----------------
- [OpenSSL 3.2](#openssl-32)
+ - [OpenSSL 3.1](#openssl-31)
- [OpenSSL 3.0](#openssl-30)
- [OpenSSL 1.1.1](#openssl-111)
- [OpenSSL 1.1.0](#openssl-110)
OpenSSL 3.2
-----------
-### Changes between 3.0 and 3.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+### Changes between 3.1 and 3.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ * Added a function to delete objects from store by URI - OSSL_STORE_delete()
+ and the corresponding provider-storemgmt API function
+ OSSL_FUNC_store_delete().
+
+ *Dmitry Belyavskiy*
+
+ * Added OSSL_FUNC_store_open_ex() provider-storemgmt API function to pass
+ a passphrase callback when opening a store.
+
+ *Simo Sorce*
+
+ * Changed the default salt length used by PBES2 KDF's (PBKDF2 and scrypt)
+ from 8 bytes to 16 bytes.
+ The PKCS5 (RFC 8018) standard uses a 64 bit salt length for PBE, and
+ recommends a minimum of 64 bits for PBES2. For FIPS compliance PBKDF2
+ requires a salt length of 128 bits. This affects OpenSSL command line
+ applications such as "genrsa" and "pkcs8" and API's such as
+ PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() that are reliant on the default value.
+ The additional commandline option 'saltlen' has been added to the
+ OpenSSL command line applications for "pkcs8" and "enc" to allow the
+ salt length to be set to a non default value.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
+ * Changed the default value of the `ess_cert_id_alg` configuration
+ option which is used to calculate the TSA's public key certificate
+ identifier. The default algorithm is updated to be sha256 instead
+ of sha1.
+
+ *Małgorzata Olszówka*
+
+ * Added optimization for SM2 algorithm on aarch64. It uses a huge precomputed
+ table for point multiplication of the base point, which increases the size of
+ libcrypto from 4.4 MB to 4.9 MB. A new configure option `no-sm2-precomp` has
+ been added to disable the precomputed table.
+
+ *Xu Yizhou*
+
+ * Added client side support for QUIC
+
+ *Hugo Landau, Matt Caswell, Paul Dale, Tomáš Mráz, Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Added multiple tutorials on the OpenSSL library and in particular
+ on writing various clients (using TLS and QUIC protocols) with libssl.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Added secp384r1 implementation using Solinas' reduction to improve
+ speed of the NIST P-384 elliptic curve. To enable the implementation
+ the build option `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128` must be used.
+
+ *Rohan McLure*
+
+ * Improved RFC7468 compliance of the asn1parse command.
+
+ *Matthias St. Pierre*
+
+ * Added SHA256/192 algorithm support.
+
+ *Fergus Dall*
+
+ * Added support for securely getting root CA certificate update in
+ CMP.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
+ * Improved contention on global write locks by using more read locks where
+ appropriate.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Improved performance of OSSL_PARAM lookups in performance critical
+ provider functions.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Added the SSL_get0_group_name() function to provide access to the
+ name of the group used for the TLS key exchange.
+
+ *Alex Bozarth*
+
+ * Provide a new configure option `no-http` that can be used to disable the
+ HTTP support. Provide new configure options `no-apps` and `no-docs` to
+ disable building the openssl command line application and the documentation.
+
+ *Vladimír Kotal*
+
+ * Provide a new configure option `no-ecx` that can be used to disable the
+ X25519, X448, and EdDSA support.
+
+ *Yi Li*
+
+ * When multiple OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO parameters are passed to
+ the EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params() function they are now concatenated not just
+ for the HKDF algorithm but also for SSKDF and X9.63 KDF algorithms.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Added OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_im/export_types_ex() provider functions that get
+ the provider context as a parameter.
+
+ *Ingo Franzki*
+
+ * TLS round-trip time calculation was added by a Brigham Young University
+ Capstone team partnering with Sandia National Laboratories. A new function
+ in ssl_lib titled SSL_get_handshake_rtt will calculate and retrieve this
+ value.
+
+ *Jairus Christensen*
+
+ * Added the "-quic" option to s_client to enable connectivity to QUIC servers.
