2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, size_t ticklen
,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id
, size_t sesslen
,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
37 tls1_export_keying_material
,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
40 tls_close_construct_packet
,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
54 tls1_export_keying_material
,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
57 tls_close_construct_packet
,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
71 tls1_export_keying_material
,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
75 tls_close_construct_packet
,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
82 tls13_setup_key_block
,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
89 tls1_export_keying_material
,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
92 tls_close_construct_packet
,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
113 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
115 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
122 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
123 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
125 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default
[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char eccurves_all
[] = {
188 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
189 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
190 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
191 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
192 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
193 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
194 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
197 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
198 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
200 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
202 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
203 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
204 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
205 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
206 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
207 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
208 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
209 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
210 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
211 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
212 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
213 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
214 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
215 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
216 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
217 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
218 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
219 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
220 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
224 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
225 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
229 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
, unsigned int *pflags
)
231 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
232 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
233 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
235 cinfo
= nid_list
+ curve_id
- 1;
237 *pflags
= cinfo
->flags
;
241 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
244 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
245 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
252 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
254 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
255 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
256 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
257 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
258 * lists in the first place.
259 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
260 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
261 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
263 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
, const unsigned char **pcurves
,
266 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
268 *pcurves
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
269 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
271 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
272 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
274 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
275 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
278 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
279 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
283 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
284 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
288 *pcurves
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
289 pcurveslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
292 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
293 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_default
);
297 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
298 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
303 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
308 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
309 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
311 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
314 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
316 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
317 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
321 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
324 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
325 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
327 const unsigned char *curves
;
328 size_t num_curves
, i
;
329 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
330 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
332 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
334 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
337 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
338 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
340 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
341 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
343 } else /* Should never happen */
346 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
348 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
349 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
350 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
356 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
357 * if there is no match.
358 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
359 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
360 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
362 int tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
364 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
365 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
367 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
373 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
374 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
376 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
377 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
378 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
379 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
380 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
381 /* Should never happen */
384 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
389 * but s->options is a long...
391 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
392 (s
, (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0, &supp
,
394 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
395 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
396 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
397 (s
, !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
), &pref
, &num_pref
))
398 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
401 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
404 if (num_supp
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0) {
406 num_supp
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
407 } else if (num_pref
== 0 &&
408 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0) {
410 num_pref
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
414 for (i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
415 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
416 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
417 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
418 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
421 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
422 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
, NULL
);
430 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
435 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
437 unsigned char *glist
, *p
;
440 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
443 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
444 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* 2);
447 for (i
= 0, p
= glist
; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
448 unsigned long idmask
;
450 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
451 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups
[i
]);
453 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
462 *pextlen
= ngroups
* 2;
466 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
473 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
475 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
481 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
483 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
485 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
487 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
488 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
489 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
490 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
491 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
492 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
494 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
495 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
497 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
501 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
502 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
506 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
510 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
513 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
514 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
521 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
522 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
525 /* Determine curve ID */
526 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
527 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
528 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
534 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
536 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
537 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
539 if ((nid_list
[id
- 1].flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME
)
540 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
542 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
548 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
549 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
550 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
552 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
553 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
556 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
557 * supported (see RFC4492).
559 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
560 pformats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
561 num_formats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
562 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
563 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
566 if (i
== num_formats
)
571 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
572 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
573 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
575 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
577 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
578 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
579 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
580 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
581 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
586 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
591 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
598 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
602 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
604 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
605 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
606 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
608 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
609 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
611 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
613 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
618 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
619 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
621 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
623 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
626 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
629 /* If not EC nothing to do */
630 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
632 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
636 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
639 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
643 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
644 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
646 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
652 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
653 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
654 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
655 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
656 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
658 return 0; /* Should never happen */
659 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
660 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
662 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
664 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
665 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
668 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
676 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
678 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
680 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
681 * is compatible with the client extensions.
