2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default
[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id
)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (curve_id
< 1 || curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
194 return &nid_list
[curve_id
- 1];
197 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
200 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
201 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
208 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
210 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
211 * the length of |pcurves| is num_curves.
212 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
213 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
214 * lists in the first place.
216 void tls1_get_grouplist(SSL
*s
, int sess
, const uint16_t **pcurves
,
221 *pcurves
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
222 *pcurveslen
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
225 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
226 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
228 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
229 *pcurveslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
232 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
233 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
238 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
243 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
244 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
245 *pcurveslen
= OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default
);
247 *pcurves
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
248 *pcurveslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
254 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
255 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve
, int op
)
257 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
;
258 unsigned char ctmp
[2];
261 if (curve
< 1 || curve
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
263 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
- 1];
264 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
265 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
268 ctmp
[0] = curve
>> 8;
269 ctmp
[1] = curve
& 0xff;
270 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)ctmp
);
273 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
274 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
276 const uint16_t *curves
;
278 size_t num_curves
, i
;
279 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
280 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
282 curve_id
= (p
[1] << 8) | p
[2];
283 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
285 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
286 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
287 if (curve_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
289 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
290 if (curve_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
292 } else /* Should never happen */
295 tls1_get_grouplist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
);
296 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++) {
297 if (curve_id
== curves
[i
])
298 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, curve_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
304 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
305 * if there is no match.
306 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
307 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
308 * an tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
310 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
312 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
313 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
316 /* Can't do anything on client side */
320 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
322 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
323 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
325 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
327 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
328 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
329 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
330 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
331 /* Should never happen */
334 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
338 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_grouplist takes an int
339 * but s->options is a long...
341 tls1_get_grouplist(s
,
342 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0,
344 tls1_get_grouplist(s
,
345 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0,
348 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
349 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
351 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++) {
353 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
363 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
367 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
368 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
373 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
376 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
377 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
));
380 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
381 unsigned long idmask
;
383 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
384 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
386 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
399 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
403 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
406 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
408 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
414 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
416 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
418 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
420 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
421 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
422 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
423 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
424 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
425 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
427 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
428 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
430 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
434 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
435 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
439 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
443 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
445 /* Return group id of a key */
446 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
448 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
453 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
454 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
457 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
458 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
462 unsigned char comp_id
;
465 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
466 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
468 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
469 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
471 /* Get required compression id */
472 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
473 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
474 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
475 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
478 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
480 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
481 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
482 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
483 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
488 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
489 * supported (see RFC4492).
491 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
)
494 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
495 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
500 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
501 static int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
)
503 const uint16_t *groups
;
504 size_t i
, groups_len
;
509 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
510 tls1_get_grouplist(s
, 0, &groups
, &groups_len
);
511 for (i
= 0; i
< groups_len
; i
++) {
512 if (groups
[i
] == group_id
)
518 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
522 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
523 tls1_get_grouplist(s
, 1, &groups
, &groups_len
);
526 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
527 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
528 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
529 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
534 for (i
= 0; i
< groups_len
; i
++) {
535 if (groups
[i
] == group_id
)
541 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
545 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
547 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
548 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
549 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
551 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
552 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
554 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
556 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
561 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
562 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
564 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
568 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
571 /* If not EC nothing to do */
572 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
574 /* Check compression */
575 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
577 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
578 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
))
581 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
584 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
589 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
590 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
591 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
592 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
593 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
595 return 0; /* Should never happen */
596 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
597 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
606 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
608 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
610 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
611 * is compatible with the client extensions.
613 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
615 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
617 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
619 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
621 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
624 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
625 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
);
626 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
627 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
);
634 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
639 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
641 /* Default sigalg schemes */
642 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
647 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
655 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
670 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
681 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
683 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
684 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
685 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
686 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
687 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
688 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
689 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
690 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
691 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
692 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
693 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
694 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
695 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
696 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
697 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
698 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
699 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
700 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
702 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
703 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
704 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
705 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
706 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
707 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
708 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
709 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
710 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
711 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
712 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
713 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
714 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
715 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
716 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
717 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
718 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
719 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
720 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
721 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
722 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
723 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
724 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
725 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
728 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
729 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
730 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
731 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
732 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
733 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
734 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
735 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
736 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
737 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
738 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
739 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
740 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
741 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
744 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
745 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
746 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
747 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
748 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
749 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
750 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
751 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
752 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
753 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
754 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
755 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
758 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
759 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
760 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
761 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
762 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
767 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
768 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
770 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
771 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
772 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
773 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
774 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
775 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
776 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
777 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
778 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
781 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
782 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
785 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
787 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
789 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
794 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
795 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
800 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
801 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
804 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
814 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
815 * is fixed by the certificate type.
