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Reorganise supported signature algorithm extension processing.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
128 #endif
129
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 };
144
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
146 {
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
149 return(60*60*2);
150 }
151
152 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
153 {
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
156 return(1);
157 }
158
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
160 {
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
163 {
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
165 }
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
167 ssl3_free(s);
168 }
169
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 {
172 ssl3_clear(s);
173 s->version = s->method->version;
174 }
175
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
177
178 static int nid_list[] =
179 {
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 };
206
207
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
209 {
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
213 };
214
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
216 {
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
242 };
243
244 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
245 {
246 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
247 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
248 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
249 return 0;
250 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
251 }
252
253 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
254 {
255 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
256 switch (nid)
257 {
258 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
259 return 1;
260 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
261 return 2;
262 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
263 return 3;
264 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
265 return 4;
266 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
267 return 5;
268 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
269 return 6;
270 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
271 return 7;
272 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
273 return 8;
274 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
275 return 9;
276 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
277 return 10;
278 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 return 11;
280 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 return 12;
282 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
283 return 13;
284 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
285 return 14;
286 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
287 return 15;
288 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
289 return 16;
290 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
291 return 17;
292 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 return 18;
294 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
295 return 19;
296 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
297 return 20;
298 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
299 return 21;
300 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
301 return 22;
302 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
303 return 23;
304 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
305 return 24;
306 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
307 return 25;
308 default:
309 return 0;
310 }
311 }
312 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
313 * preferred list
314 */
315 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
316 const unsigned char **pcurves,
317 size_t *pcurveslen)
318 {
319 if (sess)
320 {
321 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
322 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
327 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
328 }
329 /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
330 if (!*pcurves)
331 {
332 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
333 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
334 }
335 }
336
337 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
338 * matches.
339 */
340
341 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
342 {
343 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
344 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
345 int k;
346 /* Can't do anything on client side */
347 if (s->server == 0)
348 return -1;
349 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
350 &supp, &supplen);
351 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
352 &pref, &preflen);
353 preflen /= 2;
354 supplen /= 2;
355 k = 0;
356 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
357 {
358 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
359 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
360 {
361 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
362 {
363 if (nmatch == k)
364 {
365 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
366 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
367 }
368 k++;
369 }
370 }
371 }
372 if (nmatch == -1)
373 return k;
374 return 0;
375 }
376
377 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
378 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
379 {
380 unsigned char *clist, *p;
381 size_t i;
382 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
383 * while curve ids < 32
384 */
385 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
386 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
387 if (!clist)
388 return 0;
389 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
390 {
391 unsigned long idmask;
392 int id;
393 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
394 idmask = 1L << id;
395 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
396 {
397 OPENSSL_free(clist);
398 return 0;
399 }
400 dup_list |= idmask;
401 s2n(id, p);
402 }
403 if (*pext)
404 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
405 *pext = clist;
406 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
407 return 1;
408 }
409
410 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
411
412 typedef struct
413 {
414 size_t nidcnt;
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
416 } nid_cb_st;
417
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
419 {
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
421 size_t i;
422 int nid;
423 char etmp[20];
424 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
425 return 0;
426 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
427 return 0;
428 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
429 etmp[len] = 0;
430 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
436 return 0;
437 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
438 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
439 return 0;
440 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
441 return 1;
442 }
443 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
444 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
445 const char *str)
446 {
447 nid_cb_st ncb;
448 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
449 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
450 return 0;
451 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
452 }
453 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
454 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
455 EC_KEY *ec)
456 {
457 int is_prime, id;
458 const EC_GROUP *grp;
459 const EC_POINT *pt;
460 const EC_METHOD *meth;
461 if (!ec)
462 return 0;
463 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
464 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
465 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
466 if (!grp || !pt)
467 return 0;
468 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
469 if (!meth)
470 return 0;
471 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
472 is_prime = 1;
473 else
474 is_prime = 0;
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
479 if (id)
480 {
481 curve_id[0] = 0;
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
483 }
484 else
485 {
486 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
487 if (is_prime)
488 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
489 else
490 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
491 }
492 if (comp_id)
493 {
494 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
495 {
496 if (is_prime)
497 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
498 else
499 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
500 }
501 else
502 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
503 }
504 return 1;
505 }
506 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
507 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
508 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
509 {
510 const unsigned char *p;
511 size_t plen, i;
512 int j;
513 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
514 * is supported (see RFC4492).
