2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
42 tls1_export_keying_material
,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
45 tls_close_construct_packet
,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
59 tls1_export_keying_material
,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
62 tls_close_construct_packet
,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
76 tls1_export_keying_material
,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
80 tls_close_construct_packet
,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
87 tls13_setup_key_block
,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
94 tls13_export_keying_material
,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
97 tls_close_construct_packet
,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
120 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
122 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
131 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
132 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
134 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
145 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
146 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
147 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
148 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
149 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
150 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
151 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
152 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
153 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
154 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
155 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
156 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
157 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
158 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
159 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
160 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
161 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
163 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
164 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
165 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
167 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
168 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
189 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
196 /* The default curves */
197 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
198 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
199 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
200 29, /* X25519 (29) */
201 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
204 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
206 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
207 34, /* GC256A (34) */
208 35, /* GC256B (35) */
209 36, /* GC256C (36) */
210 37, /* GC256D (37) */
211 38, /* GC512A (38) */
212 39, /* GC512B (39) */
213 40, /* GC512C (40) */
215 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
216 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
217 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
218 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
219 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
220 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
223 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
232 struct provider_group_data_st
{
234 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
237 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
238 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
239 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
241 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
242 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
243 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
245 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
246 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
248 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
251 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
252 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
254 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
255 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
256 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
258 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
259 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
260 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
261 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
263 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
266 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
267 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
269 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
270 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
273 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
275 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
276 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
280 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
281 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
282 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
286 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
287 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
288 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
291 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
292 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
297 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
298 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
302 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
304 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
305 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
306 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
309 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
310 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
315 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
316 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
317 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
321 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
322 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
326 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
328 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
329 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
334 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
335 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
340 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
341 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
342 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
346 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
347 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
348 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
352 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
353 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
354 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
358 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
359 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
361 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
362 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
364 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
365 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
366 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
367 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
368 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
369 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
372 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
373 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
374 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
377 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
384 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
394 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
401 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
);
404 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
409 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
411 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(name
);
413 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
414 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(name
);
415 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
416 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(name
);
418 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
419 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
421 && nid
== tls1_group_id2nid(ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
,
424 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
430 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
434 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
435 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
436 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
442 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
450 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
451 * work for groups we don't know about.
453 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
455 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
456 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
458 if (!include_unknown
)
460 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
463 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
468 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
469 * work for groups we don't know about.
471 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
473 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
474 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
481 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
482 * the number of groups supported.
484 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
488 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
489 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
491 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
492 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
493 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
496 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
497 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
501 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
502 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
508 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
509 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
510 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
512 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
513 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
520 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
523 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
532 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
534 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
537 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
538 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
539 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
541 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
543 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
546 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
547 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
548 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
554 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
555 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
557 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
558 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
563 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
564 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
565 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
566 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
569 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
570 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
573 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
580 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
581 * if there is no match.
582 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
583 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
584 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
586 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
588 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
589 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
592 /* Can't do anything on client side */
596 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
598 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
599 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
601 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
603 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
604 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
605 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
606 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
607 /* Should never happen */
610 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
614 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
615 * otherwise peer decides.
617 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
618 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
619 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
621 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
622 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
625 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
626 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
628 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
629 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
637 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
641 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
642 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
647 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
648 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
650 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
651 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
652 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
655 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
658 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
659 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
662 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
663 unsigned long idmask
;
665 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
666 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
668 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
669 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
670 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
684 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
685 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
690 uint16_t gid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
693 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
695 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
702 if (garg
->gidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
704 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
706 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
709 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
712 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
713 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
715 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
719 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
720 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
728 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
734 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
737 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
741 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
745 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
746 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
748 const uint16_t *groups
;
754 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
755 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
756 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
758 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
759 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
761 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
762 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
765 /* Should never happen */
770 if (check_own_groups
) {
771 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
772 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
773 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
777 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
780 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
784 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
785 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
788 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
789 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
790 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
791 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
795 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
799 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
803 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
805 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
806 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
807 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
809 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
810 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
812 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
814 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
818 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
819 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
823 unsigned char comp_id
;
826 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
827 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
829 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
830 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
832 /* Get required compression id */
833 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
834 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
835 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
837 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
842 int field_type
= EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp
);
844 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
845 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
846 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
847 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
852 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
853 * supported (see RFC4492).
