2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X448 (30) */
171 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
177 /* The default curves */
178 static const uint16_t eccurves_default
[] = {
179 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
182 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
183 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
193 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
194 if (group_id
< 1 || group_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
196 return &nid_list
[group_id
- 1];
199 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
202 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
203 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
204 return (uint16_t)(i
+ 1);
210 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
211 * the number of groups supported.
213 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
217 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
218 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
219 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
220 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
221 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
224 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
225 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
230 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
235 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
236 *pgroups
= eccurves_default
;
237 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default
);
239 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
240 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
246 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
247 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve
, int op
)
249 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(curve
);
250 unsigned char ctmp
[2];
254 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
255 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
258 ctmp
[0] = curve
>> 8;
259 ctmp
[1] = curve
& 0xff;
260 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)ctmp
);
263 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
264 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
267 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
274 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
275 * if there is no match.
276 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
277 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
278 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
280 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
282 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
283 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
286 /* Can't do anything on client side */
290 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
292 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
293 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
295 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
297 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
299 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
301 /* Should never happen */
304 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
308 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
309 * otherwise peer decides.
311 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
312 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
316 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
319 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
320 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
322 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
323 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
331 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
335 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
336 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
341 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
344 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
346 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
350 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
351 unsigned long idmask
;
353 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
354 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
356 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
369 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
373 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
376 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
378 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
384 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
386 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
388 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
390 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
391 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
392 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
393 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
394 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
395 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
397 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
398 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
400 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
404 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
405 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
409 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
413 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
415 /* Return group id of a key */
416 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
418 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
423 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
424 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
427 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
428 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
432 unsigned char comp_id
;
435 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
436 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
438 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
439 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
441 /* Get required compression id */
442 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
443 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
444 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
446 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
451 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
453 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
454 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
455 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
456 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
461 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
462 * supported (see RFC4492).
464 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
)
467 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
468 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
474 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
475 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
477 const uint16_t *groups
;
483 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
484 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
485 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
487 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
488 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
490 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
491 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
494 /* Should never happen */
499 if (check_own_groups
) {
500 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
501 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
502 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
506 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
509 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
513 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
514 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
517 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
518 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
519 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
520 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
524 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
527 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
531 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
533 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
534 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
535 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
537 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
538 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
540 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
542 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
547 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
548 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
550 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
554 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
557 /* If not EC nothing to do */
558 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
560 /* Check compression */
561 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
563 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
565 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
568 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
571 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
574 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
579 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
580 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
581 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
582 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
583 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
585 return 0; /* Should never happen */
586 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
587 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
596 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
598 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
600 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
601 * is compatible with the client extensions.
603 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
605 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
607 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
609 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
611 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
614 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
615 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
616 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
617 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
631 /* Default sigalg schemes */
632 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
636 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
637 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
674 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
680 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
682 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
683 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
684 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
685 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
686 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
687 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
688 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
689 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
690 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
691 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
692 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
693 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
694 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
695 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
696 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
697 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
698 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
699 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
700 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
701 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
702 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
704 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
705 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
706 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
707 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
708 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
709 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
710 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
711 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
712 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
713 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
714 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
715 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
716 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
717 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
718 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
719 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
720 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
721 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
722 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
723 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
724 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
725 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
726 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
727 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
728 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
729 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
730 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
732 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
733 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
734 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
735 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
736 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
738 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
739 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
740 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
741 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
742 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
743 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
744 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
745 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
746 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
747 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
748 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
749 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
750 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
751 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
752 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
755 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
756 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
757 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
758 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
759 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
762 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
763 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
766 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
769 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
770 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
771 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
772 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
773 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
778 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
779 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
781 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
782 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
783 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
784 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
785 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
789 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
790 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
793 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
794 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
799 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
801 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
806 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
807 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
812 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
813 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
816 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
826 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
828 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
829 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
830 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
832 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
833 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
839 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
841 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
847 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
848 * is fixed by the certificate type.