+ QUIC requires the use of ALPN, so this must be specified via the "-alpn"
+ option. Use of the "advanced" s_client command command via the "-adv" option
+ is recommended.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Added an "advanced" command mode to s_client. Use this with the "-adv"
+ option. The old "basic" command mode recognises certain letters that must
+ always appear at the start of a line and cannot be escaped. The advanced
+ command mode enables commands to be entered anywhere and there is an
+ escaping mechanism. After starting s_client with "-adv" type "{help}"
+ to show a list of available commands.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Add Raw Public Key (RFC7250) support. Authentication is supported
+ by matching keys against either local policy (TLSA records synthesised
+ from the expected keys) or DANE (TLSA records obtained by the
+ application from DNS). TLSA records will also match the same key in
+ the server certificate, should RPK use not happen to be negotiated.
+
+ *Todd Short*
+
+ * Added support for modular exponentiation and CRT offloading for the
+ S390x architecture.
+
+ *Juergen Christ*
+
+ * Added further assembler code for the RISC-V architecture.
+
+ *Christoph Müllner*
+
+ * Added EC_GROUP_to_params() which creates an OSSL_PARAM array
+ from a given EC_GROUP.
+
+ *Oliver Mihatsch*
+
+ * Improved support for non-default library contexts and property queries
+ when parsing PKCS#12 files.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
+ * Implemented support for all five instances of EdDSA from RFC8032:
+ Ed25519, Ed25519ctx, Ed25519ph, Ed448, and Ed448ph.
+ The streaming is not yet supported for the HashEdDSA variants
+ (Ed25519ph and Ed448ph).
+
+ *James Muir*
+
+ * Added SM4 optimization for ARM processors using ASIMD and AES HW
+ instructions.
+
+ *Xu Yizhou*
+
+ * Implemented SM4-XTS support.
+
+ *Xu Yizhou*
+
+ * Added platform-agnostic OSSL_sleep() function.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Implemented deterministic ECDSA signatures (RFC6979) support.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
+ * Implemented AES-GCM-SIV (RFC8452) support.
+
+ *Todd Short*
+
+ * Added support for pluggable (provider-based) TLS signature algorithms.
+ This enables TLS 1.3 authentication operations with algorithms embedded
+ in providers not included by default in OpenSSL. In combination with
+ the already available pluggable KEM and X.509 support, this enables
+ for example suitable providers to deliver post-quantum or quantum-safe
+ cryptography to OpenSSL users.
+
+ *Michael Baentsch*
+
+ * Added support for pluggable (provider-based) CMS signature algorithms.
+ This enables CMS sign and verify operations with algorithms embedded
+ in providers not included by default in OpenSSL.
+
+ *Michael Baentsch*
* Added support for Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) as defined
in RFC9180. HPKE is required for TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH),
*Stephen Farrell*
+ * Implemented HPKE DHKEM support in providers used by HPKE (RFC9180)
+ API.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
* Add support for certificate compression (RFC8879), including
library support for Brotli and Zstandard compression.
*Graham Woodward*
- * Major refactor of the libssl record layer
-
- *Matt Caswell*
-
- * Added a new BIO_s_dgram_mem() to read/write datagrams to memory
+ * Major refactor of the libssl record layer.
*Matt Caswell*
*Darshan Sen*
- * RNDR and RNDRRS support in provider functions to provide
- random number generation for Arm CPUs (aarch64).
+ * The PKCS12_parse() function now supports MAC-less PKCS12 files.
- *Orr Toledano*
+ *Daniel Fiala*
- * s_client and s_server apps now explicitly say when the TLS version
- does not include the renegotiation mechanism. This avoids confusion
- between that scenario versus when the TLS version includes secure
- renegotiation but the peer lacks support for it.
+ * Added ASYNC_set_mem_functions() and ASYNC_get_mem_functions() calls to be able
+ to change functions used for allocating the memory of asynchronous call stack.
- *Felipe Gasper*
+ *Arran Cudbard-Bell*
- * AES-GCM enabled with AVX512 vAES and vPCLMULQDQ.
+ * Added support for signed BIGNUMs in the OSSL_PARAM APIs.
- *Tomasz Kantecki, Andrey Matyukov*
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * A failure exit code is returned when using the openssl x509 command to check
+ certificate attributes and the checks fail.
+
+ *Rami Khaldi*
* The default SSL/TLS security level has been changed from 1 to 2. RSA,
DSA and DH keys of 1024 bits and above and less than 2048 bits and ECC keys
*Paul Dale*
- * The various OBJ_* functions have been made thread safe.
-
- *Paul Dale*
-
* CCM8 cipher suites in TLS have been downgraded to security level zero
because they use a short authentication tag which lowers their strength.
*Dmitry Belyavskiy*
- * Parallel dual-prime 1536/2048-bit modular exponentiation for
- AVX512_IFMA capable processors.