855 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
858 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
859 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
865 /* Return group id of a key */
866 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
868 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
870 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
872 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
876 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
877 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
879 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
883 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
886 /* If not EC nothing to do */
887 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
889 /* Check compression */
890 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
892 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
894 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
897 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
900 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
903 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
907 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
908 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
909 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
910 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
911 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
913 return 0; /* Should never happen */
914 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
915 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
924 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
926 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
928 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
929 * is compatible with the client extensions.
931 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
933 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
935 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
937 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
939 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
942 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
943 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
944 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
945 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
952 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
957 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
959 /* Default sigalg schemes */
960 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
962 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
963 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
964 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
965 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
971 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
972 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
973 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1004 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1010 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1012 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1013 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1014 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1015 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1016 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1017 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1018 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1019 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1020 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1021 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1022 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1023 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1024 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1025 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1026 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1027 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1028 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1029 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1030 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1031 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1032 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1034 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1035 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1036 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1037 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1038 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1039 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1040 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1041 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1042 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1043 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1044 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1045 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1046 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1047 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1048 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1049 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1050 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1051 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1052 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1053 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1054 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1055 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1056 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1057 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1058 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1059 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1060 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1062 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1063 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1065 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1066 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1068 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1069 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1070 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1071 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1072 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1073 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1074 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1075 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1076 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1077 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1078 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1079 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1080 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1081 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1082 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1085 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1086 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1087 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1088 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1089 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1090 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1091 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1092 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1093 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1094 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1095 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1096 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1097 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1098 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1099 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1100 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1101 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1102 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1103 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1104 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1107 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1108 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1109 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1110 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1111 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1112 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1116 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1117 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1119 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1120 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1121 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1122 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1123 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1124 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1125 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1127 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1128 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1131 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1135 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1136 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1137 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1140 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1144 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1145 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1151 * Check hash is available.
1152 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1153 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1154 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1155 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1156 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1158 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1159 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1160 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1164 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1165 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1168 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1169 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1171 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1172 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1175 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1180 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1181 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1185 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1186 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1189 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1191 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1192 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1193 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1195 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
1200 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1201 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1206 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1207 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1210 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1220 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1222 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1223 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1224 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1226 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1227 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1228 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1234 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1236 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1242 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1243 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1244 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1245 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1246 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1248 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1254 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1255 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1256 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1258 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1265 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1267 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1270 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1272 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1279 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1280 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1282 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1285 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1287 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1294 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1297 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1299 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1300 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1302 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1304 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1308 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1310 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1312 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1313 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1316 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1318 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1320 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1323 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1327 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1330 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1334 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1335 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1336 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1337 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1340 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1343 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1344 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1349 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1350 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1351 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1353 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1354 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1355 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1356 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1357 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1358 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1360 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1361 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1367 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1368 * specified EC curve.
1370 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1372 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1375 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1376 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1377 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1379 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1380 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1383 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1384 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1388 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1389 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1390 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1399 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1402 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1404 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1407 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1411 int md_type
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1413 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1414 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1416 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1417 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1418 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1420 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1421 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1422 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1423 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1425 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1427 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1429 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1432 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1433 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1435 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1442 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1443 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1446 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1448 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1449 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1451 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1453 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1456 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1457 /* Should never happen */
1460 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1461 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1462 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1466 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1467 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1468 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1470 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1472 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1473 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1476 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1477 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1478 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1482 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1483 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1484 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1490 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1492 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1493 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1495 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1499 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1501 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1503 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1508 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1509 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1510 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1514 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1515 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1516 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1517 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1518 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1519 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1524 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1530 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1531 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1532 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1533 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1536 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1537 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1538 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1542 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1547 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1548 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1550 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1551 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1552 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1554 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1555 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1556 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1560 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1561 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1565 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1567 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1569 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1573 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1575 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1577 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1582 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1583 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1584 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1586 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1589 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1591 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1593 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1594 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1595 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1596 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1597 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1600 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1601 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1602 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1603 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1605 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1607 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1608 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1609 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1616 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1617 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1618 * @c: cipher to check
1619 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1620 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1622 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1624 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1626 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1627 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1629 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1631 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1632 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1635 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1636 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1638 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1639 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1640 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1642 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1646 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1649 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1652 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1654 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1656 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1659 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1663 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1664 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1665 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1666 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1667 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1668 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1669 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1671 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1672 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1674 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1675 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1676 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1677 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1679 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1680 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1685 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1686 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1687 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1688 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1696 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1697 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1700 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1703 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1705 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1710 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1712 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1713 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1714 * point to the resulting session.
