]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/t1_lib.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
mark all block comments that need format preserving so that
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 #endif
127
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176 static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205 static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
210 #endif
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
215 #endif
216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
220 #endif
221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
227 #endif
228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
233 #endif
234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 #endif
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 };
245
246 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
247 {
248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
250 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
251 return 0;
252 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
253 }
254
255 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
256 {
257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
258 switch (nid)
259 {
260 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
261 return 1;
262 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
263 return 2;
264 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
265 return 3;
266 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
267 return 4;
268 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
269 return 5;
270 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 return 6;
272 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 return 7;
274 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
275 return 8;
276 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
277 return 9;
278 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
279 return 10;
280 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 return 11;
282 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 return 12;
284 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 return 13;
286 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
287 return 14;
288 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 return 15;
290 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
291 return 16;
292 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 return 17;
294 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 return 18;
296 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
297 return 19;
298 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
299 return 20;
300 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
301 return 21;
302 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
303 return 22;
304 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
305 return 23;
306 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
307 return 24;
308 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
309 return 25;
310 default:
311 return 0;
312 }
313 }
314 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
315
316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
317
318 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
320 */
321
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
324 #else
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
326 #endif
327
328 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
329 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
330 #else
331 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
332 #endif
333
334 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
335 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
336 #else
337 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
338 #endif
339
340 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
341 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
342 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
343 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
344
345 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
347 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
349 #endif
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
351 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
353 #endif
354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
355 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
356 #endif
357 };
358
359 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
360 {
361 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
362 if (p)
363 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
364 return (int)slen;
365 }
366
367 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
368 {
369 int extdatalen=0;
370 unsigned char *orig = buf;
371 unsigned char *ret = buf;
372
373 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
374 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
375 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
376 return orig;
377
378 ret+=2;
379
380 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
381
382 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
383 {
384 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
385 unsigned long size_str;
386 long lenmax;
387
388 /*-
389 * check for enough space.
390 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
391 * 2 for servernamelist length
392 * 1 for the hostname type
393 * 2 for hostname length
394 * + hostname length
395 */
396
397 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
398 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
399 return NULL;
400
401 /* extension type and length */
402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
403 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
404
405 /* length of servername list */
406 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
407
408 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
409 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
410 s2n(size_str,ret);
411 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
412 ret+=size_str;
413 }
414
415 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
416 if (s->renegotiate)
417 {
418 int el;
419
420 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
421 {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
423 return NULL;
424 }
425
426 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
427
428 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
429 s2n(el,ret);
430
431 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
432 {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 return NULL;
435 }
436
437 ret += el;
438 }
439
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
441 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
442 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
443 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
444
445 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
446 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
447 {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 return NULL;
450 }
451
452 /*-
453 * check for enough space.
454 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
455 * 1 for the srp user identity
456 * + srp user identity length
457 */
458 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
459
460 /* fill in the extension */
461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
462 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
463 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
464 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
465 ret+=login_len;
466 }
467 #endif
468
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
471 {
472 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
473 long lenmax;
474
475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
476 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
478 {
479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
480 return NULL;
481 }
482
483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
484 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
485 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
486 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
487 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
488 }
489 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
490 {
491 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
492 long lenmax;
493
494 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
495 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
496 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
497 {
498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
499 return NULL;
500 }
501
502 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
503 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
504
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
508 }
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
510
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
512 {
513 int ticklen;
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
518 {
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
522 return NULL;
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
