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1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
128 #endif
129
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 };
144
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
146 {
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
149 return(60*60*2);
150 }
151
152 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
153 {
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
156 return(1);
157 }
158
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
160 {
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
163 {
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
165 }
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
167 ssl3_free(s);
168 }
169
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 {
172 ssl3_clear(s);
173 s->version = s->method->version;
174 }
175
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
177
178 static int nid_list[] =
179 {
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 };
206
207
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
209 {
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
213 };
214
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
216 {
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
242 };
243
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
245 {
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
248 };
249
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
251 {
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
255 return 0;
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
257 }
258
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
260 {
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
262 switch (nid)
263 {
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
265 return 1;
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
267 return 2;
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
269 return 3;
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
271 return 4;
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
273 return 5;
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
275 return 6;
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
277 return 7;
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
279 return 8;
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 return 9;
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
283 return 10;
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
285 return 11;
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
287 return 12;
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
289 return 13;
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
291 return 14;
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
293 return 15;
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
295 return 16;
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
297 return 17;
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
299 return 18;
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
301 return 19;
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
303 return 20;
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 return 21;
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
307 return 22;
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
309 return 23;
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
311 return 24;
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
313 return 25;
314 default:
315 return 0;
316 }
317 }
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
319 * preferred list
320 */
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
323 size_t *pcurveslen)
324 {
325 if (sess)
326 {
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
329 return;
330 }
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
333 {
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
337 break;
338
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
341 *pcurveslen = 2;
342 break;
343
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
346 *pcurveslen = 2;
347 break;
348 default:
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
351 }
352 if (!*pcurves)
353 {
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
356 }
357 }
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
360 {
361 const unsigned char *curves;
362 size_t curveslen, i;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
365 return 0;
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
367 if (suiteb_flags)
368 {
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
370 if (p[1])
371 return 0;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
373 {
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
375 return 0;
376 }
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
378 {
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
380 return 0;
381 }
382 else /* Should never happen */
383 return 0;
384 }
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
387 {
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
389 return 1;
390 }
391 return 0;
392 }
393
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
396 * an EC tmp key.
397 */
398
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
400 {
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
403 int k;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
405 if (s->server == 0)
406 return -1;
407 if (nmatch == -2)
408 {
409 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
410 {
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
413 * checks.
414 */
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
421 return NID_undef;
422 }
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
424 nmatch = 0;
425 }
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
427 &supp, &supplen);
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
429 &pref, &preflen);
430 preflen /= 2;
431 supplen /= 2;
432 k = 0;
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
434 {
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
437 {
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
439 {
440 if (nmatch == k)
441 {
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
444 }
445 k++;
446 }
447 }
448 }
449 if (nmatch == -1)
450 return k;
451 return 0;
452 }
453
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
456 {
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
458 size_t i;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
461 */
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
464 if (!clist)
465 return 0;
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
467 {
468 unsigned long idmask;
469 int id;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
471 idmask = 1L << id;
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
473 {
474 OPENSSL_free(clist);
475 return 0;
476 }
477 dup_list |= idmask;
478 s2n(id, p);
479 }
480 if (*pext)
481 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
482 *pext = clist;
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
484 return 1;
485 }
486
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
488
489 typedef struct
490 {
491 size_t nidcnt;
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
493 } nid_cb_st;
494
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
496 {
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
498 size_t i;
499 int nid;
500 char etmp[20];
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
502 return 0;
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
504 return 0;
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
506 etmp[len] = 0;
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
513 return 0;
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
516 return 0;
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
518 return 1;
519 }
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
522 const char *str)
523 {
524 nid_cb_st ncb;
525 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
527 return 0;
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
529 }
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
532 EC_KEY *ec)
533 {
534 int is_prime, id;
535 const EC_GROUP *grp;
536 const EC_POINT *pt;
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
538 if (!ec)
539 return 0;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
543 if (!grp || !pt)
544 return 0;
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
546 if (!meth)
547 return 0;
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
549 is_prime = 1;
550 else
551 is_prime = 0;
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
556 if (id)
557 {
558 curve_id[0] = 0;
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
560 }
561 else
562 {
563 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
564 if (is_prime)
565 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
566 else
567 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
568 }
569 if (comp_id)
570 {
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
572 {
573 if (is_prime)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
575 else
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
577 }
578 else
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
580 }
581 return 1;
582 }
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
586 {
587 const unsigned char *p;
588 size_t plen, i;
589 int j;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
592 */
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
594 {
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
598 {
599 if (*comp_id == *p)
600 break;
601 }
602 if (i == plen)
603 return 0;
604 }
605 if (!curve_id)
606 return 1;
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
609 {
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
612 {
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
614 break;
615 }
616 if (i == plen)
617 return 0;
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
619 if (!s->server)
620 return 1;
621 }
622 return 1;
623 }
624
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
626 size_t *pformatslen)
627 {
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
629 * use default */
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
631 {
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
634 }
635 else
636 {
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
639 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
641 else
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
643 }
644 }
645
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
648 */
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
650 {
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
652 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
653 int rv;
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
655 if (!pkey)
656 return 0;
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
659 {
660 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
661 return 1;
662 }
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
664 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
665 if (!rv)
666 return 0;
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
669 */
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
671 if (!rv)
672 return 0;
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
675 */
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
677 {
678 int check_md;
679 size_t i;
680 CERT *c = s->cert;
681 if (curve_id[0])
682 return 0;
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
688 else
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
692 break;
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
694 return 0;
695 if (set_ee_md == 2)
696 {
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
699 else
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
701 }
702 }
703 return rv;
704 }
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
707 {
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
711 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
713 return 1;
714 #endif
715 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
716 * no other curves permitted.
717 */
718 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
719 {
720 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
721 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
723 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
725 else
726 return 0;
727 curve_id[0] = 0;
728 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
729 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
730 return 0;
731 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
733 return 1;
734 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
735 else
736 {
737 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
738 if (!ec)
739 return 0;
740 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
741 return 0;
742 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
743 return 1;
744 return 0;
745 }
746
747 }
748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
749 {
750 /* Need a shared curve */
751 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
752 return 1;
753 else return 0;
754 }
755 if (!ec)
756 {
757 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
758 return 1;
759 else
760 return 0;
761 }
762 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
763 return 0;
764 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
765 #if 0
766 return 1;
767 #else
768 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
769 #endif
770 }
771
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
773
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
775
776 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
777 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
778 */
779
780 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
781 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
782 #else
783 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
784 #endif
785
786 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
787 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
788 #else
789 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
790 #endif
791
792 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
793 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
794 #else
795 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
796 #endif
797
798 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
799 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
800 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
801 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
802
803 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
805 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
806 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
807 #endif
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
809 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
810 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
811 #endif
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
813 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
814 #endif
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
816 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
817 #endif
818 };
819
820 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
821 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
822 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
823 };
824
825 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
826 {
827 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
828 * preferences.