1716 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1720 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1723 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1726 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1727 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1730 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1731 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1733 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1734 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1735 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1737 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1739 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1740 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1744 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1746 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1747 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1748 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1749 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1752 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1753 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1754 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1755 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1756 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1757 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1759 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1760 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1761 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1762 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1763 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1764 * point to the resulting session.
1766 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1767 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1768 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1770 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1771 unsigned char *sdec
;
1772 const unsigned char *p
;
1773 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1774 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1776 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1777 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1778 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1779 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1781 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1783 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1784 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1786 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1789 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1791 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1792 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1793 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1794 * calculate the master secret later.
1796 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1800 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1801 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1802 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1806 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1807 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1809 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1812 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1814 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1818 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1820 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1823 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1826 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1827 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1828 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1830 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1833 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1834 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1835 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1836 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1837 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1840 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1844 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1850 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1852 /* Check key name matches */
1853 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1854 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1855 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1859 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1861 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1862 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1863 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1865 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1866 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1867 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1868 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1869 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1872 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1877 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1880 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1882 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1886 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1888 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1889 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1893 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1894 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1895 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1896 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1900 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1901 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1904 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1905 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1906 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1907 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1908 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1909 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1910 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1912 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1915 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1917 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1923 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1927 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1929 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1931 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1935 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1936 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1937 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1941 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1942 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1945 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1947 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1952 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1954 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1957 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1958 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1961 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1962 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1963 * performs any action
1965 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1966 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1967 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1968 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1969 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1970 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1973 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1974 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1975 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1977 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1979 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1980 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1983 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1984 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1985 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1989 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1990 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1991 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1992 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1993 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1997 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1998 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1999 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2000 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2001 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2002 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2003 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2005 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2009 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2013 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2015 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2016 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2017 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2018 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2027 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2028 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2030 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2033 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2035 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2036 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2038 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2039 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2040 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2041 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2042 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2045 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2046 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2049 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2050 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2051 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2052 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2053 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2056 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2057 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2062 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2063 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2064 * ciphersuites enabled.
2067 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2070 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2071 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2072 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2073 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2075 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2076 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2077 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2080 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2088 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2089 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2090 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2091 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2092 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2096 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2097 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2101 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2103 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2104 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2105 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2107 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2110 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2111 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2112 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2113 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2118 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2122 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2123 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2124 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2125 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2127 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2130 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2131 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2136 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2137 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2139 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2144 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2145 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2147 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2148 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2149 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2150 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2154 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2158 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2159 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2160 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2161 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2163 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2164 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2165 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2166 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2168 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2169 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2171 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2172 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2183 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2184 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2186 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2187 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2189 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2191 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2193 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2194 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2195 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2196 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2197 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2198 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2199 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2200 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2201 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2202 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2204 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2205 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2208 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2209 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2213 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2214 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2216 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2218 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2219 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2222 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2226 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2227 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2231 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2237 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2239 /* Invalid data length */
2240 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2245 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2246 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2249 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2257 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2264 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2266 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2267 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2269 /* Should never happen */
2270 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2274 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2275 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2277 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2278 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2282 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2284 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2287 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2289 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2292 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2295 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2296 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2297 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2299 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2302 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2303 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, idx
))
2304 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2309 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2310 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2311 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2313 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2314 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2315 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2318 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2320 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2324 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2326 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2327 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2329 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2331 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2332 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2333 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2335 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2338 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2339 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2340 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2342 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2343 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2345 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2346 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2348 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2350 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2352 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2353 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2354 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2356 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2358 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2359 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2362 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2363 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2367 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2368 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2371 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2373 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2374 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2375 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2376 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2377 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2378 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2379 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2380 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2382 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2383 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2384 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2387 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2388 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2390 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2392 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2394 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2395 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2396 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2399 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2401 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2403 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2405 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2407 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2408 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2409 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2410 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2411 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2412 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2416 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2418 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2419 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2423 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2430 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2431 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2432 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2434 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2436 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2437 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2441 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2445 /* Reject duplicates */
2446 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2447 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2456 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2457 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2459 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2463 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2467 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2470 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2475 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2476 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2479 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2482 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2483 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2484 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2486 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2487 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2488 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2494 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2496 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2501 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2502 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2505 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2507 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2508 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2509 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2511 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2513 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2514 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2519 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2524 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2525 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2526 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2528 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2529 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2530 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2536 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2540 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2542 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2546 if (default_nid
== -1)
2548 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2550 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2552 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2554 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2555 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2556 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2558 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2561 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2563 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2564 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2565 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2566 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2567 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2573 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2574 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2576 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2578 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2579 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2580 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2587 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2588 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2589 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2590 * attempting to use them.
