )
880 {
881 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
882 return 0;
883 }
884 while (dsize > 0)
885 {
886 OCSP_RESPID *id;
887 int idsize;
888 if (dsize < 4)
889 {
890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
891 return 0;
892 }
893 n2s(data, idsize);
894 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
895 if (dsize < 0)
896 {
897 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
898 return 0;
899 }
900 sdata = data;
901 data += idsize;
902 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
903 &sdata, idsize);
904 if (!id)
905 {
906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
907 return 0;
908 }
909 if (data != sdata)
910 {
911 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
912 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
913 return 0;
914 }
915 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
916 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
917 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
918 {
919 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
921 return 0;
922 }
923 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
924 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
925 {
926 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
927 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
928 return 0;
929 }
930 }
931
932 /* Read in request_extensions */
933 n2s(data,dsize);
934 size -= 2;
935 if (dsize > size)
936 {
937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
938 return 0;
939 }
940 sdata = data;
941 if (dsize > 0)
942 {
943 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
944 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
945 &sdata, dsize);
946 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
947 || (data + dsize != sdata))
948 {
949 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
950 return 0;
951 }
952 }
953 }
954 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
955 * so ignore it.
956 */
957 else
958 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
959 }
960
961 /* session ticket processed earlier */
962 data+=size;
963 }
964
965 *p = data;
966
967 ri_check:
968
969 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
970
971 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
972 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
973 {
974 /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
975 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
977 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
978 return 0;
979 }
980
981 return 1;
982 }
983
984 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
985 {
986 unsigned short type;
987 unsigned short size;
988 unsigned short len;
989 unsigned char *data = *p;
990 int tlsext_servername = 0;
991 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
992
993 if (data >= (d+n-2))
994 goto ri_check;
995
996 n2s(data,len);
997
998 while(data <= (d+n-4))
999 {
1000 n2s(data,type);
1001 n2s(data,size);
1002
1003 if (data+size > (d+n))
1004 goto ri_check;
1005
1006 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1007 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1008 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1009
1010 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1011 {
1012 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1013 {
1014 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1015 return 0;
1016 }
1017 tlsext_servername = 1;
1018 }
1019
1020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1021 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1022 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1023 {
1024 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1025 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1026
1027 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1028 {
1029 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1030 return 0;
1031 }
1032 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1033 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1034 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1035 {
1036 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1037 return 0;
1038 }
1039 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1040 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1041 #if 0
1042 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1043 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1044 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1045 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1046 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1047 #endif
1048 }
1049 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1050
1051 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1052 {
1053 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1054 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1055 {
1056 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1057 return 0;
1058 }
1059 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1060 || (size > 0))
1061 {
1062 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1063 return 0;
1064 }
1065 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1066 }
1067 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1068 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1069 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1070 {
1071 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1072
1073 if (size < 2)
1074 {
1075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 return 0;
1077 }
1078 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1079 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1080 {
1081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 return 0;
1083 }
1084
1085 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1086 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1087 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1088 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1089 else
1090 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1091
1092 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1093 {
1094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1095 return 0;
1096 }
1097 }
1098 #endif
1099 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1100 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1101 {
1102 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1103 * a status request message.
1104 */
1105 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1106 {
1107 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1108 return 0;
1109 }
1110 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1111 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1112 }
1113 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1114 {
1115 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1116 return 0;
1117 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1118 }
1119 data+=size;
1120 }
1121
1122 if (data != d+n)
1123 {
1124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127
1128 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1129 {
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1131 {
1132 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1133 {
1134 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1135 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1136 {
1137 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 }
1141 else
1142 {
1143 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 return 0;
1145 }
1146 }
1147 }
1148
1149 *p = data;
1150
1151 ri_check:
1152
1153 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1154 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1155 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1156 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1157 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1158 * absence on initial connect only.
