2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
28 #include "ssl_local.h"
29 #include <openssl/ct.h>
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
34 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
35 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
37 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
41 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
42 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
43 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
44 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
45 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
47 tls1_export_keying_material
,
49 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
50 tls_close_construct_packet
,
54 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
58 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
59 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
60 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
61 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
62 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
64 tls1_export_keying_material
,
65 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
66 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
67 tls_close_construct_packet
,
71 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
75 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
76 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
77 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
78 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
79 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
81 tls1_export_keying_material
,
82 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
83 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
85 tls_close_construct_packet
,
89 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
92 tls13_setup_key_block
,
93 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
94 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
95 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
96 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
97 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
99 tls13_export_keying_material
,
100 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
101 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
102 tls_close_construct_packet
,
106 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
109 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
110 * http, the cache would over fill
112 return (60 * 60 * 2);
119 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
125 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
127 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
136 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
137 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
139 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
144 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
145 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
150 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
151 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
152 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
153 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
154 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
155 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
156 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
157 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
158 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
159 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
160 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
161 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
162 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
163 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
164 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
165 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
166 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
167 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
169 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
170 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
171 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
173 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
174 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
175 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
176 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
177 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
178 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
179 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
187 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
188 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
189 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
190 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
191 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
196 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
201 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
203 /* The default curves */
204 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
206 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
207 29, /* X25519 (29) */
208 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
210 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
211 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
214 34, /* GC256A (34) */
215 35, /* GC256B (35) */
216 36, /* GC256C (36) */
217 37, /* GC256D (37) */
218 38, /* GC512A (38) */
219 39, /* GC512B (39) */
220 40, /* GC512C (40) */
222 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
223 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
224 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
225 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
226 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
227 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
230 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
233 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
239 struct provider_group_data_st
{
241 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
244 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
245 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
246 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
248 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
249 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
250 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
252 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
253 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
257 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
258 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
260 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
261 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
262 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
264 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
265 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
266 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
267 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
269 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
272 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
273 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
275 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
276 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
279 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
281 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
282 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
283 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
286 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
287 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
288 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
292 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
293 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
294 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
297 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
298 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
299 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
303 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
304 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
305 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
308 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
310 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
311 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
312 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
315 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
316 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
317 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
321 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
322 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
323 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
327 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
328 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
329 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
333 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
334 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
335 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
339 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
340 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
341 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
345 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
346 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
347 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
351 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
352 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
353 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
357 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
358 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
360 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
361 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
363 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
364 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
365 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
366 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
367 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
368 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
371 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
372 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
373 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
376 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
380 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
383 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
388 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
390 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
393 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
394 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
395 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
398 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
400 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
);
403 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
408 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
410 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(name
);
412 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
413 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(name
);
414 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
415 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(name
);
417 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
418 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
420 && nid
== tls1_group_id2nid(ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
,
422 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
428 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
432 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
433 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
434 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
440 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
441 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
449 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
450 * work for groups we don't know about.
452 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
454 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
455 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
457 if (!include_unknown
)
459 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
462 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
467 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
468 * work for groups we don't know about.
470 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
472 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
473 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
478 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
481 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
482 * the number of groups supported.
484 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
488 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
489 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
491 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
492 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
493 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
496 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
497 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
501 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
502 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
508 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
509 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
510 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
512 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
513 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
520 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
523 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
532 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
534 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
537 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
538 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
539 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
541 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
543 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
546 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
547 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
548 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
554 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
555 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
557 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
558 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
563 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
564 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
565 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
566 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
569 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
570 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
573 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
580 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
581 * if there is no match.
582 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
583 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
584 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
586 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
588 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
589 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
592 /* Can't do anything on client side */
596 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
598 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
599 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
601 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
603 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
604 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
605 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
606 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
607 /* Should never happen */
610 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
614 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
615 * otherwise peer decides.
617 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
618 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
619 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
621 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
622 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
625 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
626 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
628 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
629 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
637 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
641 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
642 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
644 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
648 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
649 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
651 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
652 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
653 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
659 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
663 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
664 unsigned long idmask
;
666 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
667 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
669 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
670 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
671 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
685 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
688 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
689 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
694 uint16_t gid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
697 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
699 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
706 if (garg
->gidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
708 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
710 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
713 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
716 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
717 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
719 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
723 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
724 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
732 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
738 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
741 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
745 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
749 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
750 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
752 const uint16_t *groups
;
758 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
759 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
760 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
762 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
763 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
765 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
766 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
769 /* Should never happen */
774 if (check_own_groups
) {
775 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
776 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
777 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
781 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
784 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
788 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
789 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
792 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
793 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
794 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
795 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
799 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
803 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
807 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
809 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
810 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
811 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
813 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
814 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
816 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
818 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
822 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
823 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
827 unsigned char comp_id
;
830 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
831 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
833 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
834 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
836 /* Get required compression id */
837 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
838 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
839 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
841 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
846 int field_type
= EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp
);
848 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
849 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
850 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
851 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
856 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
857 * supported (see RFC4492).
