2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, size_t ticklen
,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id
, size_t sesslen
,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
37 tls1_export_keying_material
,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
40 tls_close_construct_packet
,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
54 tls1_export_keying_material
,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
57 tls_close_construct_packet
,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
71 tls1_export_keying_material
,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
75 tls_close_construct_packet
,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
82 tls13_setup_key_block
,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
89 tls1_export_keying_material
,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
92 tls_close_construct_packet
,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
113 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
115 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_session_ticket
);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
122 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
123 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
125 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default
[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char eccurves_all
[] = {
188 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
189 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
190 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
191 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
192 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
193 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
194 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
197 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
198 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
200 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
202 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
203 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
204 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
205 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
206 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
207 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
208 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
209 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
210 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
211 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
212 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
213 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
214 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
215 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
216 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
217 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
218 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
219 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
220 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
224 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
225 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
229 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
, unsigned int *pflags
)
231 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
232 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
233 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
235 cinfo
= nid_list
+ curve_id
- 1;
237 *pflags
= cinfo
->flags
;
241 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
244 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
245 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
252 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
254 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
255 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
256 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
257 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
258 * lists in the first place.
259 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
260 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
261 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
263 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
, const unsigned char **pcurves
,
266 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
268 *pcurves
= s
->session
->tlsext_supportedgroupslist
;
269 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length
;
271 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
272 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
274 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
275 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
278 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
279 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
283 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
284 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
288 *pcurves
= s
->tlsext_supportedgroupslist
;
289 pcurveslen
= s
->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length
;
292 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
293 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_default
);
297 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
298 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
303 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
308 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
309 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
311 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
314 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
316 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
317 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
321 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
324 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
325 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
327 const unsigned char *curves
;
328 size_t num_curves
, i
;
329 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
330 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
332 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
334 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
337 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
338 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
340 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
341 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
343 } else /* Should never happen */
346 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
348 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
349 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
350 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
356 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
357 * if there is no match.
358 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
359 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
360 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
362 int tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
364 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
365 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
367 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
373 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
374 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
376 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
377 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
378 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
379 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
380 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
381 /* Should never happen */
384 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
389 * but s->options is a long...
391 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
392 (s
, (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0, &supp
,
394 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
395 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
396 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
397 (s
, !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
), &pref
, &num_pref
))
398 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
401 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
404 if (num_supp
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0) {
406 num_supp
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
407 } else if (num_pref
== 0 &&
408 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0) {
410 num_pref
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
414 for (i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
415 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
416 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
417 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
418 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
421 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
422 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
, NULL
);
430 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
435 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
437 unsigned char *glist
, *p
;
440 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
443 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
444 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* 2);
447 for (i
= 0, p
= glist
; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
448 unsigned long idmask
;
450 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
451 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups
[i
]);
453 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
462 *pextlen
= ngroups
* 2;
466 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
473 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
475 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
481 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
483 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
485 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
487 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
488 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
489 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
490 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
491 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
492 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
494 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
495 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
497 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
501 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
502 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
506 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
510 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
513 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
514 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
521 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
522 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
525 /* Determine curve ID */
526 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
527 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
528 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
534 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
536 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
537 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
539 if ((nid_list
[id
- 1].flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME
)
540 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
542 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
548 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
549 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
550 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
552 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
553 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
556 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
557 * supported (see RFC4492).
559 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
560 pformats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
561 num_formats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
562 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
563 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
566 if (i
== num_formats
)
571 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
572 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
573 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
575 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
577 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
578 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
579 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
580 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
581 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
586 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
591 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
598 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
602 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
604 if (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
605 *pformats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
606 *num_formats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
608 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
609 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
611 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
613 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
618 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
619 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
621 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
623 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
626 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
629 /* If not EC nothing to do */
630 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
632 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
636 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
639 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
643 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
644 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
646 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
652 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
653 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
654 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
655 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
656 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
658 return 0; /* Should never happen */
659 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
660 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
662 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
664 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
665 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
666 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
668 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
676 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
678 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
680 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
681 * is compatible with the client extensions.
