2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, int ticklen
,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id
, int sesslen
,
126 SSL_SESSION
**psess
);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
133 tls1_setup_key_block
,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
141 tls1_export_keying_material
,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
151 tls1_setup_key_block
,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
159 tls1_export_keying_material
,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
169 tls1_setup_key_block
,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
177 tls1_export_keying_material
,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
202 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
204 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_session_ticket
);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
211 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The default curves */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_default
[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all
[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
331 return nid_list
[curve_id
- 1].nid
;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1
: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1
: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1
: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves
,
415 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
417 *pcurves
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
418 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
423 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
424 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
428 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
433 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
437 *pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
438 pcurveslen
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
441 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
442 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_default
);
446 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
447 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
452 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
457 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
458 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
460 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
463 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
465 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
466 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
467 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
470 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
473 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
474 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
476 const unsigned char *curves
;
477 size_t num_curves
, i
;
478 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
479 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
481 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
483 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
486 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
487 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
489 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
490 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
492 } else /* Should never happen */
495 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
497 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
498 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
499 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
505 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
506 * if there is no match.
507 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
508 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
509 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
511 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
513 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
514 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
516 /* Can't do anything on client side */
520 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
522 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
523 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
525 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
526 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
527 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
528 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
529 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
530 /* Should never happen */
533 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
537 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
538 * but s->options is a long...
540 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
541 (s
, (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0, &supp
,
543 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
544 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
545 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
546 (s
, !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
), &pref
,
548 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
551 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
554 if (num_supp
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0) {
556 num_supp
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
557 } else if (num_pref
== 0 &&
558 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0) {
560 num_pref
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
564 for (i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
565 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
566 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
567 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
568 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
571 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
572 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
);
580 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
584 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
585 int *curves
, size_t ncurves
)
587 unsigned char *clist
, *p
;
590 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
593 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
594 clist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves
* 2);
597 for (i
= 0, p
= clist
; i
< ncurves
; i
++) {
598 unsigned long idmask
;
600 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves
[i
]);
602 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
611 *pextlen
= ncurves
* 2;
615 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
619 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
622 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
624 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
630 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
632 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
634 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
636 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
637 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
638 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
639 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
640 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
641 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
643 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
644 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
646 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
650 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
651 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
656 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
660 return tls1_set_curves(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
663 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
664 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
669 const EC_METHOD
*meth
;
672 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
673 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
676 meth
= EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
);
679 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth
) == NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
683 /* Determine curve ID */
684 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
685 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
686 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
689 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
698 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
700 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
) {
702 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
704 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
706 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
711 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
712 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
713 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
715 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
716 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
719 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
720 * supported (see RFC4492).
722 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
723 pformats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
724 num_formats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
725 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
726 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
729 if (i
== num_formats
)
734 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
735 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
736 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
738 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
740 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
741 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
742 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
743 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
744 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
748 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
749 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
754 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
761 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
765 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
767 if (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
768 *pformats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
769 *num_formats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
771 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
772 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
774 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
776 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
781 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
782 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
784 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
786 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
789 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
792 /* If not EC nothing to do */
793 if (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
797 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
802 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
805 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
809 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
810 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
812 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
818 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
819 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
820 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
821 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
822 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
824 return 0; /* Should never happen */
825 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
826 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
828 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
830 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
831 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
832 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
834 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
842 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
844 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
846 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
847 * is compatible with the client extensions.
849 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
863 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
864 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
865 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
866 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
867 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
868 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
872 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
873 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s
, 0))
882 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
891 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
894 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
895 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
901 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
905 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
907 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
911 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
913 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
916 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
921 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512
)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224
)
926 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1
)
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
,
930 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
937 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
940 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **psigs
)
943 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
948 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
949 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
950 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs
);
952 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
953 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
956 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
957 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 2;
961 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
962 if (s
->server
&& s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
) {
963 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
964 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
965 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
966 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
967 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
969 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
970 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs
);
975 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
976 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
978 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD
**pmd
, SSL
*s
,
979 const unsigned char *sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
981 const unsigned char *sent_sigs
;
982 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
983 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
984 /* Should never happen */
987 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
988 if (sigalg
!= (int)sig
[1]) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
993 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
994 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
995 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
996 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
))
998 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1003 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1006 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
) {
1007 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256
) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1009 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
1012 } else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
) {
1013 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384
) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1015 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
1021 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1025 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1026 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sent_sigs
);
1027 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
+= 2, sent_sigs
+= 2) {
1028 if (sig
[0] == sent_sigs
[0] && sig
[1] == sent_sigs
[1])
1031 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1032 if (i
== sent_sigslen
1033 && (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1034 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1038 *pmd
= tls12_get_hash(sig
[0]);
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1043 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1044 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1045 EVP_MD_size(*pmd
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd
),
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1051 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1053 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_md
= *pmd
;
1058 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1059 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1060 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1063 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1065 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1066 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1067 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1068 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1069 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1071 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1072 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1073 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1074 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
|= SSL_TLSV1
;
1075 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1077 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1080 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1081 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kECDHr
;
1082 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1083 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kDHd
;
1084 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1085 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kECDHe
;
1086 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1087 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1088 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1089 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1090 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1094 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1095 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1096 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
1103 if (c
->algorithm_ssl
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
1104 || c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1105 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1107 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1110 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1112 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)
1114 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1117 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *buf
,
1118 unsigned char *limit
, int *al
)
1121 unsigned char *orig
= buf
;
1122 unsigned char *ret
= buf
;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1124 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1126 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1128 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
1129 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1131 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
); i
++) {
1132 SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
1134 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
1135 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
1136 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)
1137 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))) {
1148 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1150 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1151 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1154 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1159 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
1165 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1172 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1173 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1176 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1177 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1178 unsigned long size_str
;
1182 * check for enough space.