859 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
862 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
863 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
869 /* Return group id of a key */
870 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
872 int curve_nid
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
874 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
876 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
880 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
881 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
883 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
887 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
890 /* If not EC nothing to do */
891 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
893 /* Check compression */
894 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
896 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
898 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
901 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
904 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
907 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
911 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
912 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
913 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
914 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
915 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
917 return 0; /* Should never happen */
918 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
919 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
928 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
930 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
932 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
933 * is compatible with the client extensions.
935 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
937 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
939 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
941 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
943 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
946 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
947 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
948 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
949 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
956 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
961 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
963 /* Default sigalg schemes */
964 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
966 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
967 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
973 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
980 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
994 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1008 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1014 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1016 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1017 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1018 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1019 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1020 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1021 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1022 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1023 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1024 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1025 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1026 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1027 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1028 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1029 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1030 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1031 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1032 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1033 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1034 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1035 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1036 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1038 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1039 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1040 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1041 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1042 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1043 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1044 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1045 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1046 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1047 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1048 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1049 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1050 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1051 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1052 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1053 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1054 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1055 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1056 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1057 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1058 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1059 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1060 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1061 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1062 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1063 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1064 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1065 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1066 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1067 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1068 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1069 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1070 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1072 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1073 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1074 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1075 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1076 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1077 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1078 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1079 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1080 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1081 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1082 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1083 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1084 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1085 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1086 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1089 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1090 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1091 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1092 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1093 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1094 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1095 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1096 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1097 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1098 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1099 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1100 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1101 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1102 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1103 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1104 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1105 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1106 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1107 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1108 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1111 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1112 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1113 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1114 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1115 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1116 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1120 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1121 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1123 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1124 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1125 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1128 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1130 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1131 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1132 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1135 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1138 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1139 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1140 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1141 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1144 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1148 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1149 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1155 * Check hash is available.
1156 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1157 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1158 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1159 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1160 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1162 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1163 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1164 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1168 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1169 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1172 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1173 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1175 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1176 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1179 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1184 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1185 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1189 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1190 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1193 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1195 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1196 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1197 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1199 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
1204 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1205 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1210 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1211 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1214 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1224 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1226 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1227 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1228 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1230 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1231 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1232 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1238 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1240 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1246 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1247 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1248 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1249 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1250 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1252 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1258 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1259 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1260 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1262 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1269 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1271 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1274 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1276 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1283 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1284 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1286 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1289 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1291 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1298 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1301 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1303 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1304 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1306 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1308 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1312 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1314 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1316 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1317 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1320 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1322 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1324 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1327 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1331 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1334 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1338 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1340 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1341 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1343 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1344 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1347 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1348 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1353 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1354 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1355 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1357 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1358 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1359 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1360 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1361 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1362 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1364 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1365 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1371 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1372 * specified EC curve.
1374 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1376 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1379 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1380 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1381 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1383 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1384 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1387 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1392 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1393 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1394 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1403 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1406 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1408 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1411 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1415 int md_type
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1417 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1418 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1420 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1421 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1422 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1424 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1425 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1426 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1427 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1429 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1431 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1433 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1436 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1437 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1439 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1446 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1447 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1450 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1452 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1453 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1455 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1457 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1460 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1461 /* Should never happen */
1464 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1465 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1466 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1468 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1471 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1472 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1473 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1475 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1477 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1478 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1481 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1482 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1483 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1485 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1488 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1489 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1490 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1491 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1492 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1497 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1499 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1500 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1501 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1502 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1503 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1507 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1508 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1509 int curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
1511 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1513 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1517 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1518 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1519 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1521 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1524 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1525 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1526 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1527 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1529 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1530 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1535 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1537 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1542 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1543 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1544 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1545 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1548 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1549 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1550 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1552 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1555 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1557 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1561 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1562 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1564 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1565 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1566 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1568 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1569 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1570 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1572 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1575 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1576 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1580 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1582 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1584 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1588 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1590 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1592 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1597 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1598 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1599 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1601 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1604 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1606 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1608 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1609 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1610 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1611 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1612 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1615 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1616 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1617 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1618 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1620 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1622 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1623 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1624 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1631 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1632 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1633 * @c: cipher to check
1634 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1635 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1637 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1639 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1641 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1642 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1644 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1646 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1647 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1650 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1651 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1653 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1654 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1655 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1657 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1661 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1664 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1667 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1669 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1671 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1674 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1678 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1679 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1680 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1681 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1682 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1683 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1684 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1686 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1687 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1689 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1690 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1691 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1692 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1694 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1695 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1700 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1701 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1702 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1703 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1711 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1713 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1716 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1719 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1720 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1721 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1726 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1728 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1729 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1730 * point to the resulting session.