829 */
830 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
831 {
832 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
833 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
834 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
835
836 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
837 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
838 return 2;
839
840 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
841 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
842 return 2;
843 }
844
845 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
846 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
847 {
848 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
849 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
850 }
851 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
852 {
853 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
854 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
855 }
856 else
857 {
858 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
859 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
860 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
861 if (FIPS_mode())
862 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
863 else
864 #endif
865 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
866 }
867 }
868 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
869 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
870 */
871 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
872 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
873 {
874 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
875 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
876 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
877 /* Should never happen */
878 if (sigalg == -1)
879 return -1;
880 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
881 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
882 {
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
884 return 0;
885 }
886 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
887 {
888 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
889 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
890 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
891 return 0;
892 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
893 {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
895 return 0;
896 }
897 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
898 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
899 {
900 if (curve_id[0])
901 return 0;
902 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
903 {
904 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
905 {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
907 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
908 return 0;
909 }
910 }
911 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
912 {
913 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914 {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
916 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
917 return 0;
918 }
919 }
920 else
921 return 0;
922 }
923 }
924 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
925 return 0;
926
927 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
928 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
929 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
930 {
931 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
932 break;
933 }
934 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
935 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
936 {
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
938 return 0;
939 }
940 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
941 if (*pmd == NULL)
942 {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
944 return 0;
945 }
946 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
947 * wish.
948 */
949 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
950 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
951 return 1;
952 }
953 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
954 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
955 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
956 * session and not global settings.
957 *
958 */
959 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
960 {
961 CERT *c = s->cert;
962 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
963 size_t i, sigalgslen;
964 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
965 c->mask_a = 0;
966 c->mask_k = 0;
967 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
968 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
969 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
970 else
971 c->mask_ssl = 0;
972 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
973 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
974 * TLS 1.2.
975 */
976 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
977 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
978 {
979 switch(sigalgs[1])
980 {
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
982 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
983 have_rsa = 1;
984 break;
985 #endif
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
987 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
988 have_dsa = 1;
989 break;
990 #endif
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
992 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
993 have_ecdsa = 1;
994 break;
995 #endif
996 }
997 }
998 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
999 * signature algorithms.
1000 */
1001 if (!have_rsa)
1002 {
1003 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1004 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1005 }
1006 if (!have_dsa)
1007 {
1008 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1009 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1010 }
1011 if (!have_ecdsa)
1012 {
1013 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1014 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1015 }
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1017 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1018 {
1019 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1020 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1021 }
1022 #endif
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1024 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1025 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1026 {
1027 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1028 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1029 }
1030 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1031 c->valid = 1;
1032 }
1033
1034 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1035 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1036 {
1037 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1038 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1039
1040 if (a > b)
1041 return 1;
1042 else if (a < b)
1043 return -1;
1044 return 0;
1045 }
1046
1047 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1048 {
1049 int extdatalen=0;
1050 unsigned char *ret = p;
1051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1052 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1053 int using_ecc = 0;
1054 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1055 {
1056 int i;
1057 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1058 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1059
1060 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1061 {
1062 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1063
1064 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1065 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1066 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1067 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1068 {
1069 using_ecc = 1;
1070 break;
1071 }
1072 }
1073 }
1074 #endif
1075
1076 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1077 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1078 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1079 return p;
1080
1081 ret+=2;
1082
1083 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1084
1085 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1086 {
1087 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1088 unsigned long size_str;
1089 long lenmax;
1090
1091 /* check for enough space.
1092 4 for the servername type and entension length
1093 2 for servernamelist length
1094 1 for the hostname type
1095 2 for hostname length
1096 + hostname length
1097 */
1098
1099 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1100 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1101 return NULL;
1102
1103 /* extension type and length */
1104 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1105 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1106
1107 /* length of servername list */
1108 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1109
1110 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1111 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1112 s2n(size_str,ret);
1113 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1114 ret+=size_str;
1115 }
1116
1117 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1118 if (s->renegotiate)
1119 {
1120 int el;
1121
1122 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1123 {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 return NULL;
1126 }
1127
1128 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1129
1130 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1131 s2n(el,ret);
1132
1133 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1134 {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1136 return NULL;
1137 }
1138
1139 ret += el;
1140 }
1141
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1143 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1144 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1145 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1146
1147 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1148 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1149 {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 return NULL;
1152 }
1153
1154 /* check for enough space.
1155 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1156 1 for the srp user identity
1157 + srp user identity length
1158 */
1159 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1160
1161 /* fill in the extension */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1163 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1164 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1165 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1166 ret+=login_len;
1167 }
1168 #endif
1169
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1171 if (using_ecc)
1172 {
1173 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1174 long lenmax;
1175 const unsigned char *plist;
1176 size_t plistlen;
1177
1178 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1179
1180 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1181 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1182 if (plistlen > 255)
1183 {
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 return NULL;
1186 }
1187
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1189 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1191 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1192 ret+=plistlen;
1193
1194 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1195 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1196 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1197
1198 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1199 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1200 if (plistlen > 65532)
1201 {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 return NULL;
1204 }
1205
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1207 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1208
1209 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1210 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1211 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1212 * resolves this to two bytes.