1183 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1184 * 2 for servernamelist length
1185 * 1 for the hostname type
1186 * 2 for hostname length
1190 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 9) < 0
1192 strlen(s
->tlsext_hostname
)) > (unsigned long)lenmax
)
1195 /* extension type and length */
1196 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
1197 s2n(size_str
+ 5, ret
);
1199 /* length of servername list */
1200 s2n(size_str
+ 3, ret
);
1202 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1203 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
;
1205 memcpy(ret
, s
->tlsext_hostname
, size_str
);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1209 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1210 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
!= NULL
) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1211 * Client Hello message */
1213 int login_len
= strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
1214 if (login_len
> 255 || login_len
== 0) {
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1220 * check for enough space.
1221 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1222 * 1 for the srp user identity
1223 * + srp user identity length
1225 if ((limit
- ret
- 5 - login_len
) < 0)
1228 /* fill in the extension */
1229 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
, ret
);
1230 s2n(login_len
+ 1, ret
);
1231 (*ret
++) = (unsigned char)login_len
;
1232 memcpy(ret
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
, login_len
);
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1240 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1243 const unsigned char *pcurves
, *pformats
;
1244 size_t num_curves
, num_formats
, curves_list_len
;
1246 unsigned char *etmp
;
1248 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
1250 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 5) < 0)
1252 if (num_formats
> (size_t)lenmax
)
1254 if (num_formats
> 255) {
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1259 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
, ret
);
1260 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1261 s2n(num_formats
+ 1, ret
);
1262 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)num_formats
;
1263 memcpy(ret
, pformats
, num_formats
);
1267 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1269 pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
1270 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
1273 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 6) < 0)
1275 if (num_curves
> (size_t)lenmax
/ 2)
1277 if (num_curves
> 65532 / 2) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1282 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
, ret
);
1284 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1285 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
1286 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1287 *etmp
++ = pcurves
[0];
1288 *etmp
++ = pcurves
[1];
1292 curves_list_len
= etmp
- ret
- 4;
1294 s2n(curves_list_len
+ 2, ret
);
1295 s2n(curves_list_len
, ret
);
1296 ret
+= curves_list_len
;
1298 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1300 if (tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1302 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
1303 ticklen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
;
1304 else if (s
->session
&& s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1305 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
) {
1306 ticklen
= s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->length
;
1307 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1308 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
)
1310 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
,
1311 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
1312 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1315 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1316 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
1319 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1322 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - ticklen
) < 0)
1324 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
1327 memcpy(ret
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
);
1333 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1335 const unsigned char *salg
;
1336 unsigned char *etmp
;
1337 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &salg
);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit
- ret
) < salglen
+ 6)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
, ret
);
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 salglen
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, ret
, salg
, salglen
);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen
+ 2, etmp
);
1351 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1353 long extlen
, idlen
, itmp
;
1357 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
1358 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
1359 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
1365 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
) {
1366 extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, NULL
);
1372 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 7 - extlen
- idlen
) < 0)
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
1375 if (extlen
+ idlen
> 0xFFF0)
1377 s2n(extlen
+ idlen
+ 5, ret
);
1378 *(ret
++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
;
1380 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
1381 /* save position of id len */
1382 unsigned char *q
= ret
;
1383 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
1384 /* skip over id len */
1386 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &ret
);
1392 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, &ret
);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - 1) < 0)
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
, ret
);
1402 * 1: peer may send requests
1403 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1405 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1406 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1408 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1414 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1415 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1417 if (limit
- ret
- 4 < 0)
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
, ret
);
1424 if (s
->alpn_client_proto_list
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1425 if ((size_t)(limit
- ret
) < 6 + s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
)
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
, ret
);
1428 s2n(2 + s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
, ret
);
1429 s2n(s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
, ret
);
1430 memcpy(ret
, s
->alpn_client_proto_list
, s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
);
1431 ret
+= s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1434 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)) {
1437 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1438 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1443 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
, ret
);
1449 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1456 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->cli_ext
);
1457 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1458 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 0, &ret
, limit
, al
))
1460 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
, ret
);
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
, ret
);
1468 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1469 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1470 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1473 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) {
1474 int hlen
= ret
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1476 if (hlen
> 0xff && hlen
< 0x200) {
1477 hlen
= 0x200 - hlen
;
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
, ret
);
1485 memset(ret
, 0, hlen
);
1492 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- orig
- 2) == 0)
1495 s2n(extdatalen
, orig
);
1499 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *buf
,
1500 unsigned char *limit
, int *al
)
1503 unsigned char *orig
= buf
;
1504 unsigned char *ret
= buf
;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 int next_proto_neg_seen
;
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1510 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1511 int using_ecc
= (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
))
1512 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
);
1513 using_ecc
= using_ecc
&& (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
);
1518 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1520 if (s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
) {
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1528 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
1534 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1542 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1543 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1546 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->servername_done
== 1
1547 && s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1548 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1556 const unsigned char *plist
;
1559 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1563 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &plist
, &plistlen
);
1565 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 5) < 0)
1567 if (plistlen
> (size_t)lenmax
)
1569 if (plistlen
> 255) {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
, ret
);
1575 s2n(plistlen
+ 1, ret
);
1576 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)plistlen
;
1577 memcpy(ret
, plist
, plistlen
);
1582 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1585 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1587 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
&& tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1588 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
1594 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
1595 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->srtp_profile
) {
1605 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1606 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1610 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
, ret
);
1616 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1624 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1625 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1626 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG
)) {
1627 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext
[36] = {
1628 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1629 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1630 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1631 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1632 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1633 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1635 if (limit
- ret
< 36)
1637 memcpy(ret
, cryptopro_ext
, 36);
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1642 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1643 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
) {
1644 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - 1) < 0)
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
, ret
);
1650 * 1: peer may send requests
1651 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1653 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1654 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1656 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1662 next_proto_neg_seen
= s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
;
1663 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1664 if (next_proto_neg_seen
&& s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb
) {
1665 const unsigned char *npa
;
1666 unsigned int npalen
;
1669 r
= s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb(s
, &npa
, &npalen
,
1671 ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg
);
1672 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1673 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - npalen
) < 0)
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
, ret
);
1677 memcpy(ret
, npa
, npalen
);
1679 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
1683 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 1, &ret
, limit
, al
))
1685 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1686 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
) {
1688 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1689 * for other cases too.
1691 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
== SSL_AEAD
1692 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_RC4
1693 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1694 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
)
1695 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
, ret
);
1702 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
) {
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
, ret
);
1707 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
) {
1708 const unsigned char *selected
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected
;
1709 unsigned len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
1711 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - 2 - 1 - len
) < 0)
1713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
, ret
);
1717 memcpy(ret
, selected
, len
);
1723 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- orig
- 2) == 0)
1726 s2n(extdatalen
, orig
);
1731 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1732 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1733 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1734 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1737 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1739 unsigned int data_len
;
1740 unsigned int proto_len
;
1741 const unsigned char *selected
;
1742 unsigned char *data
;
1743 unsigned char selected_len
;
1746 if (s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb
== NULL
)
1750 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1751 * length-prefixed strings.
1753 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &data_len
)
1754 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != data_len
1755 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt
, &data
, data_len
))
1759 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &proto_len
)
1761 || !PACKET_forward(pkt
, proto_len
))
1763 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
1765 r
= s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
, data
, data_len
,
1766 s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb_arg
);
1767 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1768 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1769 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1770 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1771 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1774 memcpy(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, selected
, selected_len
);
1775 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
1780 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1786 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1787 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1788 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1793 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1794 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1795 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1796 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1798 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const PACKET
*pkt
)
1800 unsigned int type
, size
;
1801 unsigned char *eblock1
, *eblock2
;
1804 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1805 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1806 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1807 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1808 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1809 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1810 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1812 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1813 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1814 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1815 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1818 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1819 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1820 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1821 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1822 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1823 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1825 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1826 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1827 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1832 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1833 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1834 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &size
)
1835 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, size
))
1838 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1841 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
1842 const size_t len1
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
1843 const size_t len2
= sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
);
1845 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock1
, len1
)
1846 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock2
, len2
)
1847 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt
))
1849 if (memcmp(eblock1
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len1
) != 0)
1851 if (memcmp(eblock2
, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
, len2
) != 0)
1854 const size_t len
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
1856 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock1
, len
)
1857 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt
))
1859 if (memcmp(eblock1
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len
) != 0)
1863 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= 1;
1865 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1867 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1872 unsigned char *data
;
1873 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
1875 s
->servername_done
= 0;
1876 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1878 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1881 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1882 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1884 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
1885 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1889 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1890 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, pkt
);
1891 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1893 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1894 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1895 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1896 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1897 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1901 OPENSSL_free(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
1902 s
->srp_ctx
.login
= NULL
;
1905 s
->srtp_profile
= NULL
;
1907 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)
1910 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
))
1913 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
)
1916 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &type
) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &size
)) {
1919 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt
, &data
, size
))
1922 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
1923 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
1925 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &subpkt
, size
))
1928 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
1929 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, &subpkt
, al
))
1931 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
1932 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
1935 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1937 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1938 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1939 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1940 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1941 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1942 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1943 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1944 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1945 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1946 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1947 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1948 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1949 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1950 * the value of the Host: field.