-
- *Sergey Kirillov, Andrey Matyukov (Intel Corp)*
-
- * The functions `OPENSSL_LH_stats`, `OPENSSL_LH_node_stats`,
- `OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats`, `OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio`,
- `OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio` and `OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio` are now
- marked deprecated from OpenSSL 3.2 onwards and can be disabled by defining
- `OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_2`.
-
- The macro `DEFINE_LHASH_OF` is now deprecated in favour of the macro
- `DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX`, which omits the corresponding type-specific function
- definitions for these functions regardless of whether
- `OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_2` is defined.
-
- Users of `DEFINE_LHASH_OF` may start receiving deprecation warnings for these
- functions regardless of whether they are using them. It is recommended that
- users transition to the new macro, `DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX`.
-
- *Hugo Landau*
-
- * When generating safe-prime DH parameters set the recommended private key
- length equivalent to minimum key lengths as in RFC 7919.
-
- *Tomáš Mráz*
-
* Add X.509 certificate codeSigning purpose and related checks on key usage and
extended key usage of the leaf certificate according to the CA/Browser Forum.
* Lutz Jänicke*
+ * The `x509`, `ca`, and `req` apps now produce X.509 v3 certificates.
+ The `-x509v1` option of `req` prefers generation of X.509 v1 certificates.
+ `X509_sign()` and `X509_sign_ctx()` make sure that the certificate has
+ X.509 version 3 if the certificate information includes X.509 extensions.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
* Fix and extend certificate handling and the apps `x509`, `verify` etc.
such as adding a trace facility for debugging certificate chain building.
*David von Oheimb*
+ * `CMS_add0_cert()` and `CMS_add1_cert()` no longer throw an error if
+ a certificate to be added is already present. `CMS_sign_ex()` and
+ `CMS_sign()` now ignore any duplicate certificates in their `certs` argument
+ and no longer throw an error for them.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
* Fixed and extended `util/check-format.pl` for checking adherence to the
coding style <https://www.openssl.org/policies/technical/coding-style.html>.
The checks are meanwhile more complete and yield fewer false positives.
*David von Oheimb*
+ * Added BIO_s_dgram_pair() and BIO_s_dgram_mem() that provide memory-based
+ BIOs with datagram semantics and support for BIO_sendmmsg() and BIO_recvmmsg()
+ calls. They can be used as the transport BIOs for QUIC.
+
+ *Hugo Landau, Matt Caswell and Tomáš Mráz*
+
* Add new BIO_sendmmsg() and BIO_recvmmsg() BIO methods which allow
sending and receiving multiple messages in a single call. An implementation
is provided for BIO_dgram. For further details, see BIO_sendmmsg(3).
*Hugo Landau*
- * The `SSL_CERT_PATH` and `SSL_CERT_URI` environment variables are introduced.
- `SSL_CERT_URI` can be used to specify a URI for a root certificate store. The
- `SSL_CERT_PATH` environment variable specifies a delimiter-separated list of
- paths which are searched for root certificates.
-
- The existing `SSL_CERT_DIR` environment variable is deprecated.
- `SSL_CERT_DIR` was previously used to specify either a delimiter-separated
- list of paths or an URI, which is ambiguous. Setting `SSL_CERT_PATH` causes
- `SSL_CERT_DIR` to be ignored for the purposes of determining root certificate
- directories, and setting `SSL_CERT_URI` causes `SSL_CERT_DIR` to be ignored
- for the purposes of determining root certificate stores.
-
- *Hugo Landau*
-
* Support for loading root certificates from the Windows certificate store
has been added. The support is in the form of a store which recognises the
- URI string of `org.openssl.winstore://`. This store is enabled by default and
- can be disabled using the new compile-time option `no-winstore`.
+ URI string of `org.openssl.winstore://`. This URI scheme currently takes no
+ arguments. This store is built by default and can be disabled using the new
+ compile-time option `no-winstore`. This store is not currently used by
+ default and must be loaded explicitly using the above store URI. It is
+ expected to be loaded by default in the future.
*Hugo Landau*
*Tianjia Zhang*
+ * Added `-ktls` option to `s_server` and `s_client` commands to enable the
+ KTLS support.
+
+ *Tianjia Zhang*
+
* Zerocopy KTLS sendfile() support on Linux.
*Maxim Mikityanskiy*
+ * The OBJ_ calls are now thread safe using a global lock.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * New parameter `-digest` for openssl cms command allowing signing
+ pre-computed digests and new CMS API functions supporting that
+ functionality.