683 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
688 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
691 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
692 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
693 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
694 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
695 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
696 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
697 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
701 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
702 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
706 /* Need a shared curve */
707 if (tls1_shared_group(s
, 0))
711 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
722 /* Default sigalg schemes */
723 static const unsigned int tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
740 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
744 static const unsigned int suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
750 typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st
{
756 static SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
757 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
, NID_sha256
, EVP_PKEY_EC
},
758 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
, NID_sha384
, EVP_PKEY_EC
},
759 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
, NID_sha512
, EVP_PKEY_EC
},
760 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, NID_sha1
, EVP_PKEY_EC
},
762 * PSS must appear before PKCS1 so that we prefer that when signing where
765 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
, NID_sha256
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
766 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
, NID_sha384
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
767 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
, NID_sha512
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
768 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
, NID_sha256
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
769 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
, NID_sha384
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
770 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
, NID_sha512
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
771 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, NID_sha1
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
},
772 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
, NID_sha256
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
},
773 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
, NID_sha384
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
},
774 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
, NID_sha512
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
},
775 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, NID_sha1
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
},
776 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
},
777 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
},
778 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, NID_id_GostR3411_94
, NID_id_GostR3410_2001
}
781 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg
)
786 for (i
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
788 if (curr
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
795 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(unsigned int sigalg
)
800 for (i
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
802 if (curr
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
809 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned int **psigs
)
812 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
816 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
817 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
818 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
819 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs
);
821 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
822 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
825 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
826 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 2;
830 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
831 if (s
->server
&& s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
) {
832 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
833 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
834 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
835 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
836 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
838 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
839 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
844 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
845 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
847 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD
**pmd
, SSL
*s
, unsigned int sig
,
850 const unsigned int *sent_sigs
;
852 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
853 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
854 /* Should never happen */
857 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
858 if (pkeyid
!= tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig
)) {
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
863 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
864 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
865 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
866 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
)))
868 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
872 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
873 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
876 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
) {
877 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig
) != NID_sha256
) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
879 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
882 } else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
) {
883 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig
) != NID_sha384
) {
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
885 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
891 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
895 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
896 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sent_sigs
);
897 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
898 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
901 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
902 if (i
== sent_sigslen
903 && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig
) != NID_sha1
904 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
908 *pmd
= tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig
));
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
914 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
915 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
917 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
918 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
919 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
920 EVP_MD_size(*pmd
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd
),
921 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
926 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
928 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_md
= *pmd
;
933 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
934 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
935 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
937 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
940 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
942 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
944 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
945 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
946 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
947 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
949 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
950 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
951 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
952 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
954 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
956 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
957 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
958 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
964 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
965 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
966 * @c: cipher to check
967 * @op: Security check that you want to do
969 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
971 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
973 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
974 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
976 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
978 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ((c
->min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
979 || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
981 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
982 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
985 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
988 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
990 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
992 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
995 /* Initialise digests to default values */
996 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
998 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1000 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1003 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1004 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1006 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
);
1007 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
];
1009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1010 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1013 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
);
1014 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
);
1015 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
);
1019 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1024 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1025 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1026 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1027 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1028 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1029 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1030 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1031 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1034 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1035 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
1036 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1038 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1041 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1042 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1044 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1045 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1049 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1053 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1058 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1060 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1061 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1062 * point to the resulting session.
1064 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1065 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1066 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1069 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1070 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1071 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1072 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1073 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1074 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1075 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1078 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1079 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1080 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1081 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1082 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1083 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1085 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1090 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1093 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1096 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1097 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1100 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1103 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1104 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1107 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1110 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1113 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1116 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1118 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1119 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1120 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1121 * calculate the master secret later.
1126 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1127 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1129 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1130 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1133 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1136 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1137 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1140 default: /* fatal error */
1146 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1148 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1149 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1150 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1151 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1152 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1153 * point to the resulting session.
1156 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1157 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1158 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1159 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1160 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1162 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1163 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1164 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1167 unsigned char *sdec
;
1168 const unsigned char *p
;
1169 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, ret
= -1, declen
;
1171 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1172 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1173 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
1174 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
1176 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1177 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1180 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1185 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1186 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1187 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1198 /* Check key name matches */
1199 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1200 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
1204 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
1205 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
1206 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1207 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1208 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
,
1209 etick
+ sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) <=
1215 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1218 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1222 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1224 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1229 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1230 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1231 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1234 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1235 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1236 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1239 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1240 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1241 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1242 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1243 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1244 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1245 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1246 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1250 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1251 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1256 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1260 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1264 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1265 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1266 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1270 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1271 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1280 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1284 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1285 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1289 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
1290 const EVP_MD
*md
, int *ispss
)
1292 int md_id
, sig_id
, tmpispss
= 0;
1294 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1298 md_id
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1299 sig_id
= EVP_PKEY_id(pk
);
1300 if (md_id
== NID_undef
)
1303 for (i
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1305 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1306 if (sig_id
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1307 tmpispss
= SIGID_IS_PSS(curr
->sigalg
);
1308 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && tmpispss
) {
1312 * Check peer actually sent a PSS sig id - it could have
1313 * been a PKCS1 sig id instead.