1159 */
1160 if (!renegotiate_seen &&
1161 (s->new_session || !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT))
1162 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1163 {
1164 /* FIXME: Spec currently doesn't give alert to use */
1165 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1167 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1168 return 0;
1169 }
1170
1171 return 1;
1172 }
1173
1174
1175 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1176 {
1177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1178 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1179 * and elliptic curves we support.
1180 */
1181 int using_ecc = 0;
1182 int i;
1183 unsigned char *j;
1184 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1185 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1186
1187 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1188 {
1189 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1190
1191 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1192 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1193 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1194 {
1195 using_ecc = 1;
1196 break;
1197 }
1198 }
1199 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
1200 if (using_ecc)
1201 {
1202 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1203 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1204 {
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1206 return -1;
1207 }
1208 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1209 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1210 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1211 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1212
1213 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1214 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1215 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1216 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1217 {
1218 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1220 return -1;
1221 }
1222 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1223 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1224 s2n(i,j);
1225 }
1226 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1227
1228 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1229 {
1230 int r = 1;
1231
1232 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1233 {
1234 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1235 if (!r)
1236 return -1;
1237 }
1238
1239 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1240 {
1241 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1242 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1243
1244 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1245 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1246 else
1247 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1249 {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1251 return -1;
1252 }
1253 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1254 }
1255
1256 if (r == 2)
1257 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1258 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1259 }
1260 #endif
1261
1262 return 1;
1263 }
1264
1265 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1266 {
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1268 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1269 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1270 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1271 */
1272
1273 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1274 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1275 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1276 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1277
1278 if (using_ecc)
1279 {
1280 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1281 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1282 {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1284 return -1;
1285 }
1286 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1287 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1288 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1289 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1290 }
1291 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1292
1293 return 1;
1294 }
1295
1296 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1297 {
1298 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1299 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1300
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1302 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1303 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1304 */
1305 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1306 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1307 */
1308 #endif
1309
1310 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1311 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1312 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1313 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1314
1315 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1316 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1317 * the certificate has changed.
1318 */
1319 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1320 {
1321 int r;
1322 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1323 switch (r)
1324 {
1325 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1326 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1327 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1328 break;
1329 /* status request response should be sent */
1330 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1331 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1332 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1333 else
1334 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1335 break;
1336 /* something bad happened */
1337 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1338 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1339 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1340 goto err;
1341 }
1342 }
1343 else
1344 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1345
1346 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1347 {
1348 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1349 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1350 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1351
1352 int r = 1;
1353
1354 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1355 {
1356 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1357 if (!r)
1358 {
1359 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1360 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1361 goto err;
1362 }
1363 }
1364
1365 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1366 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1367 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1368
1369 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1370 {
1371 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1372 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1373 {
1374 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1375 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1376
1377 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1378 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1379 else
1380 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1381 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1382 {
1383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1384 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1385 goto err;
1386 }
1387 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1388 }
1389 }
1390
1391 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1392 {
1393 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1394 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1395 * abort the handshake.
1396 */
1397 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1398 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 }
1400 }
1401
1402 #endif
1403 err:
1404 switch (ret)
1405 {
1406 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1407 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1408 return -1;
1409
1410 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1411 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1412 return 1;
1413
1414 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1415 s->servername_done=0;
1416 default:
1417 return 1;
1418 }
1419 }
1420
1421 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1422 {
1423 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1424 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1425
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1427 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server
1428 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed.
1429 */
1430 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1431 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1432 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1433 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1434 {
1435 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1436 size_t i;
1437 unsigned char *list;
1438 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1439 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0))
1440 {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1442 return -1;
1443 }
1444 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1445 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1446 {
1447 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1448 {
1449 found_uncompressed = 1;
1450 break;
1451 }
1452 }
1453 if (!found_uncompressed)
1454 {
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1456 return -1;
1457 }
1458 }
1459 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1460 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1461
1462 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1463 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1464 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1465 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1466
1467 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1468 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1469 {
1470 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1471 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1472
1473 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1474 {
1475 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1476 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1477 }
1478
1479 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1480 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1481 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1482 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1483 {
1484 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1485 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1486 }
1487 }
1488 #endif
1489
1490 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1491 * tell the callback
1492 */
1493 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1494 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1495 {
1496 int r;
1497 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1498 * there is no response.
