2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
33 tls1_export_keying_material
,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
36 tls_close_construct_packet
,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
50 tls1_export_keying_material
,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
53 tls_close_construct_packet
,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
67 tls1_export_keying_material
,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
71 tls_close_construct_packet
,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
78 tls13_setup_key_block
,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
85 tls1_export_keying_material
,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
88 tls_close_construct_packet
,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
109 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
111 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
115 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
118 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
119 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
121 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
127 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
128 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
129 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
133 * Table of curve information.
134 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
135 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
137 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
138 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
139 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
140 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
141 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
142 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
143 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
144 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
145 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
146 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
147 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
148 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
149 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
150 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
151 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
152 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
153 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
154 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
155 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
157 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
158 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
159 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
161 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
162 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default
[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
184 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
185 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
188 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
, unsigned int *pflags
)
190 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
194 cinfo
= nid_list
+ curve_id
- 1;
196 *pflags
= cinfo
->flags
;
200 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
203 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
204 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
211 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
213 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
214 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
215 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
216 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
217 * lists in the first place.
218 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
219 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
220 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
222 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
, const unsigned char **pcurves
,
225 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
228 *pcurves
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
229 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
234 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
235 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
239 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
244 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
248 *pcurves
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
249 pcurveslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
252 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
253 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_default
);
257 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
258 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
263 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
267 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
268 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
270 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
273 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
275 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
276 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
280 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
283 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
284 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
286 const unsigned char *curves
;
287 size_t num_curves
, i
;
288 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
289 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
293 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
296 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
297 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
299 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
300 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
302 } else /* Should never happen */
305 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
307 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
308 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
309 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
315 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
316 * if there is no match.
317 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
318 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
319 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
321 int tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
323 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
324 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
327 /* Can't do anything on client side */
331 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
333 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
334 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
336 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
338 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
339 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
340 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
341 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
342 /* Should never happen */
345 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
349 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
350 * but s->options is a long...
352 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
,
353 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0,
355 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
356 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
,
358 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0,
360 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
362 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
363 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
365 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
366 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
367 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
370 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
372 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
, NULL
);
380 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
384 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
385 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
387 unsigned char *glist
, *p
;
390 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
393 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
394 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* 2);
397 for (i
= 0, p
= glist
; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
398 unsigned long idmask
;
400 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
401 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups
[i
]);
403 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
412 *pextlen
= ngroups
* 2;
416 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
420 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
423 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
425 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
431 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
433 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
435 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
437 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
438 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
439 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
440 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
441 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
442 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
444 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
445 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
447 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
451 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
452 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
456 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
460 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
463 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
464 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
471 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
472 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
477 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
478 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
482 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
484 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
486 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
487 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
489 if ((nid_list
[id
- 1].flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME
)
490 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
492 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
498 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
499 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
500 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
502 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
503 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
506 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
507 * supported (see RFC4492).
509 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
510 pformats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
511 num_formats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
512 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
513 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
516 if (i
== num_formats
)
521 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
522 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
523 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
525 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
527 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
528 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
529 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
530 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
531 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
535 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
536 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
541 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
548 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
552 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
554 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
555 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
556 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
558 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
559 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
561 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
563 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
568 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
569 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
571 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
573 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
576 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
579 /* If not EC nothing to do */
580 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
582 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
586 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
589 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
593 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
594 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
596 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
602 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
603 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
604 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
605 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
606 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
608 return 0; /* Should never happen */
609 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
610 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
612 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
614 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
615 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
616 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
618 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
645 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
646 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
647 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s
, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
711 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
712 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
713 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
714 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
715 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
716 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
717 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
718 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
719 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
720 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
721 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
724 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
725 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
726 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
727 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
728 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
729 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
730 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
731 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
732 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
733 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
,
734 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
735 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
736 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
,
737 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
738 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
739 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
,
740 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
741 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
742 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
,
743 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
745 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
746 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
747 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
748 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
749 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
750 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
751 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
752 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
753 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
754 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
755 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
756 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
762 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
763 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
766 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
767 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
770 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
774 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
775 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
780 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
782 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
788 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg
)
790 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*r
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg
);
792 return r
!= NULL
? r
->sig
: 0;
795 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
798 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
802 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
803 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
804 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
805 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
807 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
808 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
811 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
812 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
817 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
818 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
819 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
821 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
822 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
823 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
824 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
825 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
826 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
828 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
829 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
834 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
835 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
838 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
840 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
841 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
843 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
844 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
845 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
847 /* Should never happen */
850 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
851 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
852 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
853 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
855 * Check sigalgs is known and key type is consistent with signature:
856 * RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
858 if (lu
== NULL
|| (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
859 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
864 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
865 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
866 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
869 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
871 if (curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
876 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
878 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
879 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, ec
))
881 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
885 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
886 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
887 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
888 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
890 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
894 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
895 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
896 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
897 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
899 if (curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
901 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
906 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
911 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
912 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
913 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
914 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
917 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
918 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
919 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
923 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
929 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
930 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
932 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
933 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
934 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
935 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
936 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
940 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
941 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
945 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
947 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
949 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
954 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
955 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
956 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
958 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
961 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
963 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
965 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
966 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
967 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
968 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
970 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
971 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
972 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
973 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
975 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
977 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
978 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
979 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
985 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
986 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
987 * @c: cipher to check
988 * @op: Security check that you want to do
990 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
992 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
994 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
995 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
997 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
999 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ((c
->min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1000 || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1002 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1003 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1006 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1009 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1011 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1013 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1016 /* Initialise digests to default values */
1017 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
1019 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
1020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1021 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1024 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1025 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1027 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
);
1028 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
];
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1031 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1034 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
);
1035 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
);
1036 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
);
1040 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1045 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1046 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1047 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1048 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1049 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1050 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1051 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1052 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1055 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1056 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
1057 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1059 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1062 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1063 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1065 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1066 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1070 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1074 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1079 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1081 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1082 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1083 * point to the resulting session.