1732 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1736 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1739 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1742 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1743 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1746 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1747 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1749 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1750 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1751 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1753 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1755 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1756 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1760 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1762 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1763 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1764 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1765 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1768 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1769 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1770 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1771 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1772 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1773 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1775 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1776 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1777 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1778 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1779 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1780 * point to the resulting session.
1782 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1783 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1784 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1786 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1787 unsigned char *sdec
;
1788 const unsigned char *p
;
1789 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1790 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1792 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1793 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1794 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1795 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1797 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1799 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1800 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1802 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1805 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1807 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1808 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1809 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1810 * calculate the master secret later.
1812 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1816 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1817 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1818 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1822 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1823 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1825 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1828 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1830 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1834 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1836 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1839 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1842 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1843 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1844 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1846 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1849 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1850 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1851 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1852 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1853 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1856 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1860 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1866 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1868 /* Check key name matches */
1869 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1870 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1871 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1875 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1877 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1878 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1879 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1881 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1882 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1883 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1884 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1885 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1888 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1889 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1893 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1896 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1898 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1902 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1904 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1905 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1909 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1910 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1911 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1912 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1916 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1917 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1920 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1921 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1922 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1923 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1924 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1925 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1926 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1928 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1931 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1933 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1939 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1943 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1945 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1947 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1951 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1952 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1953 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1957 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1958 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1961 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1963 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1968 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1970 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1973 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1974 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1977 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1978 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1979 * performs any action
1981 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1982 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1983 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1984 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1985 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1986 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1989 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1990 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1991 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1993 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1995 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1996 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1999 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2000 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2001 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2005 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2006 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2007 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2008 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2009 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2013 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2014 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2015 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2016 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2017 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2018 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2019 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2021 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2025 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2029 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2031 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2032 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2033 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2034 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2043 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2044 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2046 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2049 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2051 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2052 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2054 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2055 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2056 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2057 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2058 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2061 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2062 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
2065 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2066 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2067 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2068 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2069 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2072 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2073 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2075 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2078 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2079 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2080 * ciphersuites enabled.
2083 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2086 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2087 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2088 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2089 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2091 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2092 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2093 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2096 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2104 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2105 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2106 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2107 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2108 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2112 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2113 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2117 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2119 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2120 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2121 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2123 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2126 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2127 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2128 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2129 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2134 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2138 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2139 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2140 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2141 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2143 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2146 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2147 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2152 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2153 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2155 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2160 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2161 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2163 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2164 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2165 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2166 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2174 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2175 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2176 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2177 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2179 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2180 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2181 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2182 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2184 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2185 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2187 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2188 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2199 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2200 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2202 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2203 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2205 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2207 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2209 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2210 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2211 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2212 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2213 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2214 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2215 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2216 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2217 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2218 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2220 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2221 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2224 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2225 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2229 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2230 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2232 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2234 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2238 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2242 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2243 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2247 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2253 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2255 /* Invalid data length */
2256 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2261 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2265 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2273 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2280 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2282 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2283 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2285 /* Should never happen */
2286 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2290 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2291 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2293 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2294 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2298 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2300 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2303 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2305 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2308 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2311 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2312 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2313 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2315 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2316 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2318 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2319 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
2320 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2325 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2326 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2327 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2329 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2330 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2331 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2334 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2336 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2340 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2342 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2343 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2345 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2347 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2348 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2349 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2351 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2354 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2355 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2356 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2358 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2359 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2361 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2362 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2364 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2366 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2368 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2369 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2370 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2372 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2374 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2375 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2378 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2379 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2383 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2384 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2387 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2389 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2390 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2391 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2392 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2393 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2394 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2395 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2396 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2398 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2399 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2400 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2403 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2404 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2406 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2408 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2410 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2411 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2412 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2415 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2417 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2419 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2421 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2423 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2424 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2425 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2426 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2427 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2428 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2432 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2434 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2435 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2439 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2446 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2447 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2448 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2450 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2452 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2453 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2457 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2461 /* Reject duplicates */
2462 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2463 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2472 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2473 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2475 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2479 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2483 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2486 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2491 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2495 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2498 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2499 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2500 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2502 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2503 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2504 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2510 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2512 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2517 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2521 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2523 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2524 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2525 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2527 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2529 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2530 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2535 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2540 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2541 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2542 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2544 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2545 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2546 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2552 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2556 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2558 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2560 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2562 if (default_nid
== -1)
2564 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2566 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2568 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2570 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2571 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2572 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2574 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2577 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2579 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2580 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2581 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2582 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2583 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2589 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2590 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2592 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2594 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2595 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2596 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2603 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2604 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2605 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2606 * attempting to use them.