515 */
516 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
517 {
518 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
519 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
520 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
521 {
522 if (*comp_id == *p)
523 break;
524 }
525 if (i == plen)
526 return 0;
527 }
528 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
529 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
530 {
531 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
532 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
533 {
534 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
535 break;
536 }
537 if (i == plen)
538 return 0;
539 }
540 return 1;
541 }
542 /* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
543 int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
544 {
545 int rv;
546 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
547 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
548 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
549 if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
550 return 0;
551 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
552 if (!pkey)
553 return 0;
554 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
555 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
556 if (!rv)
557 return 0;
558 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
559 }
560 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
561 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
562 {
563 unsigned char curve_id[2];
564 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
565 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
566 {
567 /* Need a shared curve */
568 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
569 return 1;
570 else return 0;
571 }
572 if (!ec)
573 {
574 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
575 return 1;
576 else
577 return 0;
578 }
579 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
580 return 1;
581 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
582 }
583
584 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
585
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
587
588 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
589 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
590 */
591
592 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
593 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
594 #else
595 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
596 #endif
597
598 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
599 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
600 #else
601 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
602 #endif
603
604 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
605 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
606 #else
607 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
608 #endif
609
610 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
611 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
612 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
613 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
614
615 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
617 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
618 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
619 #endif
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
621 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
622 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
623 #endif
624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
625 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
626 #endif
627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
628 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
629 #endif
630 };
631
632 size_t tls12_get_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
633 {
634 const unsigned char *sigs;
635 size_t sigslen;
636 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
637
638 if (sigs)
639 sigslen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
640 else
641 {
642 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
643 sigslen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
644 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
645 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
646 if (FIPS_mode())
647 sigslen -= 2;
648 #endif
649 }
650
651 if (p)
652 memcpy(p, sigs, sigslen);
653 return sigslen;
654 }
655
656 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
657 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
658 {
659 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
660 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
661
662 if (a > b)
663 return 1;
664 else if (a < b)
665 return -1;
666 return 0;
667 }
668
669 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
670 {
671 int extdatalen=0;
672 unsigned char *ret = p;
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
674 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
675 int using_ecc = 0;
676 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
677 {
678 int i;
679 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
680 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
681
682 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
683 {
684 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
685
686 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
687 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
688 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
689 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
690 {
691 using_ecc = 1;
692 break;
693 }
694 }
695 }
696 #endif
697
698 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
699 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
700 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
701 return p;
702
703 ret+=2;
704
705 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
706
707 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
708 {
709 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
710 unsigned long size_str;
711 long lenmax;
712
713 /* check for enough space.
714 4 for the servername type and entension length
715 2 for servernamelist length
716 1 for the hostname type
717 2 for hostname length
718 + hostname length
719 */
720
721 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
722 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
723 return NULL;
724
725 /* extension type and length */
726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
727 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
728
729 /* length of servername list */
730 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
731
732 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
733 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
734 s2n(size_str,ret);
735 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
736 ret+=size_str;
737 }
738
739 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
740 if (s->renegotiate)
741 {
742 int el;
743
744 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
745 {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
747 return NULL;
748 }
749
750 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
751
752 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
753 s2n(el,ret);
754
755 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
756 {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
758 return NULL;
759 }
760
761 ret += el;
762 }
763
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
765 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
766 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
767 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
768
769 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
770 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
771 {
772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773 return NULL;
774 }
775
776 /* check for enough space.
777 4 for the srp type type and entension length
778 1 for the srp user identity
779 + srp user identity length
780 */
781 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
782
783 /* fill in the extension */
784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
785 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
786 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
787 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
788 ret+=login_len;
789 }
790 #endif
791
792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
793 if (using_ecc)
794 {
795 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
796 long lenmax;
797 const unsigned char *plist;
798 size_t plistlen;
799 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
800 * use default */
801 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
802 if (plist)
803 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
804 else
805 {
806 plist = ecformats_default;
807 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
808 }
809
810 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
811 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
812 if (plistlen > 255)
813 {
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
815 return NULL;
816 }
817
818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
819 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
820 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
821 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
822 ret+=plistlen;
823
824 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
825 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
826 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
827
828 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
829 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
830 if (plistlen > 65532)
831 {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
833 return NULL;
834 }
835
836 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
837 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
838
839 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
840 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
841 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
842 * resolves this to two bytes.
843 */
844 s2n(plistlen, ret);
845 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
846 ret+=plistlen;
847 }
848 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
849
850 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
851 {
852 int ticklen;
853 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
854 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
855 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
856 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
857 {
858 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
859 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
860 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
861 return NULL;
862 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
863 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
864 ticklen);
865 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
866 }
867 else
868 ticklen = 0;
869 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
870 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
871 goto skip_ext;
872 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
873 * rest for ticket
874 */
875 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
876 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
877 s2n(ticklen,ret);
878 if (ticklen)
879 {
880 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
881 ret += ticklen;
882 }
883 }
884 skip_ext:
885
886 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
887 {
888 size_t salglen;
889 salglen = tls12_get_sig_algs(s, NULL);
890 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
891 return NULL;
892 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
893 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
894 s2n(salglen, ret);
895 tls12_get_sig_algs(s, ret);
896 ret += salglen;
897 }
898
899 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
900 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
901 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
902 {
903 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
904
905 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
906 return NULL;
907 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
908 return NULL;
909
910 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
911 s2n(col + 2, ret);
912 s2n(col, ret);
913 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
914 ret += col;
915 }
916 #endif
917
918 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
919 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
920 {
921 int i;
922 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
923 OCSP_RESPID *id;
924
925 idlen = 0;
926 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
927 {
928 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
929 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
930 if (itmp <= 0)
931 return NULL;
932 idlen += itmp + 2;
933 }
934
935 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
936 {
937 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
938 if (extlen < 0)
939 return NULL;
940 }
941 else
942 extlen = 0;
943
944 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
945 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
946 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
947 return NULL;
948 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