817 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
823 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
824 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
825 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
827 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
833 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
836 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
838 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
839 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
841 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
845 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
847 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
848 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
851 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
853 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
855 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
858 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
862 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
865 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
869 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
870 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
871 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
872 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
874 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
875 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
878 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
879 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
884 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
885 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
886 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
888 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
889 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
890 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
891 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
892 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
893 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
895 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
896 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
901 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
902 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
905 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
907 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
908 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
910 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
911 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
912 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
914 /* Should never happen */
917 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
918 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
919 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
923 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
924 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
925 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
927 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
929 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
930 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
933 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
934 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
935 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
942 /* Check point compression is permitted */
943 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
945 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
949 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
951 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
952 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
954 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
959 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
960 /* Check curve matches extensions */
961 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
))) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
965 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
966 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
967 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
968 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
970 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
975 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
980 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
981 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
982 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
983 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
986 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
987 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
988 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
992 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
998 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
999 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1001 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1002 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1003 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1004 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1005 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1010 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1011 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1015 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1017 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1019 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1024 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1025 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1026 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1028 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1031 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1033 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1035 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1036 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1037 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1038 ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1040 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1041 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1042 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1043 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1045 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1047 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1048 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1049 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1055 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1056 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1057 * @c: cipher to check
1058 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1059 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1061 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1063 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1065 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1066 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1068 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1070 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1071 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1074 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1075 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1077 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1078 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1079 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1081 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
))
1084 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1085 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1088 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1091 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1093 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1095 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1098 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1103 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1104 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1105 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1106 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1107 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1108 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1109 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1111 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1112 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1114 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1115 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1116 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1118 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1119 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1124 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1125 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1126 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1127 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1135 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1137 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1140 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1142 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1144 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1146 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1151 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1153 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1154 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1155 * point to the resulting session.
1157 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1158 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1159 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1162 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1163 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1164 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1165 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1166 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1167 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1168 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1171 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1172 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1173 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1174 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1175 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1176 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1178 TICKET_RETURN
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1183 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1186 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1189 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1190 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1193 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1196 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1197 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1200 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1203 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1206 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1207 return TICKET_EMPTY
;
1209 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1211 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1212 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1213 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1214 * calculate the master secret later.
1216 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1219 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1220 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1222 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1223 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1224 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1226 case TICKET_SUCCESS
:
1227 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1229 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1230 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1231 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1234 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1239 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1241 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1242 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1243 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1244 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1245 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1246 * point to the resulting session.
1248 TICKET_RETURN
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1249 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1250 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1253 unsigned char *sdec
;
1254 const unsigned char *p
;
1255 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1256 TICKET_RETURN ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1258 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1259 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
1261 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1263 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1264 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1266 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1267 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1269 ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1272 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1273 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1274 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1279 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1285 /* Check key name matches */
1286 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1287 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
1288 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1291 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
1292 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
1293 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1294 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1295 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
,
1297 + sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) <= 0) {
1302 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1305 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1309 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1311 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1312 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1316 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1317 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1318 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1321 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1322 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1324 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1326 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1327 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1328 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1329 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1330 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1331 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1332 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1335 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1337 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1338 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1340 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1347 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1351 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1352 if (slen
!= 0 || sess
->session_id_length
!= 0) {
1353 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1354 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1357 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1358 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1359 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1363 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1364 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1367 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1369 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1373 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1375 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1377 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1378 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1382 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1383 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1385 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1388 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1389 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1391 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1392 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1394 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1395 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1396 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1397 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1398 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1400 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1401 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1403 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1405 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1406 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1407 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1408 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1409 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1410 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1414 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1415 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1419 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1421 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1422 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1423 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1425 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1428 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1429 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1430 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1431 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1436 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1438 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1439 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1440 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1441 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1443 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1446 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1447 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1452 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1453 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1455 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1460 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1461 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1463 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1464 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1465 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1466 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1474 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1475 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1476 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1477 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1479 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1480 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1481 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1482 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1484 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1485 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1487 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1488 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1499 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1500 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1502 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1503 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1505 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1507 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1509 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1510 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1511 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1512 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1513 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1514 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1515 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1516 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1517 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1518 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1520 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1521 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1524 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1525 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1529 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1530 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1532 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1534 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
));
1537 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1541 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1542 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1546 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1552 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1554 /* Invalid data length */
1555 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1560 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
));
1563 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1571 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1578 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1580 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1581 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1583 /* Should never happen */
1584 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1587 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1588 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1593 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1595 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1598 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1601 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1604 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1607 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1608 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1609 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1611 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1612 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1614 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1615 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1616 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1621 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1622 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1623 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1625 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1626 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1627 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1630 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1632 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1636 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1638 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1639 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1641 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1643 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1644 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1645 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1647 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1650 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1651 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1652 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1654 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1655 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1657 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1658 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1660 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1662 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1664 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1665 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1666 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1668 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1670 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1671 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1674 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1675 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1679 int sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1682 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1684 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1685 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1686 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1687 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1688 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1689 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1690 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1691 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1693 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1694 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1695 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1698 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1699 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1701 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1703 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1705 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1706 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1709 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1711 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1713 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1715 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1716 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1718 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1720 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1722 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1733 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1734 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1737 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| (p
!= NULL
&& hash_alg
== NID_undef
))
1740 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
1741 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
1744 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
1745 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
1750 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1751 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1753 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1757 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1761 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1764 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1766 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1771 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1772 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1774 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1776 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1777 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1778 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1780 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1782 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1783 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
1788 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1793 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1794 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1795 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1797 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1798 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1799 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1805 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1809 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1813 if (default_nid
== -1)
1815 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1817 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1818 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1819 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1824 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1825 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1829 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1830 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1831 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1838 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1839 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1840 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1841 * attempting to use them.