2609 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2611 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2612 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2613 /* Strict mode flags */
2614 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2615 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2616 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2618 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2623 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2624 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2627 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2628 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2630 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2633 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2635 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2636 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2638 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2640 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2641 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2650 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2653 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2655 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2656 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2658 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2665 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2666 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2667 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2668 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2669 else if (!check_flags
)
2674 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2675 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2677 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2680 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2681 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2683 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2687 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2688 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2691 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2692 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2693 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2697 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2698 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2701 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2702 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2703 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2706 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2707 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2708 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2711 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2712 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2713 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2722 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2723 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2725 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2727 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2728 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2729 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2731 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2734 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2741 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2742 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2744 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2745 * so check_flags is always set.
2747 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2748 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2749 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2753 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2754 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2755 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2756 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2758 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2765 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2766 else if (check_flags
)
2767 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2769 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2770 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2771 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2772 else if (!check_flags
)
2775 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2776 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2777 else if (strict_mode
) {
2778 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2779 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2780 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2781 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2783 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2790 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2791 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2794 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2795 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2796 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2797 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2798 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2799 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2802 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2805 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2806 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2807 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2811 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2814 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2817 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2819 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2820 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2822 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2823 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2824 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2826 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2827 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2828 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2829 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2830 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2835 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2838 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2840 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2841 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2845 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2846 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2848 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2851 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2855 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2858 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2859 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2866 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2867 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2869 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2870 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2871 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2872 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2873 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2874 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2875 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2876 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2877 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2880 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2881 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2883 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2887 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2891 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2892 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2893 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2894 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2899 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2901 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2909 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2914 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2915 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2916 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2917 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2918 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2919 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2920 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2921 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2923 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2924 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2934 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2937 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2940 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2941 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2942 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2943 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2945 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2948 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2950 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2953 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2955 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2956 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2957 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2958 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2960 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2962 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2963 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2966 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2968 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2971 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2974 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2976 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2977 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2979 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2980 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2982 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2983 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2988 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2989 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2990 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2993 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2995 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2997 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3002 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3006 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3007 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3008 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3016 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3017 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3020 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3022 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3023 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3025 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3027 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3028 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3029 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3032 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3036 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3037 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3039 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3041 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3044 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3045 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3049 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3050 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3053 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3059 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3060 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3062 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3063 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3065 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3066 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3071 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3072 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3073 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3074 * signing certificate.
3076 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3083 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3084 * a viable public key is permitted.
3090 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3091 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3092 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3093 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3094 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3096 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3098 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3101 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3104 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3105 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3109 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3110 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3112 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3117 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3120 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3121 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3124 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3128 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3129 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3130 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3132 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3141 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3142 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3143 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3145 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3146 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3147 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3148 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3149 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3151 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3152 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3154 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3155 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3158 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3159 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3161 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3164 curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3165 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3170 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3171 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3172 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3178 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3185 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3186 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3188 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3189 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3191 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3192 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3193 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3195 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3197 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3200 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3201 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3203 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3204 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3209 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3213 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3214 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3216 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3219 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3221 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3225 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3228 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3233 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3236 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3237 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3240 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3243 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3245 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3246 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3249 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3250 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3252 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3253 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3254 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3256 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3260 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3266 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3267 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3268 * we have to assume GOST support.
3270 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3271 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3275 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3276 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3280 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3284 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3287 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3288 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3289 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3294 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3296 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3297 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3299 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3303 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3307 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3308 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3309 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3310 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3311 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3314 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3318 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3319 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3324 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3327 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3328 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3334 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3335 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3336 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3337 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3341 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3343 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3344 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
3346 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3350 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3354 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3356 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3357 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
3359 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3363 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3367 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3369 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3373 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3375 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3377 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3378 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3383 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3384 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3385 ret
->old_ctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3386 if (ret
->old_ctx
== NULL
)
3391 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", NULL
);
3392 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3397 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3403 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3406 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3408 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx
->old_ctx
);
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3415 HMAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3417 return ctx
->old_ctx
;
3421 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3426 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3428 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3430 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3431 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3432 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3433 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3434 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3438 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3439 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx
->old_ctx
, key
, len
,
3440 EVP_get_digestbyname(md
), NULL
);
3445 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3447 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3448 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3450 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3451 return HMAC_Update(ctx
->old_ctx
, data
, len
);
3456 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3459 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3460 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3462 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
) {
3465 if (HMAC_Final(ctx
->old_ctx
, md
, &l
) > 0) {
3475 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3477 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3478 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3480 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3481 return HMAC_size(ctx
->old_ctx
);