2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
42 tls1_export_keying_material
,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
45 tls_close_construct_packet
,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
59 tls1_export_keying_material
,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
62 tls_close_construct_packet
,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
76 tls1_export_keying_material
,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
80 tls_close_construct_packet
,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
87 tls13_setup_key_block
,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
94 tls13_export_keying_material
,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
97 tls_close_construct_packet
,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
120 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
122 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
127 OPENSSL_free(sc
->ext
.session_ticket
);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
133 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
141 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
142 sc
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
144 sc
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
149 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
154 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
155 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
156 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
157 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
158 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
159 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
160 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
161 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
162 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
163 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
164 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
165 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
166 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
167 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
168 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
169 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
170 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
171 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
173 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
174 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
175 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
176 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
177 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
178 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
179 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
180 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
181 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
182 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
183 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
},
188 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
},
189 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
},
190 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
},
191 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
192 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
193 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
194 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
195 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
198 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
201 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
204 /* The default curves */
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
, /* X25519 (29) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, /* secp256r1 (23) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
, /* X448 (30) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, /* secp384r1 (24) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
, /* GC256A (34) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
, /* GC256B (35) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
, /* GC256C (36) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
, /* GC256D (37) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
, /* GC512A (38) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
, /* GC512B (39) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
, /* GC512C (40) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
219 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
220 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
225 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
226 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
,
227 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
,
230 struct provider_group_data_st
{
232 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
235 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
236 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
237 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
239 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
240 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
241 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
243 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
244 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
246 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
249 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
250 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
252 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
253 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
254 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
256 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
257 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
258 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
259 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
261 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
264 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
265 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
267 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
268 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
271 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
273 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
274 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
275 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
278 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
279 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
284 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
285 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
286 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
289 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
290 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
295 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
296 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
297 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
300 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
302 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
303 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
304 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
307 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
308 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
313 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
314 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
319 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
320 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
324 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
326 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
327 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
332 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
333 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
338 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
339 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
340 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
344 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
345 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
346 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
350 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
351 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
352 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
357 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
358 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
360 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
361 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
363 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
364 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
365 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
366 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
367 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
368 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
371 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
372 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
373 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
376 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
384 ginf
->algorithm
= ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
394 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
401 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
402 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
404 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
407 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
408 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
409 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
410 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
416 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
419 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
420 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
422 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
) {
423 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
427 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
429 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
430 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
435 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
439 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
440 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
441 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
442 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
448 uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id
)
451 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
:
452 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
;
453 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
:
454 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
;
455 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
:
456 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
;
457 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
:
458 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
:
459 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
:
466 uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id
)
469 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
:
470 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
:
471 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
:
473 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
:
474 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
;
475 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
:
476 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
;
477 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
:
478 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
;
484 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
488 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
489 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
490 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
496 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
504 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
505 * work for groups we don't know about.
507 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
509 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
510 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
512 if (!include_unknown
)
514 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
517 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
522 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
523 * work for groups we don't know about.
525 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
527 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
528 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
535 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
536 * the number of groups supported.
538 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
541 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
543 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
544 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
545 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
546 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
547 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
550 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
551 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
555 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
556 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
561 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
562 *pgroups
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
563 *pgroupslen
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
565 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
566 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
572 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
573 int minversion
, int maxversion
,
574 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
576 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
580 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
586 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
587 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
589 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
592 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
593 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
594 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
596 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
598 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
601 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
602 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
603 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
604 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
605 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
606 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
609 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
610 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
611 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
616 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
617 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
619 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
621 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
626 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
627 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
628 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
629 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
632 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
633 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
636 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
643 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
644 * if there is no match.
645 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
646 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
647 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
649 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int nmatch
)
651 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
652 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
655 /* Can't do anything on client side */
659 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
661 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
662 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
664 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
666 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
667 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
;
668 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
669 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
;
670 /* Should never happen */
673 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
677 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
678 * otherwise peer decides.