1499 */
1500 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1501 {
1502 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1503 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1504 }
1505 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1506 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1507 if (r == 0)
1508 {
1509 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1510 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1511 }
1512 if (r < 0)
1513 {
1514 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1515 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1516 }
1517 }
1518
1519 switch (ret)
1520 {
1521 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1522 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1523 return -1;
1524
1525 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1526 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1527 return 1;
1528
1529 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1530 s->servername_done=0;
1531 default:
1532 return 1;
1533 }
1534 }
1535
1536 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1537 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1538 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1539 */
1540
1541 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1542 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1543 {
1544 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1545 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1546 unsigned short i;
1547
1548 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1549 * to permit stateful resumption.
1550 */
1551 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1552 return 1;
1553
1554 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1555 return 1;
1556 if (p >= limit)
1557 return -1;
1558 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1559 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1560 {
1561 i = *(p++);
1562 p+= i;
1563 if (p >= limit)
1564 return -1;
1565 }
1566 /* Skip past cipher list */
1567 n2s(p, i);
1568 p+= i;
1569 if (p >= limit)
1570 return -1;
1571 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1572 i = *(p++);
1573 p += i;
1574 if (p > limit)
1575 return -1;
1576 /* Now at start of extensions */
1577 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1578 return 1;
1579 n2s(p, i);
1580 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1581 {
1582 unsigned short type, size;
1583 n2s(p, type);
1584 n2s(p, size);
1585 if (p + size > limit)
1586 return 1;
1587 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1588 {
1589 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1590 * trigger a full handshake
1591 */
1592 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1593 return 1;
1594 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1595 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1596 */
1597 if (size == 0)
1598 {
1599 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1600 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1601 }
1602 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1603 {
1604 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1605 * generating the session from ticket now,
1606 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1607 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1608 * secret later. */
1609 return 0;
1610 }
1611 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1612 ret);
1613 }
1614 p += size;
1615 }
1616 return 1;
1617 }
1618
1619 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1620 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1621 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1622 {
1623 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1624 unsigned char *sdec;
1625 const unsigned char *p;
1626 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1627 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1628 HMAC_CTX hctx;
1629 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
1630 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1631 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1632 if (eticklen < 48)
1633 goto tickerr;
1634 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1635 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1636 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1637 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1638 {
1639 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1640 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1641 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
1642 if (rv < 0)
1643 return -1;
1644 if (rv == 0)
1645 goto tickerr;
1646 if (rv == 2)
1647 renew_ticket = 1;
1648 }
1649 else
1650 {
1651 /* Check key name matches */
1652 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1653 goto tickerr;
1654 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1655 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1656 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1657 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1658 }
1659 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1660 * integrity checks on ticket.
1661 */
1662 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1663 if (mlen < 0)
1664 {
1665 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1666 return -1;
1667 }
1668 eticklen -= mlen;
1669 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1670 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1671 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1672 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1673 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1674 goto tickerr;
1675 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1676 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1677 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1678 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1679 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1680 if (!sdec)
1681 {
1682 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1683 return -1;
1684 }
1685 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1686 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1687 goto tickerr;
1688 slen += mlen;
1689 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1690 p = sdec;
1691
1692 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1693 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1694 if (sess)
1695 {
1696 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1697 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1698 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1699 * as required by standard.
1700 */
1701 if (sesslen)
1702 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1703 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1704 *psess = sess;
1705 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1706 return 1;
1707 }
1708 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1709 * send a new ticket
1710 */
1711 tickerr:
1712 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1713 return 0;
1714 }
1715
1716 #endif