525 ticklen);
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
527 }
528 else
529 ticklen = 0;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
532 goto skip_ext;
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
534 * rest for ticket
535 */
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
538 s2n(ticklen,ret);
539 if (ticklen)
540 {
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
542 ret += ticklen;
543 }
544 }
545 skip_ext:
546
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
548 {
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
550 return NULL;
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
556 }
557
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
561 {
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
563
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
565 return NULL;
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
567 return NULL;
568
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
570 s2n(col + 2, ret);
571 s2n(col, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
573 ret += col;
574 }
575 #endif
576
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
579 {
580 int i;
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
582 OCSP_RESPID *id;
583
584 idlen = 0;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
586 {
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
589 if (itmp <= 0)
590 return NULL;
591 idlen += itmp + 2;
592 }
593
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
595 {
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
597 if (extlen < 0)
598 return NULL;
599 }
600 else
601 extlen = 0;
602
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
606 return NULL;
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
609 s2n(idlen, ret);
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
611 {
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
616 ret += 2;
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
618 /* write id len */
619 s2n(itmp, q);
620 }
621 s2n(extlen, ret);
622 if (extlen > 0)
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
624 }
625
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
629 return NULL;
630 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 s2n(1,ret);
632 /*-
633 * Set mode:
634 * 1: peer may send requests
635 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
636 */
637 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
638 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
639 else
640 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
641 #endif
642
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
644 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
645 {
646 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
647 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
648 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
649 return NULL;
650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
651 s2n(0,ret);
652 }
653 #endif
654
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
656 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
657 {
658 int el;
659
660 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
661
662 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
663
664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
665 s2n(el,ret);
666
667 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
668 {
669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
670 return NULL;
671 }
672 ret += el;
673 }
674 #endif
675 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
676 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
677 *
678 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
679 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
680 */
681 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
682 {
683 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
684 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
685 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
686 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
687 */
688 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
689 hlen -= 5;
690 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
691 {
692 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
693 if (hlen >= 4)
694 hlen -= 4;
695 else
696 hlen = 0;
697
698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
699 s2n(hlen, ret);
700 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
701 ret += hlen;
702 }
703 }
704
705 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
706 return orig;
707
708 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
709 return ret;
710 }
711
712 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
713 {
714 int extdatalen=0;
715 unsigned char *orig = buf;
716 unsigned char *ret = buf;
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
718 int next_proto_neg_seen;
719 #endif
720
721 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
722 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
723 return orig;
724
725 ret+=2;
726 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
727
728 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
729 {
730 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
731
732 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
733 s2n(0,ret);
734 }
735
736 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
737 {
738 int el;
739
740 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
741 {
742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743 return NULL;
744 }
745
746 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
747
748 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
749 s2n(el,ret);
750
751 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
752 {
753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
754 return NULL;
755 }
756
757 ret += el;
758 }
759
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
761 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
762 {
763 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
764 long lenmax;
765
766 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
767 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
768 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
769 {
770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 return NULL;
772 }
773
774 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
775 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
776 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
777 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
778 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
779
780 }
781 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
782 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
783
784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
785 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
786 {
787 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
788 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
789 s2n(0,ret);
790 }
791
792 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
793 {
794 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
796 s2n(0,ret);
797 }
798
799 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
800 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
801 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
802 {
803 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
804
805 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
806 return NULL;
807 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
808 return NULL;
809
810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
811 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
812 s2n(sol, ret);
813 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
814 ret += sol;
815 }
816 #endif
817
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
819 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
820 {
821 int el;
822
823 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
824
825 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
826
827 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
828 s2n(el,ret);
829
830 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
831 {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
833 return NULL;
834 }
835 ret+=el;
836 }
837 #endif
838
839 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
840 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
841 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
842 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
843 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
844 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
845 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
846 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
847 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
848 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
849 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
850 ret+=36;
851
852 }
853
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
855 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
856 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