1085 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1086 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1087 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1090 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1091 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1092 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1093 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1094 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1095 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1096 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1099 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1100 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1101 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1102 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1103 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1104 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1106 TICKET_RETURN
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1111 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1114 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1117 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1118 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1121 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1124 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1125 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1128 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1131 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1134 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1135 return TICKET_EMPTY
;
1137 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1139 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1140 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1141 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1142 * calculate the master secret later.
1144 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1147 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1148 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1150 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1151 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1152 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1154 case TICKET_SUCCESS
:
1155 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1157 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1158 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1159 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1162 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1167 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1169 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1170 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1171 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1172 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1173 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1174 * point to the resulting session.
1176 TICKET_RETURN
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1177 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1178 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1181 unsigned char *sdec
;
1182 const unsigned char *p
;
1183 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1184 TICKET_RETURN ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1186 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1187 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1188 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
1189 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1191 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1192 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1194 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1195 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1197 ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1200 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1201 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1202 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1207 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1213 /* Check key name matches */
1214 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1215 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
1216 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1219 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
1220 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
1221 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1222 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1223 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
,
1225 + sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) <= 0) {
1230 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1233 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1237 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1239 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1240 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1244 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1245 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1246 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1249 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1250 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1251 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1252 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1254 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1255 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1256 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1257 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1258 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1259 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1260 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1261 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1263 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1265 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1266 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1268 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1271 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1275 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1279 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1280 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1281 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1285 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1286 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1289 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1291 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1295 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1297 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1300 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1304 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
1305 const EVP_MD
*md
, int *ispss
)
1309 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1313 md_id
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1314 sig_id
= EVP_PKEY_id(pk
);
1315 if (md_id
== NID_undef
)
1317 /* For TLS 1.3 only allow RSA-PSS */
1318 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sig_id
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1319 sig_id
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1321 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1322 /* Should never happen: we abort if no sigalgs extension and TLS 1.3 */
1323 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1325 /* For TLS 1.2 and no sigalgs lookup using complete table */
1326 for (i
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1328 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1329 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curr
->sigalg
))
1331 *ispss
= curr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1338 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1339 curr
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1342 * Look for matching key and hash. If key type is RSA also match PSS
1345 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& (curr
->sig
== sig_id
1346 || (sig_id
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& curr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
))){
1347 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curr
->sigalg
))
1349 *ispss
= curr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1356 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid
)
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1361 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
1363 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1364 * this will need to be updated.
1366 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
:
1367 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1371 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1375 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1378 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1379 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1381 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1382 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1384 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1385 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1391 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1392 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, uint16_t ptmp
)
1394 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(ptmp
);
1395 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1398 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1399 if (lu
== NULL
|| ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
) == NULL
)
1401 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1402 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu
->sig
) == -1)
1404 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1405 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1406 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1407 sigalgstr
[0] = (ptmp
>> 8) & 0xff;
1408 sigalgstr
[1] = ptmp
& 0xff;
1409 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1413 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1414 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1418 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1420 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1421 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1422 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
1424 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1425 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1426 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1428 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1429 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1430 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs
)) {
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1432 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1433 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
:
1435 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1441 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1454 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
1456 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
1458 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
1461 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1462 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1466 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1467 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, *psig
)) {
1468 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1475 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1476 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1477 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1478 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1480 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1481 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1482 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1483 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1484 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, *ptmp
))
1486 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1487 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1490 *shsig
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1500 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1501 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1503 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1504 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1506 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1508 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1510 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1511 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1512 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1513 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1514 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1515 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1516 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1517 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1518 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1519 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1521 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1522 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1525 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1526 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1530 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1531 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1533 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1535 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
));
1538 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1542 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1543 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1547 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1549 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1555 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1556 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1558 /* Should never happen */
1562 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1564 /* Invalid data length */
1565 if ((size
& 1) != 0)
1570 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1571 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
1572 * sizeof(*s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
));
1573 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
1575 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= size
;
1576 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1577 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
[i
] = stmp
;
1585 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1590 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
1591 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1594 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1597 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1598 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1600 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1601 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1603 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->sig
);
1604 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
1605 md
= ssl_md(sigptr
->hash_idx
);
1607 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1608 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
1609 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1610 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
1615 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1616 * use the certificate for signing.