1951 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1952 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1953 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1955 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1959 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
1960 unsigned char *sdata
;
1961 unsigned int servname_type
;
1965 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
1966 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt
, &ssubpkt
, dsize
))
1969 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) > 3) {
1970 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt
, &servname_type
)
1971 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt
, &len
)
1972 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) < len
)
1975 if (s
->servername_done
== 0)
1976 switch (servname_type
) {
1977 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
:
1979 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
)
1982 if (len
> TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
) {
1983 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1986 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
=
1987 OPENSSL_malloc(len
+ 1)) == NULL
) {
1988 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1991 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt
,
1992 (unsigned char *)s
->session
1995 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1998 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
[len
] = '\0';
1999 if (strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) != len
) {
2000 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
);
2001 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= NULL
;
2002 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2005 s
->servername_done
= 1;
2008 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt
, &sdata
, len
)) {
2009 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2012 s
->servername_done
= s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
2013 && strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) == len
2014 && strncmp(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
,
2015 (char *)sdata
, len
) == 0;
2024 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2025 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) != 0)
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2030 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
) {
2031 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &len
)
2032 || s
->srp_ctx
.login
!= NULL
)
2035 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.login
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
+ 1)) == NULL
)
2037 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
, (unsigned char *)s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
2040 s
->srp_ctx
.login
[len
] = '\0';
2042 if (strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
) != len
2043 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
))
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2049 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
2050 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length
;
2052 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &ecpointformatlist_length
)
2053 || ecpointformatlist_length
== 0)
2057 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
);
2058 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
= NULL
;
2059 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
= 0;
2060 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
=
2061 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2062 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2065 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
=
2066 ecpointformatlist_length
;
2067 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
,
2068 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
2069 ecpointformatlist_length
))
2071 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
2074 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2075 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2076 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2079 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
) {
2080 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length
;
2082 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2083 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &ellipticcurvelist_length
)
2084 || ellipticcurvelist_length
== 0
2085 || (ellipticcurvelist_length
& 1) != 0)
2089 if (s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
)
2092 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
= 0;
2093 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
=
2094 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2095 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2098 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
=
2099 ellipticcurvelist_length
;
2100 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
,
2101 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
,
2102 ellipticcurvelist_length
))
2104 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, ellipticcurvelist_length
)) {
2107 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2108 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2112 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2113 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2114 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, size
)
2115 || (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
2116 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
, data
, size
,
2117 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
))) {
2118 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2121 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
) {
2124 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
2125 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2128 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt
, &data
, dsize
)
2129 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
) != 0
2130 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, dsize
)) {
2133 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
2136 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
,
2137 (unsigned int *)&s
->tlsext_status_type
))
2140 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2141 const unsigned char *sdata
;
2143 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2144 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2145 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt
, &ssubpkt
, dsize
))
2148 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
)) {
2150 unsigned int idsize
;
2152 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) < 4
2153 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt
, &idsize
)
2154 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt
, &data
, idsize
)) {
2159 id
= d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL
, &sdata
, idsize
);
2162 if (data
!= sdata
) {
2163 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2166 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2167 && !(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
=
2168 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2170 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2173 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, id
)) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2175 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2180 /* Read in request_extensions */
2181 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2182 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt
, &data
, dsize
)
2183 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2188 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
,
2189 X509_EXTENSION_free
);
2190 s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
=
2191 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL
, &sdata
, dsize
);
2192 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|| (data
+ dsize
!= sdata
))
2197 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2200 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2203 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2204 unsigned int hbtype
;
2206 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &hbtype
)
2207 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2208 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2212 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2213 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2215 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2216 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2217 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2220 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
&&
2227 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 &&
2228 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2230 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2233 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2234 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2235 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2236 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2237 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2238 * anything like that, but this might change).
2240 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2241 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2242 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2243 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2244 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2246 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2250 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
&&
2251 s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb
&& s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2252 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s
, &subpkt
, al
) != 0)
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2255 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2256 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
2260 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2262 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)
2263 && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2264 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, &subpkt
, al
))
2268 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2269 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
2270 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2273 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2274 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2278 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2279 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2280 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2281 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2282 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2285 if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, al
) <= 0)
2290 /* Spurious data on the end */
2291 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0)
2296 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2298 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& s
->renegotiate
&&
2299 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2300 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2302 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2308 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2312 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2315 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->srv_ext
);
2316 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
) <= 0) {
2317 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2321 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2330 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2331 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2332 * fill the length of the block.
2334 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET
*pkt
)
2338 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2339 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &len
)
2340 || !PACKET_forward(pkt
, len
))
2348 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2350 unsigned int length
, type
, size
;
2351 int tlsext_servername
= 0;
2352 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2355 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
2357 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2359 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2360 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2362 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
2363 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
2366 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2367 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2370 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2372 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &length
))
2375 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != length
) {
2376 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2380 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &type
) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &size
)) {
2381 unsigned char *data
;
2384 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, size
)
2385 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt
, &data
, size
))
2388 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
2389 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
2391 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
2392 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2394 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
2395 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2396 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
2397 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
|| size
> 0) {
2398 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2401 tlsext_servername
= 1;
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2404 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
2405 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length
;
2406 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &ecpointformatlist_length
)
2407 || ecpointformatlist_length
!= size
- 1) {
2408 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2412 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
= 0;
2413 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
);
2414 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
=
2415 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2416 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2419 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
=
2420 ecpointformatlist_length
;
2421 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
,
2422 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
2423 ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
2424 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2430 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2432 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2433 if (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
2434 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
, data
, size
,
2435 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
))
2437 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2440 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
) || (size
> 0)) {
2441 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2444 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2446 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
2448 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2451 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
== -1) || (size
> 0)) {
2452 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2455 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2456 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2459 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
&&
2460 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2461 unsigned char *selected
;
2462 unsigned char selected_len
;
2463 /* We must have requested it. */
2464 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
== NULL
) {
2465 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2468 /* The data must be valid */
2469 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt
)) {
2470 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2474 ctx
->next_proto_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
, data
,
2476 s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb_arg
) !=
2477 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2478 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2481 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
2482 if (s
->next_proto_negotiated
== NULL
) {
2483 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2486 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, selected
, selected_len
);
2487 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= selected_len
;
2488 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2492 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
) {
2494 /* We must have requested it. */
2495 if (s
->alpn_client_proto_list
== NULL
) {
2496 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2500 * The extension data consists of:
2501 * uint16 list_length
2502 * uint8 proto_length;
2503 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2505 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt
, &len
)
2506 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
2507 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &len
)
2508 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
) {
2509 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2512 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2513 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
2514 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2515 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2518 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
2519 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2522 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2525 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2526 unsigned int hbtype
;
2527 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &hbtype
)) {
2528 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2532 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2533 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2535 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2536 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2537 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2540 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2546 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2547 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2551 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2552 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
) {
2553 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2554 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
2555 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
2556 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2559 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
) {
2560 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2562 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
2565 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2566 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2568 else if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, al
) <= 0)
2572 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2573 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2577 if (!s
->hit
&& tlsext_servername
== 1) {
2578 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2579 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
) {
2580 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->tlsext_hostname
);
2581 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2582 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2586 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2595 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2596 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2597 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2598 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2599 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2600 * initial connect only.
2602 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
)
2603 && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2604 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2606 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2612 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2615 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
) !=
2616 !(s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
)) {
2617 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS
);
2626 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2632 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2637 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
)
2639 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2640 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2644 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2645 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2648 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2649 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2653 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2655 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2656 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2657 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2658 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2660 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2662 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2666 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2670 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2674 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2679 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2680 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
2682 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
2683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2684 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2687 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2688 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2690 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
);
2691 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
];
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2694 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2697 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
);
2698 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
);
2699 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
);
2703 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2707 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2708 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
2709 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2710 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2711 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2712 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2713 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2714 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2717 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2718 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
2719 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2721 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2724 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2725 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
2727 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2728 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2732 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2736 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2740 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL
*s
)
2742 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
2743 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2746 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2747 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2748 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2749 * influence which certificate is sent
2751 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2753 CERT_PKEY
*certpkey
;
2754 certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2755 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2756 if (certpkey
== NULL
) {
2757 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2761 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2762 * et al can pick it up.
2764 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
2765 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2767 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2769 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2771 /* status request response should be sent */
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2773 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2774 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2776 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2778 /* something bad happened */
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2780 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2781 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2785 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2802 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2804 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2805 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2809 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2810 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2811 * must contain uncompressed.
2813 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2814 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2815 if ((s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2816 && (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2817 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2818 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2819 && ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
))
2820 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))) {
2821 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2823 unsigned char *list
;
2824 int found_uncompressed
= 0;
2825 list
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
2826 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
; i
++) {
2827 if (*(list
++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
) {
2828 found_uncompressed
= 1;
2832 if (!found_uncompressed
) {
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2834 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST
);
2838 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
2839 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2841 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2843 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2844 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2845 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2846 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2848 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2850 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2853 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2856 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && !(s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
2857 && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2860 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2863 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2864 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= NULL
;
2865 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= -1;
2866 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2868 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2869 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2872 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2873 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2878 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2882 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2886 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2887 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2893 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2896 if (s
->version
< SSL3_VERSION
)
2898 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
) <= 0) {
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2903 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2911 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2912 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2913 * need to be handled at the same time.
2915 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2918 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2919 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2920 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2921 * point to the resulting session.
2923 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2924 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2925 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2928 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2929 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2930 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2931 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2932 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2933 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2934 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2937 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2938 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2939 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2940 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2941 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2942 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2944 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2947 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
, const PACKET
*ext
,
2948 const PACKET
*session_id
,
2952 PACKET local_ext
= *ext
;
2955 int have_ticket
= 0;
2956 int use_ticket
= tls_use_ticket(s
);
2959 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2960 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2963 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2966 if ((s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
))
2969 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &i
)) {
2973 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext
) >= 4) {
2974 unsigned int type
, size
;
2976 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &type
)
2977 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &size
)) {
2978 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2982 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext
) < size
) {
2986 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
&& use_ticket
) {
2988 unsigned char *etick
;
2990 /* Duplicate extension */
2991 if (have_ticket
!= 0) {
2999 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3002 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
3006 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
3008 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3009 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3010 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3011 * calculate the master secret later.
3016 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext
, &etick
, size
)) {
3017 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3021 r
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, etick
, size
, PACKET_data(session_id
),
3022 PACKET_remaining(session_id
), ret
);
3024 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3025 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
3028 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3031 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3032 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
3035 default: /* fatal error */
3041 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
3042 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
3043 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext
, size
)) {
3049 if (have_ticket
== 0)
3056 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3058 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3059 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3060 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3061 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3062 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3063 * point to the resulting session.
3066 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3067 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3068 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3069 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3070 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3072 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
3073 int eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
3074 int sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
3077 unsigned char *sdec
;
3078 const unsigned char *p
;
3079 int slen
, mlen
, renew_ticket
= 0;
3080 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
3081 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3083 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3084 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3087 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3088 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3091 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3092 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3093 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
3094 int rv
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
3103 /* Check key name matches */
3104 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16))
3106 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3107 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
3108 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3109 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
,
3115 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3118 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
3123 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3124 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
3125 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3128 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3129 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
3130 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3133 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3134 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3135 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3136 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3137 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
3139 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
, eticklen
) <= 0) {
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3143 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &mlen
) <= 0) {
3144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3149 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3152 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
3156 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3157 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3158 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3162 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
3163 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
3172 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3176 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3177 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3181 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3188 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md
[] = {
3189 {NID_md5
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
3190 {NID_sha1
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
3191 {NID_sha224
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
3192 {NID_sha256
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
3193 {NID_sha384
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
3194 {NID_sha512
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
3195 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
3196 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
3197 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
3200 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig
[] = {
3201 {EVP_PKEY_RSA
, TLSEXT_signature_rsa
},
3202 {EVP_PKEY_DSA
, TLSEXT_signature_dsa
},
3203 {EVP_PKEY_EC
, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
},
3204 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
},
3205 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
},
3206 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
}
3209 static int tls12_find_id(int nid
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3212 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3213 if (table
[i
].nid
== nid
)
3219 static int tls12_find_nid(int id
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3222 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3223 if ((table
[i
].id
) == id
)
3224 return table
[i
].nid
;
3229 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
3235 md_id
= tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md
), tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3238 sig_id
= tls12_get_sigid(pk
);
3241 p
[0] = (unsigned char)md_id
;
3242 p
[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id
;
3246 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
3248 return tls12_find_id(pk
->type
, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3255 unsigned char tlsext_hash
;
3258 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info
[] = {
3259 {NID_md5
, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
3260 {NID_sha1
, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
3261 {NID_sha224
, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
3262 {NID_sha256
, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
3263 {NID_sha384
, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
3264 {NID_sha512
, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
3265 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
3266 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
3267 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
3270 static const tls12_hash_info
*tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3276 for (i
=0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info
); i
++)
3278 if (tls12_md_info
[i
].tlsext_hash
== hash_alg
)
3279 return tls12_md_info
+ i
;
3285 const EVP_MD
*tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3287 const tls12_hash_info
*inf
;
3288 if (hash_alg
== TLSEXT_hash_md5
&& FIPS_mode())
3290 inf
= tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg
);
3293 return ssl_md(inf
->md_idx
);
3296 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg
)
3299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3300 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3301 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3304 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3305 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3308 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3309 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
3311 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
:
3313 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
3315 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
:
3316 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
:
3319 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
3325 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3326 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid
, int *psign_nid
,
3327 int *psignhash_nid
, const unsigned char *data
)
3329 int sign_nid
= NID_undef
, hash_nid
= NID_undef
;
3330 if (!phash_nid
&& !psign_nid
&& !psignhash_nid
)
3332 if (phash_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3333 hash_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[0], tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3335 *phash_nid
= hash_nid
;
3337 if (psign_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3338 sign_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[1], tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3340 *psign_nid
= sign_nid
;
3342 if (psignhash_nid
) {
3343 if (sign_nid
== NID_undef
|| hash_nid
== NID_undef
3344 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid
, hash_nid
,
3346 *psignhash_nid
= NID_undef
;
3350 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3351 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const unsigned char *ptmp
)
3353 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3354 const tls12_hash_info
*hinf
= tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp
[0]);
3355 if (hinf
== NULL
|| ssl_md(hinf
->md_idx
) == NULL
)
3357 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3358 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp
[1]) == -1)
3360 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3361 return ssl_security(s
, op
, hinf
->secbits
, hinf
->nid
, (void *)ptmp
);
3365 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3366 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3370 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
3372 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
3373 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
3374 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
3376 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3377 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3378 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3380 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
);
3381 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
+= 2, sigalgs
+= 2) {
3382 switch (sigalgs
[1]) {
3383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3384 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3385 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3390 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3391 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3396 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3397 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3404 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
3406 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
3408 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
3411 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *out
,
3412 const unsigned char *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
3414 unsigned char *tmpout
= out
;
3416 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
+= 2, psig
+= 2) {
3417 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, psig
)) {
3418 *tmpout
++ = psig
[0];
3419 *tmpout
++ = psig
[1];
3422 return tmpout
- out
;
3425 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3426 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, TLS_SIGALGS
*shsig
,
3427 const unsigned char *pref
, size_t preflen
,
3428 const unsigned char *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
3430 const unsigned char *ptmp
, *atmp
;
3431 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
3432 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
+= 2, ptmp
+= 2) {
3433 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3434 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, ptmp
))
3436 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
+= 2, atmp
+= 2) {
3437 if (ptmp
[0] == atmp
[0] && ptmp
[1] == atmp
[1]) {
3440 shsig
->rhash
= ptmp
[0];
3441 shsig
->rsign
= ptmp
[1];
3442 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig
->hash_nid
,
3444 &shsig
->signandhash_nid
, ptmp
);
3454 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3455 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3457 const unsigned char *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
3458 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
3460 TLS_SIGALGS
*salgs
= NULL
;
3462 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3464 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
3465 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
3466 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
3467 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3468 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3469 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
3470 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
3471 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3472 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3473 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
3475 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &conf
);
3476 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
3479 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3480 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3484 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3485 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3487 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3489 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS
));
3492 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3496 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
3497 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
3501 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3503 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *data
, int dsize
)
3506 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3507 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3509 /* Should never happen */
3513 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
3514 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(dsize
);
3515 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
3517 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= dsize
;
3518 memcpy(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
, data
, dsize
);
3522 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3527 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
3528 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
3530 TLS_SIGALGS
*sigptr
;
3531 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
3534 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3535 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
) {
3537 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3538 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3540 const unsigned char *sigs
= NULL
;
3542 sigs
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3544 sigs
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
3546 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs
[1]);
3547 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigs
[0]);
3549 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3550 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
3551 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3552 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
3558 for (i
= 0, sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
;
3559 i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++, sigptr
++) {
3560 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->rsign
);
3561 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
3562 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigptr
->rhash
);
3564 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3565 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
3566 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3567 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
3573 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3574 * the certificate for signing.
3576 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
3578 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3579 * supported it stays as NULL.
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3582 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
3583 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3586 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
3587 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3588 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3592 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
3593 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
3595 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3596 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] == NULL
)
3597 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
);
3598 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] == NULL
)
3599 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
);
3600 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] == NULL
)
3601 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
);
3607 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3608 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3609 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3611 const unsigned char *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3616 if (idx
>= (int)s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
)
3623 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash
, psign
, psignhash
, psig
);
3625 return s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
/ 2;
3628 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3629 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3630 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3632 TLS_SIGALGS
*shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
;
3633 if (!shsigalgs
|| idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3637 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash_nid
;
3639 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sign_nid
;
3641 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->signandhash_nid
;
3643 *rsig
= shsigalgs
->rsign
;
3645 *rhash
= shsigalgs
->rhash
;
3646 return s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3650 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *p
, unsigned int length
)
3653 unsigned short hbtype
;
3654 unsigned int payload
;
3655 unsigned int padding
= 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3657 if (s
->msg_callback
)
3658 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3660 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3662 /* Read type and payload length first */
3663 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length
)
3664 return 0; /* silently discard */
3667 if (1 + 2 + payload
+ 16 > length
)
3668 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3671 if (hbtype
== TLS1_HB_REQUEST
) {
3672 unsigned char *buffer
, *bp
;
3676 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3677 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3679 buffer
= OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload
+ padding
);
3680 if (buffer
== NULL
) {
3681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3686 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3687 *bp
++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE
;
3689 memcpy(bp
, pl
, payload
);
3691 /* Random padding */
3692 if (RAND_bytes(bp
, padding
) <= 0) {
3693 OPENSSL_free(buffer
);
3697 r
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
, buffer
,
3698 3 + payload
+ padding
);
3700 if (r
>= 0 && s
->msg_callback
)
3701 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3702 buffer
, 3 + payload
+ padding
,
3703 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3705 OPENSSL_free(buffer
);
3709 } else if (hbtype
== TLS1_HB_RESPONSE
) {
3713 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3714 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3718 if (payload
== 18 && seq
== s
->tlsext_hb_seq
) {
3720 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
3727 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL
*s
)
3729 unsigned char *buf
, *p
;
3731 unsigned int payload
= 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3732 unsigned int padding
= 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3734 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3735 if (!(s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
) ||
3736 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
) {
3737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT
);
3741 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3742 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
3743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING
);
3747 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3748 if (SSL_in_init(s
) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
3749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3754 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3755 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3756 * some random stuff.