857 {
858 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
859 return NULL;
860 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
861 s2n(1,ret);
862 /*-
863 * Set mode:
864 * 1: peer may send requests
865 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
866 */
867 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
868 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
869 else
870 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
871
872 }
873 #endif
874
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
876 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
878 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
879 {
880 const unsigned char *npa;
881 unsigned int npalen;
882 int r;
883
884 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
885 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
886 {
887 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
888 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
889 s2n(npalen,ret);
890 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
891 ret += npalen;
892 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
893 }
894 }
895 #endif
896
897 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
898 return orig;
899
900 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
901 return ret;
902 }
903
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
905 /*-
906 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
907 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
908 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
909 * SNI,
910 * elliptic_curves
911 * ec_point_formats
912 *
913 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
914 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
915 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
916 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
917 */
918 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
919 unsigned short type, size;
920 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
921 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
922 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
923 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
924 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
925 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
926 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
927
928 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
929 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
930 0x01, /* 1 point format */
931 0x00, /* uncompressed */
932 };
933
934 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
935 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
936 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
937 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
938 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
939 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
940 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
941 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
942 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
943 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
944 };
945
946 if (data >= (d+n-2))
947 return;
948 data += 2;
949
950 if (data > (d+n-4))
951 return;
952 n2s(data,type);
953 n2s(data,size);
954
955 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
956 return;
957
958 if (data+size > d+n)
959 return;
960 data += size;
961
962 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
963 {
964 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
965 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
966
967 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
968 return;
969 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
970 return;
971 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
972 return;
973 }
974 else
975 {
976 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
977
978 if (data + len != d+n)
979 return;
980 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
981 return;
982 }
983
984 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
985 }
986 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
987
988 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
989 {
990 unsigned short type;
991 unsigned short size;
992 unsigned short len;
993 unsigned char *data = *p;
994 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
995 int sigalg_seen = 0;
996
997 s->servername_done = 0;
998 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1000 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1001 #endif
1002
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1004 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1005 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1006 #endif
1007
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1010 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1011 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1012
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1014 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1015 {
1016 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1017 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1018 }
1019 #endif
1020
1021 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1022
1023 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1024 goto ri_check;
1025 n2s(data,len);
1026
1027 if (data > (d+n-len))
1028 goto ri_check;
1029
1030 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1031 {
1032 n2s(data,type);
1033 n2s(data,size);
1034
1035 if (data+size > (d+n))
1036 goto ri_check;
1037 #if 0
1038 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1039 #endif
1040 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1041 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1042 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1043 /*-
1044 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1045 *
1046 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1047 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1048 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1049 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1050 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1051 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1052 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1053 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1054 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1055 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1056 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1057 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1058 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1059 * the value of the Host: field.
1060 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1061 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1062 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1063 * extension.
1064 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1065 *
1066 */
1067
1068 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1069 {
1070 unsigned char *sdata;
1071 int servname_type;
1072 int dsize;
1073
1074 if (size < 2)
1075 {
1076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1077 return 0;
1078 }
1079 n2s(data,dsize);
1080 size -= 2;
1081 if (dsize > size )
1082 {
1083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 return 0;
1085 }
1086
1087 sdata = data;
1088 while (dsize > 3)
1089 {
1090 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1091 n2s(sdata,len);
1092 dsize -= 3;
1093
1094 if (len > dsize)
1095 {
1096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 return 0;
1098 }
1099 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1100 switch (servname_type)
1101 {
1102 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1103 if (!s->hit)
1104 {
1105 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1106 {
1107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1108 return 0;
1109 }
1110 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1111 {
1112 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1113 return 0;
1114 }
1115 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1116 {
1117 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1118 return 0;
1119 }
1120 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1121 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1122 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1123 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1124 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1125 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1126 return 0;
1127 }
1128 s->servername_done = 1;
1129
1130 }
1131 else
1132 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1133 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1134 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1135
1136 break;
1137
1138 default:
1139 break;
1140 }
1141
1142 dsize -= len;
1143 }
1144 if (dsize != 0)
1145 {
1146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1147 return 0;
1148 }
1149
1150 }
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1153 {
1154 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1155 {
