2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include "internal/nelem.h"
23 #include "internal/evp.h"
24 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
25 #include "ssl_local.h"
26 #include <openssl/ct.h>
28 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
29 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
31 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
35 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
36 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
37 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
41 tls1_export_keying_material
,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
44 tls_close_construct_packet
,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
58 tls1_export_keying_material
,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
60 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
61 tls_close_construct_packet
,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
72 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
73 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
75 tls1_export_keying_material
,
76 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
77 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
78 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
79 tls_close_construct_packet
,
83 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
86 tls13_setup_key_block
,
87 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
88 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
89 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
90 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
91 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
93 tls13_export_keying_material
,
94 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
95 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
96 tls_close_construct_packet
,
100 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
103 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
104 * http, the cache would over fill
106 return (60 * 60 * 2);
113 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
119 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
121 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
125 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
130 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
131 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
133 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
138 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
145 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
146 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
147 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
148 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
149 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
150 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
151 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
152 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
153 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
154 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
155 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
156 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
157 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
158 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
159 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
160 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
161 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
163 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
164 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
165 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
167 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
168 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
190 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
193 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
195 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
197 /* The default curves */
198 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
199 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
200 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
201 29, /* X25519 (29) */
202 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
204 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
208 34, /* GC256A (34) */
209 35, /* GC256B (35) */
210 36, /* GC256C (36) */
211 37, /* GC256D (37) */
212 38, /* GC512A (38) */
213 39, /* GC512B (39) */
214 40, /* GC512C (40) */
216 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
217 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
218 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
219 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
220 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
221 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
224 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
233 struct provider_group_data_st
{
235 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
238 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
239 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
240 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
242 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
243 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
244 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
246 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
247 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
249 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
252 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
253 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
255 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
256 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
257 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
259 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
260 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
261 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
262 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
264 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
267 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
268 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
270 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
271 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
274 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
276 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
277 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
278 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
281 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
282 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
283 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
287 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
288 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
289 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
292 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
293 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
298 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
299 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
300 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
303 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
305 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
306 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
307 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
310 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
311 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
312 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
316 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
317 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
322 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
323 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
327 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
329 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
330 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
331 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
335 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
336 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
337 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
341 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
342 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
343 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
347 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
348 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
349 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
353 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
354 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
355 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
359 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
360 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
362 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
363 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
365 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
366 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
367 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
368 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
369 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
370 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
373 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
374 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
375 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
378 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
384 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
385 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
390 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
392 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
395 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
396 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
397 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
400 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
402 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
);
405 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
410 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
412 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(name
);
414 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
415 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(name
);
416 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
417 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(name
);
419 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
420 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
422 && nid
== tls1_group_id2nid(ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
,
424 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
430 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
434 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
435 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
436 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
442 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
443 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
451 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
452 * work for groups we don't know about.
454 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
456 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
457 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
459 if (!include_unknown
)
461 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
464 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
469 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
470 * work for groups we don't know about.
472 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
474 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
475 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
480 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
483 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
484 * the number of groups supported.
486 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
489 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
490 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
491 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
492 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
493 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
494 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
495 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
498 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
499 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
503 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
504 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
510 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
511 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
512 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
514 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
515 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
522 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
525 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
)
527 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
534 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
536 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
539 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
540 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
541 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
543 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
545 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
548 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
549 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
550 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
556 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
557 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
559 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
560 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
565 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
566 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
567 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
568 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
571 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
572 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
575 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
582 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
583 * if there is no match.
584 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
585 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
586 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
588 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
590 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
591 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
594 /* Can't do anything on client side */
598 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
600 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
601 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
603 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
605 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
606 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
607 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
608 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
609 /* Should never happen */
612 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
616 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
617 * otherwise peer decides.
619 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
620 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
621 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
623 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
624 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
627 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
628 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
630 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
631 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
639 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
643 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
644 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
646 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
650 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
651 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
653 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
654 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
655 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
658 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
661 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
662 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
665 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
666 unsigned long idmask
;
668 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
669 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
671 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
672 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
673 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
687 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
690 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
691 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
696 uint16_t gid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
699 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
701 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
708 if (garg
->gidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
710 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
712 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
715 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
718 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
719 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
721 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
725 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
726 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
734 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
740 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
743 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
747 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
751 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
752 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
754 const uint16_t *groups
;
760 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
761 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
762 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
764 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
765 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
767 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
768 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
771 /* Should never happen */
776 if (check_own_groups
) {
777 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
778 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
779 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
783 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
786 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
790 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
791 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
794 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
795 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
796 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
797 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
801 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
805 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
809 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
811 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
812 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
813 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
815 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
816 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
818 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
820 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
824 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
825 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
829 unsigned char comp_id
;
832 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
833 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
835 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
836 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
838 /* Get required compression id */
839 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
840 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
841 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
843 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
848 int field_type
= EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp
);
850 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
851 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
852 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
853 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
858 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
859 * supported (see RFC4492).
861 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
864 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
865 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
871 /* Return group id of a key */
872 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
874 int curve_nid
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
876 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
878 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
882 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
883 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
885 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
889 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
892 /* If not EC nothing to do */
893 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
895 /* Check compression */
896 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
898 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
900 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
903 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
906 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
909 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
913 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
914 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
915 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
916 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
917 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
919 return 0; /* Should never happen */
920 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
921 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
930 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
932 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
934 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
935 * is compatible with the client extensions.
937 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
939 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
941 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
943 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
945 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
948 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
949 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
950 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
951 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
958 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
963 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
965 /* Default sigalg schemes */
966 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
971 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
980 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
983 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
994 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1010 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1016 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1019 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1020 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1021 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1022 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1023 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1024 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1025 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1026 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1027 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1028 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1029 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1030 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1031 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1032 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1033 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1034 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1035 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1036 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1037 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1038 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1040 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1041 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1042 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1043 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1044 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1045 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1046 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1047 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1048 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1049 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1050 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1051 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1052 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1053 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1054 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1055 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1056 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1057 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1058 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1059 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1060 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1062 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1063 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1065 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1066 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1067 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1068 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1069 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1070 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1071 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1072 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1074 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1075 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1076 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1077 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1078 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1079 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1080 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1081 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1082 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1083 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1084 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1085 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1086 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1087 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1088 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1091 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1092 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1093 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1094 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1095 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1096 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1097 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1098 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1099 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1100 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1101 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1102 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1103 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1104 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1105 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1106 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1107 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1108 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1109 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1110 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1113 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1114 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1115 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1116 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1117 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1118 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1122 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1123 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1125 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1127 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1128 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1130 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1131 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1132 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1133 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1134 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1137 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1140 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1141 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1142 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1143 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1146 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1150 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1151 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1157 * Check hash is available.
1158 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1159 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1160 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1161 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1162 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1164 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1165 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1166 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1170 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1171 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1174 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1175 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1177 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1178 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1181 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1186 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1187 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1191 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1192 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1195 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1197 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1198 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1199 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1201 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
1206 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1207 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1212 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1213 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1216 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1226 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1228 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1229 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1230 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1232 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1233 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1234 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1240 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1242 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1248 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1249 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1250 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1251 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1252 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1254 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1260 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1261 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1262 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1264 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1271 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1273 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1276 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1278 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1285 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1286 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1288 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1291 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1293 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1300 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1303 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1305 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1306 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1308 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1310 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1314 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1316 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1318 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1319 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1322 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1324 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1326 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1329 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1333 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1336 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1340 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1341 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1342 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1343 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1345 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1346 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1349 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1350 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1355 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1356 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1357 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1359 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1360 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1361 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1362 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1363 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1364 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1366 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1367 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1373 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1374 * specified EC curve.
1376 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1378 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1381 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1382 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1383 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1385 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1386 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1389 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1390 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1394 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1395 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1396 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1405 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1408 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1410 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1413 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1417 int md_type
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1419 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1420 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1422 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1423 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1424 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1426 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1427 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1428 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1429 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1431 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1433 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1435 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1438 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1439 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1441 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1448 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1449 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1452 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1454 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1455 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1457 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1459 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1462 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1463 /* Should never happen */
1466 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1467 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1468 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1472 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1473 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1474 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1476 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1478 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1479 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1482 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1483 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1484 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1488 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1489 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1490 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1491 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1496 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1498 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1499 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1501 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1505 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1506 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1507 int curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
1509 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1514 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1515 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1516 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1520 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1521 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1522 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1523 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1525 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1530 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1531 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1536 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1537 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1538 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1539 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1542 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1543 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1544 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1548 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1553 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1554 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1556 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1557 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1558 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1560 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1561 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1562 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1563 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1566 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1567 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1571 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1573 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1575 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1579 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1581 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1583 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1588 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1589 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1590 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1592 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1595 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1597 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1599 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1600 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1601 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1602 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1603 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1606 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1607 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1608 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1609 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1613 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1614 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1615 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1622 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1623 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1624 * @c: cipher to check
1625 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1626 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1628 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1630 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1632 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1633 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1635 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1637 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1638 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1641 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1642 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1644 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1645 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1646 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1648 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1651 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1652 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1655 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1658 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1660 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1662 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1665 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1669 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1670 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1671 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1672 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1673 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1674 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1675 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1677 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1678 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1680 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1681 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1682 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1683 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1685 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1686 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1691 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1692 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1693 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1694 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1702 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1706 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1709 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1710 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1711 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1716 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1718 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1719 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1720 * point to the resulting session.
1722 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1726 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1729 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1732 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1733 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1736 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1737 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1739 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1740 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1741 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1743 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1745 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1746 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1750 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1752 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1753 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1754 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1755 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1758 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1759 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1760 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1761 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1762 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1763 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1765 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1766 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1767 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1768 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1769 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1770 * point to the resulting session.
1772 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1773 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1774 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1776 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1777 unsigned char *sdec
;
1778 const unsigned char *p
;
1779 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1780 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1782 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1783 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1784 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1785 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1787 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1789 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1790 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1792 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1795 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1797 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1798 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1799 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1800 * calculate the master secret later.
1802 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1806 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1807 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1808 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1812 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1813 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1815 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1818 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1820 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1824 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1826 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1829 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1832 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1833 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1834 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1836 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1839 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1840 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1841 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1842 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1843 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1846 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1850 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1856 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1858 /* Check key name matches */
1859 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1860 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1861 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1865 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1867 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1868 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1869 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1871 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1872 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1873 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1874 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1875 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1878 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1879 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1883 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1886 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1888 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1892 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1894 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1895 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1899 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1900 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1901 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1902 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1906 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1907 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1910 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1911 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1912 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1913 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1914 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1915 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1916 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1918 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1921 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1923 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1929 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1933 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1935 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1937 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1941 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1942 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1943 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1947 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1948 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1951 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1953 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1958 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1960 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1963 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1964 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1967 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1968 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1969 * performs any action
1971 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1972 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1973 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1974 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1975 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1976 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1979 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1980 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1981 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1983 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1985 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1986 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1989 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1990 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1991 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1995 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1996 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1997 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1998 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1999 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2003 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2004 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2005 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2006 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2007 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2008 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2009 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2011 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2015 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2019 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2021 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2022 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2023 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2024 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2033 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2034 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2036 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2039 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2041 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2042 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2044 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2045 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2046 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2047 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2048 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2051 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2052 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
2055 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2056 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2057 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2058 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2059 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2062 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2063 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2065 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2068 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2069 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2070 * ciphersuites enabled.
2073 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2076 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2077 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2078 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2079 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2081 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2082 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2083 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2086 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2094 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2095 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2096 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2097 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2098 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2102 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2103 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2107 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2109 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2110 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2111 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2113 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2116 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2117 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2118 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2119 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2124 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2128 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2129 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2130 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2131 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2133 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2136 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2137 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2142 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2143 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2145 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2150 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2151 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2153 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2154 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2155 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2156 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2160 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2164 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2165 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2166 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2167 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2169 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2170 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2171 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2172 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2174 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2175 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2177 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2178 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2189 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2190 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2192 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2193 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2195 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2197 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2199 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2200 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2201 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2202 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2203 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2204 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2205 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2206 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2207 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2208 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2210 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2211 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2214 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2215 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2219 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2220 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2222 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2224 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2228 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2232 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2233 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2237 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2243 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2245 /* Invalid data length */
2246 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2251 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2252 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2255 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2263 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2270 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2272 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2273 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2275 /* Should never happen */
2276 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2280 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2281 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2283 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2284 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2288 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2290 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2293 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2295 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2298 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2301 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2302 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2303 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2305 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2306 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2308 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2309 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
2310 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2315 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2316 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2317 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2319 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2320 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2321 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2324 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2326 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2330 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2332 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2333 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2335 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2337 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2338 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2339 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2341 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2344 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2345 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2346 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2348 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2349 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2351 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2352 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2354 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2356 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2358 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2359 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2360 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2362 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2364 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2365 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2368 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2369 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2373 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2374 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2377 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2379 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2380 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2381 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2382 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2383 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2384 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2385 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2386 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2388 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2389 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2390 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2393 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2394 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2396 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2398 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2400 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2401 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2402 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2405 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2407 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2409 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2411 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2413 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2414 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2415 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2416 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2417 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2418 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2422 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2424 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2425 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2429 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2436 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2437 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2438 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2440 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2442 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2443 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2447 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2451 /* Reject duplicates */
2452 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2453 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2462 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2463 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2465 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2469 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2473 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2476 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2481 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2482 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2485 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2488 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2489 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2490 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2492 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2493 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2494 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2500 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2502 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2507 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2508 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2511 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2513 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2514 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2515 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2517 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2519 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2520 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2525 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2530 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2531 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2532 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2534 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2535 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2536 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2542 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2546 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2548 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2550 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2552 if (default_nid
== -1)
2554 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2556 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2558 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2560 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2561 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2562 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2564 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2567 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2569 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2570 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2571 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2572 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2573 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2579 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2580 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2582 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2584 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2585 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2586 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2593 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2594 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2595 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2596 * attempting to use them.