949 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
950 s2n(idlen, ret);
951 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
952 {
953 /* save position of id len */
954 unsigned char *q = ret;
955 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
956 /* skip over id len */
957 ret += 2;
958 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
959 /* write id len */
960 s2n(itmp, q);
961 }
962 s2n(extlen, ret);
963 if (extlen > 0)
964 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
965 }
966
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
968 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
969 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
970 s2n(1,ret);
971 /* Set mode:
972 * 1: peer may send requests
973 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
974 */
975 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
976 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
977 else
978 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
979 #endif
980
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
982 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
983 {
984 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
985 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
986 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
987 return NULL;
988 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
989 s2n(0,ret);
990 }
991 #endif
992
993 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
994 {
995 int el;
996
997 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
998
999 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1000
1001 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1002 s2n(el,ret);
1003
1004 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1005 {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 return NULL;
1008 }
1009 ret += el;
1010 }
1011
1012 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1013 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1014 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1015 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1016 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1017 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1018 {
1019 size_t lenmax;
1020 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1021 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1022
1023 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1024
1025 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1026 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1027 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1028 *(ret++) = list_len;
1029 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1030 }
1031
1032 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1033 return p;
1034
1035 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1036 return ret;
1037 }
1038
1039 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1040 {
1041 int extdatalen=0;
1042 unsigned char *ret = p;
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1044 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1045 #endif
1046
1047 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1048 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1049 return p;
1050
1051 ret+=2;
1052 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1053
1054 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1055 {
1056 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1057
1058 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1059 s2n(0,ret);
1060 }
1061
1062 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1063 {
1064 int el;
1065
1066 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1067 {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1069 return NULL;
1070 }
1071
1072 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1073
1074 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1075 s2n(el,ret);
1076
1077 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1078 {
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 return NULL;
1081 }
1082
1083 ret += el;
1084 }
1085
1086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1087 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1088 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1089 {
1090 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1091 long lenmax;
1092
1093 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1094 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1095 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1096 {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 return NULL;
1099 }
1100
1101 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1102 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1103 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1104 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1105 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1106
1107 }
1108 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1109 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1110
1111 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1112 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1113 {
1114 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1115 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1116 s2n(0,ret);
1117 }
1118
1119 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1120 {
1121 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1122 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1123 s2n(0,ret);
1124 }
1125
1126 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1127 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1128 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1129 {
1130 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1131
1132 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1133 return NULL;
1134 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1135 return NULL;
1136
1137 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1138 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1139 s2n(sol, ret);
1140 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1141 ret += sol;
1142 }
1143 #endif
1144
1145 if(s->srtp_profile)
1146 {
1147 int el;
1148
1149 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1150
1151 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1152
1153 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1154 s2n(el,ret);
1155
1156 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1157 {
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 return NULL;
1160 }
1161 ret+=el;
1162 }
1163
1164 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1165 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1166 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1167 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1168 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1169 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1170 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1171 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1172 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1173 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1174 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1175 ret+=36;
1176
1177 }
1178
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1180 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1181 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1182 {
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1184 s2n(1,ret);
1185 /* Set mode:
1186 * 1: peer may send requests
1187 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1188 */
1189 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1190 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1191 else
1192 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1193
1194 }
1195 #endif
1196
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1198 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1199 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1200 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1201 {
1202 const unsigned char *npa;
1203 unsigned int npalen;
1204 int r;
1205
1206 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1207 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1208 {
1209 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1210 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1211 s2n(npalen,ret);
1212 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1213 ret += npalen;
1214 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1215 }
1216 }
1217 #endif
1218
1219 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1220 * to it. */
1221 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1222 {
1223 size_t authz_length;
1224 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1225 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1226 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1227 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1228 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1229 size_t i;
1230 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1231
1232 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1233 * uint8_t authz_type
1234 * uint16_t length
1235 * uint8_t data[length]
1236 *
1237 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1238 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1239 {
1240 unsigned short length;
1241 unsigned char type;
1242
1243 type = *(authz++);
1244 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1245 type,
1246 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1247 authz_count++;
1248
1249 n2s(authz, length);
1250 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1251 i += 2;
1252 authz += length;
1253 i += length;
1254 }
1255
1256 if (authz_count)
1257 {
1258 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1259 * 2 bytes for extension type
1260 * 2 bytes for extension length
1261 * 1 byte for the list length
1262 * n bytes for the list */
1263 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1264
1265 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1266 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1267 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1268 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1269 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1270 }
1271
1272 authz = orig_authz;
1273 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1274 {
1275 unsigned short length;
1276 unsigned char type;
1277
1278 authz_count++;
1279 type = *(authz++);
1280 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1281 type,
1282 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1283 *(ret++) = type;
1284 n2s(authz, length);
1285 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1286 i += 2;
1287 authz += length;
1288 i += length;
1289 }
1290 }
1291
1292 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1293 return p;
1294
1295 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1296 return ret;
1297 }
1298
1299 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1300 {
1301 unsigned short type;
1302 unsigned short size;
1303 unsigned short len;
1304 unsigned char *data = *p;
1305 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1306
1307 s->servername_done = 0;
1308 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1310 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1311 #endif
1312
1313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1314 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1315 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1316 #endif
1317 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1318 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1319 {
1320 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1321 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1322 }
1323 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1324 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1325 {
1326 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1327 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1328 }
1329
1330 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1331 goto ri_check;
1332 n2s(data,len);
1333
1334 if (data > (d+n-len))
1335 goto ri_check;
1336
1337 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1338 {
1339 n2s(data,type);
1340 n2s(data,size);
1341
1342 if (data+size > (d+n))
1343 goto ri_check;
1344 #if 0
1345 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1346 #endif
1347 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1348 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1349 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1350 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1351
1352 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1353 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1354 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1355 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1356 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1357 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1358 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1359 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1360 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1361 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1362 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1363 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1364 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1365 the value of the Host: field.