1213 */
1214 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1215 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1216 ret+=plistlen;
1217 }
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1219
1220 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1221 {
1222 int ticklen;
1223 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1224 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1225 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1226 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1227 {
1228 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1229 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1230 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1231 return NULL;
1232 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1233 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1234 ticklen);
1235 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1236 }
1237 else
1238 ticklen = 0;
1239 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1240 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1241 goto skip_ext;
1242 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1243 * rest for ticket
1244 */
1245 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1247 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1248 if (ticklen)
1249 {
1250 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1251 ret += ticklen;
1252 }
1253 }
1254 skip_ext:
1255
1256 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1257 {
1258 size_t salglen;
1259 const unsigned char *salg;
1260 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1261 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1262 return NULL;
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1264 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1265 s2n(salglen, ret);
1266 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1267 ret += salglen;
1268 }
1269
1270 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1273 {
1274 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1275
1276 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1277 return NULL;
1278 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1279 return NULL;
1280
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1282 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(col, ret);
1284 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1285 ret += col;
1286 }
1287 #endif
1288
1289 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1290 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1291 {
1292 int i;
1293 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1294 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1295
1296 idlen = 0;
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1298 {
1299 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1300 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1301 if (itmp <= 0)
1302 return NULL;
1303 idlen += itmp + 2;
1304 }
1305
1306 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1307 {
1308 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1309 if (extlen < 0)
1310 return NULL;
1311 }
1312 else
1313 extlen = 0;
1314
1315 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1316 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1317 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1318 return NULL;
1319 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1320 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1321 s2n(idlen, ret);
1322 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1323 {
1324 /* save position of id len */
1325 unsigned char *q = ret;
1326 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1327 /* skip over id len */
1328 ret += 2;
1329 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1330 /* write id len */
1331 s2n(itmp, q);
1332 }
1333 s2n(extlen, ret);
1334 if (extlen > 0)
1335 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1336 }
1337
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1339 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1341 s2n(1,ret);
1342 /* Set mode:
1343 * 1: peer may send requests
1344 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1345 */
1346 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1348 else
1349 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1350 #endif
1351
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1353 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1354 {
1355 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1356 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1357 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1358 return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1360 s2n(0,ret);
1361 }
1362 #endif
1363
1364 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1365 {
1366 int el;
1367
1368 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1369
1370 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1371
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1373 s2n(el,ret);
1374
1375 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1376 {
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 return NULL;
1379 }
1380 ret += el;
1381 }
1382
1383 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1384 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1385 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1386 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1387 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1388 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1389 {
1390 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1391 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1392
1393 if (limit < ret + 6)
1394 return NULL;
1395
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1397 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1398 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = list_len;
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1401 }
1402
1403 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1404 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1405 {
1406 size_t i;
1407 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1408
1409 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1410 {
1411 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1412 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1413
1414 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1415 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1416 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1417 if (record->fn1)
1418 {
1419 int cb_retval = 0;
1420 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1421 &out, &outlen,
1422 record->arg);
1423 if (cb_retval == 0)
1424 return NULL; /* error */
1425 if (cb_retval == -1)
1426 continue; /* skip this extension */
1427 }
1428 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1429 return NULL;
1430 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1431 s2n(outlen, ret);
1432 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1433 ret += outlen;
1434 }
1435 }
1436
1437 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1438 return p;
1439
1440 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1441 return ret;
1442 }
1443
1444 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1445 {
1446 int extdatalen=0;
1447 unsigned char *ret = p;
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1449 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1450 #endif
1451 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1452 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1453 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1454 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1455
1456 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1457 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1458 return p;
1459
1460 ret+=2;
1461 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1462
1463 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1464 {
1465 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1466
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1468 s2n(0,ret);
1469 }
1470
1471 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1472 {
1473 int el;
1474
1475 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1476 {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return NULL;
1479 }
1480
1481 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1482
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1484 s2n(el,ret);
1485
1486 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1487 {
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 return NULL;
1490 }
1491
1492 ret += el;
1493 }
1494
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1496 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1497 {
1498 const unsigned char *plist;
1499 size_t plistlen;
1500 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1501 long lenmax;
1502
1503 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1504
1505 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1506 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1507 if (plistlen > 255)
1508 {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 return NULL;
1511 }
1512
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1514 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1515 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1516 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1517 ret+=plistlen;
1518
1519 }
1520 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1521 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1522
1523 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1524 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1525 {
1526 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1528 s2n(0,ret);
1529 }
1530
1531 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1532 {
1533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1534 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1535 s2n(0,ret);
1536 }
1537
1538 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1539 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1540 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1541 {
1542 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1543
1544 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1545 return NULL;
1546 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1547 return NULL;
1548
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1550 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1551 s2n(sol, ret);
1552 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1553 ret += sol;
1554 }
1555 #endif
1556
1557 if(s->srtp_profile)
1558 {
1559 int el;
1560
1561 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1562
1563 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1564
1565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1566 s2n(el,ret);
1567
1568 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1569 {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 return NULL;
1572 }
1573 ret+=el;
1574 }
1575
1576 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1577 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1578 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1579 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1580 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1581 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1582 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1583 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1584 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1585 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1586 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1587 ret+=36;
1588
1589 }
1590
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1592 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1593 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1594 {
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1596 s2n(1,ret);
1597 /* Set mode:
1598 * 1: peer may send requests
1599 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1600 */
1601 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1602 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1603 else
1604 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1605
1606 }
1607 #endif
1608
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1610 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1611 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1612 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1613 {
1614 const unsigned char *npa;
1615 unsigned int npalen;
1616 int r;
1617
1618 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1619 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1620 {
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1623 s2n(npalen,ret);
1624 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1625 ret += npalen;
1626 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1627 }
1628 }
1629 #endif
1630
1631 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1632 * to it. */
1633 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1634 {
1635 size_t authz_length;
1636 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1637 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1638 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1639 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1640 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1641 size_t i;
1642 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1643
1644 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1645 * uint8_t authz_type
1646 * uint16_t length
1647 * uint8_t data[length]
1648 *
1649 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1650 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1651 {
1652 unsigned short length;
1653 unsigned char type;
1654
1655 type = *(authz++);
1656 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1657 type,
1658 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1659 authz_count++;
1660
1661 n2s(authz, length);
1662 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1663 i += 2;
1664 authz += length;
1665 i += length;
1666 }
1667
1668 if (authz_count)
1669 {
1670 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1671 * 2 bytes for extension type
1672 * 2 bytes for extension length
1673 * 1 byte for the list length
1674 * n bytes for the list */
1675 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1676
1677 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1679 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1680 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1681 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1682 }
1683
1684 authz = orig_authz;
1685 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1686 {
1687 unsigned short length;
1688 unsigned char type;
1689
1690 authz_count++;
1691 type = *(authz++);
1692 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1693 type,
1694 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1695 *(ret++) = type;
1696 n2s(authz, length);
1697 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1698 i += 2;
1699 authz += length;
1700 i += length;
1701 }
1702 }
1703
1704 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1705 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1706 {
1707 size_t i;
1708
1709 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1710 {
1711 size_t j;
1712 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1713
1714 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1715 {
1716 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1717 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1718 {
1719 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1720 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1721 int cb_retval = 0;
1722
1723 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1724 if (!record->fn2)
1725 break;
1726 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1727 &out, &outlen,
1728 record->arg);
1729 if (cb_retval == 0)
1730 return NULL; /* error */
1731 if (cb_retval == -1)
1732 break; /* skip this extension */
1733 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1734 return NULL;
1735 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1736 s2n(outlen, ret);
1737 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1738 ret += outlen;
1739 break;
1740 }
1741 }
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1746 return p;
1747
1748 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1749 return ret;
1750 }
1751
1752 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1753 {
1754 unsigned short type;
1755 unsigned short size;
1756 unsigned short len;
1757 unsigned char *data = *p;
1758 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1759 size_t i;
1760
1761 s->servername_done = 0;
1762 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1764 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1765 #endif
1766
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1768 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1769 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1770 #endif
1771 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1772 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1773 {
1774 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1775 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1776 }
1777 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1778 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1779 {
1780 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1781 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1782 }
1783 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1784 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1785 {
1786 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1787 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1788 }
1789
1790 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1791 goto ri_check;
1792 n2s(data,len);
1793
1794 if (data > (d+n-len))
1795 goto ri_check;
1796
1797 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1798 {
1799 n2s(data,type);
1800 n2s(data,size);
1801
1802 if (data+size > (d+n))
1803 goto ri_check;
1804 #if 0
1805 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1806 #endif
1807 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1808 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1809 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1810 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1811
1812 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1813 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1814 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1815 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1816 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1817 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1818 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1819 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1820 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1821 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1822 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1823 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1824 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1825 the value of the Host: field.