+
+ *Viktor Söderqvist*
+
+ * OPENSSL_malloc() and other allocation functions now raise errors on
+ allocation failures. The callers do not need to explicitly raise errors
+ unless they want to for tracing purposes.
+
+ *David von Oheimb*
+
+ * Added and enabled by default implicit rejection in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
+ decryption as a protection against Bleichenbacher-like attacks.
+ The RSA decryption API will now return a randomly generated deterministic
+ message instead of an error in case it detects an error when checking
+ padding during PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. This is a general protection against
+ issues like CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657. This protection can be
+ disabled by calling
+ `EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection". "0")`
+ on the RSA decryption context.
+
+ *Hubert Kario*
+
+ * Added support for Brainpool curves in TLS-1.3.
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger and Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Added OpenBSD specific build targets.
+
+ *David Carlier*
+
+ * Support for Argon2d, Argon2i, Argon2id KDFs has been added along with
+ a basic thread pool implementation for select platforms.
+
+ *Čestmír Kalina*
+
+OpenSSL 3.1
+-----------
+
+### Changes between 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ * Fix POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting XMM registers on Windows.
+
+ The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL
+ does not save the contents of non-volatile XMM registers on Windows 64
+ platform when calculating the MAC of data larger than 64 bytes. Before
+ returning to the caller all the XMM registers are set to zero rather than
+ restoring their previous content. The vulnerable code is used only on newer
+ x86_64 processors supporting the AVX512-IFMA instructions.
+
+ The consequences of this kind of internal application state corruption can
+ be various - from no consequences, if the calling application does not
+ depend on the contents of non-volatile XMM registers at all, to the worst
+ consequences, where the attacker could get complete control of the
+ application process. However given the contents of the registers are just
+ zeroized so the attacker cannot put arbitrary values inside, the most likely
+ consequence, if any, would be an incorrect result of some application
+ dependent calculations or a crash leading to a denial of service.
+
+ ([CVE-2023-4807])
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+### Changes between 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 [1 Aug 2023]
+
+ * Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value.
+
+ The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. After
+ fixing CVE-2023-3446 it was discovered that a large q parameter value can
+ also trigger an overly long computation during some of these checks.
+ A correct q value, if present, cannot be larger than the modulus p
+ parameter, thus it is unnecessary to perform these checks if q is larger
+ than p.
+
+ If DH_check() is called with such q parameter value,
+ DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE return flag is set and the computationally
+ intensive checks are skipped.
+
+ ([CVE-2023-3817])
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus.
+
+ The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. One of
+ those checks confirms that the modulus ("p" parameter) is not too large.
+ Trying to use a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not normally use
+ a modulus which is over 10,000 bits in length.
+
+ However the DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or
+ parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied
+ modulus value even if it has already been found to be too large.
+
+ A new limit has been added to DH_check of 32,768 bits. Supplying a
+ key/parameters with a modulus over this size will simply cause DH_check() to
+ fail.
+
+ ([CVE-2023-3446])
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Do not ignore empty associated data entries with AES-SIV.
+
+ The AES-SIV algorithm allows for authentication of multiple associated
+ data entries along with the encryption. To authenticate empty data the
+ application has to call `EVP_EncryptUpdate()` (or `EVP_CipherUpdate()`)
+ with NULL pointer as the output buffer and 0 as the input buffer length.
+ The AES-SIV implementation in OpenSSL just returns success for such call
+ instead of performing the associated data authentication operation.
+ The empty data thus will not be authenticated. ([CVE-2023-2975])
+
+ Thanks to Juerg Wullschleger (Google) for discovering the issue.
+
+ The fix changes the authentication tag value and the ciphertext for
+ applications that use empty associated data entries with AES-SIV.
+ To decrypt data encrypted with previous versions of OpenSSL the application
+ has to skip calls to `EVP_DecryptUpdate()` for empty associated data
+ entries.
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * When building with the `enable-fips` option and using the resulting
+ FIPS provider, TLS 1.2 will, by default, mandate the use of an extended
+ master secret (FIPS 140-3 IG G.Q) and the Hash and HMAC DRBGs will
+ not operate with truncated digests (FIPS 140-3 IG G.R).
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+### Changes between 3.1.0 and 3.1.1 [30 May 2023]
+
+ * Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
+
+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
+ sub-identifier. ([CVE-2023-2650])
+
+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
+
+ The basis for this restriction is [RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5]. OBJECT
+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
+
+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
+ bytes.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Multiple algorithm implementation fixes for ARM BE platforms.