1366 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1367 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1368 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1369 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1370
1371 */
1372
1373 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1374 {
1375 unsigned char *sdata;
1376 int servname_type;
1377 int dsize;
1378
1379 if (size < 2)
1380 {
1381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 return 0;
1383 }
1384 n2s(data,dsize);
1385 size -= 2;
1386 if (dsize > size )
1387 {
1388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391
1392 sdata = data;
1393 while (dsize > 3)
1394 {
1395 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1396 n2s(sdata,len);
1397 dsize -= 3;
1398
1399 if (len > dsize)
1400 {
1401 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 return 0;
1403 }
1404 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1405 switch (servname_type)
1406 {
1407 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1408 if (!s->hit)
1409 {
1410 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1411 {
1412 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1413 return 0;
1414 }
1415 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1416 {
1417 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1421 {
1422 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1423 return 0;
1424 }
1425 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1426 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1427 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1428 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1429 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1430 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1431 return 0;
1432 }
1433 s->servername_done = 1;
1434
1435 }
1436 else
1437 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1438 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1439 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1440
1441 break;
1442
1443 default:
1444 break;
1445 }
1446
1447 dsize -= len;
1448 }
1449 if (dsize != 0)
1450 {
1451 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1452 return 0;
1453 }
1454
1455 }
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1458 {
1459 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1460 {
1461 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1462 return 0;
1463 }
1464 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1465 {
1466 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1467 return 0;
1468 }
1469 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1470 return -1;
1471 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1472 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1473
1474 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1475 {
1476 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1477 return 0;
1478 }
1479 }
1480 #endif
1481
1482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1485 {
1486 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1487 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1488
1489 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1490 {
1491 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1492 return 0;
1493 }
1494 if (!s->hit)
1495 {
1496 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1497 {
1498 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1499 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1500 }
1501 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1502 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1503 {
1504 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1505 return 0;
1506 }
1507 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1508 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1509 }
1510 #if 0
1511 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1512 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1513 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1514 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1515 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1516 #endif
1517 }
1518 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1519 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1520 {
1521 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1522 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1523 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1524
1525 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1526 {
1527 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530 if (!s->hit)
1531 {
1532 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1533 {
1534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1535 return 0;
1536 }
1537 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1538 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1539 {
1540 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1541 return 0;
1542 }
1543 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1544 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1545 }
1546 #if 0
1547 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1548 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1549 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1550 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1551 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1552 #endif
1553 }
1554 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1555 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1556 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1557 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1558 {
1559 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1560
1561 if (size < 2)
1562 {
1563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1564 return 0;
1565 }
1566 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1567 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1568 {
1569 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1570 return 0;
1571 }
1572
1573 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1574 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1575 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1576 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1577 else
1578 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1579 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1580 {
1581 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1582 return 0;
1583 }
1584 }
1585 #endif
1586 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1587 {
1588 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1589 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1590 {
1591 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1592 return 0;
1593 }
1594 }
1595 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1596 {
1597 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1598 return 0;
1599 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1600 }
1601 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1602 {
1603 int dsize;
1604 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1605 {
1606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1607 return 0;
1608 }
1609 n2s(data,dsize);
1610 size -= 2;
1611 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1612 {
1613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1614 return 0;
1615 }
1616 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1617 {
1618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1619 return 0;
1620 }
1621 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1622 * error.
1623 */
1624 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1625 {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1627 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1628 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1629 return 0;
1630 }
1631 }
1632 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1633 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1634 {
1635
1636 if (size < 5)
1637 {
1638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1639 return 0;
1640 }
1641
1642 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1643 size--;
1644 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1645 {
1646 const unsigned char *sdata;
1647 int dsize;
1648 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1649 n2s(data,dsize);
1650 size -= 2;
1651 if (dsize > size )
1652 {
1653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1654 return 0;
1655 }
1656 while (dsize > 0)
1657 {
1658 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1659 int idsize;
1660 if (dsize < 4)
1661 {
1662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1663 return 0;
1664 }
1665 n2s(data, idsize);
1666 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1667 size -= 2 + idsize;
1668 if (dsize < 0)
1669 {
1670 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1671 return 0;
1672 }
1673 sdata = data;
1674 data += idsize;
1675 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1676 &sdata, idsize);
1677 if (!id)
1678 {
1679 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1680 return 0;
1681 }
1682 if (data != sdata)
1683 {
1684 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1685 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1686 return 0;
1687 }
1688 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1689 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1690 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1691 {
1692 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1693 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1694 return 0;
1695 }
1696 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1697 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1698 {
1699 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1700 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1701 return 0;
1702 }
1703 }
1704
1705 /* Read in request_extensions */
1706 if (size < 2)
1707 {
1708 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1709 return 0;
1710 }
1711 n2s(data,dsize);
1712 size -= 2;
1713 if (dsize != size)
1714 {
1715 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1716 return 0;
1717 }
1718 sdata = data;
1719 if (dsize > 0)
1720 {
1721 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1722 {
1723 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1724 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1725 }
1726
1727 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1728 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1729 &sdata, dsize);
1730 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1731 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1732 {
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1734 return 0;
1735 }
1736 }
1737 }
1738 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1739 * so ignore it.
1740 */
1741 else
1742 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1743 }
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1745 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1746 {
1747 switch(data[0])
1748 {
1749 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1750 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1751 break;
1752 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1753 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1754 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1755 break;
1756 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1757 return 0;
1758 }
1759 }
1760 #endif
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1762 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1763 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1764 {
1765 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1766 * renegotiation.
1767 *
1768 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1769 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1770 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1771 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1772 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1773 * anything like that, but this might change).