1826 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1827 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1828 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1829 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1830
1831 */
1832
1833 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1834 {
1835 unsigned char *sdata;
1836 int servname_type;
1837 int dsize;
1838
1839 if (size < 2)
1840 {
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1842 return 0;
1843 }
1844 n2s(data,dsize);
1845 size -= 2;
1846 if (dsize > size )
1847 {
1848 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 return 0;
1850 }
1851
1852 sdata = data;
1853 while (dsize > 3)
1854 {
1855 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1856 n2s(sdata,len);
1857 dsize -= 3;
1858
1859 if (len > dsize)
1860 {
1861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1862 return 0;
1863 }
1864 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1865 switch (servname_type)
1866 {
1867 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1868 if (!s->hit)
1869 {
1870 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1871 {
1872 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 return 0;
1874 }
1875 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1876 {
1877 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1878 return 0;
1879 }
1880 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1881 {
1882 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1883 return 0;
1884 }
1885 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1886 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1887 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1889 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1890 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1891 return 0;
1892 }
1893 s->servername_done = 1;
1894
1895 }
1896 else
1897 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1898 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1899 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1900
1901 break;
1902
1903 default:
1904 break;
1905 }
1906
1907 dsize -= len;
1908 }
1909 if (dsize != 0)
1910 {
1911 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1912 return 0;
1913 }
1914
1915 }
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1917 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1918 {
1919 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1920 {
1921 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 return 0;
1923 }
1924 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1925 {
1926 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 return 0;
1928 }
1929 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1930 return -1;
1931 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1932 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1933
1934 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1935 {
1936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1937 return 0;
1938 }
1939 }
1940 #endif
1941
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1943 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1944 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1945 {
1946 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1947 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1948
1949 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1950 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1951 {
1952 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 return 0;
1954 }
1955 if (!s->hit)
1956 {
1957 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1958 {
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1960 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1961 }
1962 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1963 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1964 {
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 return 0;
1967 }
1968 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1969 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1970 }
1971 #if 0
1972 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1973 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1974 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1975 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1976 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1977 #endif
1978 }
1979 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1980 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1981 {
1982 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1983 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1984 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1985
1986 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1987 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1988 {
1989 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992 if (!s->hit)
1993 {
1994 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1995 {
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 return 0;
1998 }
1999 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2000 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2001 {
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2003 return 0;
2004 }
2005 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2006 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2007 }
2008 #if 0
2009 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2010 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2011 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2012 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2013 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2014 #endif
2015 }
2016 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2017 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2018 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2019 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2020 {
2021 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2022
2023 if (size < 2)
2024 {
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 return 0;
2027 }
2028 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2029 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2030 {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 return 0;
2033 }
2034
2035 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2036 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2037 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2038 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2039 else
2040 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2041 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2042 {
2043 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 return 0;
2045 }
2046 }
2047 #endif
2048 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2049 {
2050 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2051 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2052 {
2053 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2054 return 0;
2055 }
2056 }
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2058 {
2059 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2060 return 0;
2061 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2062 }
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2064 {
2065 int dsize;
2066 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2067 {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 return 0;
2070 }
2071 n2s(data,dsize);
2072 size -= 2;
2073 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2074 {
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 return 0;
2077 }
2078 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2079 {
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 return 0;
2082 }
2083 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2084 * error.
2085 */
2086 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2087 {
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2089 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2090 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2091 return 0;
2092 }
2093 }
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2095 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2096 {
2097
2098 if (size < 5)
2099 {
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 return 0;
2102 }
2103
2104 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2105 size--;
2106 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2107 {
2108 const unsigned char *sdata;
2109 int dsize;
2110 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2111 n2s(data,dsize);
2112 size -= 2;
2113 if (dsize > size )
2114 {
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 return 0;
2117 }
2118 while (dsize > 0)
2119 {
2120 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2121 int idsize;
2122 if (dsize < 4)
2123 {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 return 0;
2126 }
2127 n2s(data, idsize);
2128 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2129 size -= 2 + idsize;
2130 if (dsize < 0)
2131 {
2132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2133 return 0;
2134 }
2135 sdata = data;
2136 data += idsize;
2137 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2138 &sdata, idsize);
2139 if (!id)
2140 {
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 return 0;
2143 }
2144 if (data != sdata)
2145 {
2146 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 return 0;
2149 }
2150 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2151 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2152 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2153 {
2154 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2155 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 return 0;
2157 }
2158 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2159 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2160 {
2161 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2162 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 return 0;
2164 }
2165 }
2166
2167 /* Read in request_extensions */
2168 if (size < 2)
2169 {
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 return 0;
2172 }
2173 n2s(data,dsize);
2174 size -= 2;
2175 if (dsize != size)
2176 {
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 return 0;
2179 }
2180 sdata = data;
2181 if (dsize > 0)
2182 {
2183 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2184 {
2185 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2186 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2187 }
2188
2189 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2190 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2191 &sdata, dsize);
2192 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2193 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2194 {
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 }
2199 }
2200 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2201 * so ignore it.
2202 */
2203 else
2204 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2205 }
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2208 {
2209 switch(data[0])
2210 {
2211 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2212 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2213 break;
2214 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2217 break;
2218 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221 }
2222 #endif
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2225 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2226 {
2227 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2228 * renegotiation.
2229 *
2230 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2231 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2232 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2233 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2234 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2235 * anything like that, but this might change).