680 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
681 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
682 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
684 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
685 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
688 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
689 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
692 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
693 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
)
694 cid
= ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id
);
696 cid
= id
= ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id
);
698 if (!tls1_in_list(cid
, supp
, num_supp
)
699 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
707 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
711 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
712 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
717 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
718 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
720 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
721 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
722 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
725 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
728 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
729 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
732 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
733 unsigned long idmask
;
735 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
736 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
738 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
739 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
740 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
754 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
755 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
763 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
765 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
768 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
772 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
774 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
, garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
);
777 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
780 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
782 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
785 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
787 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
,
788 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp
);
791 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
792 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
794 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
798 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
799 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
807 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
808 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
809 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
812 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
820 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
823 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
827 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
830 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
834 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
835 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
836 int check_own_groups
)
838 const uint16_t *groups
;
844 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
845 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
846 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
848 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
849 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
851 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
852 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
855 /* Should never happen */
860 if (check_own_groups
) {
861 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
862 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
863 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
867 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
870 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
874 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
875 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
878 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
879 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
880 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
881 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
885 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
888 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
892 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
894 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
895 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
896 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
898 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
899 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
901 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
903 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
907 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
908 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
910 unsigned char comp_id
;
914 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
915 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
919 /* Get required compression id */
920 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
923 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
924 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
925 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
927 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
932 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
934 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
935 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
936 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
937 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
942 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
943 * supported (see RFC4492).
945 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
948 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
949 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
955 /* Return group id of a key */
956 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
958 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
960 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
962 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
966 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
967 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
969 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
973 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
976 /* If not EC nothing to do */
977 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
979 /* Check compression */
980 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
982 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
984 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
987 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
990 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
993 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
997 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
998 if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
999 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
1000 else if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1001 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
1003 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1004 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1005 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1014 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1015 * @s: SSL connection
1016 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1018 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1019 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1021 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1023 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
1025 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1026 if (!tls1_suiteb(s
))
1027 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
1029 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1032 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
1033 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, 1);
1034 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
1035 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, 1);
1040 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1041 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
1042 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1043 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1044 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1045 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1046 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1048 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1049 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1051 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1052 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1053 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1054 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1055 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1056 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1058 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1059 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1060 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1062 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1063 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1065 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1066 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1068 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1069 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1071 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1072 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1073 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1076 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1077 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1078 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1079 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1080 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1085 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1086 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1087 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1090 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1091 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1092 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1093 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1094 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1095 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1096 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1097 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1098 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1099 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1100 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1101 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1102 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1103 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1104 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1105 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1106 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1107 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1108 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1109 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1110 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1111 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1112 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1113 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1114 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 1},
1115 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1116 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1117 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 1},
1118 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1119 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1120 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 1},
1121 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1122 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1123 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1124 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1125 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1126 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1127 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1128 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1129 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1130 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1131 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1132 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1133 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1134 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1135 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1136 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1137 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1138 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1139 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1140 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1141 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1142 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1143 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1144 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1145 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1146 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1147 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1148 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1149 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1150 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1151 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1152 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1153 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1154 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1155 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1156 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1157 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1158 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1159 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1160 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1161 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1162 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1163 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1164 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1165 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1166 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1167 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1168 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1170 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1171 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1172 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1173 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1174 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1175 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1176 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1177 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1178 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1179 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1180 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1181 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1182 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1183 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1184 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1185 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1186 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1187 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1188 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1189 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1192 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1193 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1194 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1195 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1196 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1197 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1201 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1202 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1204 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1205 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1206 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1207 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1208 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1209 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1210 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1211 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1212 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1213 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1216 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1219 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1220 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1221 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1222 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1225 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1229 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1230 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1236 * Check hash is available.
1237 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1238 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1239 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1240 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1241 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1243 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1244 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1245 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1249 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1250 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1253 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1254 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1256 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1257 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1260 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1265 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1266 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1270 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1271 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1275 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1277 for (i
= 0, lu
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1278 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1279 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1281 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1289 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1290 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1296 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1297 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1300 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1310 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1312 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1313 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1314 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1316 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1317 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1318 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1324 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1326 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1332 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1333 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1334 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1335 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1336 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1338 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1345 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1346 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1347 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1351 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1358 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1360 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1363 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1365 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1372 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1373 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1375 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1378 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1380 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1387 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1390 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1392 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1393 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1397 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, NULL
))
1399 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1403 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1405 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1407 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1408 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1411 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1413 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1415 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1418 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1422 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1425 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1428 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1429 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1430 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1431 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1433 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1434 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1437 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1438 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1442 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1443 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1444 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1446 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1447 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1448 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1449 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1450 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1451 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1453 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1454 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1459 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1460 * specified EC curve.