1315 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; j
++)
1316 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[j
].rsigalg
== curr
->sigalg
)
1319 if (j
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
)
1323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curr
->sigalg
))
1339 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info
[] = {
1340 {NID_md5
, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
},
1341 {NID_sha1
, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
},
1342 {NID_sha224
, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
},
1343 {NID_sha256
, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
},
1344 {NID_sha384
, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
},
1345 {NID_sha512
, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
},
1346 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
},
1347 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
},
1348 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
},
1351 static const tls12_hash_info
*tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid
)
1354 if (hash_nid
== NID_undef
)
1357 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info
); i
++) {
1358 if (tls12_md_info
[i
].nid
== hash_nid
)
1359 return tls12_md_info
+ i
;
1365 const EVP_MD
*tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid
)
1367 const tls12_hash_info
*inf
;
1368 if (hash_nid
== NID_md5
&& FIPS_mode())
1370 inf
= tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid
);
1373 return ssl_md(inf
->md_idx
);
1376 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid
)
1379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1381 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1385 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1389 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1392 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1393 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1395 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1396 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1398 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1399 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1405 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1406 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid
, int *psign_nid
,
1407 int *psignhash_nid
, unsigned int data
)
1409 int sign_nid
= NID_undef
, hash_nid
= NID_undef
;
1410 if (!phash_nid
&& !psign_nid
&& !psignhash_nid
)
1412 if (phash_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
1413 hash_nid
= tls_sigalg_get_hash(data
);
1415 *phash_nid
= hash_nid
;
1417 if (psign_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
1418 sign_nid
= tls_sigalg_get_sig(data
);
1420 *psign_nid
= sign_nid
;
1422 if (psignhash_nid
) {
1423 if (sign_nid
== NID_undef
|| hash_nid
== NID_undef
1424 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid
, hash_nid
, sign_nid
) <= 0)
1425 *psignhash_nid
= NID_undef
;
1429 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1430 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, unsigned int ptmp
)
1432 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1433 const tls12_hash_info
*hinf
1434 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp
));
1435 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1437 if (hinf
== NULL
|| ssl_md(hinf
->md_idx
) == NULL
)
1439 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1440 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp
)) == -1)
1442 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1443 sigalgstr
[0] = (ptmp
>> 8) & 0xff;
1444 sigalgstr
[1] = ptmp
& 0xff;
1445 return ssl_security(s
, op
, hinf
->secbits
, hinf
->nid
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1449 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1450 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1454 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1456 const unsigned int *sigalgs
;
1457 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1458 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
1460 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1461 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1462 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1464 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
);
1465 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1466 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs
)) {
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1469 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1475 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1481 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, *sigalgs
))
1488 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
1490 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
1492 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
1495 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1496 const unsigned int *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1500 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1501 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, *psig
)) {
1502 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1509 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1510 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, TLS_SIGALGS
*shsig
,
1511 const unsigned int *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1512 const unsigned int *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1514 const unsigned int *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1515 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1516 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1517 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1518 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, *ptmp
))
1520 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1521 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1524 shsig
->rsigalg
= *ptmp
;
1525 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig
->hash_nid
,
1527 &shsig
->signandhash_nid
, *ptmp
);
1537 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1538 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1540 const unsigned int *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1541 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1543 TLS_SIGALGS
*salgs
= NULL
;
1545 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1547 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1548 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1549 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1550 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1551 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1552 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1553 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1554 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1555 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1556 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1558 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &conf
);
1559 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1562 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1563 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1567 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1568 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1570 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1572 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS
));
1575 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1579 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1580 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1584 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1586 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1591 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1592 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1594 /* Should never happen */
1598 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1600 /* Invalid data length */
1601 if ((size
& 1) != 0)
1606 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1607 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
1608 * sizeof(*s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
));
1609 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
1611 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= size
;
1612 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
[i
]);
1622 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1627 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
1628 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1630 TLS_SIGALGS
*sigptr
;
1631 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1634 for (i
= 0, sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
;
1635 i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++, sigptr
++) {
1636 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1638 && (sigptr
->rsigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
1639 || sigptr
->rsigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
1640 || sigptr
->rsigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
1641 || sigptr
->rsigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
))
1643 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->sign_nid
);
1644 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
1645 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigptr
->hash_nid
);
1647 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1648 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
1649 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1650 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
1656 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1657 * use the certificate for signing.