2236
2237 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2238 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2239 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2240 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2241 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2242 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2243 }
2244 #endif
2245
2246 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2248 {
2249 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2250 al))
2251 return 0;
2252 }
2253
2254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2255 {
2256 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2257 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2258
2259 if (size == 0)
2260 {
2261 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 return 0;
2263 }
2264
2265 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2266
2267 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2268 {
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 return 0;
2271 }
2272
2273 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2274 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2275 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2276 if (!s->hit)
2277 {
2278 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2279 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2280 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2281 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2282 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2283 {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 return 0;
2286 }
2287
2288 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2289 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2290 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2291 sdata,
2292 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2293
2294 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2295 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2296 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2297 1 /* element size */,
2298 byte_compare);
2299
2300 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2301 {
2302 if (i > 0 &&
2303 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2304 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2305 {
2306 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 return 0;
2308 }
2309 }
2310 }
2311 }
2312
2313 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2314 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2315 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2316 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2317 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2318 */
2319 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2320 {
2321 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2322
2323 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2324 {
2325 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2326 if (type == record->ext_type)
2327 {
2328 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2329 size_t j;
2330
2331 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2332 {
2333 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j] == type)
2334 {
2335 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 return 0;
2337 }
2338 }
2339
2340 /* Callback */
2341 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2342 return 0;
2343
2344 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2345 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2346 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2347 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2348 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count*2);
2349 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2350 {
2351 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2352 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 return 0;
2354 }
2355 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2356 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count-1] = type;
2357 }
2358 }
2359 }
2360
2361 data+=size;
2362 }
2363
2364 *p = data;
2365
2366 ri_check:
2367
2368 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2369
2370 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2371 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2372 {
2373 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2375 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2376 return 0;
2377 }
2378 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2379 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2380 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2381
2382 return 1;
2383 }
2384
2385 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2386 {
2387 int al = -1;
2388 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2389 {
2390 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2391 return 0;
2392 }
2393
2394 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2395 {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2397 return 0;
2398 }
2399 return 1;
2400 }
2401
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2404 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2405 * the length of the block. */
2406 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2407 {
2408 unsigned int off = 0;
2409
2410 while (off < len)
2411 {
2412 if (d[off] == 0)
2413 return 0;
2414 off += d[off];
2415 off++;
2416 }
2417
2418 return off == len;
2419 }
2420 #endif
2421
2422 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2423 {
2424 unsigned short length;
2425 unsigned short type;
2426 unsigned short size;
2427 unsigned char *data = *p;
2428 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2429 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2430
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2432 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2433 #endif
2434
2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2437 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2438 #endif
2439
2440 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2441 goto ri_check;
2442
2443 n2s(data,length);
2444 if (data+length != d+n)
2445 {
2446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2447 return 0;
2448 }
2449
2450 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2451 {
2452 n2s(data,type);
2453 n2s(data,size);
2454
2455 if (data+size > (d+n))
2456 goto ri_check;
2457
2458 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2459 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2460 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2461
2462 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2463 {
2464 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2465 {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2467 return 0;
2468 }
2469 tlsext_servername = 1;
2470 }
2471
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2474 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2475 {
2476 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2477 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2478
2479 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2480 {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2482 return 0;
2483 }
2484 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2485 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2486 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2487 {
2488 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2489 return 0;
2490 }
2491 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2492 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2493 #if 0
2494 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2495 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2496 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2497 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2498 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2499 #endif
2500 }
2501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2502
2503 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2504 {
2505 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2506 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2507 {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2509 return 0;
2510 }
2511 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2512 || (size > 0))
2513 {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2515 return 0;
2516 }
2517 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2518 }
2519 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2521 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2522 {
2523 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2524
2525 if (size < 2)
2526 {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 return 0;
2529 }
2530 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2531 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2532 {
2533 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 return 0;
2535 }
2536
2537 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2539 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2540 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2541 else
2542 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2543
2544 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2545 {
2546 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2547 return 0;
2548 }
2549 }
2550 #endif
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2552 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2553 {
2554 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2555 * a status request message.
2556 */
2557 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2558 {
2559 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2560 return 0;
2561 }
2562 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2563 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2564 }
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2566 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2567 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2568 {
2569 unsigned char *selected;
2570 unsigned char selected_len;
2571
2572 /* We must have requested it. */
2573 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2574 {
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2576 return 0;
2577 }
2578 /* The data must be valid */
2579 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2580 {
2581 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 return 0;
2583 }
2584 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2585 {
2586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 return 0;
2588 }
2589 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2590 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2591 {
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2593 return 0;
2594 }
2595 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2596 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2597 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2598 }
2599 #endif
2600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2601 {
2602 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2603 return 0;
2604 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2605 }
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2608 {
2609 switch(data[0])
2610 {
2611 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2612 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2613 break;
2614 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2615 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2616 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2617 break;
2618 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621 }
2622 #endif
2623 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2624 {
2625 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2626 al))
2627 return 0;
2628 }
2629
2630 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2631 {
2632 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2633 * an authz hello extension if the client
2634 * didn't request a proof. */
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2637
2638 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2639 {
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2641 return 0;
2642 }
2643
2644 if (!size)
2645 {
2646 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2647 return 0;
2648 }
2649
2650 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2651 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2652 {
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2654 return 0;
2655 }
2656
2657 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2658 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2659 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2660 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2661 {
2662 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2663 return 0;
2664 }
2665
2666 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2667 }
2668
2669 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2670 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2671 * callback */
2672 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2673 {
2674 size_t i;
2675 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2676
2677 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2678 {
2679 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2680 if (record->ext_type == type)
2681 {
2682 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2683 return 0;
2684 break;
2685 }
2686 }
2687 }
2688
2689 data += size;
2690 }
2691
2692 if (data != d+n)
2693 {
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 return 0;
2696 }
2697
2698 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2699 {
2700 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2701 {
2702 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2703 {
2704 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2705 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2706 {
2707 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2708 return 0;
2709 }
2710 }
2711 else
2712 {
2713 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716 }
2717 }
2718
2719 *p = data;
2720
2721 ri_check:
2722
2723 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2724 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2725 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2726 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2727 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2728 * absence on initial connect only.
2729 */
2730 if (!renegotiate_seen
2731 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2732 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2733 {
2734 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2736 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739
2740 return 1;
2741 }
2742
2743
2744 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2745 {
2746
2747 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2748 {
2749 int r = 1;
2750
2751 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2752 {
2753 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2754 if (!r)
2755 return -1;
2756 }
2757
2758 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2759 {
2760 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2761 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2762
2763 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2764 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2765 else
2766 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2767 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2768 {
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2770 return -1;
2771 }
2772 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2773 }
2774
2775 if (r == 2)
2776 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2777 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2778 }
2779 #endif
2780
2781 return 1;
2782 }
2783
2784 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2785 {
2786 return 1;
2787 }
2788
2789 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2790 {
2791 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2792 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2793
2794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2795 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2796 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2797 */
2798 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2799 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2800 */
2801 #endif
2802
2803 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2804 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2805 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2806 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2807
2808 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2809 {
2810 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2811 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2812 * so this has to happen here in
2813 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2814
2815 int r = 1;
2816
2817 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2818 {
2819 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2820 if (!r)
2821 {
2822 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2823 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2824 goto err;
2825 }
2826 }
2827
2828 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2830 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2831
2832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2833 {
2834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2835 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2836 {
2837 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2838 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2839
2840 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2842 else
2843 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2844 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2845 {
2846 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2847 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2848 goto err;
2849 }
2850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2851 }
2852 }
2853
2854 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2855 {
2856 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2857 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2858 * abort the handshake.