1462 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int curve
)
1464 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1467 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1468 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1469 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1471 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1472 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1475 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1476 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1480 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1481 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1482 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1490 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1493 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1495 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1498 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1502 int md_type
= EVP_MD_get_type(md
);
1504 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1505 secbits
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
) * 4;
1507 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1508 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1509 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1511 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1512 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1513 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1514 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1516 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1518 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1520 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1523 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1524 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1526 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1533 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1534 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1537 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1539 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1540 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1542 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1547 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
1548 /* Should never happen */
1551 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1552 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1553 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1557 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1558 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1559 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1561 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1563 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1564 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1567 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1568 && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1569 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1570 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1574 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1575 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1576 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1581 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1583 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1584 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1586 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1590 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1591 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1592 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1594 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1595 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1599 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1600 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1601 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1602 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1605 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1606 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1607 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1608 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1610 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1615 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1620 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1621 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1622 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1623 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1626 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1627 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1628 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1632 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, &md
)) {
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1637 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1638 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1640 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1641 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1642 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
1644 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1645 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_get_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1646 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1650 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1651 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1655 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1657 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
1662 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1664 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1668 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1670 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
1675 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1677 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1682 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1683 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1684 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1686 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1689 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1691 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1693 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1694 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1695 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1696 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1697 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1700 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1701 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1702 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1703 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1705 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1707 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1708 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1709 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1716 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1717 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1718 * @c: cipher to check
1719 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1720 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1722 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1724 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
,
1727 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1728 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1730 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1732 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1733 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1736 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1737 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1739 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1740 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1741 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1743 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1746 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1747 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1748 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1751 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1754 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1756 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1758 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1761 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1765 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1766 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1767 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1768 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1769 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1770 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1771 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1773 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1774 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1776 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1777 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1778 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1779 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1781 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1782 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1787 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1788 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1789 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1790 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1798 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1802 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1805 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1806 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1807 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1812 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1814 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1815 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1816 * point to the resulting session.
1818 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1819 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1823 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1826 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1829 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1830 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1833 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1834 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1836 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1837 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1838 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1840 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1842 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1843 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1847 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1849 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1850 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1851 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1852 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1855 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1856 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1857 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1858 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1859 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1860 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1862 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1863 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1864 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1865 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1866 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1867 * point to the resulting session.
1869 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1870 const unsigned char *etick
,
1872 const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1873 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1875 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1876 unsigned char *sdec
;
1877 const unsigned char *p
;
1878 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1879 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1881 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1882 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1883 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1884 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1886 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1888 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1889 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1891 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1894 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1896 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1897 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1898 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1899 * calculate the master secret later.
1901 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1905 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1906 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1907 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1911 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1912 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1914 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1917 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1919 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1923 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1925 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1928 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1931 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1932 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
1933 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1935 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1938 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1939 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1940 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
1941 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1942 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1945 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1949 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1955 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1956 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1958 /* Check key name matches */
1959 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1960 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1961 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1965 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1967 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1968 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1969 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1971 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1972 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1973 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1974 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1975 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1978 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1979 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
1983 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1986 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1988 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1992 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1994 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1995 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1999 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2000 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
2001 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
2002 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2006 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
2007 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2010 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2011 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2012 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
2013 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
2014 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
2015 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
2016 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
2018 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2021 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
2023 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2029 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
2033 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2035 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2037 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2041 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2042 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2043 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2047 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
2048 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
2051 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2053 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2058 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2060 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2063 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2064 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
2067 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2068 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2069 * performs any action
2071 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
2072 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2073 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2074 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2075 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
2076 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2079 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2080 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2081 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2082 sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2084 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2086 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2087 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2090 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2091 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2092 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2096 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2097 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2098 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2099 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2100 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2104 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2105 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2106 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2107 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2108 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2109 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2110 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2112 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2116 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2120 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2122 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2123 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2124 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2125 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2134 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2135 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
,
2136 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2138 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2141 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2143 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2144 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2147 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2150 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2151 && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2152 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2153 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2154 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2157 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2158 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
->sig_idx
))
2161 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2162 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2163 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2164 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2165 if (s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2168 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2169 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2171 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2174 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2175 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2176 * ciphersuites enabled.