683 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
688 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
691 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
692 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
693 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
694 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
695 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
696 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
697 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
701 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
702 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
706 /* Need a shared curve */
707 if (tls1_shared_group(s
, 0))
711 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
723 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
724 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
727 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
728 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
733 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
734 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
740 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
745 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
746 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
747 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
750 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
751 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512
)
752 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224
)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1
)
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
757 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
,
758 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
,
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
764 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
765 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
766 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
769 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **psigs
)
772 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
776 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
777 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
778 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
779 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs
);
781 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
782 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
785 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
786 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 2;
790 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
791 if (s
->server
&& s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
) {
792 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
793 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
794 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
795 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
796 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
798 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
799 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs
);
804 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
805 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
807 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD
**pmd
, SSL
*s
,
808 const unsigned char *sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
810 const unsigned char *sent_sigs
;
811 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
812 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
813 /* Should never happen */
816 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
817 if (sigalg
!= (int)sig
[1]) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
822 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
823 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
824 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
825 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
)))
827 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
831 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
832 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
835 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
) {
836 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256
) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
838 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
841 } else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
) {
842 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384
) {
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
844 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
850 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
854 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
855 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sent_sigs
);
856 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
+= 2, sent_sigs
+= 2) {
857 if (sig
[0] == sent_sigs
[0] && sig
[1] == sent_sigs
[1])
860 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
861 if (i
== sent_sigslen
862 && (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
863 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
867 *pmd
= tls12_get_hash(sig
[0]);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
872 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
873 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
874 EVP_MD_size(*pmd
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd
), (void *)sig
)) {
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
879 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
881 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_md
= *pmd
;
886 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
887 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
888 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
890 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
893 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
895 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
897 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
898 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
899 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
900 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
902 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
903 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
904 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
905 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
909 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
910 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
911 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
917 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
918 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
919 * @c: cipher to check
920 * @op: Security check that you want to do
922 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
924 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
926 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
927 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
929 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
931 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ((c
->min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
932 || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
935 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
938 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
941 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
943 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
945 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
948 /* Initialise digests to default values */
949 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
951 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
953 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
956 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
957 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
959 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
);
960 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
];
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
966 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
);
967 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
);
968 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
);
972 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
977 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
978 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
979 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
980 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
981 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
982 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
983 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
984 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
987 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
988 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
989 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
991 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
994 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
995 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
997 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
998 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1002 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1006 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1011 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
1012 * type and return it.
1014 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
1015 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
1016 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
1018 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
1020 RAW_EXTENSION
*tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
, size_t numexts
,
1025 for (loop
= 0; loop
< numexts
; loop
++) {
1026 if (exts
[loop
].type
== type
)
1034 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1036 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1037 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1038 * point to the resulting session.
1040 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1041 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1042 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
1045 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1046 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1047 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1048 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1049 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1050 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1051 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1054 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1055 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1056 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1057 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1058 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1059 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
1061 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1066 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1069 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1072 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1073 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1076 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1079 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1080 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1083 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1086 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1089 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
1092 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1094 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1095 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1096 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1097 * calculate the master secret later.
1102 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1103 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1105 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1106 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
1109 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1112 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1113 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
1116 default: /* fatal error */
1122 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1124 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1125 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1126 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1127 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1128 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1129 * point to the resulting session.
1132 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1134 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1135 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1136 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1138 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1139 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1140 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1143 unsigned char *sdec
;
1144 const unsigned char *p
;
1145 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, ret
= -1, declen
;
1147 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1148 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1149 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
1150 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
1152 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1153 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1156 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1161 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
1162 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1163 int rv
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1174 /* Check key name matches */