1156 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 return 0;
1158 }
1159 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1160 {
1161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 return 0;
1163 }
1164 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1165 return -1;
1166 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1167 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1168
1169 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1170 {
1171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 return 0;
1173 }
1174 }
1175 #endif
1176
1177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1179 {
1180 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1181 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1182
1183 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1184 {
1185 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 return 0;
1187 }
1188 if (!s->hit)
1189 {
1190 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1191 {
1192 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1193 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1194 }
1195 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1196 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1197 {
1198 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1199 return 0;
1200 }
1201 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1203 }
1204 #if 0
1205 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1206 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1207 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1208 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1209 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1210 #endif
1211 }
1212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1213 {
1214 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1215 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1216 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1217
1218 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1219 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
1220 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
1221 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
1222 {
1223 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1224 return 0;
1225 }
1226 if (!s->hit)
1227 {
1228 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1229 {
1230 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 return 0;
1232 }
1233 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1234 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1235 {
1236 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1240 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1241 }
1242 #if 0
1243 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1244 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1245 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1246 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1247 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1248 #endif
1249 }
1250 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1251 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1253 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1254 {
1255 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1256
1257 if (size < 2)
1258 {
1259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 return 0;
1261 }
1262 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1264 {
1265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268
1269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1270 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1272 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1273 else
1274 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1275 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1276 {
1277 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1278 return 0;
1279 }
1280 }
1281 #endif
1282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1283 {
1284 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1285 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1286 {
1287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1288 return 0;
1289 }
1290 }
1291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1292 {
1293 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1294 return 0;
1295 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1296 }
1297 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1298 {
1299 int dsize;
1300 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1301 {
1302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305 sigalg_seen = 1;
1306 n2s(data,dsize);
1307 size -= 2;
1308 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1309 {
1310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1311 return 0;
1312 }
1313 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1314 {
1315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1316 return 0;
1317 }
1318 }
1319 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1320 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1321 {
1322
1323 if (size < 5)
1324 {
1325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1326 return 0;
1327 }
1328
1329 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1330 size--;
1331 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1332 {
1333 const unsigned char *sdata;
1334 int dsize;
1335 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1336 n2s(data,dsize);
1337 size -= 2;
1338 if (dsize > size )
1339 {
1340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 return 0;
1342 }
1343 while (dsize > 0)
1344 {
1345 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1346 int idsize;
1347 if (dsize < 4)
1348 {
1349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 return 0;
1351 }
1352 n2s(data, idsize);
1353 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1354 size -= 2 + idsize;
1355 if (dsize < 0)
1356 {
1357 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1358 return 0;
1359 }
1360 sdata = data;
1361 data += idsize;
1362 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1363 &sdata, idsize);
1364 if (!id)
1365 {
1366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1367 return 0;
1368 }
1369 if (data != sdata)
1370 {
1371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1376 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1377 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1378 {
1379 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1380 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1381 return 0;
1382 }
1383 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1384 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1385 {
1386 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1387 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1388 return 0;
1389 }
1390 }
1391
1392 /* Read in request_extensions */
1393 if (size < 2)
1394 {
1395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 n2s(data,dsize);
1399 size -= 2;
1400 if (dsize != size)
1401 {
1402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1403 return 0;
1404 }
1405 sdata = data;
1406 if (dsize > 0)
1407 {
1408 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1409 {
1410 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1411 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1412 }
1413
1414 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1415 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1416 &sdata, dsize);
1417 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1418 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1419 {
1420 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1421 return 0;
1422 }
1423 }
1424 }
1425 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1426 * so ignore it.
1427 */
1428 else
1429 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1430 }
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1433 {
1434 switch(data[0])
1435 {
1436 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1437 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1438 break;
1439 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1440 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1442 break;
1443 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1444 return 0;
1445 }
1446 }
1447 #endif
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1450 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1451 {
1452 /*-
1453 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1454 * renegotiation.
1455 *
1456 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1457 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1458 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1459 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1460 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1461 * anything like that, but this might change).
1462 *
1463 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1464 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1465 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1466 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1467 * Finished message could have been computed.)