2859 */
2860 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2861 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2862 }
2863 }
2864
2865 err:
2866 #endif
2867 switch (ret)
2868 {
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2870 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2871 return -1;
2872
2873 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2875 return 1;
2876
2877 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2878 s->servername_done=0;
2879 default:
2880 return 1;
2881 }
2882 }
2883
2884 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2885 {
2886 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2887 int al;
2888
2889 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2890 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2891 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2892 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2893 */
2894 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2895 {
2896 int r;
2897 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2898 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2899 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2900 if (certpkey == NULL)
2901 {
2902 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2903 return 1;
2904 }
2905 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2906 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2907 */
2908 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2909 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2910 switch (r)
2911 {
2912 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2915 break;
2916 /* status request response should be sent */
2917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2918 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2919 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2920 else
2921 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2922 break;
2923 /* something bad happened */
2924 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2925 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2926 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2927 goto err;
2928 }
2929 }
2930 else
2931 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2932
2933 err:
2934 switch (ret)
2935 {
2936 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2937 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2938 return -1;
2939
2940 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2942 return 1;
2943
2944 default:
2945 return 1;
2946 }
2947 }
2948
2949 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2950 {
2951 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2952 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2953
2954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2955 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2956 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2957 * it must contain uncompressed.
2958 */
2959 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2960 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2961 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2962 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2963 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2964 {
2965 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2966 size_t i;
2967 unsigned char *list;
2968 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2969 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2970 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2971 {
2972 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2973 {
2974 found_uncompressed = 1;
2975 break;
2976 }
2977 }
2978 if (!found_uncompressed)
2979 {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2981 return -1;
2982 }
2983 }
2984 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2985 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2986
2987 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2988 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2989 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2990 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2991
2992 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2993 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2994 {
2995 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2996 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2997
2998 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2999 {
3000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3001 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3002 }
3003
3004 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3005 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3006 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3007 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3008 {
3009 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3010 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3011 }
3012 }
3013 #endif
3014
3015 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3016 * tell the callback
3017 */
3018 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3019 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3020 {
3021 int r;
3022 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3023 * there is no response.
3024 */
3025 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3026 {
3027 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3028 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3029 }
3030 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3031 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3032 if (r == 0)
3033 {
3034 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3036 }
3037 if (r < 0)
3038 {
3039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3041 }
3042 }
3043
3044 switch (ret)
3045 {
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3048 return -1;
3049
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3052 return 1;
3053
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3055 s->servername_done=0;
3056 default:
3057 return 1;
3058 }
3059 }
3060
3061 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3062 {
3063 int al = -1;
3064 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3065 return 1;
3066 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3067 {
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3069 return 0;
3070 }
3071
3072 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3073 {
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3075 return 0;
3076 }
3077 return 1;
3078 }
3079
3080 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3081 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3082 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3083 *
3084 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3085 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3086 * extension, if any.
3087 * len: the length of the session ID.
3088 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3089 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3090 * point to the resulting session.
3091 *
3092 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3093 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3094 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3095 *
3096 * Returns:
3097 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3098 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3099 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3100 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3101 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3102 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3103 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3104 *
3105 * Side effects:
3106 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3107 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3108 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3109 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3110 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3111 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3112 */
3113 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3114 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3115 {
3116 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3117 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3118 unsigned short i;
3119
3120 *ret = NULL;
3121 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3122
3123 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3124 * to permit stateful resumption.
3125 */
3126 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3127 return 0;
3128 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3129 return 0;
3130 if (p >= limit)
3131 return -1;
3132 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3133 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3134 {
3135 i = *(p++);
3136 p+= i;
3137 if (p >= limit)
3138 return -1;
3139 }
3140 /* Skip past cipher list */
3141 n2s(p, i);
3142 p+= i;
3143 if (p >= limit)
3144 return -1;
3145 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3146 i = *(p++);
3147 p += i;
3148 if (p > limit)
3149 return -1;
3150 /* Now at start of extensions */
3151 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3152 return 0;
3153 n2s(p, i);
3154 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3155 {
3156 unsigned short type, size;
3157 n2s(p, type);
3158 n2s(p, size);
3159 if (p + size > limit)
3160 return 0;
3161 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3162 {
3163 int r;
3164 if (size == 0)
3165 {
3166 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3167 * currently have one. */
3168 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3169 return 1;
3170 }
3171 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3172 {
3173 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3174 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3175 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3176 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3177 * calculate the master secret later. */
3178 return 2;
3179 }
3180 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3181 switch (r)
3182 {
3183 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3184 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3185 return 2;
3186 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3187 return r;
3188 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3189 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3190 return 3;
3191 default: /* fatal error */
3192 return -1;
3193 }
3194 }
3195 p += size;
3196 }
3197 return 0;
3198 }
3199
3200 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3201 *
3202 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3203 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3204 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3205 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3206 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3207 * point to the resulting session.
3208 *
3209 * Returns:
3210 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3211 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3212 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3213 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3214 */
3215 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3216 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3217 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3218 {
3219 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3220 unsigned char *sdec;
3221 const unsigned char *p;
3222 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3223 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3224 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3225 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3226 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3227 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3228 if (eticklen < 48)
3229 return 2;
3230 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3231 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3232 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3233 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3234 {
3235 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3236 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3237 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3238 if (rv < 0)
3239 return -1;
3240 if (rv == 0)
3241 return 2;
3242 if (rv == 2)
3243 renew_ticket = 1;
3244 }
3245 else
3246 {
3247 /* Check key name matches */
3248 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3249 return 2;
3250 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3251 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3252 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3253 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3254 }
3255 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3256 * integrity checks on ticket.
3257 */
3258 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3259 if (mlen < 0)
3260 {
3261 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3262 return -1;
3263 }
3264 eticklen -= mlen;
3265 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3266 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3267 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3268 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3269 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3270 return 2;
3271 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3272 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3273 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3274 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3275 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3276 if (!sdec)
3277 {
3278 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3279 return -1;
3280 }
3281 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3282 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3283 return 2;
3284 slen += mlen;
3285 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3286 p = sdec;
3287
3288 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3289 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3290 if (sess)
3291 {
3292 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3293 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3294 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3295 * as required by standard.
