### Changes between 3.1 and 3.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ * Added EC_GROUP_to_params which creates an OSSL_PARAM array
+ from a given EC_GROUP.
+
+ *Oliver Mihatsch*
+
+ * Added support for pluggable (provider-based) TLS signature algorithms.
+ This enables TLS 1.3 authentication operations with algorithms embedded
+ in providers not included by default in OpenSSL. In combination with
+ the already available pluggable KEM and X.509 support, this enables
+ for example suitable providers to deliver post-quantum or quantum-safe
+ cryptography to OpenSSL users.
+
+ *Michael Baentsch*
+
* Added support for Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) as defined
in RFC9180. HPKE is required for TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH),
Message Layer Security (MLS) and other IETF specifications.
* Lutz Jänicke*
+ * The `x509`, `ca`, and `req` apps now produce X.509 v3 certificates.
+ The `-x509v1` option of `req` prefers generation of X.509 v1 certificates.
+ `X509_sign()` and `X509_sign_ctx()` make sure that the certificate has
+ X.509 version 3 if the certificate information includes X.509 extensions.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
* Fix and extend certificate handling and the apps `x509`, `verify` etc.
such as adding a trace facility for debugging certificate chain building.
*David von Oheimb*
+ * `CMS_add0_cert()` and `CMS_add1_cert()` no more throw an error
+ if a certificate to be added is already present.
+ * `CMS_sign_ex()` and `CMS_sign()` now ignore any duplicate certificates
+ in their `certs` argument and no longer throw an error for them.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
* Fixed and extended `util/check-format.pl` for checking adherence to the
coding style <https://www.openssl.org/policies/technical/coding-style.html>.
The checks are meanwhile more complete and yield fewer false positives.
### Changes between 3.0 and 3.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
- * Added support for KMAC in KBKDF.
+ * Add FIPS provider configuration option to enforce the
+ Extended Master Secret (EMS) check during the TLS1_PRF KDF.
+ The option '-ems-check' can optionally be supplied to
+ 'openssl fipsinstall'.
*Shane Lontis*
- * Our provider implementations of `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT` and
- `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GET_PARAMS` for EC and SM2 keys now honor
- `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` as set (and
- default to `POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED`) when exporting
- `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`, instead of unconditionally using
- `POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED` as in previous 3.x releases.
- For symmetry, our implementation of `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD->export_to`
- for legacy EC and SM2 keys is also changed similarly to honor the
- equivalent conversion format flag as specified in the underlying
- `EC_KEY` object being exported to a provider, when this function is
- called through `EVP_PKEY_export()`.
+ * The FIPS provider includes a few non-approved algorithms for
+ backward compatibility purposes and the "fips=yes" property query
+ must be used for all algorithm fetches to ensure FIPS compliance.
- *Nicola Tuveri*
+ The algorithms that are included but not approved are Triple DES ECB,
+ Triple DES CBC and EdDSA.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Added support for KMAC in KBKDF.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
* RNDR and RNDRRS support in provider functions to provide
random number generation for Arm CPUs (aarch64).
[Migration guide]: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/tree/master/doc/man7/migration_guide.pod
+### Changes between 3.0.7 and 3.0.8 [7 Feb 2023]
+
+ * Fixed NULL dereference during PKCS7 data verification.
+
+ A NULL pointer can be dereferenced when signatures are being
+ verified on PKCS7 signed or signedAndEnveloped data. In case the hash
+ algorithm used for the signature is known to the OpenSSL library but
+ the implementation of the hash algorithm is not available the digest
+ initialization will fail. There is a missing check for the return
+ value from the initialization function which later leads to invalid
+ usage of the digest API most likely leading to a crash.
+ ([CVE-2023-0401])
+
+ PKCS7 data is processed by the SMIME library calls and also by the
+ time stamp (TS) library calls. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does
+ not call these functions however third party applications would be
+ affected if they call these functions to verify signatures on untrusted
+ data.
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
+
+ There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
+ inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
+ but the public structure definition for GENERAL_NAME incorrectly specified
+ the type of the x400Address field as ASN1_TYPE. This field is subsequently
+ interpreted by the OpenSSL function GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE rather
+ than an ASN1_STRING.