1175 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
1176 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
1180 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
1181 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
1182 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1183 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1184 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
,
1185 etick
+ sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
)) <=
1191 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1194 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1198 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1200 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1205 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1206 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1207 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1210 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1211 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1212 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1215 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1216 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1217 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1218 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1219 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1220 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1221 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1222 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1226 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1227 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1232 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1236 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1240 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1241 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1242 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1246 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1247 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1256 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1261 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1265 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1272 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md
[] = {
1273 {NID_md5
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
1274 {NID_sha1
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
1275 {NID_sha224
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
1276 {NID_sha256
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
1277 {NID_sha384
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
1278 {NID_sha512
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
1279 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
1280 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
1281 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
1284 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig
[] = {
1285 {EVP_PKEY_RSA
, TLSEXT_signature_rsa
},
1286 {EVP_PKEY_DSA
, TLSEXT_signature_dsa
},
1287 {EVP_PKEY_EC
, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
},
1288 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
},
1289 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
},
1290 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
}
1293 static int tls12_find_id(int nid
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
1296 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
1297 if (table
[i
].nid
== nid
)
1303 static int tls12_find_nid(int id
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
1306 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
1307 if ((table
[i
].id
) == id
)
1308 return table
[i
].nid
;
1313 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET
*pkt
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
, const EVP_MD
*md
)
1319 md_id
= tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md
), tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
1322 sig_id
= tls12_get_sigid(pk
);
1325 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, md_id
) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, sig_id
))
1331 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1333 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk
), tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
1340 unsigned char tlsext_hash
;
1343 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info
[] = {
1344 {NID_md5
, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
1345 {NID_sha1
, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
1346 {NID_sha224
, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
1347 {NID_sha256
, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
1348 {NID_sha384
, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
1349 {NID_sha512
, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
1350 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
1351 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1352 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
1353 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1354 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
1357 static const tls12_hash_info
*tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg
)
1363 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info
); i
++) {
1364 if (tls12_md_info
[i
].tlsext_hash
== hash_alg
)
1365 return tls12_md_info
+ i
;
1371 const EVP_MD
*tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg
)
1373 const tls12_hash_info
*inf
;
1374 if (hash_alg
== TLSEXT_hash_md5
&& FIPS_mode())
1376 inf
= tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg
);
1379 return ssl_md(inf
->md_idx
);
1382 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg
)
1385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1386 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
1387 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1390 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
1391 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1394 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
1395 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1398 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
:
1399 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1401 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
:
1402 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1404 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
:
1405 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1411 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1412 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid
, int *psign_nid
,
1413 int *psignhash_nid
, const unsigned char *data
)
1415 int sign_nid
= NID_undef
, hash_nid
= NID_undef
;
1416 if (!phash_nid
&& !psign_nid
&& !psignhash_nid
)
1418 if (phash_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
1419 hash_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[0], tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
1421 *phash_nid
= hash_nid
;
1423 if (psign_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
1424 sign_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[1], tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
1426 *psign_nid
= sign_nid
;
1428 if (psignhash_nid
) {
1429 if (sign_nid
== NID_undef
|| hash_nid
== NID_undef
1430 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid
, hash_nid
, sign_nid
) <= 0)
1431 *psignhash_nid
= NID_undef
;
1435 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1436 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const unsigned char *ptmp
)
1438 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1439 const tls12_hash_info
*hinf
= tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp
[0]);
1440 if (hinf
== NULL
|| ssl_md(hinf
->md_idx
) == NULL
)
1442 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1443 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp
[1]) == -1)
1445 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1446 return ssl_security(s
, op
, hinf
->secbits
, hinf
->nid
, (void *)ptmp
);
1450 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1451 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1455 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1457 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1458 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1459 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
1461 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1462 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1463 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1465 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
);
1466 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
+= 2, sigalgs
+= 2) {
1467 switch (sigalgs
[1]) {
1468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1469 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
1470 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
1474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1475 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
1476 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1481 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
1482 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
1489 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
1491 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
1493 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
1496 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1497 const unsigned char *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1501 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
+= 2, psig
+= 2) {
1502 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, psig
)) {
1503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, psig
[0])
1504 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, psig
[1]))
1511 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1512 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, TLS_SIGALGS
*shsig
,
1513 const unsigned char *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1514 const unsigned char *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1516 const unsigned char *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1517 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1518 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
+= 2, ptmp
+= 2) {
1519 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1520 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, ptmp
))
1522 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
+= 2, atmp
+= 2) {
1523 if (ptmp
[0] == atmp
[0] && ptmp
[1] == atmp
[1]) {
1526 shsig
->rhash
= ptmp
[0];
1527 shsig
->rsign
= ptmp
[1];
1528 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig
->hash_nid
,
1530 &shsig
->signandhash_nid
, ptmp
);
1540 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1541 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1543 const unsigned char *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1544 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1546 TLS_SIGALGS
*salgs
= NULL
;
1548 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1550 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1551 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1552 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1553 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1554 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1555 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1556 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1557 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1558 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1559 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1561 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &conf
);
1562 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1565 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1566 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1570 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1571 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1573 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1575 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS
));
1578 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1582 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1583 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1587 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1589 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t dsize
)
1592 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1593 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1595 /* Should never happen */
1599 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1600 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(dsize
);
1601 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
1603 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= dsize
;
1604 memcpy(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
, data
, dsize
);
1608 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1613 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
1614 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1616 TLS_SIGALGS
*sigptr
;
1617 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1620 for (i
= 0, sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
;
1621 i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++, sigptr
++) {
1622 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->rsign
);
1623 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
1624 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigptr
->rhash
);
1626 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1627 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
1628 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
1629 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
1635 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
1636 * the certificate for signing.