1774
1775 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1776 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1777 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1778 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1779 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1780 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1781 }
1782 #endif
1783
1784 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1785 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1786 {
1787 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1788 al))
1789 return 0;
1790 }
1791
1792 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
1793 {
1794 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1795 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1796
1797 if (size == 0)
1798 {
1799 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1800 return 0;
1801 }
1802
1803 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1804
1805 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
1806 {
1807 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1808 return 0;
1809 }
1810
1811 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
1812 * information as the original session so we ignore this
1813 * in the case of a session resumption. */
1814 if (!s->hit)
1815 {
1816 size_t i;
1817 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
1818 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
1819 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
1820 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1821 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
1822 {
1823 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1824 return 0;
1825 }
1826
1827 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
1828 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1829 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1830 sdata,
1831 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1832
1833 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
1834 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1835 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
1836 1 /* element size */,
1837 byte_compare);
1838
1839 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
1840 {
1841 if (i > 0 &&
1842 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
1843 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
1844 {
1845 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1846 return 0;
1847 }
1848 }
1849 }
1850 }
1851
1852 data+=size;
1853 }
1854
1855 *p = data;
1856
1857 ri_check:
1858
1859 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1860
1861 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1862 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1863 {
1864 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1866 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1867 return 0;
1868 }
1869 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
1870 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1871 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
1872
1873 return 1;
1874 }
1875
1876 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
1877 {
1878 int al = -1;
1879 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
1880 {
1881 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1882 return 0;
1883 }
1884
1885 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1886 {
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1888 return 0;
1889 }
1890 return 1;
1891 }
1892
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1894 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1895 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1896 * the length of the block. */
1897 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1898 {
1899 unsigned int off = 0;
1900
1901 while (off < len)
1902 {
1903 if (d[off] == 0)
1904 return 0;
1905 off += d[off];
1906 off++;
1907 }
1908
1909 return off == len;
1910 }
1911 #endif
1912
1913 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1914 {
1915 unsigned short length;
1916 unsigned short type;
1917 unsigned short size;
1918 unsigned char *data = *p;
1919 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1920 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1921
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1924 #endif
1925
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1927 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1928 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1929 #endif
1930
1931 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1932 goto ri_check;
1933
1934 n2s(data,length);
1935 if (data+length != d+n)
1936 {
1937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1938 return 0;
1939 }
1940
1941 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1942 {
1943 n2s(data,type);
1944 n2s(data,size);
1945
1946 if (data+size > (d+n))
1947 goto ri_check;
1948
1949 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1950 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1951 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1952
1953 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1954 {
1955 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1956 {
1957 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1958 return 0;
1959 }
1960 tlsext_servername = 1;
1961 }
1962
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1964 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1965 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1966 {
1967 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1968 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1969
1970 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1971 {
1972 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 return 0;
1974 }
1975 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1976 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1977 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1978 {
1979 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 return 0;
1981 }
1982 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1983 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1984 #if 0
1985 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1986 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1987 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1988 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1989 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1990 #endif
1991 }
1992 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1993
1994 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1995 {
1996 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1997 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1998 {
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 return 0;
2001 }
2002 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2003 || (size > 0))
2004 {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2009 }
2010 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2011 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2012 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2013 {
2014 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2015
2016 if (size < 2)
2017 {
2018 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2019 return 0;
2020 }
2021 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2022 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2023 {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2025 return 0;
2026 }
2027
2028 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2029 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2030 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2031 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2032 else
2033 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2034
2035 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2036 {
2037 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 return 0;
2039 }
2040 }
2041 #endif
2042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2043 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2044 {
2045 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2046 * a status request message.
2047 */
2048 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2049 {
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2051 return 0;
2052 }
2053 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2054 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2055 }
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2058 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2059 {
2060 unsigned char *selected;
2061 unsigned char selected_len;
2062
2063 /* We must have requested it. */
2064 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2065 {
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2067 return 0;
2068 }
2069 /* The data must be valid */
2070 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2071 {
2072 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2076 {
2077 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 return 0;
2079 }
2080 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2081 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2082 {
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2084 return 0;
2085 }
2086 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2087 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2088 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2089 }
2090 #endif
2091 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2092 {
2093 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2094 return 0;
2095 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2096 }
2097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2098 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2099 {
2100 switch(data[0])
2101 {
2102 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2103 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2104 break;
2105 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2106 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2107 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2108 break;
2109 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2110 return 0;
2111 }
2112 }
2113 #endif
2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2115 {
2116 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2117 al))
2118 return 0;
2119 }
2120
2121 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2122 {
2123 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2124 * an authz hello extension if the client
2125 * didn't request a proof. */
2126 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2127 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2128
2129 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2130 {
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2132 return 0;
2133 }
2134
2135 if (!size)
2136 {
2137 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140
2141 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2142 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2143 {
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 return 0;
2146 }
2147
2148 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2149 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2150 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2151 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2152 {
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2154 return 0;
2155 }
2156
2157 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2158 }
2159
2160 data += size;
2161 }
2162
2163 if (data != d+n)
2164 {
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 return 0;
2167 }
2168
2169 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2170 {
2171 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2172 {
2173 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2174 {
2175 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2176 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2177 {
2178 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2179 return 0;
2180 }
2181 }
2182 else
2183 {
2184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 return 0;
2186 }
2187 }
2188 }
2189
2190 *p = data;
2191
2192 ri_check:
2193
2194 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2195 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2196 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2197 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2198 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2199 * absence on initial connect only.