3296 */
3297 if (sesslen)
3298 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3299 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3300 *psess = sess;
3301 if (renew_ticket)
3302 return 4;
3303 else
3304 return 3;
3305 }
3306 ERR_clear_error();
3307 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3308 * ticket. */
3309 return 2;
3310 }
3311
3312 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3313
3314 typedef struct
3315 {
3316 int nid;
3317 int id;
3318 } tls12_lookup;
3319
3320 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3321 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3322 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3323 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3324 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3325 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3326 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3327 };
3328
3329 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3330 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3331 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3332 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3333 };
3334
3335 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3336 {
3337 size_t i;
3338 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3339 {
3340 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3341 return table[i].id;
3342 }
3343 return -1;
3344 }
3345
3346 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3347 {
3348 size_t i;
3349 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3350 {
3351 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3352 return table[i].nid;
3353 }
3354 return NID_undef;
3355 }
3356
3357 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3358 {
3359 int sig_id, md_id;
3360 if (!md)
3361 return 0;
3362 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3363 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3364 if (md_id == -1)
3365 return 0;
3366 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3367 if (sig_id == -1)
3368 return 0;
3369 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3370 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3371 return 1;
3372 }
3373
3374 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3375 {
3376 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3377 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3378 }
3379
3380 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3381 {
3382 switch(hash_alg)
3383 {
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3385 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3386 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3387 if (FIPS_mode())
3388 return NULL;
3389 #endif
3390 return EVP_md5();
3391 #endif
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3393 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3394 return EVP_sha1();
3395 #endif
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3397 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3398 return EVP_sha224();
3399
3400 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3401 return EVP_sha256();
3402 #endif
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3404 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3405 return EVP_sha384();
3406
3407 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3408 return EVP_sha512();
3409 #endif
3410 default:
3411 return NULL;
3412
3413 }
3414 }
3415
3416 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3417 {
3418 switch(sig_alg)
3419 {
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3421 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3422 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3423 #endif
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3425 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3426 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3427 #endif
3428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3429 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3430 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3431 #endif
3432 }
3433 return -1;
3434 }
3435
3436 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3437 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3438 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3439 {
3440 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3441 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3442 return;
3443 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3444 {
3445 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3446 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3447 if (phash_nid)
3448 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3449 }
3450 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3451 {
3452 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3453 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3454 if (psign_nid)
3455 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3456 }
3457 if (psignhash_nid)
3458 {
3459 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3460 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3461 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3462 else
3463 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3464 }
3465 }
3466 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3467 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3468 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3469 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3470 {
3471 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3472 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3473 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3474 {
3475 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3476 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3477 continue;
3478 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3479 continue;
3480 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3481 {
3482 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3483 {
3484 nmatch++;
3485 if (shsig)
3486 {
3487 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3488 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3489 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3490 &shsig->sign_nid,
3491 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3492 ptmp);
3493 shsig++;
3494 }
3495 break;
3496 }
3497 }
3498 }
3499 return nmatch;
3500 }
3501
3502 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3503 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3504 {
3505 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3506 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3507 size_t nmatch;
3508 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3509 CERT *c = s->cert;
3510 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3511 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3512 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3513 {
3514 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3515 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3516 }
3517 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3518 {
3519 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3520 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3521 }
3522 else
3523 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3524 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3525 {
3526 pref = conf;
3527 preflen = conflen;
3528 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3529 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3530 }
3531 else
3532 {
3533 allow = conf;
3534 allowlen = conflen;
3535 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3536 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3537 }
3538 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3539 if (!nmatch)
3540 return 1;
3541 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3542 if (!salgs)
3543 return 0;
3544 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3545 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3546 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3547 return 1;
3548 }
3549
3550
3551 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3552
3553 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3554 {
3555 int idx;
3556 size_t i;
3557 const EVP_MD *md;
3558 CERT *c = s->cert;
3559 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3560 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3561 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3562 return 1;
3563 /* Should never happen */
3564 if (!c)
3565 return 0;
3566
3567 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3568 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3569 return 0;
3570 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3571 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3572
3573 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3574
3575 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3576 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3577 {
3578 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3579 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3580 */
3581 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3582 if (s->server)
3583 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3584 else
3585 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3586 if (sigs)
3587 {
3588 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3589 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3590 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3591 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3592 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3593 {
3594 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3595 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3596 }
3597 }
3598 }
3599 #endif
3600
3601 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3602 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3603 {
3604 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3605 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3606 {
3607 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3608 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3609 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3610 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3611 {
3612 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3613 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3614 }
3615 }
3616
3617 }
3618 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3619 * use the certificate for signing.
3620 */
3621 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3622 {
3623 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3624 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3625 */
3626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3627 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3628 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3629 #endif
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3631 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3632 {
3633 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3634 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3635 }
3636 #endif
3637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3638 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3639 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3640 #endif
3641 }
3642 return 1;
3643 }
3644
3645
3646 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3647 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3648 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3649 {
3650 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3651 if (psig == NULL)
3652 return 0;
3653 if (idx >= 0)
3654 {
3655 idx <<= 1;
3656 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3657 return 0;
3658 psig += idx;
3659 if (rhash)
3660 *rhash = psig[0];
3661 if (rsig)
3662 *rsig = psig[1];
3663 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3664 }
3665 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3666 }
3667
3668 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3669 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3670 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3671 {
3672 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3673 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3674 return 0;
3675 shsigalgs += idx;
3676 if (phash)
3677 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3678 if (psign)
3679 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3680 if (psignhash)
3681 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3682 if (rsig)
3683 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3684 if (rhash)
3685 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3686 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3687 }
3688
3689
3690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3691 int
3692 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3693 {
3694 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3695 unsigned short hbtype;
3696 unsigned int payload;
3697 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3698
3699 /* Read type and payload length first */
3700 hbtype = *p++;
3701 n2s(p, payload);
3702 pl = p;
3703
3704 if (s->msg_callback)
3705 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3706 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3707 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3708
3709 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3710 {
3711 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3712 int r;
3713
3714 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3715 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3716 * payload, plus padding
3717 */
3718 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3719 bp = buffer;
3720
3721 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3722 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3723 s2n(payload, bp);
3724 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3725 bp += payload;
3726 /* Random padding */
3727 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3728
3729 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3730
3731 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3732 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3733 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3734 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3735
3736 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3737
3738 if (r < 0)
3739 return r;
3740 }
3741 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3742 {
3743 unsigned int seq;
3744
3745 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3746 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3747 * sequence number */
3748 n2s(pl, seq);
3749
3750 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3751 {
3752 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3753 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3754 }
3755 }
3756
3757 return 0;
3758 }
3759
3760 int
3761 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3762 {
3763 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3764 int ret;
3765 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3766 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3767
3768 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3769 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3770 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3771 {
3772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3773 return -1;
3774 }
3775
3776 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3777 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3778 {
3779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3780 return -1;
3781 }
3782
3783 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3784 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3785 {
3786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3787 return -1;
3788 }
3789
3790 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3791 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3792 */
3793 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3794
3795 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3796 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3797 * some random stuff.