1468 */
1469 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1470 }
1471 #endif
1472
1473 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1475 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1476 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1477 {
1478 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1479 al))
1480 return 0;
1481 }
1482 #endif
1483
1484 data+=size;
1485 }
1486
1487 *p = data;
1488
1489 ri_check:
1490
1491 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1492
1493 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1494 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1495 {
1496 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1498 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1499 return 0;
1500 }
1501
1502 return 1;
1503 }
1504
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1507 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1508 * the length of the block. */
1509 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1510 {
1511 unsigned int off = 0;
1512
1513 while (off < len)
1514 {
1515 if (d[off] == 0)
1516 return 0;
1517 off += d[off];
1518 off++;
1519 }
1520
1521 return off == len;
1522 }
1523 #endif
1524
1525 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1526 {
1527 unsigned short length;
1528 unsigned short type;
1529 unsigned short size;
1530 unsigned char *data = *p;
1531 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1532 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1533
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1536 #endif
1537 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1538
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1540 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1541 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1542 #endif
1543
1544 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1545 goto ri_check;
1546
1547 n2s(data,length);
1548 if (data+length != d+n)
1549 {
1550 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1551 return 0;
1552 }
1553
1554 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1555 {
1556 n2s(data,type);
1557 n2s(data,size);
1558
1559 if (data+size > (d+n))
1560 goto ri_check;
1561
1562 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1563 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1564 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1565
1566 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1567 {
1568 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1569 {
1570 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1571 return 0;
1572 }
1573 tlsext_servername = 1;
1574 }
1575
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1578 {
1579 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1580 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1581
1582 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1583 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1584 {
1585 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1586 return 0;
1587 }
1588 if (!s->hit)
1589 {
1590 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1591 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1592 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1593 {
1594 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1595 return 0;
1596 }
1597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1598 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1599 }
1600 #if 0
1601 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1602 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1603 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1604 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1605 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1606 #endif
1607 }
1608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609
1610 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1611 {
1612 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1613 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1614 {
1615 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1616 return 0;
1617 }
1618 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1619 || (size > 0))
1620 {
1621 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1622 return 0;
1623 }
1624 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1625 }
1626 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1627 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1628 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1629 {
1630 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1631
1632 if (size < 2)
1633 {
1634 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1635 return 0;
1636 }
1637 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1638 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1639 {
1640 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1641 return 0;
1642 }
1643
1644 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1645 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1646 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1647 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1648 else
1649 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1650
1651 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1652 {
1653 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1654 return 0;
1655 }
1656 }
1657 #endif
1658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1659 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1660 {
1661 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1662 * a status request message.
1663 */
1664 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1665 {
1666 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1667 return 0;
1668 }
1669 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1670 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1671 }
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1673 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1674 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1675 {
1676 unsigned char *selected;
1677 unsigned char selected_len;
1678
1679 /* We must have requested it. */
1680 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1681 {
1682 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1683 return 0;
1684 }
1685 /* The data must be valid */
1686 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1687 {
1688 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1689 return 0;
1690 }
1691 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1692 {
1693 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1694 return 0;
1695 }
1696 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1697 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1698 {
1699 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1700 return 0;
1701 }
1702 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1703 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1704 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 }
1706 #endif
1707 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1708 {
1709 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1710 return 0;
1711 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1712 }
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1714 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1715 {
1716 switch(data[0])
1717 {
1718 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1719 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1720 break;
1721 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1722 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1723 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1724 break;
1725 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1726 return 0;
1727 }
1728 }
1729 #endif
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1731 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1732 {
1733 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1734 al))
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737 #endif
1738
1739 data+=size;
1740 }
1741
1742 if (data != d+n)
1743 {
1744 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1745 return 0;
1746 }
1747
1748 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1749 {
1750 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1751 {
1752 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1753 {
1754 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1755 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1756 {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760 }
1761 else
1762 {
1763 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1764 return 0;
1765 }
1766 }
1767 }
1768
1769 *p = data;
1770
1771 ri_check:
1772
1773 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1774 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1775 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1776 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1777 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1778 * absence on initial connect only.
1779 */
1780 if (!renegotiate_seen
1781 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1782 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1783 {
1784 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1786 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1787 return 0;
1788 }
1789
1790 return 1;
1791 }
1792
1793
1794 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1795 {
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1797 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1798 * and elliptic curves we support.