850 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
856 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
857 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
858 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
860 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
867 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
869 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
872 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
874 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
881 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
884 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
887 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
889 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
893 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
895 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
896 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
899 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
901 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
903 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
906 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
910 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
913 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
917 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
918 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
919 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
920 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
922 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
923 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
926 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
927 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
932 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
933 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
934 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
936 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
937 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
938 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
939 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
940 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
941 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
943 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
944 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
949 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
950 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
953 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
955 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
956 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
958 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
959 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
960 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
962 /* Should never happen */
965 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
966 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
967 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
968 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
969 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
972 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
973 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
974 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
976 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
978 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
979 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
982 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
983 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
984 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
985 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
986 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
989 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
990 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
991 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
992 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
993 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
998 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1000 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1001 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1002 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1003 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1004 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1008 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1009 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1010 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
1011 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
1013 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1015 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1019 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1020 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1021 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1023 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1026 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1027 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1028 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1029 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1031 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1032 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1037 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1038 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1039 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1044 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1045 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1046 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1047 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1050 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1051 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1052 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1054 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1057 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1059 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1064 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1065 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1067 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1068 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1069 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1070 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1071 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1072 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1073 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1077 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1078 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1082 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1084 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1086 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1091 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1092 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1093 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1095 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1098 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1100 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1102 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1103 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1104 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1105 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
,
1106 &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1109 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1110 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1111 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1112 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1116 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1117 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1118 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1125 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1126 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1127 * @c: cipher to check
1128 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1129 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1131 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1133 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1135 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1136 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1138 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1140 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1141 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1144 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1145 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1147 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1148 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1149 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1151 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
))
1154 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1155 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1158 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1161 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1163 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1165 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1168 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1172 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1173 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1174 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1175 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1176 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1177 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1178 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1180 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1181 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1184 && s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1185 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1186 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1188 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1189 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1194 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1195 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1196 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1197 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1205 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1207 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1210 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1213 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1214 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1215 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1220 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1222 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1223 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1224 * point to the resulting session.
1226 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1230 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1233 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1236 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1237 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1240 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1241 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1243 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1244 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1245 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1247 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1249 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1250 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1254 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1256 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1257 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1258 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1259 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1262 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1263 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1264 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1265 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1266 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1267 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1269 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1270 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1271 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1272 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1273 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1274 * point to the resulting session.
1276 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1277 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1278 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1280 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1281 unsigned char *sdec
;
1282 const unsigned char *p
;
1283 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1284 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1286 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1287 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1288 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1289 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1291 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1293 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1294 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1296 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1299 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1301 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1302 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1303 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1304 * calculate the master secret later.
1306 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1310 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1311 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1312 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1316 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1317 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1319 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1322 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1324 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1327 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1328 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1329 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1330 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1333 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1337 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1343 /* Check key name matches */
1344 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1345 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1346 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1349 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1350 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1351 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1352 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1353 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1354 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1355 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1358 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1362 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1365 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1367 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1371 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1373 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1374 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1378 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1379 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1380 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1381 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1385 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1386 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1389 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1390 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1391 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1392 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1393 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1394 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1395 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1397 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1400 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1402 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1408 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1412 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1414 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1416 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1420 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1421 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1422 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1426 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1427 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1430 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1432 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1437 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1439 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1442 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1443 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1446 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1447 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1448 * performs any action
1450 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1451 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1452 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1453 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1454 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1455 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1458 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1459 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1460 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1462 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1464 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1465 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1468 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1469 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1470 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1474 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1475 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1476 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1477 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1478 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1482 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1483 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1484 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1485 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
1486 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1487 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
1488 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1490 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1494 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1498 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1500 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1501 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1502 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1503 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1512 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1513 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1515 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1518 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1519 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1521 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1522 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1524 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1525 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1526 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1527 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1528 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1531 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1532 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1535 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1536 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1537 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
1538 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1539 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1542 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1543 && s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1545 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1548 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1549 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1550 * ciphersuites enabled.
1553 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1556 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1557 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
1558 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
1559 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1561 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1562 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1563 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
1566 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kGOST
) != 0)
1574 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1576 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1577 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1578 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1579 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1580 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1581 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1585 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1586 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1590 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1592 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1593 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1594 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1596 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1599 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1600 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1601 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1602 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1607 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1611 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1612 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1613 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1614 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1616 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1619 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1620 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1625 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1626 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1628 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1633 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1634 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1636 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1637 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1638 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1639 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1647 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1648 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1649 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1650 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1652 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1653 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1654 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1655 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1657 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1658 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1660 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1661 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1672 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1673 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1675 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1676 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1678 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1680 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1682 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1683 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1684 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1685 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1686 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1687 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1688 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1689 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1690 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1691 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1693 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1694 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1697 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1698 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1702 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1703 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1705 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1707 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1711 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1715 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1716 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1720 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1726 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1728 /* Invalid data length */
1729 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1734 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1738 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1746 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1753 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1755 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1756 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1758 /* Should never happen */
1759 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1763 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1764 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1766 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1767 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1771 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1773 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1776 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1779 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1782 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1785 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1786 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1787 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1789 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1790 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1792 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1793 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1794 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1799 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1800 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1801 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1803 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1804 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1805 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1808 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1810 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1814 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1816 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1817 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1819 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1821 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1822 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1823 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1825 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1828 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1829 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1830 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1832 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1833 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1835 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1836 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1838 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1840 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1842 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1843 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1844 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1846 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1848 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1849 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1852 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1853 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1857 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1858 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1861 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1863 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1864 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1865 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1866 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1867 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1868 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1869 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1870 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1872 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1873 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1874 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1877 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1878 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1880 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1882 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1884 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1885 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1886 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1889 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1891 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1893 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1895 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1897 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1898 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1899 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1900 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1901 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1902 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1906 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1908 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1909 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1913 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1920 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1921 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1922 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1924 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1926 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
1927 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1931 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1935 /* Reject duplicates */
1936 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
1937 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
1946 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1947 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1949 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1953 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1957 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1960 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
1965 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1969 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1972 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1973 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1974 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1976 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1977 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1978 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1984 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1986 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1991 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1995 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1997 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1998 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1999 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2001 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2003 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2004 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2009 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2014 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2015 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2016 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2018 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2019 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2020 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2026 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2030 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2034 if (default_nid
== -1)
2036 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2038 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2039 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
2040 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
2045 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2046 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2050 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2051 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2052 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2059 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2060 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2061 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2062 * attempting to use them.