2593 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2595 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2596 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2597 /* Strict mode flags */
2598 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2599 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2600 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2602 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2607 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2608 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2611 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2612 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2614 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2617 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2619 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2620 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2622 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2624 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2625 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2634 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2637 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2639 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2640 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2642 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2649 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2650 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2651 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2652 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2653 else if (!check_flags
)
2658 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2659 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2661 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2664 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2665 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2667 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2671 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2672 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2675 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2676 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2677 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2681 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2682 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2685 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2686 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2687 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2690 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2691 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2692 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2695 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2696 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2697 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2706 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2707 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2709 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2711 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2712 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2713 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2715 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2718 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2725 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2728 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2729 * so check_flags is always set.
2731 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2732 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2733 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2737 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2738 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2739 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2740 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2742 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2749 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2750 else if (check_flags
)
2751 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2753 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2754 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2755 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2756 else if (!check_flags
)
2759 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2760 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2761 else if (strict_mode
) {
2762 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2763 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2764 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2765 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2767 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2774 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2775 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2778 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2779 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2780 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2781 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2782 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2783 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2786 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2789 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2790 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2791 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2795 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2798 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2801 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2803 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2804 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2806 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2807 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2808 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2810 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2811 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2812 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2813 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2814 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2819 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2822 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2824 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2825 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2829 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2830 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2832 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2835 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2839 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2842 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2843 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2850 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2851 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2853 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2854 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2855 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2856 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2857 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2858 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2859 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2860 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2861 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2864 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2865 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2867 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2870 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2872 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
2874 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2875 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2876 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2877 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2879 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2880 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2881 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2886 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2888 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2892 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2893 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2894 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2895 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2896 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2897 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2898 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2899 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2901 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2905 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "DH", s
->ctx
->propq
);
2907 || EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
2910 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2912 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2913 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
2916 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
2917 if (params
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, params
) != 1)
2921 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params
);
2922 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2928 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2931 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2934 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2935 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2936 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2937 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2939 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2942 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2944 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2947 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2949 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2950 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2951 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2952 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2954 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2956 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2957 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2960 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2962 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2965 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2968 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2970 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2971 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2973 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2974 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2976 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2977 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2982 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2983 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2984 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2987 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2989 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2991 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2996 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3000 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3001 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3002 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3010 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3011 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3014 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3016 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3017 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3019 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3021 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3022 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3023 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3026 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3030 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3031 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3033 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3035 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3038 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3039 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3043 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3044 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3047 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3053 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3054 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3056 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3057 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3059 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3060 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3065 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3066 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3067 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3068 * signing certificate.
3070 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3077 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3078 * a viable public key is permitted.
3084 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3085 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3086 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3087 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3088 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3090 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3092 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3095 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3098 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3099 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3103 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3104 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3106 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3111 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3114 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3115 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3118 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3122 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3123 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3124 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3126 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3128 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3133 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3134 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3135 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3137 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3138 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3139 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3140 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3141 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3143 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3144 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3146 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3147 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3150 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3151 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3153 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3155 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3156 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3158 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3159 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3160 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3166 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3173 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3174 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3176 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3177 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3179 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3180 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3181 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3183 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3185 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3188 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3189 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3191 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3192 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3196 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3197 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3201 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3202 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3204 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3207 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3209 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3212 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3214 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3218 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3221 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3222 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3225 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3228 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3230 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3231 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3234 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3235 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3237 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3238 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3239 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3241 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3244 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3249 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3250 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3251 * we have to assume GOST support.
3253 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3254 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3258 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3262 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3266 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3269 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3270 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3275 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3277 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3278 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3280 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3284 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3288 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3289 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3290 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3291 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3292 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3295 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3299 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3304 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3308 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3314 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3315 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3316 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3317 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3321 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3323 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3324 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3325 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3329 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3333 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3335 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3336 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3337 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3341 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3345 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3347 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3351 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3353 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3355 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3356 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3361 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3362 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3363 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3368 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3369 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3374 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3380 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3383 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3385 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3391 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3396 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3398 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3400 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3401 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3402 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3403 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3404 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3408 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3409 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3414 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3416 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3417 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3419 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3420 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3425 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3428 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3429 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3431 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3432 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3437 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3439 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3440 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3442 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3443 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3448 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3450 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3452 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3453 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);