1618 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1619 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1621 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1622 * supported it stays as NULL.
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1625 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
1626 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1629 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
1630 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1631 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1635 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
1636 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1639 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] == NULL
)
1640 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
);
1641 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] == NULL
)
1642 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] =
1643 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
);
1644 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] == NULL
)
1645 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] =
1646 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
);
1652 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1653 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1654 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1656 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1657 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1658 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1661 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1663 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1667 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1669 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1670 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1672 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1674 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1675 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1676 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1678 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1681 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1682 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1683 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1685 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1686 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1688 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1689 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1691 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1693 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1695 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1696 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1697 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1699 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1701 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1702 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1705 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1706 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1710 int sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1713 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1715 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1716 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1717 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1718 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1719 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1720 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1721 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1722 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1724 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1725 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1726 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1729 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1730 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1732 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1734 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1736 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1737 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1740 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1742 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1744 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1746 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1747 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1749 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1751 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1753 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1764 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1765 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1768 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1771 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
1772 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
1775 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
1776 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
1781 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1782 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1784 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1788 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1792 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1795 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1797 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1802 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1803 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1805 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1807 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1808 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1809 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1811 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1813 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1814 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
1819 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1824 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1825 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1826 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1828 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1829 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1830 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1836 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1840 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1844 if (default_nid
== -1)
1846 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1848 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1849 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1850 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1855 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1856 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1860 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1861 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1862 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1869 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1870 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1871 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1872 * attempting to use them.
1875 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1877 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1878 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1879 /* Strict mode flags */
1880 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1881 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1882 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1884 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1889 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1890 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1893 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1894 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1896 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1899 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1901 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1902 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1904 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1906 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1907 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1913 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
1916 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1918 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1919 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
1921 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
1928 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1929 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
1930 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
1931 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1932 else if (!check_flags
)
1937 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1938 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1940 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
1943 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
1945 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1948 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
1949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
1950 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1951 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
1954 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1955 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1956 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
1960 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1961 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
1964 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1965 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
1966 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
1969 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1970 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
1971 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
1974 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1975 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
1976 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
1985 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1986 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1988 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1990 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1991 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
1992 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
1994 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
1997 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2004 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2005 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2009 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2010 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2011 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2012 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2014 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2021 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2022 else if (check_flags
)
2023 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2025 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2026 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
2027 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2028 else if (!check_flags
)
2031 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2032 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2033 else if (strict_mode
) {
2034 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2035 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2036 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2037 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2039 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2046 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2047 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2049 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2051 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2054 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2057 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2061 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
2065 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
2067 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2068 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
2070 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
2071 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
2072 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2076 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2079 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2081 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
2083 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2084 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2086 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2088 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2090 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2091 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2092 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2093 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2094 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2099 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2102 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2104 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2105 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2109 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2110 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
2111 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2112 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
2113 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2115 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2118 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2122 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
2125 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2126 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2133 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2134 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2136 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
2137 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
2138 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2139 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2140 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2141 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2142 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2145 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2146 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2148 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2152 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2154 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2155 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2156 return DH_get_1024_160();
2157 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2158 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2163 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2164 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
2167 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2175 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2176 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2178 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2179 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2187 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2188 return DH_get_2048_224();
2189 return DH_get_1024_160();
2193 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2196 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2199 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2200 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2201 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2202 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2204 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2207 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2209 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2212 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2214 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2215 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
2216 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2217 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2219 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2220 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
2222 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
2223 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
2226 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2228 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2231 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2234 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2236 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2237 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2239 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2240 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2242 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2243 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2248 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2249 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2250 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2253 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2255 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2257 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2262 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2266 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2267 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2268 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2276 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2277 * Set current certificate and digest to match chosen algorithm.
2279 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
)
2281 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2287 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigaglgs */
2288 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2289 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2294 /* Skip RSA if not PSS */
2295 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2297 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
2301 c
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
];
2302 if (c
->x509
== NULL
|| c
->privatekey
== NULL
) {
2303 if (idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
)
2305 idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
2306 c
= s
->cert
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2307 if (c
->x509
== NULL
|| c
->privatekey
== NULL
)
2310 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2313 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(c
->privatekey
);
2315 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2317 if (curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2323 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2324 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_idx
= idx
;
2325 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] = md
;
2326 s
->cert
->key
= s
->cert
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2332 * FIXME: could handle previous TLS versions in an appropriate way
2333 * and tidy up certificate and signature algorithm handling.