2179 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2182 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
2183 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2184 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2185 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2187 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2188 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2189 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2192 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2200 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2201 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
2202 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2203 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2204 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2208 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2209 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2213 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
)
2215 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2216 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2217 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2219 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2222 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2223 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2224 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2225 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2230 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2234 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2235 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2236 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2237 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2239 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2242 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2243 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2248 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2249 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2252 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2254 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2257 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2258 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2260 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2261 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2262 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2263 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2267 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2271 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2272 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2273 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2274 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2275 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2277 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2278 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2279 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2280 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2282 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2284 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2286 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2287 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2298 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2299 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2301 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2302 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2304 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2306 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2308 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2309 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2310 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2311 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2312 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2313 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2314 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2315 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2316 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2317 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2319 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2320 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2323 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2324 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2328 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2329 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2331 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2333 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2337 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2341 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2342 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2346 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2352 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2354 /* Invalid data length */
2355 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2360 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2361 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2364 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2372 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2379 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2381 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2382 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2384 /* Should never happen */
2385 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2389 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2390 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2392 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2393 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2397 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2399 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2402 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2404 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2407 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2410 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2411 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2412 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2414 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2415 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2417 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2418 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0
2419 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), idx
))
2420 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2425 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2426 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2427 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2431 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2436 psig
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2437 numsigalgs
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2439 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2442 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2444 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2448 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2450 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2451 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc
, *psig
);
2453 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2455 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2456 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2457 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2459 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2462 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2463 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2464 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2466 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2467 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2472 if (sc
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2474 || idx
>= (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
2475 || sc
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2477 shsigalgs
= sc
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2479 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2481 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2482 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2483 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2485 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2487 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2488 return (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2491 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2492 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2496 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2497 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2500 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2502 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2503 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2504 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2505 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2506 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2507 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2508 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2509 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2511 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2512 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2513 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2516 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2517 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2519 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2521 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2523 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2524 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2525 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2528 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2530 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2532 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2534 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2536 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2537 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2538 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2539 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2540 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2541 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2545 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2547 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2548 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2552 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2559 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2560 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2561 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2563 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2565 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2566 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2570 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2574 /* Reject duplicates */
2575 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2576 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2585 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2586 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2588 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2592 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2596 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2599 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2604 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2605 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2608 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2611 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2612 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2613 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2615 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2616 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2617 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2623 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2625 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2630 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2631 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2634 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2637 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2638 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2640 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2642 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2643 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2648 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2653 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2654 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2655 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2657 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2658 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2659 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2665 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2669 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2671 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2673 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2676 if (default_nid
== -1)
2678 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2680 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2682 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2684 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2685 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2686 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2688 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2691 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2693 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2694 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2695 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2696 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2697 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2703 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2704 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2706 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2708 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2709 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2710 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2717 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2718 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2719 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2720 * attempting to use them.
2723 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2725 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2726 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2727 /* Strict mode flags */
2728 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2729 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2730 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2732 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
2733 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
, int idx
)
2737 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2738 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2741 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2743 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2745 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2748 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2750 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2751 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2753 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2755 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2756 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2765 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2768 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2770 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2771 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2773 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2780 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2781 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2782 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2783 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2784 else if (!check_flags
)
2789 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2790 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2792 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
2797 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2798 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2800 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2804 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2805 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2808 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2809 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2810 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2814 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2815 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2818 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2819 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2820 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2823 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2824 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2825 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2828 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2829 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2830 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2839 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2840 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2842 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2844 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2845 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2846 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2848 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2851 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2858 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2859 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2861 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2862 * so check_flags is always set.