2065 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2067 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2068 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2069 /* Strict mode flags */
2070 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2071 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2072 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2074 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2079 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2080 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2083 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2084 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2086 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2089 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2091 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2092 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2094 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2096 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2097 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2106 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2109 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2111 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2112 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2114 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2121 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2122 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2123 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2124 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2125 else if (!check_flags
)
2130 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2131 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2133 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2136 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2137 || s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2139 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2143 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2144 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2147 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2148 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2149 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2153 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2154 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2157 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2158 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2159 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2162 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2163 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2164 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2167 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2168 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2169 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2178 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2179 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2181 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2183 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2184 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2185 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2187 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2190 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2197 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2198 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2202 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2203 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2204 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2205 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2207 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2214 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2215 else if (check_flags
)
2216 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2218 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2219 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2220 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2221 else if (!check_flags
)
2224 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2225 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2226 else if (strict_mode
) {
2227 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2228 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2229 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2230 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2232 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2239 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2240 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2242 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2244 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2247 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2250 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2254 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2257 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2258 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2259 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2263 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2266 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2269 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2271 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2272 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2274 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2275 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2276 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2278 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2279 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2280 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2281 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2282 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2287 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2290 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2292 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2293 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2297 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2298 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2300 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2303 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2307 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2310 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2311 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2318 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2319 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2321 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2322 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2323 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2324 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2325 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2326 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2327 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2328 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2329 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2332 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2333 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2335 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2339 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2341 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2342 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2343 return DH_get_1024_160();
2344 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2345 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2350 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2352 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2355 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2361 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2366 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2367 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2369 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2370 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2378 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2379 return DH_get_2048_224();
2380 return DH_get_1024_160();
2384 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2387 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2390 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2391 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2392 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2393 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2395 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2398 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2400 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2403 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2405 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2406 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2407 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2408 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2410 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2412 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2413 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2416 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2418 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2421 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2424 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2426 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2427 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2429 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2430 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2432 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2433 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2438 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2439 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2440 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2443 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2445 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2447 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2452 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2456 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2457 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2458 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2466 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2467 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2470 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2472 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2473 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2475 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2476 if (clu
== NULL
|| !(clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
))
2479 return s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2483 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2484 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2485 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2486 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2487 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2489 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2491 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2495 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2498 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2500 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2501 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2502 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2504 || !X509_get_signature_info(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
, &mdnid
,
2505 &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
2508 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2509 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2510 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2511 * signing certificate.
2513 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
2522 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2523 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2525 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2526 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2528 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2529 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2530 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2532 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2534 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2537 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2538 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2540 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2546 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2547 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2548 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2551 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2552 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2553 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2554 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2555 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2557 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2558 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
) || !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2560 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2563 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2565 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2567 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2572 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2573 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2576 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2577 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2582 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2586 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2590 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2591 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2593 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2596 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2598 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2602 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2603 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2604 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2605 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2612 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2615 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2616 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2619 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2622 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2624 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2625 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2628 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2629 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2631 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2632 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2633 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2635 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2639 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2643 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2646 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2647 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2652 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2654 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2655 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2657 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2665 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2666 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2667 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2668 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2669 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2672 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2675 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2676 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2677 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2682 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2692 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2693 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2694 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2695 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2699 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2701 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2702 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2704 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2708 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2712 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2714 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2715 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2717 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2721 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2725 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
2727 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;