1844 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1846 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1847 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1848 /* Strict mode flags */
1849 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1850 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1851 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1853 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1858 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1859 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1862 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1863 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1865 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1868 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1870 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1871 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1873 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1875 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1876 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1885 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
1888 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1890 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1891 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
1893 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
1900 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1901 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
1902 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
1903 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1904 else if (!check_flags
)
1909 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1910 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1912 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
1915 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
1917 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1921 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1922 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
1925 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1926 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1927 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
1931 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1932 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
1935 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1936 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
1937 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
1940 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1941 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
1942 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
1945 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1946 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
1947 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
1956 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1957 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1959 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1961 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1962 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
1963 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
1965 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
1968 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
1975 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1976 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
1980 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
1981 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
1982 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1983 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
1985 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
1992 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
1993 else if (check_flags
)
1994 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
1996 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
1997 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
1998 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
1999 else if (!check_flags
)
2002 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2003 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2004 else if (strict_mode
) {
2005 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2006 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2007 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2008 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2010 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2017 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2018 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2020 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2022 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2025 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2028 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2032 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2035 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2036 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2037 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2041 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2044 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2047 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2049 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2050 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2052 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2053 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2054 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2056 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2057 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2058 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2059 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2060 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2065 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2068 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2070 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2071 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2075 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2076 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2078 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2081 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2085 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2088 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2089 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2096 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2097 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2099 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2100 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2101 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2102 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2103 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2104 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2105 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2106 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2109 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2110 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2112 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2116 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2118 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2119 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2120 return DH_get_1024_160();
2121 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2122 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2127 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2129 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2132 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2140 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2141 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2143 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2144 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2152 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2153 return DH_get_2048_224();
2154 return DH_get_1024_160();
2158 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2161 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2164 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2165 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2166 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2167 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2169 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2172 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2174 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2177 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2179 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2180 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2181 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2182 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2184 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2186 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2187 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2190 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2192 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2195 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2198 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2200 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2201 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2203 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2204 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2206 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2207 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2212 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2213 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2214 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2217 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2219 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2221 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2226 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2230 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2231 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2232 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2240 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2241 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2244 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2246 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2247 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2249 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2250 if (clu
== NULL
|| !(clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
))
2253 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2254 if (sig_idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, sig_idx
))
2255 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2257 return s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2261 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2262 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2264 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2265 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2267 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2268 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2269 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2271 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2273 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2276 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2277 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2279 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2282 int curve
= -1, skip_ec
= 0;
2285 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2286 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2287 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2289 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2290 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2291 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2292 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2293 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2295 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
2297 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, lu
->sig_idx
)) {
2298 if (lu
->sig_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2299 || !ssl_has_cert(s
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
))
2301 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2303 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2306 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2308 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2309 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
)
2310 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
)
2313 if (skip_ec
|| (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
))
2321 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2324 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2326 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2330 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2331 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2333 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2336 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2337 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2342 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2343 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2344 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2345 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2352 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2355 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2356 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2359 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2362 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2364 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2365 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
) {
2366 if (sig_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2367 || cc_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
)
2369 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2373 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2377 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2380 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2386 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2388 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2389 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
2391 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2394 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2399 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2400 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2401 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2402 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
)
2405 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2409 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2414 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2417 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2424 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2425 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2426 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2427 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;