1659 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1660 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1662 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1663 * supported it stays as NULL.
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1666 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
1667 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1670 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
1671 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1672 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1676 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
1677 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1680 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] == NULL
)
1681 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
);
1682 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] == NULL
)
1683 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] =
1684 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
);
1685 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] == NULL
)
1686 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] =
1687 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
);
1693 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1694 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1695 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1697 unsigned int *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1698 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1699 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1702 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1706 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1708 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1709 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash
, psign
, psignhash
, *psig
);
1711 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1714 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1715 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1716 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1718 TLS_SIGALGS
*shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
;
1719 if (!shsigalgs
|| idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1720 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1724 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash_nid
;
1726 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sign_nid
;
1728 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->signandhash_nid
;
1730 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->rsigalg
& 0xff);
1732 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->rsigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1733 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1736 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1740 int sigalgs
[MAX_SIGALGLEN
];
1743 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1745 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1746 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1747 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1748 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1749 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1750 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1752 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1753 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1754 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1758 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1760 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1763 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1766 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== MAX_SIGALGLEN
)
1768 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1770 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1772 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1780 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1781 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1783 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1786 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
1787 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
1790 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
1791 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
1796 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1797 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1799 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1803 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1807 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1810 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Needs updating to allow setting of TLS1.3 sig algs */
1811 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1813 unsigned int *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1818 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1819 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1822 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to be able to set RSA-PSS as well as
1823 * RSA-PKCS1. For now we only allow setting of RSA-PKCS1
1825 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1827 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1828 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1829 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1831 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1833 /* Skip setting PSS so we get PKCS1 by default */
1834 if (SIGID_IS_PSS(curr
->sigalg
))
1836 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1837 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
1842 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1847 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1848 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1849 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1851 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1852 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1853 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1859 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1863 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1867 if (default_nid
== -1)
1869 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1871 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1872 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1873 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
1878 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1879 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1883 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1884 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1885 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1892 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1893 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1894 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1895 * attempting to use them.
1898 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1900 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1901 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1902 /* Strict mode flags */
1903 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1904 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1905 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1907 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1912 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1913 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1916 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1917 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1919 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1922 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1924 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1925 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1927 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1929 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1930 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1936 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
1939 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1941 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1942 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
1944 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
1951 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1952 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
1953 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
1954 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1955 else if (!check_flags
)
1960 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1961 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1963 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
1966 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
1968 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1971 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
1972 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
1973 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1974 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
1977 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1978 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1979 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
1983 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1984 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
1987 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1988 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
1989 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
1992 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1993 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
1994 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
1997 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1998 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
1999 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2008 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2009 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2011 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2013 const unsigned int *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2014 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2015 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p
) == NID_sha1
2016 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p
) == rsign
)
2019 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2026 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2027 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2031 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2032 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2033 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2034 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2036 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2043 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2044 else if (check_flags
)
2045 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2047 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2048 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
2049 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2050 else if (!check_flags
)
2053 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2054 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2055 else if (strict_mode
) {
2056 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2057 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2058 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2059 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2061 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2068 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2069 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2071 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2073 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2076 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2079 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2083 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
2087 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
2089 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2090 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
2092 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
2093 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
2094 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2098 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2101 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2103 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
2105 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2106 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2108 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2109 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2110 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2112 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2113 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2114 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2115 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2116 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2121 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2124 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2126 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2127 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2131 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2132 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
2133 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2134 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
2135 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2137 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2140 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2144 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
2147 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2148 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2155 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2156 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2158 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
2159 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
2160 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2161 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2162 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2163 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2164 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2167 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2168 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2170 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2174 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2176 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2177 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2178 return DH_get_1024_160();
2179 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2180 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2185 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2186 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
2189 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2197 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2198 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2200 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2201 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2209 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2210 return DH_get_2048_224();
2211 return DH_get_1024_160();
2215 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2218 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2221 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2222 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2223 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2224 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2226 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2229 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2231 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2234 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2236 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2237 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
2238 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2239 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2241 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2242 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
2244 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
2245 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
2248 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2250 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2253 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2256 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2258 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2259 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2261 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2262 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2264 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2265 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2270 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2271 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2272 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2275 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2277 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2279 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2284 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2288 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2289 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2290 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);