1799 */
1800 int using_ecc = 0;
1801 int i;
1802 unsigned char *j;
1803 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1804 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1805
1806 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1807 {
1808 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1809
1810 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1811 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1812 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1813 {
1814 using_ecc = 1;
1815 break;
1816 }
1817 }
1818 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1819 if (using_ecc)
1820 {
1821 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1822 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1823 {
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1825 return -1;
1826 }
1827 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1828 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1829 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1830 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1831
1832 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
1833 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1834 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1835 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1836 {
1837 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 return -1;
1840 }
1841 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1842 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1843 {
1844 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1845 s2n(id,j);
1846 }
1847 }
1848 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1849
1850 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1851 {
1852 int r = 1;
1853
1854 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1855 {
1856 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1857 if (!r)
1858 return -1;
1859 }
1860
1861 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1862 {
1863 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1864 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1865
1866 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1867 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1868 else
1869 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1871 {
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1873 return -1;
1874 }
1875 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1876 }
1877
1878 if (r == 2)
1879 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1880 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1881 }
1882 #endif
1883
1884 return 1;
1885 }
1886
1887 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1888 {
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1891 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1892 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1893 */
1894
1895 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1896 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1897 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1898 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1899
1900 if (using_ecc)
1901 {
1902 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1903 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1904 {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1906 return -1;
1907 }
1908 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1909 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1910 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1911 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1912 }
1913 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1914
1915 return 1;
1916 }
1917
1918 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1919 {
1920 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1921 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1922
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1924 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1925 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1926 */
1927 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1928 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1929 */
1930 #endif
1931
1932 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1933 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1934 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1935 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1936
1937 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1938 {
1939 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1940 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1941 * so this has to happen here in
1942 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1943
1944 int r = 1;
1945
1946 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1947 {
1948 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1949 if (!r)
1950 {
1951 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1952 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1953 goto err;
1954 }
1955 }
1956
1957 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1959 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1960
1961 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1962 {
1963 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1964 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1965 {
1966 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1967 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1968
1969 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1971 else
1972 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1973 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1974 {
1975 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1976 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1977 goto err;
1978 }
1979 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1980 }
1981 }
1982
1983 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1984 {
1985 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1986 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1987 * abort the handshake.
1988 */
1989 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1990 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1991 }
1992 }
1993
1994 err:
1995 #endif
1996 switch (ret)
1997 {
1998 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1999 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2000 return -1;
2001
2002 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2003 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2004 return 1;
2005
2006 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2007 s->servername_done=0;
2008 default:
2009 return 1;
2010 }
2011 }
2012
2013 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2014 {
2015 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2016 int al;
2017
2018 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2019 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2020 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2021 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2022 */
2023 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2024 {
2025 int r;
2026 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2027 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2028 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2029 if (certpkey == NULL)
2030 {
2031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2032 return 1;
2033 }
2034 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2035 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2036 */
2037 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2038 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2039 switch (r)
2040 {
2041 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2042 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2043 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2044 break;
2045 /* status request response should be sent */
2046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2047 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2049 else
2050 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2051 break;
2052 /* something bad happened */
2053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2054 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2055 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2056 goto err;
2057 }
2058 }
2059 else
2060 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2061
2062 err:
2063 switch (ret)
2064 {
2065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2066 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2067 return -1;
2068
2069 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2070 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2071 return 1;
2072
2073 default:
2074 return 1;
2075 }
2076 }
2077
2078 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2079 {
2080 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2081 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2084 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2085 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2086 * it must contain uncompressed.
2087 */
2088 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2089 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2090 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2091 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2092 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2093 {
2094 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2095 size_t i;
2096 unsigned char *list;
2097 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2098 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2099 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2100 {
2101 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2102 {
2103 found_uncompressed = 1;
2104 break;
2105 }
2106 }
2107 if (!found_uncompressed)
2108 {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2110 return -1;
2111 }
2112 }
2113 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2115
2116 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2117 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2118 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2119 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2120
2121 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2122 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2123 {
2124 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2125 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2126
2127 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2128 {
2129 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2130 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2131 }
2132
2133 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2134 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2136 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2137 {
2138 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2139 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2140 }
2141 }
2142 #endif
2143
2144 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2145 * tell the callback
2146 */
2147 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2148 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2149 {
2150 int r;
2151 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2152 * there is no response.
2153 */
2154 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2155 {
2156 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2157 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2158 }
2159 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2160 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2161 if (r == 0)
2162 {
2163 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2164 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2165 }
2166 if (r < 0)
2167 {
2168 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2169 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2170 }
2171 }
2172
2173 switch (ret)
2174 {
2175 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2176 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2177 return -1;
2178
2179 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2181 return 1;
2182
2183 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2184 s->servername_done=0;
2185 default:
2186 return 1;
2187 }
2188 }
2189
2190 /*-
2191 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2192 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2193 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2194 *
2195 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2196 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2197 * extension, if any.
2198 * len: the length of the session ID.
2199 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2200 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2201 * point to the resulting session.