+
+ When CRL checking is enabled (i.e. the application sets the
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK flag), this vulnerability may allow an attacker to
+ pass arbitrary pointers to a memcmp call, enabling them to read memory
+ contents or enact a denial of service.
+ ([CVE-2023-0286])
+
+ *Hugo Landau*
+
+ * Fixed NULL dereference validating DSA public key.
+
+ An invalid pointer dereference on read can be triggered when an
+ application tries to check a malformed DSA public key by the
+ EVP_PKEY_public_check() function. This will most likely lead
+ to an application crash. This function can be called on public
+ keys supplied from untrusted sources which could allow an attacker
+ to cause a denial of service attack.
+
+ The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does not call this function
+ but applications might call the function if there are additional
+ security requirements imposed by standards such as FIPS 140-3.
+ ([CVE-2023-0217])
+
+ *Shane Lontis, Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed Invalid pointer dereference in d2i_PKCS7 functions.
+
+ An invalid pointer dereference on read can be triggered when an
+ application tries to load malformed PKCS7 data with the
+ d2i_PKCS7(), d2i_PKCS7_bio() or d2i_PKCS7_fp() functions.
+
+ The result of the dereference is an application crash which could
+ lead to a denial of service attack. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL
+ does not call this function however third party applications might
+ call these functions on untrusted data.
+ ([CVE-2023-0216])
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
+
+ The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
+ streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
+ to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
+ be called directly by end user applications.
+
+ The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
+ filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
+ the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
+ for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
+ is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
+ However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
+ BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
+ freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
+ then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
+ ([CVE-2023-0215])
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
+
+ The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
+ decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
+ data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
+ arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
+ decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
+ possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
+ In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
+ the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
+ If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
+ will most likely lead to a crash.
+
+ The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
+ PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
+
+ These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
+ functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
+ SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
+ internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
+ not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
+ ([CVE-2022-4450])
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
+
+ A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
+ implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
+ a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
+ decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
+ of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
+ modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
+ ([CVE-2022-4304])
+
+ *Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario*
+
+ * Fixed X.509 Name Constraints Read Buffer Overflow.
+
+ A read buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification,
+ specifically in name constraint checking. The read buffer overrun might
+ result in a crash which could lead to a denial of service attack.
+ In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious
+ server. In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests
+ client authentication and a malicious client connects.
+ ([CVE-2022-4203])
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+ * Fixed X.509 Policy Constraints Double Locking security issue.
+
+ If an X.509 certificate contains a malformed policy constraint and
+ policy processing is enabled, then a write lock will be taken twice
+ recursively. On some operating systems (most widely: Windows) this
+ results in a denial of service when the affected process hangs. Policy
+ processing being enabled on a publicly facing server is not considered
+ to be a common setup.
+ ([CVE-2022-3996])
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Our provider implementations of `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT` and
+ `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GET_PARAMS` for EC and SM2 keys now honor
+ `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` as set (and
+ default to `POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED`) when exporting
+ `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`, instead of unconditionally using
+ `POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED` as in previous 3.x releases.
+ For symmetry, our implementation of `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD->export_to`
+ for legacy EC and SM2 keys is also changed similarly to honor the
+ equivalent conversion format flag as specified in the underlying
+ `EC_KEY` object being exported to a provider, when this function is
+ called through `EVP_PKEY_export()`.
+
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
+
### Changes between 3.0.6 and 3.0.7 [1 Nov 2022]
* Fixed two buffer overflows in punycode decoding functions.
<!-- Links -->
+[CVE-2023-0401]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0401
+[CVE-2023-0286]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0286
+[CVE-2023-0217]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0217
+[CVE-2023-0216]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0216
+[CVE-2023-0215]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0215
+[CVE-2022-4450]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4450
+[CVE-2022-4304]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4304
+[CVE-2022-4203]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4203
+[CVE-2022-3996]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-3996
+[CVE-2022-2274]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-2274
+[CVE-2022-2097]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-2097
[CVE-2020-1971]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2020-1971
[CVE-2020-1967]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2020-1967
[CVE-2019-1563]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1563
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff