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1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #endif
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 #endif
133
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190 };
191
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
199 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
220 s->version = s->method->version;
221 }
222
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224
225 typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
236 {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 };
266
267
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
269 {
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
305 };
306
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
320 }
321
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
398 return;
399 }
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
402 {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
406 break;
407
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
427
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
439 }
440
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *curves;
445 size_t curveslen, i;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
448 return 0;
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
450 if (suiteb_flags)
451 {
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
453 if (p[1])
454 return 0;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
456 {
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 {
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 else /* Should never happen */
466 return 0;
467 }
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
470 {
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
473 }
474 return 0;
475 }
476
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
479 * an EC tmp key.
480 */
481
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
483 {
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
486 int k;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
488 if (s->server == 0)
489 return -1;
490 if (nmatch == -2)
491 {
492 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
493 {
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
496 * checks.
497 */
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
504 return NID_undef;
505 }
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
507 nmatch = 0;
508 }
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
510 &supp, &supplen);
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
512 &pref, &preflen);
513 preflen /= 2;
514 supplen /= 2;
515 k = 0;
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
517 {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
520 {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
522 {
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 continue;
525 if (nmatch == k)
526 {
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
529 }
530 k++;
531 }
532 }
533 }
534 if (nmatch == -1)
535 return k;
536 return 0;
537 }
538
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 {
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 size_t i;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
546 */
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
549 if (!clist)
550 return 0;
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
552 {
553 unsigned long idmask;
554 int id;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 idmask = 1L << id;
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
558 {
559 OPENSSL_free(clist);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 dup_list |= idmask;
563 s2n(id, p);
564 }
565 if (*pext)
566 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
567 *pext = clist;
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 return 1;
570 }
571
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
573
574 typedef struct
575 {
576 size_t nidcnt;
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
578 } nid_cb_st;
579
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
581 {
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 size_t i;
584 int nid;
585 char etmp[20];
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 return 0;
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 return 0;
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 etmp[len] = 0;
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 return 0;
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 return 0;
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 return 1;
604 }
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
607 const char *str)
608 {
609 nid_cb_st ncb;
610 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
612 return 0;
613 if (pext == NULL)
614 return 1;
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 }
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 EC_KEY *ec)
620 {
621 int is_prime, id;
622 const EC_GROUP *grp;
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
624 if (!ec)
625 return 0;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
628 if (!grp)
629 return 0;
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
631 if (!meth)
632 return 0;
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
634 is_prime = 1;
635 else
636 is_prime = 0;
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
641 if (id)
642 {
643 curve_id[0] = 0;
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
645 }
646 else
647 {
648 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
649 if (is_prime)
650 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
651 else
652 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
653 }
654 if (comp_id)
655 {
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
657 return 0;
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
659 {
660 if (is_prime)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
662 else
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
664 }
665 else
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
667 }
668 return 1;
669 }
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
673 {
674 const unsigned char *p;
675 size_t plen, i;
676 int j;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
679 */
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
681 {
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
685 {
686 if (*comp_id == *p)
687 break;
688 }
689 if (i == plen)
690 return 0;
691 }
692 if (!curve_id)
693 return 1;
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
696 {
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
699 {
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
701 break;
702 }
703 if (i == plen)
704 return 0;
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
706 if (!s->server)
707 break;
708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
711
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
713 size_t *pformatslen)
714 {
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
716 * use default */
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
726 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
728 else
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
730 }
731 }
732
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
735 */
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
737 {
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
739 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
740 int rv;
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
742 if (!pkey)
743 return 0;
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
746 {
747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
748 return 1;
749 }
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 if (!rv)
753 return 0;
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
756 */
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
758 if (!rv)
759 return 0;
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 */
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 int check_md;
766 size_t i;
767 CERT *c = s->cert;
768 if (curve_id[0])
769 return 0;
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
775 else
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
779 break;
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
781 return 0;
782 if (set_ee_md == 2)
783 {
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
786 else
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
788 }
789 }
790 return rv;
791 }
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
794 {
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
800 return 1;
801 #endif
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
804 */
805 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 {
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
812 else
813 return 0;
814 curve_id[0] = 0;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
817 return 0;
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
820 return 1;
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
822 else
823 {
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
825 if (!ec)
826 return 0;
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
828 return 0;
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
830 return 1;
831 return 0;
832 }
833
834 }
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
836 {
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
839 return 1;
840 else return 0;
841 }
842 if (!ec)
843 {
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
845 return 1;
846 else
847 return 0;
848 }
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
850 return 0;
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
852 #if 0
853 return 1;
854 #else
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
856 #endif
857 }
858
859 #else
860
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
862 {
863 return 1;
864 }
865
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
867
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
869
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
872 */
873
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
876 #else
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
878 #endif
879
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
882 #else
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
884 #endif
885
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
888 #else
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
890 #endif
891
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
896
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
901 #endif
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
905 #endif
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
908 #endif
909 };
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914 };
915 #endif
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
917 {
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
919 * preferences.
920 */
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 {
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
927
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return 2;
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
934 return 2;
935 }
936 #endif
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
939 {
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
942 }
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
944 {
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
947 }
948 else
949 {
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
952 }
953 }
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
956 */
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
959 {
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
964 if (sigalg == -1)
965 return -1;
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
970 return 0;
971 }
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
974 {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
982 return 0;
983 }
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 {
987 if (curve_id[0])
988 return 0;
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
990 {
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
995 return 0;
996 }
997 }
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
999 {
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1001 {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 }
1007 else
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1012 return 0;
1013 #endif
1014
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1018 {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1020 break;
1021 }
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1024 {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1029 if (*pmd == NULL)
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1032 return 0;
1033 }
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1037 (void *)sig))
1038 {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1043 * wish.
1044 */
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1047 return 1;
1048 }
1049
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1054 *
1055 */
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 {
1058 CERT *c = s->cert;
1059 c->mask_a = 0;
1060 c->mask_k = 0;
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1064 else
1065 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1069 */
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1078 {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 }
1082 #endif
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1086 {
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1089 }
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1093 {
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1096 }
1097 #endif
1098 c->valid = 1;
1099 }
1100
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1102 {
1103 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1105 return 1;
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1107 }
1108
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1110 {
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1112 return 0;
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1114 }
1115
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1117 {
1118 int extdatalen=0;
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 int using_ecc = 0;
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1125 {
1126 int i;
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1129
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1131 {
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1133
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1138 {
1139 using_ecc = 1;
1140 break;
1141 }
1142 }
1143 }
1144 #endif
1145
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1149 return orig;
1150
1151 ret+=2;
1152
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1154
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1156 {
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1159 long lenmax;
1160
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1166 + hostname length
1167 */
1168
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1171 return NULL;
1172
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1176
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1179
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1182 s2n(size_str,ret);
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1184 ret+=size_str;
1185 }
1186
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1188 if (s->renegotiate)
1189 {
1190 int el;
1191
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1193 {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 return NULL;
1196 }
1197
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1199
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1201 s2n(el,ret);
1202
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1204 {
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return NULL;
1207 }
1208
1209 ret += el;
1210 }
1211
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1216
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1219 {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1221 return NULL;
1222 }
1223
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1228 */
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1230
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1236 ret+=login_len;
1237 }
1238 #endif
1239
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1241 if (using_ecc)
1242 {
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1244 long lenmax;
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1246 size_t plistlen;
1247 size_t i;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1249
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1251
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > 255)
1255 {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 return NULL;
1258 }
1259
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1264 ret+=plistlen;
1265
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1269
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1273 {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 return NULL;
1276 }
1277
1278
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1280 etmp = ret + 4;
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1283 {
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1285 {
1286 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1287 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1288 }
1289 }
1290
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1292
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1297 */
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1299 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1300 ret+=plistlen;
1301 }
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1303
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1305 {
1306 int ticklen;
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1311 {
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1315 return NULL;
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1318 ticklen);
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1320 }
1321 else
1322 ticklen = 0;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1325 goto skip_ext;
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1327 * rest for ticket
1328 */
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1331 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1332 if (ticklen)
1333 {
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1335 ret += ticklen;
1336 }
1337 }
1338 skip_ext:
1339
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1341 {
1342 size_t salglen;
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1347 return NULL;
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1349 etmp = ret;
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1351 ret += 4;
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1355 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1356 ret += salglen;
1357 }
1358
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1361 {
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1363
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1365 return NULL;
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1367 return NULL;
1368
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1370 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1371 s2n(col, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1373 ret += col;
1374 }
1375 #endif
1376
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1378 {
1379 int i;
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1381 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1382
1383 idlen = 0;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1385 {
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1388 if (itmp <= 0)
1389 return NULL;
1390 idlen += itmp + 2;
1391 }
1392
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1394 {
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1396 if (extlen < 0)
1397 return NULL;
1398 }
1399 else
1400 extlen = 0;
1401
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1405 return NULL;
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1408 s2n(idlen, ret);
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1410 {
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1415 ret += 2;
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1417 /* write id len */
1418 s2n(itmp, q);
1419 }
1420 s2n(extlen, ret);
1421 if (extlen > 0)
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1423 }
1424
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1428 return NULL;
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1430 s2n(1,ret);
1431 /* Set mode:
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1434 */
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1437 else
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1439 #endif
1440
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1443 {
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1447 return NULL;
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1449 s2n(0,ret);
1450 }
1451 #endif
1452
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1454 {
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1456 return NULL;
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1463 }
1464
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1466 {
1467 int el;
1468
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1470
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1472
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1474 s2n(el,ret);
1475
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1477 {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1479 return NULL;
1480 }
1481 ret += el;
1482 }
1483
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1486 return NULL;
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1489 s2n(0,ret);
1490 #endif
1491
1492 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1493 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1494 *
1495 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1496 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1497 */
1498 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1499 {
1500 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1501 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1502 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1503 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1504 */
1505 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1506 hlen -= 5;
1507 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1508 {
1509 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1510 if (hlen >= 4)
1511 hlen -= 4;
1512 else
1513 hlen = 0;
1514
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1516 s2n(hlen, ret);
1517 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1518 ret += hlen;
1519 }
1520 }
1521
1522 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1523 return orig;
1524
1525 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1526 return ret;
1527 }
1528
1529 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1530 {
1531 int extdatalen=0;
1532 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1533 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1536 #endif
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1539 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1540 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1541 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1542 #endif
1543 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1545 return orig;
1546
1547 ret+=2;
1548 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1549
1550 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1551 {
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1553
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1555 s2n(0,ret);
1556 }
1557
1558 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1559 {
1560 int el;
1561
1562 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1563 {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565 return NULL;
1566 }
1567
1568 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1569
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1571 s2n(el,ret);
1572
1573 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1574 {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 return NULL;
1577 }
1578
1579 ret += el;
1580 }
1581
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1583 if (using_ecc)
1584 {
1585 const unsigned char *plist;
1586 size_t plistlen;
1587 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1588 long lenmax;
1589
1590 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1591
1592 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1593 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1594 if (plistlen > 255)
1595 {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 return NULL;
1598 }
1599
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1601 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1602 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1603 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1604 ret+=plistlen;
1605
1606 }
1607 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609
1610 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1611 {
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1614 s2n(0,ret);
1615 }
1616
1617 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1618 {
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1621 s2n(0,ret);
1622 }
1623
1624 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1626 {
1627 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1628
1629 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1630 return NULL;
1631 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1632 return NULL;
1633
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1635 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1636 s2n(sol, ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1638 ret += sol;
1639 }
1640 #endif
1641
1642 if(s->srtp_profile)
1643 {
1644 int el;
1645
1646 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1647
1648 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1649
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1651 s2n(el,ret);
1652
1653 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1654 {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 return NULL;
1657 }
1658 ret+=el;
1659 }
1660
1661 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1662 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1663 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1664 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1665 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1666 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1667 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1668 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1669 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1670 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1671 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1672 ret+=36;
1673
1674 }
1675
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1677 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1678 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1679 {
1680 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1681 return NULL;
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1683 s2n(1,ret);
1684 /* Set mode:
1685 * 1: peer may send requests
1686 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1687 */
1688 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1689 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1690 else
1691 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1692
1693 }
1694 #endif
1695
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1697 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1699 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1700 {
1701 const unsigned char *npa;
1702 unsigned int npalen;
1703 int r;
1704
1705 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1706 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1707 {
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1710 s2n(npalen,ret);
1711 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1712 ret += npalen;
1713 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1714 }
1715 }
1716 #endif
1717 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1718 return NULL;
1719 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1720 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1721 {
1722 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1723 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1724 */
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1726 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1727 else
1728 {
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1730 s2n(0,ret);
1731 }
1732 }
1733 #endif
1734
1735 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1736 {
1737 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1738 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1739
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1741 return NULL;
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1743 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1744 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1745 *ret++ = len;
1746 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1747 ret += len;
1748 }
1749
1750 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1751 return orig;
1752
1753 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1754 return ret;
1755 }
1756
1757 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1758 * ClientHello.
1759 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1760 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1762 * return.
1763 *
1764 * returns: 0 on success. */
1765 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1766 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1767 {
1768 unsigned i;
1769 unsigned proto_len;
1770 const unsigned char *selected;
1771 unsigned char selected_len;
1772 int r;
1773
1774 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1775 return 0;
1776
1777 if (data_len < 2)
1778 goto parse_error;
1779
1780 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1781 * length-prefixed strings. */
1782 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1783 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1784 data_len -= 2;
1785 data += 2;
1786 if (data_len != i)
1787 goto parse_error;
1788
1789 if (data_len < 2)
1790 goto parse_error;
1791
1792 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1793 {
1794 proto_len = data[i];
1795 i++;
1796
1797 if (proto_len == 0)
1798 goto parse_error;
1799
1800 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1801 goto parse_error;
1802
1803 i += proto_len;
1804 }
1805
1806 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1808 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1809 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1813 {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1815 return -1;
1816 }
1817 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1819 }
1820 return 0;
1821
1822 parse_error:
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 return -1;
1825 }
1826
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1831 * SNI,
1832 * elliptic_curves
1833 * ec_point_formats
1834 *
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1839 */
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1849
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1854 };
1855
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1866 };
1867
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1869 return;
1870 data += 2;
1871
1872 if (data > (d+n-4))
1873 return;
1874 n2s(data,type);
1875 n2s(data,size);
1876
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1878 return;
1879
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1881 return;
1882 data += size;
1883
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1885 {
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1888
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1890 return;
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1892 return;
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1894 return;
1895 }
1896 else
1897 {
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1899
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1901 return;
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1903 return;
1904 }
1905
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1907 }
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1909
1910
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1912 {
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1915 unsigned short len;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1918 size_t i;
1919
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1924 #endif
1925
1926 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1927 {
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1929 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1930 }
1931
1932 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1933 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1934 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1935 {
1936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1937 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1938 }
1939
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1941 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1942 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1943 #endif
1944
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1947 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1949
1950 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1951 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1952 {
1953 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1954 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1955 }
1956 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1957 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1958 {
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1961 }
1962 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1963 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1964 {
1965 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1966 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1967 }
1968
1969 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1970 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1971 #endif
1972
1973 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1974 goto ri_check;
1975 n2s(data,len);
1976
1977 if (data > (d+n-len))
1978 goto ri_check;
1979
1980 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1981 {
1982 n2s(data,type);
1983 n2s(data,size);
1984
1985 if (data+size > (d+n))
1986 goto ri_check;
1987 #if 0
1988 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1989 #endif
1990 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1991 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1992 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1993 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1994
1995 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1996 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1997 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1998 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1999 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2000 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2001 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2002 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2003 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2004 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2005 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2006 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2007 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2008 the value of the Host: field.
2009 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2010 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2011 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2012 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2013
2014 */
2015
2016 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2017 {
2018 unsigned char *sdata;
2019 int servname_type;
2020 int dsize;
2021
2022 if (size < 2)
2023 {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2025 return 0;
2026 }
2027 n2s(data,dsize);
2028 size -= 2;
2029 if (dsize > size )
2030 {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 return 0;
2033 }
2034
2035 sdata = data;
2036 while (dsize > 3)
2037 {
2038 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2039 n2s(sdata,len);
2040 dsize -= 3;
2041
2042 if (len > dsize)
2043 {
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 return 0;
2046 }
2047 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2048 switch (servname_type)
2049 {
2050 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2051 if (!s->hit)
2052 {
2053 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2054 {
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 return 0;
2057 }
2058 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2059 {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2061 return 0;
2062 }
2063 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2064 {
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2070 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2072 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2074 return 0;
2075 }
2076 s->servername_done = 1;
2077
2078 }
2079 else
2080 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2081 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2082 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2083
2084 break;
2085
2086 default:
2087 break;
2088 }
2089
2090 dsize -= len;
2091 }
2092 if (dsize != 0)
2093 {
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 return 0;
2096 }
2097
2098 }
2099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2100 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2101 {
2102 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2103 {
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 return 0;
2106 }
2107 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2108 {
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 return 0;
2111 }
2112 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2113 return -1;
2114 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2115 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2116
2117 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2118 {
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 return 0;
2121 }
2122 }
2123 #endif
2124
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2126 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2127 {
2128 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2129 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2130
2131 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2132 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2133 {
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 return 0;
2136 }
2137 if (!s->hit)
2138 {
2139 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2140 {
2141 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2142 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2143 }
2144 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2145 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2146 {
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 return 0;
2149 }
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2151 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2152 }
2153 #if 0
2154 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2155 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2156 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2157 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2158 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2159 #endif
2160 }
2161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2162 {
2163 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2164 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2166
2167 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2168 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2169 {
2170 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 return 0;
2172 }
2173 if (!s->hit)
2174 {
2175 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2176 {
2177 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 return 0;
2179 }
2180 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2181 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2182 {
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2184 return 0;
2185 }
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2187 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2188 }
2189 #if 0
2190 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2191 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2192 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2193 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2194 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2195 #endif
2196 }
2197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2198 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2199 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2200 {
2201 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2202
2203 if (size < 2)
2204 {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 return 0;
2207 }
2208 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2209 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2210 {
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 return 0;
2213 }
2214
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2216 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2217 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2218 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2219 else
2220 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2222 {
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226 }
2227 #endif
2228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2229 {
2230 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2231 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2232 {
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 return 0;
2235 }
2236 }
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2238 {
2239 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2240 return 0;
2241 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2242 }
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2244 {
2245 int dsize;
2246 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2247 {
2248 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 return 0;
2250 }
2251 n2s(data,dsize);
2252 size -= 2;
2253 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2254 {
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2259 {
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 return 0;
2262 }
2263 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2264 * error.
2265 */
2266 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2267 {
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2269 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2270 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2271 return 0;
2272 }
2273 }
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2275 {
2276
2277 if (size < 5)
2278 {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 return 0;
2281 }
2282
2283 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2284 size--;
2285 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2286 {
2287 const unsigned char *sdata;
2288 int dsize;
2289 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2290 n2s(data,dsize);
2291 size -= 2;
2292 if (dsize > size )
2293 {
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 return 0;
2296 }
2297 while (dsize > 0)
2298 {
2299 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2300 int idsize;
2301 if (dsize < 4)
2302 {
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 return 0;
2305 }
2306 n2s(data, idsize);
2307 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2308 size -= 2 + idsize;
2309 if (dsize < 0)
2310 {
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 return 0;
2313 }
2314 sdata = data;
2315 data += idsize;
2316 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2317 &sdata, idsize);
2318 if (!id)
2319 {
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 return 0;
2322 }
2323 if (data != sdata)
2324 {
2325 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 return 0;
2328 }
2329 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2330 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2331 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2332 {
2333 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2334 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 return 0;
2336 }
2337 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2339 {
2340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 return 0;
2343 }
2344 }
2345
2346 /* Read in request_extensions */
2347 if (size < 2)
2348 {
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2350 return 0;
2351 }
2352 n2s(data,dsize);
2353 size -= 2;
2354 if (dsize != size)
2355 {
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 return 0;
2358 }
2359 sdata = data;
2360 if (dsize > 0)
2361 {
2362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2363 {
2364 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2365 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2366 }
2367
2368 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2369 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2370 &sdata, dsize);
2371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2372 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2373 {
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 return 0;
2376 }
2377 }
2378 }
2379 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2380 * so ignore it.
2381 */
2382 else
2383 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2384 }
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2387 {
2388 switch(data[0])
2389 {
2390 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2392 break;
2393 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2394 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2395 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2396 break;
2397 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400 }
2401 #endif
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2404 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2405 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2406 {
2407 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2408 * renegotiation.
2409 *
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2412 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2416
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2422 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2423 }
2424 #endif
2425
2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2427 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2428 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2429 {
2430 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2431 return 0;
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2433 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2434 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2435 #endif
2436 }
2437
2438 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2440 {
2441 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2442 al))
2443 return 0;
2444 }
2445 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2446 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2447 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2448 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2449 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2450 */
2451 else if (!s->hit)
2452 {
2453 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al))
2454 return 0;
2455 }
2456 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2459 #endif
2460
2461 data+=size;
2462 }
2463
2464 *p = data;
2465
2466 ri_check:
2467
2468 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2469
2470 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2471 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2472 {
2473 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2475 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2476 return 0;
2477 }
2478 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2479 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2480 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2481
2482 return 1;
2483 }
2484
2485 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2486 {
2487 int al = -1;
2488 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2489 {
2490 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2491 return 0;
2492 }
2493
2494 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2495 {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2497 return 0;
2498 }
2499 return 1;
2500 }
2501
2502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2503 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2504 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2505 * the length of the block. */
2506 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2507 {
2508 unsigned int off = 0;
2509
2510 while (off < len)
2511 {
2512 if (d[off] == 0)
2513 return 0;
2514 off += d[off];
2515 off++;
2516 }
2517
2518 return off == len;
2519 }
2520 #endif
2521
2522 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2523 {
2524 unsigned short length;
2525 unsigned short type;
2526 unsigned short size;
2527 unsigned char *data = *p;
2528 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2529 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2530
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2532 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2533 #endif
2534
2535 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2536 {
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2539 }
2540
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2542 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2543 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2544 #endif
2545
2546 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2547 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2548 #endif
2549
2550 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2551 goto ri_check;
2552
2553 n2s(data,length);
2554 if (data+length != d+n)
2555 {
2556 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 return 0;
2558 }
2559
2560 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2561 {
2562 n2s(data,type);
2563 n2s(data,size);
2564
2565 if (data+size > (d+n))
2566 goto ri_check;
2567
2568 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2569 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2570 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2571
2572 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2573 {
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2575 {
2576 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2577 return 0;
2578 }
2579 tlsext_servername = 1;
2580 }
2581
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2584 {
2585 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2586 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2587
2588 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2589 {
2590 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 return 0;
2592 }
2593 if (!s->hit)
2594 {
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2597 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2598 {
2599 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2600 return 0;
2601 }
2602 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2603 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2604 }
2605 #if 0
2606 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2607 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2608 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2609 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2610 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2611 #endif
2612 }
2613 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2614
2615 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2616 {
2617 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2618 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2619 {
2620 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 return 0;
2622 }
2623 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2624 {
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2626 return 0;
2627 }
2628 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2629 }
2630 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2631 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2632 {
2633 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2634
2635 if (size < 2)
2636 {
2637 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 return 0;
2639 }
2640 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2641 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2642 {
2643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 return 0;
2645 }
2646
2647 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2648 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2650 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2651 else
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2653
2654 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2655 {
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 return 0;
2658 }
2659 }
2660 #endif
2661 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2662 {
2663 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2664 * a status request message.
2665 */
2666 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2667 {
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2669 return 0;
2670 }
2671 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2672 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2673 }
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2675 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2676 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2677 {
2678 unsigned char *selected;
2679 unsigned char selected_len;
2680
2681 /* We must have requested it. */
2682 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2683 {
2684 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2685 return 0;
2686 }
2687 /* The data must be valid */
2688 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2689 {
2690 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2691 return 0;
2692 }
2693 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2694 {
2695 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 return 0;
2697 }
2698 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2699 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2700 {
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 return 0;
2703 }
2704 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2705 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2706 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2707 }
2708 #endif
2709
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2711 {
2712 unsigned len;
2713
2714 /* We must have requested it. */
2715 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2716 {
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2718 return 0;
2719 }
2720 if (size < 4)
2721 {
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 return 0;
2724 }
2725 /* The extension data consists of:
2726 * uint16 list_length
2727 * uint8 proto_length;
2728 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2729 len = data[0];
2730 len <<= 8;
2731 len |= data[1];
2732 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2733 {
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2735 return 0;
2736 }
2737 len = data[2];
2738 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2739 {
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2741 return 0;
2742 }
2743 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2745 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2746 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2747 {
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 return 0;
2750 }
2751 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2752 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2753 }
2754
2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2756 {
2757 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2758 return 0;
2759 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2760 }
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2762 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2763 {
2764 switch(data[0])
2765 {
2766 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2767 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2768 break;
2769 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2770 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2771 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2772 break;
2773 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2774 return 0;
2775 }
2776 }
2777 #endif
2778 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2779 {
2780 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2781 al))
2782 return 0;
2783 }
2784 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2785 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2786 * callback */
2787 else if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al))
2788 return 0;
2789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2791 {
2792 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2793 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2794 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2795 }
2796 #endif
2797
2798 data += size;
2799 }
2800
2801 if (data != d+n)
2802 {
2803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2804 return 0;
2805 }
2806
2807 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2808 {
2809 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2810 {
2811 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2812 {
2813 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2814 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2815 {
2816 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2817 return 0;
2818 }
2819 }
2820 else
2821 {
2822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2823 return 0;
2824 }
2825 }
2826 }
2827
2828 *p = data;
2829
2830 ri_check:
2831
2832 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2833 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2834 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2835 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2836 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2837 * absence on initial connect only.
2838 */
2839 if (!renegotiate_seen
2840 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2841 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2842 {
2843 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2845 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2846 return 0;
2847 }
2848
2849 return 1;
2850 }
2851
2852
2853 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2854 {
2855
2856 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2857 {
2858 int r = 1;
2859
2860 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2861 {
2862 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2863 if (!r)
2864 return -1;
2865 }
2866
2867 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2868 {
2869 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2870 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2871
2872 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2873 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2874 else
2875 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2876 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2877 {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 return -1;
2880 }
2881 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2882 }
2883
2884 if (r == 2)
2885 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2886 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2887 }
2888 #endif
2889
2890 return 1;
2891 }
2892
2893 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2894 {
2895 return 1;
2896 }
2897
2898 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2899 {
2900 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2901 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2902
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2904 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2905 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2906 */
2907 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2908 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2909 */
2910 #endif
2911
2912 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2913 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2914 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2915 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2916
2917 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2918 {
2919 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2920 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2921 * so this has to happen here in
2922 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2923
2924 int r = 1;
2925
2926 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2927 {
2928 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2929 if (!r)
2930 {
2931 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2932 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 goto err;
2934 }
2935 }
2936
2937 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2940
2941 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2942 {
2943 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2944 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2945 {
2946 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2947 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2948
2949 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2951 else
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2953 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2954 {
2955 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2956 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2957 goto err;
2958 }
2959 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2960 }
2961 }
2962
2963 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2964 {
2965 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2966 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2967 * abort the handshake.
2968 */
2969 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2970 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2971 }
2972 }
2973
2974 err:
2975 #endif
2976 switch (ret)
2977 {
2978 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2979 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2980 return -1;
2981
2982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2983 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2984 return 1;
2985
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2987 s->servername_done=0;
2988 default:
2989 return 1;
2990 }
2991 }
2992
2993 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2994 {
2995 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2996 int al;
2997
2998 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2999 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3000 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3001 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3002 */
3003 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3004 {
3005 int r;
3006 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3007 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3008 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3009 if (certpkey == NULL)
3010 {
3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3012 return 1;
3013 }
3014 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3015 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3016 */
3017 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3018 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3019 switch (r)
3020 {
3021 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3022 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3023 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3024 break;
3025 /* status request response should be sent */
3026 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3027 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3028 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3029 else
3030 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3031 break;
3032 /* something bad happened */
3033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3034 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3036 goto err;
3037 }
3038 }
3039 else
3040 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3041
3042 err:
3043 switch (ret)
3044 {
3045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3047 return -1;
3048
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3051 return 1;
3052
3053 default:
3054 return 1;
3055 }
3056 }
3057
3058 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3059 {
3060 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3061 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3062
3063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3064 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3065 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3066 * it must contain uncompressed.
3067 */
3068 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3069 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3070 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3071 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3072 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3073 {
3074 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3075 size_t i;
3076 unsigned char *list;
3077 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3078 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3079 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3080 {
3081 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3082 {
3083 found_uncompressed = 1;
3084 break;
3085 }
3086 }
3087 if (!found_uncompressed)
3088 {
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3090 return -1;
3091 }
3092 }
3093 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3094 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3095
3096 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3097 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3098 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3099 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3100
3101 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3102 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3103 {
3104 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3105 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3106
3107 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3108 {
3109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3111 }
3112
3113 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3114 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3115 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3116 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3117 {
3118 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3119 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3120 }
3121 }
3122 #endif
3123
3124 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3125 * tell the callback
3126 */
3127 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3128 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3129 {
3130 int r;
3131 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3132 * there is no response.
3133 */
3134 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3135 {
3136 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3137 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3138 }
3139 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3140 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3141 if (r == 0)
3142 {
3143 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3145 }
3146 if (r < 0)
3147 {
3148 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3149 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3150 }
3151 }
3152
3153 switch (ret)
3154 {
3155 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3156 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3157 return -1;
3158
3159 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3160 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3161 return 1;
3162
3163 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3164 s->servername_done=0;
3165 default:
3166 return 1;
3167 }
3168 }
3169
3170 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3171 {
3172 int al = -1;
3173 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3174 return 1;
3175 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3176 {
3177 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3178 return 0;
3179 }
3180
3181 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3182 {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3184 return 0;
3185 }
3186 return 1;
3187 }
3188
3189 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3190 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3191 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3192 *
3193 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3194 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3195 * extension, if any.
3196 * len: the length of the session ID.
3197 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3198 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3199 * point to the resulting session.
3200 *
3201 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3202 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3203 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3204 *
3205 * Returns:
3206 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3207 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3208 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3209 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3210 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3211 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3212 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3213 *
3214 * Side effects:
3215 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3216 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3217 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3218 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3219 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3220 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3221 */
3222 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3223 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3224 {
3225 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3226 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3227 unsigned short i;
3228
3229 *ret = NULL;
3230 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3231
3232 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3233 * to permit stateful resumption.
3234 */
3235 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3236 return 0;
3237 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3238 return 0;
3239 if (p >= limit)
3240 return -1;
3241 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3243 {
3244 i = *(p++);
3245 p+= i;
3246 if (p >= limit)
3247 return -1;
3248 }
3249 /* Skip past cipher list */
3250 n2s(p, i);
3251 p+= i;
3252 if (p >= limit)
3253 return -1;
3254 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3255 i = *(p++);
3256 p += i;
3257 if (p > limit)
3258 return -1;
3259 /* Now at start of extensions */
3260 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3261 return 0;
3262 n2s(p, i);
3263 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3264 {
3265 unsigned short type, size;
3266 n2s(p, type);
3267 n2s(p, size);
3268 if (p + size > limit)
3269 return 0;
3270 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3271 {
3272 int r;
3273 if (size == 0)
3274 {
3275 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3276 * currently have one. */
3277 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3278 return 1;
3279 }
3280 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3281 {
3282 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3283 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3284 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3285 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3286 * calculate the master secret later. */
3287 return 2;
3288 }
3289 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3290 switch (r)
3291 {
3292 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3293 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3294 return 2;
3295 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3296 return r;
3297 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3299 return 3;
3300 default: /* fatal error */
3301 return -1;
3302 }
3303 }
3304 p += size;
3305 }
3306 return 0;
3307 }
3308
3309 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3310 *
3311 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3312 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3313 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3314 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3315 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3316 * point to the resulting session.
3317 *
3318 * Returns:
3319 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3320 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3321 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3322 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3323 */
3324 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3325 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3326 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3327 {
3328 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3329 unsigned char *sdec;
3330 const unsigned char *p;
3331 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3332 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3333 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3335 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3336 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3337 if (eticklen < 48)
3338 return 2;
3339 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3340 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3342 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3343 {
3344 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3345 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3346 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3347 if (rv < 0)
3348 return -1;
3349 if (rv == 0)
3350 return 2;
3351 if (rv == 2)
3352 renew_ticket = 1;
3353 }
3354 else
3355 {
3356 /* Check key name matches */
3357 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3358 return 2;
3359 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3360 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3361 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3362 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3363 }
3364 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3365 * integrity checks on ticket.
3366 */
3367 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3368 if (mlen < 0)
3369 {
3370 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3371 return -1;
3372 }
3373 eticklen -= mlen;
3374 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3375 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3376 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3377 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3378 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3379 return 2;
3380 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3381 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3382 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3383 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3384 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3385 if (!sdec)
3386 {
3387 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3388 return -1;
3389 }
3390 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3391 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3392 {
3393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3394 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3395 return 2;
3396 }
3397 slen += mlen;
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3399 p = sdec;
3400
3401 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3402 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3403 if (sess)
3404 {
3405 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3406 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3407 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3408 * as required by standard.
3409 */
3410 if (sesslen)
3411 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3412 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3413 *psess = sess;
3414 if (renew_ticket)
3415 return 4;
3416 else
3417 return 3;
3418 }
3419 ERR_clear_error();
3420 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3421 * ticket. */
3422 return 2;
3423 }
3424
3425 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3426
3427 typedef struct
3428 {
3429 int nid;
3430 int id;
3431 } tls12_lookup;
3432
3433 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3434 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3435 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3436 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3437 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3438 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3439 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3440 };
3441
3442 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3443 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3444 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3445 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3446 };
3447
3448 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3449 {
3450 size_t i;
3451 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3452 {
3453 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3454 return table[i].id;
3455 }
3456 return -1;
3457 }
3458
3459 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3460 {
3461 size_t i;
3462 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3463 {
3464 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3465 return table[i].nid;
3466 }
3467 return NID_undef;
3468 }
3469
3470 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3471 {
3472 int sig_id, md_id;
3473 if (!md)
3474 return 0;
3475 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3476 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3477 if (md_id == -1)
3478 return 0;
3479 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3480 if (sig_id == -1)
3481 return 0;
3482 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3483 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3484 return 1;
3485 }
3486
3487 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3488 {
3489 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3490 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3491 }
3492
3493 typedef struct
3494 {
3495 int nid;
3496 int secbits;
3497 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3498 } tls12_hash_info;
3499
3500 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3501 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3502 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3503 #else
3504 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3505 #endif
3506 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3507 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3508 #else
3509 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3510 #endif
3511 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3512 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3513 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3514 #else
3515 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3516 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3517 #endif
3518 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3519 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3520 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3521 #else
3522 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3523 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3524 #endif
3525 };
3526
3527 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3528 {
3529 if (hash_alg == 0)
3530 return NULL;
3531 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3532 return NULL;
3533 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3534 }
3535
3536 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3537 {
3538 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3540 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3541 return NULL;
3542 #endif
3543 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3544 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3545 return NULL;
3546 return inf->mfunc();
3547 }
3548
3549 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3550 {
3551 switch(sig_alg)
3552 {
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3554 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3555 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3556 #endif
3557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3560 #endif
3561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3562 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3563 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3564 #endif
3565 }
3566 return -1;
3567 }
3568
3569 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3570 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3571 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3572 {
3573 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3574 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3575 return;
3576 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3577 {
3578 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3579 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3580 if (phash_nid)
3581 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3582 }
3583 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3584 {
3585 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3586 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3587 if (psign_nid)
3588 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3589 }
3590 if (psignhash_nid)
3591 {
3592 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3593 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3594 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3595 else
3596 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3597 }
3598 }
3599 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3600 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3601 {
3602 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3603 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3604 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3605 return 0;
3606 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3607 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3608 return 0;
3609 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3610 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3611 }
3612
3613 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3614 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3615 * then RSA is disabled.
3616 */
3617
3618 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3619 {
3620 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3621 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3622 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3623 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3624 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3625 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3626 * if we have to.
3627 */
3628 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3629 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3630 {
3631 switch(sigalgs[1])
3632 {
3633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3634 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3635 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3636 have_rsa = 1;
3637 break;
3638 #endif
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3641 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3642 have_dsa = 1;
3643 break;
3644 #endif
3645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3646 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3647 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3648 have_ecdsa = 1;
3649 break;
3650 #endif
3651 }
3652 }
3653 if (!have_rsa)
3654 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3655 if (!have_dsa)
3656 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3657 if (!have_ecdsa)
3658 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3659 }
3660
3661 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3662 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3663 {
3664 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3665 size_t i;
3666 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3667 {
3668 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3669 {
3670 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3671 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3672 }
3673 }
3674 return tmpout - out;
3675 }
3676
3677 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3678 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3679 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3680 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3681 {
3682 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3683 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3684 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3685 {
3686 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3687 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3688 continue;
3689 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3690 {
3691 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3692 {
3693 nmatch++;
3694 if (shsig)
3695 {
3696 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3697 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3698 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3699 &shsig->sign_nid,
3700 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3701 ptmp);
3702 shsig++;
3703 }
3704 break;
3705 }
3706 }
3707 }
3708 return nmatch;
3709 }
3710
3711 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3712 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3713 {
3714 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3715 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3716 size_t nmatch;
3717 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3718 CERT *c = s->cert;
3719 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3720 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3721 {
3722 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3723 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3724 }
3725 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3726 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3727 {
3728 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3729 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3730 }
3731 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3732 {
3733 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3734 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3735 }
3736 else
3737 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3738 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3739 {
3740 pref = conf;
3741 preflen = conflen;
3742 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3743 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3744 }
3745 else
3746 {
3747 allow = conf;
3748 allowlen = conflen;
3749 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3750 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3751 }
3752 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3753 if (!nmatch)
3754 return 1;
3755 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3756 if (!salgs)
3757 return 0;
3758 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3759 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3760 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3761 return 1;
3762 }
3763
3764
3765 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3766
3767 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3768 {
3769 int idx;
3770 size_t i;
3771 const EVP_MD *md;
3772 CERT *c = s->cert;
3773 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3774 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3775 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3776 return 1;
3777 /* Should never happen */
3778 if (!c)
3779 return 0;
3780
3781 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3783 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3784 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3785 return 0;
3786 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3787 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3788
3789 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3790
3791 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3792 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3793 {
3794 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3795 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3796 */
3797 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3798 if (s->server)
3799 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3800 else
3801 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3802 if (sigs)
3803 {
3804 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3805 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3806 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3807 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3808 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3809 {
3810 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3811 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3812 }
3813 }
3814 }
3815 #endif
3816
3817 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3818 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3819 {
3820 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3821 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3822 {
3823 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3824 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3825 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3826 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3827 {
3828 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3829 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3830 }
3831 }
3832
3833 }
3834 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3835 * use the certificate for signing.
3836 */
3837 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3838 {
3839 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3840 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3841 */
3842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3843 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3844 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3845 #endif
3846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3847 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3848 {
3849 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3850 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3851 }
3852 #endif
3853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3854 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3855 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3856 #endif
3857 }
3858 return 1;
3859 }
3860
3861
3862 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3863 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3864 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3865 {
3866 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3867 if (psig == NULL)
3868 return 0;
3869 if (idx >= 0)
3870 {
3871 idx <<= 1;
3872 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3873 return 0;
3874 psig += idx;
3875 if (rhash)
3876 *rhash = psig[0];
3877 if (rsig)
3878 *rsig = psig[1];
3879 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3880 }
3881 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3882 }
3883
3884 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3885 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3886 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3887 {
3888 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3889 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3890 return 0;
3891 shsigalgs += idx;
3892 if (phash)
3893 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3894 if (psign)
3895 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3896 if (psignhash)
3897 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3898 if (rsig)
3899 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3900 if (rhash)
3901 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3902 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3903 }
3904
3905
3906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3907 int
3908 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3909 {
3910 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3911 unsigned short hbtype;
3912 unsigned int payload;
3913 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3914
3915 if (s->msg_callback)
3916 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3917 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3918 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3919
3920 /* Read type and payload length first */
3921 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3922 return 0; /* silently discard */
3923 hbtype = *p++;
3924 n2s(p, payload);
3925 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3926 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3927 pl = p;
3928
3929 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3930 {
3931 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3932 int r;
3933
3934 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3935 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3936 * payload, plus padding
3937 */
3938 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3939 bp = buffer;
3940
3941 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3942 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3943 s2n(payload, bp);
3944 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3945 bp += payload;
3946 /* Random padding */
3947 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3948
3949 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3950
3951 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3952 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3953 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3954 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3955
3956 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3957
3958 if (r < 0)
3959 return r;
3960 }
3961 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3962 {
3963 unsigned int seq;
3964
3965 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3966 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3967 * sequence number */
3968 n2s(pl, seq);
3969
3970 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3971 {
3972 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3973 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3974 }
3975 }
3976
3977 return 0;
3978 }
3979
3980 int
3981 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3982 {
3983 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3984 int ret;
3985 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3986 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3987
3988 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3989 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3990 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3991 {
3992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3993 return -1;
3994 }
3995
3996 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3997 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3998 {
3999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4000 return -1;
4001 }
4002
4003 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4004 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4005 {
4006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4007 return -1;
4008 }
4009
4010 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4011 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4012 */
4013 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4014
4015 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4016 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4017 * some random stuff.
4018 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4019 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4020 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4021 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4022 * - Padding
4023 */
4024 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4025 p = buf;
4026 /* Message Type */
4027 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4028 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4029 s2n(payload, p);
4030 /* Sequence number */
4031 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4032 /* 16 random bytes */
4033 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4034 p += 16;
4035 /* Random padding */
4036 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4037
4038 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4039 if (ret >= 0)
4040 {
4041 if (s->msg_callback)
4042 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4043 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4044 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4045
4046 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4047 }
4048
4049 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4050
4051 return ret;
4052 }
4053 #endif
4054
4055 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4056
4057 typedef struct
4058 {
4059 size_t sigalgcnt;
4060 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4061 } sig_cb_st;
4062
4063 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4064 {
4065 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4066 size_t i;
4067 char etmp[20], *p;
4068 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4069 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4070 return 0;
4071 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4072 return 0;
4073 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4074 etmp[len] = 0;
4075 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4076 if (!p)
4077 return 0;
4078 *p = 0;
4079 p++;
4080 if (!*p)
4081 return 0;
4082
4083 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4084 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4085 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4086 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4087 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4088 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4089 else return 0;
4090
4091 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4092 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4093 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4094 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4095 return 0;
4096
4097 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4098 {
4099 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4100 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4101 return 0;
4102 }
4103 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4104 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4105 return 1;
4106 }
4107
4108 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4109 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4110 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4111 {
4112 sig_cb_st sig;
4113 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4114 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4115 return 0;
4116 if (c == NULL)
4117 return 1;
4118 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4119 }
4120
4121 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4122 {
4123 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4124 int rhash, rsign;
4125 size_t i;
4126 if (salglen & 1)
4127 return 0;
4128 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4129 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4130 return 0;
4131 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4132 {
4133 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4134 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4135 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4136 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4137
4138 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4139 goto err;
4140 *sptr++ = rhash;
4141 *sptr++ = rsign;
4142 }
4143
4144 if (client)
4145 {
4146 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4147 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4148 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4149 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4150 }
4151 else
4152 {
4153 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4154 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4155 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4156 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4157 }
4158
4159 return 1;
4160
4161 err:
4162 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4163 return 0;
4164 }
4165
4166 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4167 {
4168 int sig_nid;
4169 size_t i;
4170 if (default_nid == -1)
4171 return 1;
4172 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4173 if (default_nid)
4174 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4175 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4176 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4177 return 1;
4178 return 0;
4179 }
4180 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4181 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4182 {
4183 X509_NAME *nm;
4184 int i;
4185 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4186 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4187 {
4188 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4189 return 1;
4190 }
4191 return 0;
4192 }
4193
4194 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4195 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4196 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4197 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4198 */
4199
4200 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4201
4202 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4203 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4204 /* Strict mode flags */
4205 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4206 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4207 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4208
4209 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4210 int idx)
4211 {
4212 int i;
4213 int rv = 0;
4214 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4215 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4216 CERT *c = s->cert;
4217 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4218 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4219 if (idx != -1)
4220 {
4221 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4222 if (idx == -2)
4223 {
4224 cpk = c->key;
4225 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4226 }
4227 else
4228 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4229 x = cpk->x509;
4230 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4231 chain = cpk->chain;
4232 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4233 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4234 if (!x || !pk)
4235 goto end;
4236 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4237 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4238 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4239 {
4240 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4241 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4242 return rv;
4243 }
4244 #endif
4245 }
4246 else
4247 {
4248 if (!x || !pk)
4249 goto end;
4250 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4251 if (idx == -1)
4252 goto end;
4253 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4254 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4255 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4256 else
4257 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4258 strict_mode = 1;
4259 }
4260
4261 if (suiteb_flags)
4262 {
4263 int ok;
4264 if (check_flags)
4265 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4266 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4267 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4268 {
4269 if (check_flags)
4270 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4271 else
4272 goto end;
4273 }
4274 }
4275
4276 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4277 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4278 * and strict mode.
4279 */
4280 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4281 {
4282 int default_nid;
4283 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4284 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4285 default_nid = 0;
4286 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4287 else
4288 {
4289 switch(idx)
4290 {
4291 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4292 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4293 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4294 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4295 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4296 break;
4297
4298 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4299 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4300 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4301 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4302 break;
4303
4304 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4305 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4306 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4307 break;
4308
4309 default:
4310 default_nid = -1;
4311 break;
4312 }
4313 }
4314 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4315 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4316 * sha1.
4317 */
4318 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4319 {
4320 size_t j;
4321 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4322 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4323 {
4324 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4325 break;
4326 }
4327 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4328 {
4329 if (check_flags)
4330 goto skip_sigs;
4331 else
4332 goto end;
4333 }
4334 }
4335 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4336 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4337 {
4338 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4339 }
4340 else
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4343 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4344 {
4345 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4346 default_nid))
4347 {
4348 if (check_flags)
4349 {
4350 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4351 break;
4352 }
4353 else
4354 goto end;
4355 }
4356 }
4357 }
4358 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4359 else if(check_flags)
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4361 skip_sigs:
4362 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4363 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4365 else if (!check_flags)
4366 goto end;
4367 if (!s->server)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4369 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4370 else if (strict_mode)
4371 {
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4373 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4374 {
4375 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4376 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4377 {
4378 if (check_flags)
4379 {
4380 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4381 break;
4382 }
4383 else
4384 goto end;
4385 }
4386 }
4387 }
4388 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4389 {
4390 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4391 int check_type = 0;
4392 switch (pk->type)
4393 {
4394 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4395 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4396 break;
4397 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4398 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4399 break;
4400 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4401 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4402 break;
4403 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4404 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4405 {
4406 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4407 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4408 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4409 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4410 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4411 }
4412 }
4413 if (check_type)
4414 {
4415 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4416 int ctypelen;
4417 if (c->ctypes)
4418 {
4419 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4420 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4421 }
4422 else
4423 {
4424 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4425 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4426 }
4427 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4428 {
4429 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4430 {
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4432 break;
4433 }
4434 }
4435 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4436 goto end;
4437 }
4438 else
4439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4440
4441
4442 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4443
4444 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4445 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4446
4447 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4448 {
4449 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4451 }
4452 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4453 {
4454 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4455 {
4456 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4457 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4458 {
4459 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4460 break;
4461 }
4462 }
4463 }
4464 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4465 goto end;
4466 }
4467 else
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4469
4470 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4471 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4472
4473 end:
4474
4475 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4476 {
4477 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4478 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4479 else if (cpk->digest)
4480 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4481 }
4482 else
4483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4484
4485 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4486 * if the chain is invalid.
4487 */
4488 if (!check_flags)
4489 {
4490 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4491 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4492 else
4493 {
4494 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4495 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4496 return 0;
4497 }
4498 }
4499 return rv;
4500 }
4501
4502 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4503 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4504 {
4505 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4506 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4507 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4508 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4509 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4510 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4511 }
4512 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4513 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4514 {
4515 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4516 }
4517
4518 #endif
4519
4520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4521 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4522 {
4523 int dh_secbits = 80;
4524 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4525 return DH_get_1024_160();
4526 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4527 {
4528 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4529 dh_secbits = 128;
4530 else
4531 dh_secbits = 80;
4532 }
4533 else
4534 {
4535 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4536 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4537 }
4538
4539 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4540 {
4541 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4542 if (!dhp)
4543 return NULL;
4544 dhp->g = BN_new();
4545 if (dhp->g)
4546 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4547 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4548 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4549 else
4550 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4551 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4552 {
4553 DH_free(dhp);
4554 return NULL;
4555 }
4556 return dhp;
4557 }
4558 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4559 return DH_get_2048_224();
4560 return DH_get_1024_160();
4561 }
4562 #endif
4563
4564 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4565 {
4566 int secbits;
4567 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4568 if (pkey)
4569 {
4570 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4571 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4572 }
4573 else
4574 secbits = -1;
4575 if (s)
4576 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4577 else
4578 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4579 }
4580
4581 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4582 {
4583 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4584 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4585 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4586 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4587 {
4588 const EVP_MD *md;
4589 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4590 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4591 }
4592 if (s)
4593 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4594 else
4595 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4596 }
4597
4598 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4599 {
4600 if (vfy)
4601 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4602 if (is_ee)
4603 {
4604 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4605 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4606 }
4607 else
4608 {
4609 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4610 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4611 }
4612 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4613 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4614 return 1;
4615 }
4616
4617 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4618 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4619 * not sending one to the peer.
4620 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4621 */
4622
4623 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4624 {
4625 int rv, start_idx, i;
4626 if (x == NULL)
4627 {
4628 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4629 start_idx = 1;
4630 }
4631 else
4632 start_idx = 0;
4633
4634 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4635 if (rv != 1)
4636 return rv;
4637
4638 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4639 {
4640 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4641 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4642 if (rv != 1)
4643 return rv;
4644 }
4645 return 1;
4646 }
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