2200 */
2201 if (!renegotiate_seen
2202 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2203 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2204 {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2207 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2208 return 0;
2209 }
2210
2211 return 1;
2212 }
2213
2214
2215 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2216 {
2217
2218 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2219 {
2220 int r = 1;
2221
2222 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2223 {
2224 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2225 if (!r)
2226 return -1;
2227 }
2228
2229 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2230 {
2231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2232 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2233
2234 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2235 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2236 else
2237 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2238 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2239 {
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2241 return -1;
2242 }
2243 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2244 }
2245
2246 if (r == 2)
2247 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2248 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2249 }
2250 #endif
2251
2252 return 1;
2253 }
2254
2255 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2256 {
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2258 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2259 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2260 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2261 */
2262
2263 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2264 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2265 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2266 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2267
2268 if (using_ecc)
2269 {
2270 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2271 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2272 {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2274 return -1;
2275 }
2276 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2277 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2278 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2279 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2280 }
2281 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2282
2283 return 1;
2284 }
2285
2286 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2287 {
2288 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2289 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2290
2291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2292 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2293 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2294 */
2295 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2296 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2297 */
2298 #endif
2299
2300 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2301 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2302 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2303 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2304
2305 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2306 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2307 * the certificate has changed.
2308 */
2309 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2310 {
2311 int r;
2312 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2313 switch (r)
2314 {
2315 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2316 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2317 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2318 break;
2319 /* status request response should be sent */
2320 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2321 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2322 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2323 else
2324 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2325 break;
2326 /* something bad happened */
2327 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2328 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2329 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2330 goto err;
2331 }
2332 }
2333 else
2334 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2335
2336 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2337 {
2338 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2339 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2340 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
2341
2342 int r = 1;
2343
2344 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2345 {
2346 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2347 if (!r)
2348 {
2349 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2350 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 goto err;
2352 }
2353 }
2354
2355 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2356 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2357 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2358
2359 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2360 {
2361 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2362 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2363 {
2364 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2365 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2366
2367 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2368 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2369 else
2370 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2371 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2372 {
2373 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2374 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2375 goto err;
2376 }
2377 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2378 }
2379 }
2380
2381 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2382 {
2383 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2384 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2385 * abort the handshake.
2386 */
2387 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2388 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2389 }
2390 }
2391
2392 #endif
2393 err:
2394 switch (ret)
2395 {
2396 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2397 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2398 return -1;
2399
2400 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2401 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2402 return 1;
2403
2404 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2405 s->servername_done=0;
2406 default:
2407 return 1;
2408 }
2409 }
2410
2411 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2412 {
2413 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2414 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2415
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2417 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2418 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2419 * it must contain uncompressed.
2420 */
2421 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2422 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2423 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2424 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2425 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2426 {
2427 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2428 size_t i;
2429 unsigned char *list;
2430 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2431 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2432 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2433 {
2434 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2435 {
2436 found_uncompressed = 1;
2437 break;
2438 }
2439 }
2440 if (!found_uncompressed)
2441 {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2443 return -1;
2444 }
2445 }
2446 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2448
2449 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2450 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2451 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2452 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2453
2454 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2455 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2456 {
2457 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2458 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2459
2460 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2461 {
2462 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2463 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2464 }
2465
2466 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2467 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2468 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2469 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2470 {
2471 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2472 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2473 }
2474 }
2475 #endif
2476
2477 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2478 * tell the callback
2479 */
2480 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2481 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2482 {
2483 int r;
2484 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2485 * there is no response.
2486 */
2487 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2488 {
2489 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2490 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2491 }
2492 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2493 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2494 if (r == 0)
2495 {
2496 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2497 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2498 }
2499 if (r < 0)
2500 {
2501 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2503 }
2504 }
2505
2506 switch (ret)
2507 {
2508 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2509 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2510 return -1;
2511
2512 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2513 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2514 return 1;
2515
2516 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2517 s->servername_done=0;
2518 default:
2519 return 1;
2520 }
2521 }
2522
2523 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2524 {
2525 int al = -1;
2526 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2527 return 1;
2528 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2529 {
2530 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2531 return 0;
2532 }
2533
2534 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2535 {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2537 return 0;
2538 }
2539 return 1;
2540 }
2541
2542 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2543 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2544 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2545 *
2546 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2547 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2548 * extension, if any.
2549 * len: the length of the session ID.
2550 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2551 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2552 * point to the resulting session.
2553 *
2554 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2555 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2556 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2557 *
2558 * Returns:
2559 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2560 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2561 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2562 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2563 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2564 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2565 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2566 *
2567 * Side effects:
2568 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2569 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2570 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2571 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2572 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2573 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2574 */
2575 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2576 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2577 {
2578 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2579 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2580 unsigned short i;
2581
2582 *ret = NULL;
2583 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2584
2585 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2586 * to permit stateful resumption.
2587 */
2588 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2589 return 0;
2590 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2591 return 0;
2592 if (p >= limit)
2593 return -1;
2594 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2595 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2596 {
2597 i = *(p++);
2598 p+= i;
2599 if (p >= limit)
2600 return -1;
2601 }
2602 /* Skip past cipher list */
2603 n2s(p, i);
2604 p+= i;
2605 if (p >= limit)
2606 return -1;
2607 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2608 i = *(p++);
2609 p += i;
2610 if (p > limit)
2611 return -1;
2612 /* Now at start of extensions */
2613 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2614 return 0;
2615 n2s(p, i);
2616 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2617 {
2618 unsigned short type, size;
2619 n2s(p, type);
2620 n2s(p, size);
2621 if (p + size > limit)
2622 return 0;
2623 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2624 {
2625 int r;
2626 if (size == 0)
2627 {
2628 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2629 * currently have one. */
2630 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2631 return 1;
2632 }
2633 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2634 {
2635 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2636 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2637 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2638 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2639 * calculate the master secret later. */
2640 return 2;
2641 }
2642 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2643 switch (r)
2644 {
2645 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2646 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2647 return 2;
2648 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2649 return r;
2650 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2651 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2652 return 3;
2653 default: /* fatal error */
2654 return -1;
2655 }
2656 }
2657 p += size;
2658 }
2659 return 0;
2660 }
2661
2662 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2663 *
2664 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2665 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2666 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2667 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2668 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2669 * point to the resulting session.