1638 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1640 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1641 * supported it stays as NULL.
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1644 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
1645 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1648 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
1649 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
1650 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1654 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
1655 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1658 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] == NULL
)
1659 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
);
1660 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] == NULL
)
1661 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] =
1662 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
);
1663 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] == NULL
)
1664 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] =
1665 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
);
1671 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1672 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1673 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1675 const unsigned char *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1676 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
/ 2;
1677 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1681 if (idx
>= (int)s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
)
1688 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash
, psign
, psignhash
, psig
);
1690 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1693 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1694 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1695 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1697 TLS_SIGALGS
*shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
;
1698 if (!shsigalgs
|| idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1699 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1703 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash_nid
;
1705 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sign_nid
;
1707 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->signandhash_nid
;
1709 *rsig
= shsigalgs
->rsign
;
1711 *rhash
= shsigalgs
->rhash
;
1712 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1715 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1719 int sigalgs
[MAX_SIGALGLEN
];
1722 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1724 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1725 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1726 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1727 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1728 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1729 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1731 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1732 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1733 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1737 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1739 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1742 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1745 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== MAX_SIGALGLEN
)
1747 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1749 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1751 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1759 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1760 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1762 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1765 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
1766 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
1769 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
1770 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
1775 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1776 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1778 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1782 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1786 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1789 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1791 unsigned char *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1796 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
);
1797 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1799 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1800 rhash
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
1801 rsign
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
1803 if (rhash
== -1 || rsign
== -1)
1810 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1811 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1812 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1814 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1815 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1816 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1822 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1826 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1830 if (default_nid
== -1)
1832 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1834 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1835 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1836 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
1841 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1842 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1846 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1847 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1848 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1855 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1856 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1857 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1858 * attempting to use them.
1861 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1863 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1864 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1865 /* Strict mode flags */
1866 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1867 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1868 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1870 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1875 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1876 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1879 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1880 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1882 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1885 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1887 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1888 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1890 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1892 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1893 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1899 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
1902 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1904 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1905 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
1907 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
1914 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1915 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
1916 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
1917 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1918 else if (!check_flags
)
1923 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1924 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1926 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
1928 unsigned char rsign
= 0;
1929 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
1931 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1934 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
1935 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
1936 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_rsa
;
1937 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
1940 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1941 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_dsa
;
1942 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
1946 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
;
1947 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
1950 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1951 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
;
1952 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
1955 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1956 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
;
1957 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
1960 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1961 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
;
1962 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
1971 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1972 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1974 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1976 const unsigned char *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1977 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
+= 2, p
+= 2) {
1978 if (p
[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1
&& p
[1] == rsign
)
1981 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
1988 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1989 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
1993 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
1994 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
1995 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1996 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
1998 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2005 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2006 else if (check_flags
)
2007 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2009 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2010 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
2011 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2012 else if (!check_flags
)
2015 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2016 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2017 else if (strict_mode
) {
2018 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2019 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2020 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2021 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2023 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2030 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2033 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2035 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2038 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2041 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2045 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
2049 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
2051 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2052 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
2054 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
2055 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
2056 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2060 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2063 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2065 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
2067 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2068 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2070 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2071 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2072 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2074 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2075 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2076 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2077 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2078 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2083 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2086 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2088 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2089 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2093 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2094 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
2095 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2096 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
2097 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2099 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2102 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2106 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
2109 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2110 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2117 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2118 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2120 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
2121 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
2122 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2123 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2124 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2125 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2126 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2129 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2130 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2132 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2136 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2138 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2139 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2140 return DH_get_1024_160();
2141 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2142 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2147 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2148 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
2151 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2159 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2160 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2162 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2163 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2171 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2172 return DH_get_2048_224();
2173 return DH_get_1024_160();
2177 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2180 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2183 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2184 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2185 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2186 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2188 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2191 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2193 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2196 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2198 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2199 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
2200 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2201 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2203 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2204 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
2206 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
2207 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
2210 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2212 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
2215 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2218 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2220 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2221 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2223 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2224 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2226 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2227 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2232 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2233 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2234 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2237 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2239 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2241 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2246 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2250 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2251 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2252 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);