3757 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3758 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3759 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3760 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3763 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload
+ padding
);
3765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3770 *p
++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST
;
3771 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3773 /* Sequence number */
3774 s2n(s
->tlsext_hb_seq
, p
);
3775 /* 16 random bytes */
3776 if (RAND_bytes(p
, 16) <= 0) {
3777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3781 /* Random padding */
3782 if (RAND_bytes(p
, padding
) <= 0) {
3783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3787 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
, buf
, 3 + payload
+ padding
);
3789 if (s
->msg_callback
)
3790 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3791 buf
, 3 + payload
+ padding
,
3792 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3794 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 1;
3803 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3807 int sigalgs
[MAX_SIGALGLEN
];
3810 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
3812 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
3813 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3814 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
3815 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3816 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3817 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3819 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
3820 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
3821 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
3825 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
3827 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
3830 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
3833 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== MAX_SIGALGLEN
)
3835 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
3837 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
3839 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
3847 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
3848 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
3850 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
3853 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
3854 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
3857 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
3858 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
3863 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3864 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3866 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
3870 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
3874 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
3877 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
,
3880 unsigned char *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
3885 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
);
3886 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
3888 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
3889 rhash
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3890 rsign
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3892 if (rhash
== -1 || rsign
== -1)
3899 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3900 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3901 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3903 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3904 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3905 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3911 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
3915 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
3919 if (default_nid
== -1)
3921 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
3923 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
3924 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
3925 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
3930 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3931 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3935 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3936 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3937 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3944 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3945 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3946 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3947 * attempting to use them.
3950 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3952 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3953 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3954 /* Strict mode flags */
3955 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3956 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3957 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3959 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
3964 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3965 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3968 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3969 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3971 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3974 idx
= cpk
- c
->pkeys
;
3976 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3977 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3979 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3981 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3982 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3985 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3986 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3987 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
) {
3988 rv
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
|
3989 CERT_PKEY_VALID
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3997 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
4000 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
4002 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
4003 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
4005 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
4012 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
4013 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
4014 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
4015 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
4016 else if (!check_flags
)
4021 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4022 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4024 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
4026 unsigned char rsign
= 0;
4027 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
4029 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4032 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
4033 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
4034 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
:
4035 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_rsa
;
4036 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
4039 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
4040 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
:
4041 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_dsa
;
4042 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
4046 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
;
4047 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
4050 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
4051 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
;
4052 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
4055 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
4056 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
;
4057 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
4060 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
4061 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
;
4062 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
4071 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4072 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4074 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
4076 const unsigned char *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
4077 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
+= 2, p
+= 2) {
4078 if (p
[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1
&& p
[1] == rsign
)
4081 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
4088 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4089 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
4093 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
4094 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4095 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4096 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
4098 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4105 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4106 else if (check_flags
)
4107 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4109 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4110 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
4111 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
4112 else if (!check_flags
)
4115 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4116 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4117 else if (strict_mode
) {
4118 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4119 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4120 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
4121 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
4123 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4130 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
4131 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
4135 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
4138 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
4141 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
4146 int cert_type
= X509_certificate_type(x
, pk
);
4147 if (cert_type
& EVP_PKS_RSA
)
4148 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH
;
4149 if (cert_type
& EVP_PKS_DSA
)
4150 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH
;
4154 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
4158 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
4160 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
4161 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
4163 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
4164 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
4165 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4169 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
4172 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4174 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
4176 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
4177 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4179 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
4180 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
4181 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4183 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
4184 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4185 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
4186 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
4187 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4192 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
4195 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4197 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
4198 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
4202 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
4203 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
4204 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
4205 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
4206 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
4208 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
4211 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4215 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
4218 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4219 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
4226 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4227 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
4229 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
4230 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
4231 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
4232 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
);
4233 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
);
4234 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
4235 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
4236 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
4237 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
4240 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4241 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
4243 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
4247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4248 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
4250 int dh_secbits
= 80;
4251 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
4252 return DH_get_1024_160();
4253 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
4254 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
4259 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
4260 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
4263 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
4269 BN_set_word(dhp
->g
, 2);
4270 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
4271 dhp
->p
= get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
4273 dhp
->p
= get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
4274 if (dhp
->p
== NULL
|| dhp
->g
== NULL
) {
4280 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
4281 return DH_get_2048_224();
4282 return DH_get_1024_160();
4286 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
4289 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
4291 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
4292 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
4296 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
4298 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
4301 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
4303 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4304 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
4305 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
4306 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
4308 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
4309 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
4312 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4314 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4317 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
4320 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
4322 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
4323 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4325 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
4326 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4328 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
4329 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
4334 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4335 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4336 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4339 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
4341 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
4343 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
4348 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
4352 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
4353 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
4354 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);