2670 *
2671 * Returns:
2672 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2673 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2674 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2675 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2676 */
2677 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2678 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2679 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2680 {
2681 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2682 unsigned char *sdec;
2683 const unsigned char *p;
2684 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2685 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2686 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2687 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2688 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2689 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2690 if (eticklen < 48)
2691 return 2;
2692 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2693 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2694 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2695 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2696 {
2697 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2698 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2699 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2700 if (rv < 0)
2701 return -1;
2702 if (rv == 0)
2703 return 2;
2704 if (rv == 2)
2705 renew_ticket = 1;
2706 }
2707 else
2708 {
2709 /* Check key name matches */
2710 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2711 return 2;
2712 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2713 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2714 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2715 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2716 }
2717 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2718 * integrity checks on ticket.
2719 */
2720 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2721 if (mlen < 0)
2722 {
2723 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2724 return -1;
2725 }
2726 eticklen -= mlen;
2727 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2728 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2729 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2730 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2731 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2732 return 2;
2733 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2734 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2735 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2736 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2737 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2738 if (!sdec)
2739 {
2740 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2741 return -1;
2742 }
2743 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2744 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2745 return 2;
2746 slen += mlen;
2747 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2748 p = sdec;
2749
2750 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2751 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2752 if (sess)
2753 {
2754 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2755 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2756 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2757 * as required by standard.
2758 */
2759 if (sesslen)
2760 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2761 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2762 *psess = sess;
2763 if (renew_ticket)
2764 return 4;
2765 else
2766 return 3;
2767 }
2768 ERR_clear_error();
2769 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2770 * ticket. */
2771 return 2;
2772 }
2773
2774 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2775
2776 typedef struct
2777 {
2778 int nid;
2779 int id;
2780 } tls12_lookup;
2781
2782 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2783 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2784 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2785 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2786 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2787 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2788 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2789 };
2790
2791 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2792 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2793 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2794 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2795 };
2796
2797 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2798 {
2799 size_t i;
2800 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2801 {
2802 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2803 return table[i].id;
2804 }
2805 return -1;
2806 }
2807
2808 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2809 {
2810 size_t i;
2811 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2812 {
2813 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2814 return table[i].nid;
2815 }
2816 return NID_undef;
2817 }
2818
2819 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2820 {
2821 int sig_id, md_id;
2822 if (!md)
2823 return 0;
2824 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2825 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2826 if (md_id == -1)
2827 return 0;
2828 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2829 if (sig_id == -1)
2830 return 0;
2831 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2832 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2833 return 1;
2834 }
2835
2836 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2837 {
2838 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2839 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2840 }
2841
2842 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2843 {
2844 switch(hash_alg)
2845 {
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2847 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2848 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
2849 if (FIPS_mode())
2850 return NULL;
2851 #endif
2852 return EVP_md5();
2853 #endif
2854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2855 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2856 return EVP_sha1();
2857 #endif
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2859 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2860 return EVP_sha224();
2861
2862 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2863 return EVP_sha256();
2864 #endif
2865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2866 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2867 return EVP_sha384();
2868
2869 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2870 return EVP_sha512();
2871 #endif
2872 default:
2873 return NULL;
2874
2875 }
2876 }
2877
2878 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
2879 {
2880 switch(sig_alg)
2881 {
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2883 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2884 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2885 #endif
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2887 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2888 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2889 #endif
2890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2891 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2892 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2893 #endif
2894 }
2895 return -1;
2896 }
2897
2898 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
2899 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
2900 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
2901 {
2902 int sign_nid, hash_nid;
2903 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
2904 return;
2905 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
2906 {
2907 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
2908 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2909 if (phash_nid)
2910 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
2911 }
2912 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
2913 {
2914 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
2915 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2916 if (psign_nid)
2917 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
2918 }
2919 if (psignhash_nid)
2920 {
2921 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
2922 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
2923 hash_nid, sign_nid);
2924 else
2925 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
2926 }
2927 }
2928 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2929 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
2930 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
2931 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
2932 {
2933 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
2934 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2935 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
2936 {
2937 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2938 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
2939 continue;
2940 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
2941 continue;
2942 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
2943 {
2944 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
2945 {
2946 nmatch++;
2947 if (shsig)
2948 {
2949 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
2950 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
2951 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
2952 &shsig->sign_nid,
2953 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
2954 ptmp);
2955 shsig++;
2956 }
2957 break;
2958 }
2959 }
2960 }
2961 return nmatch;
2962 }
2963
2964 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2965 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2966 {
2967 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
2968 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2969 size_t nmatch;
2970 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
2971 CERT *c = s->cert;
2972 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2973 if (conf)
2974 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2975 else
2976 {
2977 conf = tls12_sigalgs;
2978 conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
2979 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
2980 if (FIPS_mode())
2981 conflen -= 2;
2982 #endif
2983 }
2984 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
2985 {
2986 pref = conf;
2987 preflen = conflen;
2988 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
2989 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
2990 }
2991 else
2992 {
2993 allow = conf;
2994 allowlen = conflen;
2995 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
2996 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
2997 }
2998 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2999 if (!nmatch)
3000 return 1;
3001 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3002 if (!salgs)
3003 return 0;
3004 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3005 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3006 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3007 return 1;
3008 }
3009
3010
3011 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3012
3013 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3014 {
3015 int idx;
3016 size_t i;
3017 const EVP_MD *md;
3018 CERT *c = s->cert;
3019 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3020 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3021 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3022 return 1;
3023 /* Should never happen */
3024 if (!c)
3025 return 0;
3026
3027 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
3028 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
3029 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
3030 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
3031
3032 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3033 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3034 return 0;
3035 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3036 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3037
3038 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3039
3040 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3041 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3042 {
3043 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3044 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3045 {
3046 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3047 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3048 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3049 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3050 }
3051
3052 }
3053 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3054 * supported it stays as NULL.