2202 *
2203 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2204 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2205 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2206 *
2207 * Returns:
2208 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2209 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2210 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2211 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2212 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2213 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2214 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2215 *
2216 * Side effects:
2217 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2218 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2219 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2220 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2221 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2222 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2223 */
2224 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2225 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2226 {
2227 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2228 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2229 unsigned short i;
2230
2231 *ret = NULL;
2232 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2233
2234 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2235 * to permit stateful resumption.
2236 */
2237 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2238 return 0;
2239 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2240 return 0;
2241 if (p >= limit)
2242 return -1;
2243 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2244 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2245 {
2246 i = *(p++);
2247 p+= i;
2248 if (p >= limit)
2249 return -1;
2250 }
2251 /* Skip past cipher list */
2252 n2s(p, i);
2253 p+= i;
2254 if (p >= limit)
2255 return -1;
2256 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2257 i = *(p++);
2258 p += i;
2259 if (p > limit)
2260 return -1;
2261 /* Now at start of extensions */
2262 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2263 return 0;
2264 n2s(p, i);
2265 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2266 {
2267 unsigned short type, size;
2268 n2s(p, type);
2269 n2s(p, size);
2270 if (p + size > limit)
2271 return 0;
2272 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2273 {
2274 int r;
2275 if (size == 0)
2276 {
2277 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2278 * currently have one. */
2279 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2280 return 1;
2281 }
2282 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2283 {
2284 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2285 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2286 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2287 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2288 * calculate the master secret later. */
2289 return 2;
2290 }
2291 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2292 switch (r)
2293 {
2294 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2295 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2296 return 2;
2297 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2298 return r;
2299 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2300 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2301 return 3;
2302 default: /* fatal error */
2303 return -1;
2304 }
2305 }
2306 p += size;
2307 }
2308 return 0;
2309 }
2310
2311 /*-
2312 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2313 *
2314 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2315 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2316 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2317 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2318 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2319 * point to the resulting session.
2320 *
2321 * Returns:
2322 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2323 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2324 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2325 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2326 */
2327 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2328 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2329 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2330 {
2331 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2332 unsigned char *sdec;
2333 const unsigned char *p;
2334 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2335 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2336 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2337 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2338 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2339 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2340 if (eticklen < 48)
2341 return 2;
2342 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2343 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2345 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2346 {
2347 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2348 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2349 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2350 if (rv < 0)
2351 return -1;
2352 if (rv == 0)
2353 return 2;
2354 if (rv == 2)
2355 renew_ticket = 1;
2356 }
2357 else
2358 {
2359 /* Check key name matches */
2360 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2361 return 2;
2362 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2363 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2364 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2365 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2366 }
2367 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2368 * integrity checks on ticket.
2369 */
2370 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2371 if (mlen < 0)
2372 {
2373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2374 return -1;
2375 }
2376 eticklen -= mlen;
2377 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2378 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2379 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2380 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2381 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2382 {
2383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2384 return 2;
2385 }
2386 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2387 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2388 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2389 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2390 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2391 if (!sdec)
2392 {
2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2394 return -1;
2395 }
2396 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2397 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2398 {
2399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2400 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2401 return 2;
2402 }
2403 slen += mlen;
2404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2405 p = sdec;
2406
2407 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2408 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2409 if (sess)
2410 {
2411 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2412 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2413 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2414 * as required by standard.