3798 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3799 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3800 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3801 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3802 * - Padding
3803 */
3804 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3805 p = buf;
3806 /* Message Type */
3807 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3808 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3809 s2n(payload, p);
3810 /* Sequence number */
3811 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3812 /* 16 random bytes */
3813 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3814 p += 16;
3815 /* Random padding */
3816 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3817
3818 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3819 if (ret >= 0)
3820 {
3821 if (s->msg_callback)
3822 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3823 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3824 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3825
3826 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3827 }
3828
3829 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3830
3831 return ret;
3832 }
3833 #endif
3834
3835 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3836
3837 typedef struct
3838 {
3839 size_t sigalgcnt;
3840 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3841 } sig_cb_st;
3842
3843 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3844 {
3845 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3846 size_t i;
3847 char etmp[20], *p;
3848 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3849 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3850 return 0;
3851 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3852 return 0;
3853 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3854 etmp[len] = 0;
3855 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3856 if (!p)
3857 return 0;
3858 *p = 0;
3859 p++;
3860 if (!*p)
3861 return 0;
3862
3863 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3864 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3865 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3866 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3867 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3868 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3869 else return 0;
3870
3871 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3872 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3873 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3874 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3875 return 0;
3876
3877 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3878 {
3879 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3880 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3881 return 0;
3882 }
3883 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3884 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3885 return 1;
3886 }
3887
3888 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3889 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3890 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3891 {
3892 sig_cb_st sig;
3893 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3894 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3895 return 0;
3896 if (c == NULL)
3897 return 1;
3898 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3899 }
3900
3901 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3902 {
3903 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3904 int rhash, rsign;
3905 size_t i;
3906 if (salglen & 1)
3907 return 0;
3908 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3909 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3910 return 0;
3911 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3912 {
3913 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3914 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3915 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3916 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3917
3918 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3919 goto err;
3920 *sptr++ = rhash;
3921 *sptr++ = rsign;
3922 }
3923
3924 if (client)
3925 {
3926 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3927 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3928 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3929 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3930 }
3931 else
3932 {
3933 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3934 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3935 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3936 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3937 }
3938
3939 return 1;
3940
3941 err:
3942 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3943 return 0;
3944 }
3945
3946 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3947 {
3948 int sig_nid;
3949 size_t i;
3950 if (default_nid == -1)
3951 return 1;
3952 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3953 if (default_nid)
3954 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3955 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3956 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3957 return 1;
3958 return 0;
3959 }
3960 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3961 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3962 {
3963 X509_NAME *nm;
3964 int i;
3965 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3966 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3967 {
3968 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3969 return 1;
3970 }
3971 return 0;
3972 }
3973
3974 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3975 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3976 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3977 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3978 */
3979
3980 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3981
3982 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3983 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3984 /* Strict mode flags */
3985 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3986 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3987 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3988
3989 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3990 int idx)
3991 {
3992 int i;
3993 int rv = 0;
3994 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3995 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3996 CERT *c = s->cert;
3997 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3998 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3999 if (idx != -1)
4000 {
4001 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4002 if (idx == -2)
4003 {
4004 cpk = c->key;
4005 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4006 }
4007 else
4008 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4009 x = cpk->x509;
4010 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4011 chain = cpk->chain;
4012 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4013 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4014 if (!x || !pk)
4015 goto end;
4016 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4017 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4018 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4019 {
4020 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4021 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4022 return rv;
4023 }
4024 #endif
4025 }
4026 else
4027 {
4028 if (!x || !pk)
4029 goto end;
4030 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4031 if (idx == -1)
4032 goto end;
4033 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4034 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4035 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4036 else
4037 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4038 strict_mode = 1;
4039 }
4040
4041 if (suiteb_flags)
4042 {
4043 int ok;
4044 if (check_flags)
4045 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4046 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4047 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4048 {
4049 if (check_flags)
4050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4051 else
4052 goto end;
4053 }
4054 }
4055
4056 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4057 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4058 * and strict mode.
4059 */
4060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4061 {
4062 int default_nid;
4063 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4064 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4065 default_nid = 0;
4066 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4067 else
4068 {
4069 switch(idx)
4070 {
4071 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4072 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4073 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4074 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4075 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4076 break;
4077
4078 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4079 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4080 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4081 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4082 break;
4083
4084 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4085 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4086 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4087 break;
4088
4089 default:
4090 default_nid = -1;
4091 break;
4092 }
4093 }
4094 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4095 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4096 * sha1.
4097 */
4098 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4099 {
4100 size_t j;
4101 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4102 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4103 {
4104 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4105 break;
4106 }
4107 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4108 {
4109 if (check_flags)
4110 goto skip_sigs;
4111 else
4112 goto end;
4113 }
4114 }
4115 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4116 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4117 {
4118 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4119 }
4120 else
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4122 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4124 {
4125 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4126 default_nid))
4127 {
4128 if (check_flags)
4129 {
4130 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4131 break;
4132 }
4133 else
4134 goto end;
4135 }
4136 }
4137 }
4138 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4139 else if(check_flags)
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4141 skip_sigs:
4142 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4143 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4144 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4145 else if (!check_flags)
4146 goto end;
4147 if (!s->server)
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4149 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4150 else if (strict_mode)
4151 {
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4153 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4154 {
4155 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4156 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4157 {
4158 if (check_flags)
4159 {
4160 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4161 break;
4162 }
4163 else
4164 goto end;
4165 }
4166 }
4167 }
4168 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4169 {
4170 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4171 int check_type = 0;
4172 switch (pk->type)
4173 {
4174 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4175 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4176 break;
4177 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4178 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4179 break;
4180 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4181 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4182 break;
4183 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4184 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4185 {
4186 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4187 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4188 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4189 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4190 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4191 }
4192 }
4193 if (check_type)
4194 {
4195 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4196 int ctypelen;
4197 if (c->ctypes)
4198 {
4199 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4200 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4201 }
4202 else
4203 {
4204 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4205 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4206 }
4207 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4208 {
4209 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4210 {
4211 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4212 break;
4213 }
4214 }
4215 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4216 goto end;
4217 }
4218 else
4219 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4220
4221
4222 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4223
4224 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4225 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4226
4227 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4228 {
4229 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4231 }
4232 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4233 {
4234 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4235 {
4236 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4237 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4238 {
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4240 break;
4241 }
4242 }
4243 }
4244 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4245 goto end;
4246 }
4247 else
4248 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4249
4250 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4252
4253 end:
4254
4255 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4256 {
4257 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4259 else if (cpk->digest)
4260 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4261 }
4262 else
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4264
4265 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4266 * if the chain is invalid.
4267 */
4268 if (!check_flags)
4269 {
4270 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4271 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4272 else
4273 {
4274 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4275 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4276 return 0;
4277 }
4278 }
4279 return rv;
4280 }
4281
4282 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4283 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4284 {
4285 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4286 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4287 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4288 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4289 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4290 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4291 }
4292 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4293 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4294 {
4295 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4296 }
4297
4298 #endif
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