3055 */
3056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3057 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3058 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
3059 #endif
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3061 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3062 {
3063 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3064 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3065 }
3066 #endif
3067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3068 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3069 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
3070 #endif
3071 return 1;
3072 }
3073
3074
3075 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3076 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3077 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3078 {
3079 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3080 if (psig == NULL)
3081 return 0;
3082 if (idx >= 0)
3083 {
3084 idx <<= 1;
3085 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3086 return 0;
3087 psig += idx;
3088 if (rhash)
3089 *rhash = psig[0];
3090 if (rsig)
3091 *rsig = psig[1];
3092 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3093 }
3094 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3095 }
3096
3097 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3098 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3099 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3100 {
3101 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3102 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3103 return 0;
3104 shsigalgs += idx;
3105 if (phash)
3106 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3107 if (psign)
3108 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3109 if (psignhash)
3110 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3111 if (rsig)
3112 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3113 if (rhash)
3114 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3115 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3116 }
3117
3118
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3120 int
3121 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3122 {
3123 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3124 unsigned short hbtype;
3125 unsigned int payload;
3126 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3127
3128 /* Read type and payload length first */
3129 hbtype = *p++;
3130 n2s(p, payload);
3131 pl = p;
3132
3133 if (s->msg_callback)
3134 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3135 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3136 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3137
3138 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3139 {
3140 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3141 int r;
3142
3143 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3144 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3145 * payload, plus padding
3146 */
3147 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3148 bp = buffer;
3149
3150 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3151 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3152 s2n(payload, bp);
3153 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3154 bp += payload;
3155 /* Random padding */
3156 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3157
3158 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3159
3160 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3161 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3162 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3163 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3164
3165 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3166
3167 if (r < 0)
3168 return r;
3169 }
3170 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3171 {
3172 unsigned int seq;
3173
3174 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3175 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3176 * sequence number */
3177 n2s(pl, seq);
3178
3179 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3180 {
3181 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3182 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3183 }
3184 }
3185
3186 return 0;
3187 }
3188
3189 int
3190 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3191 {
3192 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3193 int ret;
3194 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3195 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3196
3197 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3198 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3199 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3200 {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3202 return -1;
3203 }
3204
3205 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3206 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3207 {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3209 return -1;
3210 }
3211
3212 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3213 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3214 {
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3216 return -1;
3217 }
3218
3219 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3220 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3221 */
3222 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3223
3224 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3225 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3226 * some random stuff.
3227 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3228 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3229 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3230 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3231 * - Padding
3232 */
3233 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3234 p = buf;
3235 /* Message Type */
3236 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3237 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3238 s2n(payload, p);
3239 /* Sequence number */
3240 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3241 /* 16 random bytes */
3242 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3243 p += 16;
3244 /* Random padding */
3245 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3246
3247 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3248 if (ret >= 0)
3249 {
3250 if (s->msg_callback)
3251 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3252 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3253 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3254
3255 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3256 }
3257
3258 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3259
3260 return ret;
3261 }
3262 #endif
3263
3264 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3265
3266 typedef struct
3267 {
3268 size_t sigalgcnt;
3269 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3270 } sig_cb_st;
3271
3272 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3273 {
3274 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3275 size_t i;
3276 char etmp[20], *p;
3277 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3278 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3279 return 0;
3280 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3281 return 0;
3282 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3283 etmp[len] = 0;
3284 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3285 if (!p)
3286 return 0;
3287 *p = 0;
3288 p++;
3289 if (!*p)
3290 return 0;
3291
3292 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3293 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3294 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3295 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3296 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3297 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3298 else return 0;
3299
3300 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3301 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3302 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3303 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3304 return 0;
3305
3306 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3307 {
3308 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3309 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3310 return 0;
3311 }
3312 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3313 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3314 return 1;
3315 }
3316
3317 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3318 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3319 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str)
3320 {
3321 sig_cb_st sig;
3322 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3323 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3324 return 0;
3325 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt);
3326 }
3327
3328 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen)
3329 {
3330 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3331 int rhash, rsign;
3332 size_t i;
3333 if (salglen & 1)
3334 return 0;
3335 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3336 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3337 return 0;
3338 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3339 {
3340 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3341 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3342 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3343 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3344
3345 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3346 goto err;
3347 *sptr++ = rhash;
3348 *sptr++ = rsign;
3349 }
3350
3351 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3352 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3353
3354 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3355 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3356 return 1;
3357
3358 err:
3359 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3360 return 0;
3361 }
3362
3363 #endif
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