2415 */
2416 if (sesslen)
2417 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2418 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2419 *psess = sess;
2420 if (renew_ticket)
2421 return 4;
2422 else
2423 return 3;
2424 }
2425 ERR_clear_error();
2426 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2427 * ticket. */
2428 return 2;
2429 }
2430
2431 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2432
2433 typedef struct
2434 {
2435 int nid;
2436 int id;
2437 } tls12_lookup;
2438
2439 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2441 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2442 #endif
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2444 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2445 #endif
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2447 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2448 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2449 #endif
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2451 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2452 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2453 #endif
2454 };
2455
2456 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2458 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2459 #endif
2460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2461 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2462 #endif
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2464 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2465 #endif
2466 };
2467
2468 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2469 {
2470 size_t i;
2471 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2472 {
2473 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2474 return table[i].id;
2475 }
2476 return -1;
2477 }
2478 #if 0
2479 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2480 {
2481 size_t i;
2482 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2483 {
2484 if (table[i].id == id)
2485 return table[i].nid;
2486 }
2487 return -1;
2488 }
2489 #endif
2490
2491 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2492 {
2493 int sig_id, md_id;
2494 if (!md)
2495 return 0;
2496 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2497 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2498 if (md_id == -1)
2499 return 0;
2500 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2501 if (sig_id == -1)
2502 return 0;
2503 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2504 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2505 return 1;
2506 }
2507
2508 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2509 {
2510 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2511 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2512 }
2513
2514 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2515 {
2516 switch(hash_alg)
2517 {
2518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2519 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2520 return EVP_sha1();
2521 #endif
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2523 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2524 return EVP_sha224();
2525
2526 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2527 return EVP_sha256();
2528 #endif
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2530 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2531 return EVP_sha384();
2532
2533 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2534 return EVP_sha512();
2535 #endif
2536 default:
2537 return NULL;
2538
2539 }
2540 }
2541
2542 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2543
2544 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2545 {
2546 int i, idx;
2547 const EVP_MD *md;
2548 CERT *c = s->cert;
2549 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2550 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2551 return 1;
2552 /* Should never happen */
2553 if (!c)
2554 return 0;
2555
2556 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2557 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2558 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2559 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2560
2561 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2562 {
2563 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2564
2565 switch(sig_alg)
2566 {
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2568 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2569 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2570 break;
2571 #endif
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2573 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2574 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2575 break;
2576 #endif
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2578 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2579 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2580 break;
2581 #endif
2582 default:
2583 continue;
2584 }
2585
2586 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2587 {
2588 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2589 if (md)
2590 {
2591 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2592 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2593 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2594 }
2595 }
2596
2597 }
2598
2599
2600 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2601 * supported it stays as NULL.
2602 */
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2604 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2605 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2606 #endif
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2608 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2609 {
2610 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2611 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2612 }
2613 #endif
2614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2615 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2616 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2617 #endif
2618 return 1;
2619 }
2620
2621 #endif
2622
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2624 int
2625 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2626 {
2627 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2628 unsigned short hbtype;
2629 unsigned int payload;
2630 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2631
2632 if (s->msg_callback)
2633 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2634 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2635 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2636
2637 /* Read type and payload length first */
2638 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2639 return 0; /* silently discard */
2640 hbtype = *p++;
2641 n2s(p, payload);
2642 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2643 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2644 pl = p;
2645
2646 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2647 {
2648 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2649 int r;
2650
2651 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2652 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2653 * payload, plus padding
2654 */
2655 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2656 bp = buffer;
2657
2658 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2659 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2660 s2n(payload, bp);
2661 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2662 bp += payload;
2663 /* Random padding */
2664 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2665
2666 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2667
2668 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2669 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2670 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2671 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2672
2673 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2674
2675 if (r < 0)
2676 return r;
2677 }
2678 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2679 {
2680 unsigned int seq;
2681
2682 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2683 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2684 * sequence number */
2685 n2s(pl, seq);
2686
2687 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2688 {
2689 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2690 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2691 }
2692 }
2693
2694 return 0;
2695 }
2696
2697 int
2698 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2699 {
2700 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2701 int ret;
2702 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2703 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2704
2705 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2706 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2707 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2708 {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2710 return -1;
2711 }
2712
2713 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2714 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2715 {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2717 return -1;
2718 }
2719
2720 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2721 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2722 {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2724 return -1;
2725 }
2726
2727 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2728 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2729 */
2730 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2731
2732 /*-
2733 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2734 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2735 * some random stuff.
2736 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2737 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2738 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2739 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2740 * - Padding
2741 */
2742 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2743 p = buf;
2744 /* Message Type */
2745 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2746 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2747 s2n(payload, p);
2748 /* Sequence number */
2749 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2750 /* 16 random bytes */
2751 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2752 p += 16;
2753 /* Random padding */
2754 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2755
2756 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2757 if (ret >= 0)
2758 {
2759 if (s->msg_callback)
2760 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2761 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2762 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2763
2764 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2765 }
2766
2767 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2768
2769 return ret;
2770 }
2771 #endif
A mirror of the official openssl repository