2599 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2601 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2602 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2603 /* Strict mode flags */
2604 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2605 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2606 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2608 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2613 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2614 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2617 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2618 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2620 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2623 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2625 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2626 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2628 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2630 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2631 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2640 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2643 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2645 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2646 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2648 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2655 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2656 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2657 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2658 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2659 else if (!check_flags
)
2664 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2665 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2667 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2670 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2671 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2673 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2677 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2678 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2681 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2682 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2683 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2687 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2688 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2691 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2692 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2693 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2696 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2697 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2698 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2701 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2702 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2703 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2712 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2713 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2715 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2717 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2718 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2719 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2721 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2724 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2731 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2732 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2734 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2735 * so check_flags is always set.
2737 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2738 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2739 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2743 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2744 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2745 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2746 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2748 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2755 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2756 else if (check_flags
)
2757 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2759 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2760 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2761 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2762 else if (!check_flags
)
2765 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2766 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2767 else if (strict_mode
) {
2768 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2769 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2770 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2771 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2773 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2780 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2781 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2784 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2785 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2786 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2787 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2788 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2789 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2792 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2795 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2796 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2797 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2801 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2804 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2807 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2809 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2810 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2812 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2813 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2814 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2816 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2817 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2818 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2819 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2820 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2825 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2828 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2830 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2831 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2835 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2836 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2838 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2841 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2845 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2848 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2849 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2856 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2857 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2859 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2860 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2861 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2862 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2863 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2864 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2865 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2866 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2867 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2870 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2871 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2873 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2877 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2881 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2882 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2883 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2884 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2889 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2891 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2899 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2904 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2905 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2906 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2907 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2908 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2909 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2910 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2911 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2913 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2914 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2924 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2927 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2930 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2931 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2932 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2933 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2935 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2938 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2940 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2943 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2945 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2946 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2947 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2948 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2950 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2952 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2953 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2956 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2958 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2961 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2964 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2966 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2967 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2969 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2970 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2972 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2973 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2978 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2979 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2980 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2983 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2985 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2987 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2992 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2996 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2997 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2998 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3006 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3007 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3010 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3012 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3013 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3015 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3017 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3018 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3019 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3022 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3026 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3027 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3029 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3031 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3034 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3035 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3039 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3040 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3043 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3049 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3050 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3052 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3053 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3055 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3056 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3061 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3062 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3063 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3064 * signing certificate.
3066 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3073 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3074 * a viable public key is permitted.
3080 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3081 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3082 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3083 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3084 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3086 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3088 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3091 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3094 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3095 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3099 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3100 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3102 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3107 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3110 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3111 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3114 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3118 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3119 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3120 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3122 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3124 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3131 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3132 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3133 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3135 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3136 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3137 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3138 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3139 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3141 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3142 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3144 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3145 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3148 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3149 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3151 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3154 curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3155 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3160 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3161 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3162 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3168 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3175 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3176 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3178 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3179 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3181 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3182 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3183 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3185 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3187 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3190 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3191 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3193 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3194 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3198 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3199 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3203 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3204 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3206 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3209 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3211 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3215 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3218 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3223 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3226 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3227 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3230 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3233 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3235 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3236 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3239 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3240 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3242 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3243 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3244 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3246 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3250 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3256 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3257 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3258 * we have to assume GOST support.
3260 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3261 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3264 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3265 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3269 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3273 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3277 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3282 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3284 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3285 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3287 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3291 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3295 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3296 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3297 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3298 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3299 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3302 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3306 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3311 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3315 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3321 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3322 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3323 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3324 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3328 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3330 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3331 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3332 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3336 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3340 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3342 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3343 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3344 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3348 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3352 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3354 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3358 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3360 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3362 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3363 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3368 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3369 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3370 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3375 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3376 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3381 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3387 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3390 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3392 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3398 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3403 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3405 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3407 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3408 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3409 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3410 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3411 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3415 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3416 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3421 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3423 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3424 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3426 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3427 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3432 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3435 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3436 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3438 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3439 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3444 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3446 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3447 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3449 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3450 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);