2864 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2865 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2866 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2870 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2871 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2872 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2873 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2875 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2882 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2883 else if (check_flags
)
2884 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2886 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2887 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2888 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2889 else if (!check_flags
)
2892 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2893 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2894 else if (strict_mode
) {
2895 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2896 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2897 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2898 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2900 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2907 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2908 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2911 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2912 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2913 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2914 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2915 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2916 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2919 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2922 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2923 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2924 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2928 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2931 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2934 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2937 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
) == 0
2938 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2939 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2941 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2942 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2944 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2945 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2950 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2953 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2955 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2956 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2960 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2961 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2963 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2966 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2970 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2973 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2974 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2981 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2982 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2984 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2985 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2986 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2987 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2988 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2989 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2990 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2991 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2992 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2995 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2996 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2998 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
3003 return tls1_check_chain(sc
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
3006 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3008 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
3010 int dh_secbits
= 80, sec_level_bits
;
3011 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3012 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
3013 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
3014 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3016 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
3017 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
3018 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
3023 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
3025 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
3029 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3030 sec_level_bits
= ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
3032 if (dh_secbits
< sec_level_bits
)
3033 dh_secbits
= sec_level_bits
;
3035 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
3036 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
3037 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
3038 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
3039 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
3040 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
3041 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
3042 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
3044 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
3048 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
3050 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
3053 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3055 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
3056 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
3059 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
3061 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
3065 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
3066 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
3067 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3072 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3076 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3080 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3081 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3082 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3083 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3085 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
);
3088 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3090 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3093 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3096 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3097 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
3099 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3100 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
3102 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3104 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3105 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
3108 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3110 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3113 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
,
3117 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3119 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3120 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3122 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3123 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3125 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3126 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3131 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3132 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3133 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3136 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
,
3139 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3142 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3144 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3149 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3153 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3154 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3155 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3163 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3164 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3167 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3168 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3170 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3171 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3173 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3175 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3176 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3177 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3180 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3184 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3185 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3187 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3189 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
,
3190 X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3192 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3193 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3195 const char *mdname
= NULL
;
3196 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3199 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3200 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3202 if (sig
->hash
!= NID_undef
)
3203 mdname
= OBJ_nid2sn(sig
->hash
);
3204 supported
= EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey
, sctx
->libctx
,
3211 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3212 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3214 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3215 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3217 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3218 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3223 * This does not differentiate between the
3224 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3225 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3226 * signing certificate.
3228 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3235 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3236 * a viable public key is permitted.
3242 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3243 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3244 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3245 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3246 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3248 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3250 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3253 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3256 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3257 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3261 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3262 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3264 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3269 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3272 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3273 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3276 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3280 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3281 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3282 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3284 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
,
3287 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3291 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3293 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3294 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3295 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3297 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3298 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3299 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3300 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3301 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3303 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3304 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3306 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3307 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3310 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3311 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3313 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3315 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3316 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3318 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3319 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3320 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3326 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3333 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3334 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3336 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3337 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3339 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3340 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3341 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3343 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3345 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3348 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3349 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3351 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3352 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3357 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3361 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3362 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3364 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3367 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3369 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3371 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3373 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3375 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3379 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3382 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3383 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3386 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3389 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3391 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3392 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3395 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3396 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3398 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3399 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3400 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3402 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3405 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3410 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3411 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3412 * we have to assume GOST support.
3414 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
3415 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
3416 & (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) != 0) {
3417 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3420 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3421 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3425 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3429 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3433 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3438 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3440 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3441 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3443 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3447 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3451 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3452 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3453 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3454 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3455 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3458 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3462 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3467 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3471 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3477 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3478 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3479 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3480 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3484 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3486 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3487 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3488 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3492 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3496 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3498 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl
);
3503 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3504 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3505 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3509 sc
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3513 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3515 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3519 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3521 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3523 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3524 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3529 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3530 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3531 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3536 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3537 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3542 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3548 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3551 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3553 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3559 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3564 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3566 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3568 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3569 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3570 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3571 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3575 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3576 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3581 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3583 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3584 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3586 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3587 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3592 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3595 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3596 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3598 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3599 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3604 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3606 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3607 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3609 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3610 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3615 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3617 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3619 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3620 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);
3625 __owur
int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
3626 const unsigned char *enckey
,
3629 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "DH")) {
3630 int bits
= EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey
);
3632 if (bits
<= 0 || enckeylen
!= (size_t)bits
/ 8)
3633 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3635 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC")) {
3636 if (enckeylen
< 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3637 || enckey
[0] != 0x04)
3641 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey
, enckey
, enckeylen
);