+
+ *Liu-ErMeng*
+
+ * Added a -pedantic option to fipsinstall that adjusts the various
+ settings to ensure strict FIPS compliance rather than backwards
+ compatibility.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms which
+ happens if the buffer size is 4 mod 5 in 16 byte AES blocks. This can
+ trigger a crash of an application using AES-XTS decryption if the memory
+ just after the buffer being decrypted is not mapped.
+ Thanks to Anton Romanov (Amazon) for discovering the issue.
+ ([CVE-2023-1255])
+
+ *Nevine Ebeid*
+
+ * Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption ([CVE-2022-4304]).
+ The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause
+ a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case
+ compared to 3.0.7. The new fix uses existing constant time
+ code paths, and restores the previous performance level while
+ fully eliminating all existing timing side channels.
+ The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support
+ by Hubert Kario.
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Add FIPS provider configuration option to disallow the use of
+ truncated digests with Hash and HMAC DRBGs (q.v. FIPS 140-3 IG D.R.).
+ The option '-no_drbg_truncated_digests' can optionally be
+ supplied to 'openssl fipsinstall'.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
+ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to David Benjamin for
+ discovering this issue.
+ ([CVE-2023-0466])
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are
+ silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped
+ for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
+ invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on the
+ certificate altogether.
+ ([CVE-2023-0465])
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate
+ against CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which
+ should be sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit
+ can be adjusted by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build
+ time define to a desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow
+ unlimited growth.
+ ([CVE-2023-0464])
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+### Changes between 3.0 and 3.1.0 [14 Mar 2023]
+
+ * Add FIPS provider configuration option to enforce the
+ Extended Master Secret (EMS) check during the TLS1_PRF KDF.
+ The option '-ems-check' can optionally be supplied to
+ 'openssl fipsinstall'.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
+ * The FIPS provider includes a few non-approved algorithms for
+ backward compatibility purposes and the "fips=yes" property query
+ must be used for all algorithm fetches to ensure FIPS compliance.
+
+ The algorithms that are included but not approved are Triple DES ECB,
+ Triple DES CBC and EdDSA.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Added support for KMAC in KBKDF.
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
+ * RNDR and RNDRRS support in provider functions to provide
+ random number generation for Arm CPUs (aarch64).
+
+ *Orr Toledano*
+
+ * s_client and s_server apps now explicitly say when the TLS version
+ does not include the renegotiation mechanism. This avoids confusion
+ between that scenario versus when the TLS version includes secure
+ renegotiation but the peer lacks support for it.
+
+ *Felipe Gasper*
+
+ * AES-GCM enabled with AVX512 vAES and vPCLMULQDQ.
+
+ *Tomasz Kantecki, Andrey Matyukov*
+
+ * The various OBJ_* functions have been made thread safe.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Parallel dual-prime 1536/2048-bit modular exponentiation for
+ AVX512_IFMA capable processors.
+
+ *Sergey Kirillov, Andrey Matyukov (Intel Corp)*
+
+ * The functions `OPENSSL_LH_stats`, `OPENSSL_LH_node_stats`,
+ `OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats`, `OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio`,
+ `OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio` and `OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio` are now
+ marked deprecated from OpenSSL 3.1 onwards and can be disabled by defining
+ `OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_1`.
+
+ The macro `DEFINE_LHASH_OF` is now deprecated in favour of the macro
+ `DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX`, which omits the corresponding type-specific function
+ definitions for these functions regardless of whether
+ `OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_1` is defined.
+
+ Users of `DEFINE_LHASH_OF` may start receiving deprecation warnings for these
+ functions regardless of whether they are using them. It is recommended that
+ users transition to the new macro, `DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX`.
+
+ *Hugo Landau*
+
+ * When generating safe-prime DH parameters set the recommended private key
+ length equivalent to minimum key lengths as in RFC 7919.
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Change the default salt length for PKCS#1 RSASSA-PSS signatures to the
+ maximum size that is smaller or equal to the digest length to comply with
+ FIPS 186-4 section 5. This is implemented by a new option
+ `OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX` ("auto-digestmax") for the
+ `rsa_pss_saltlen` parameter, which is now the default. Signature
+ verification is not affected by this change and continues to work as before.
+
+ *Clemens Lang*
+
OpenSSL 3.0
-----------
[Migration guide]: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/tree/master/doc/man7/migration_guide.pod
+### Changes between 3.0.7 and 3.0.8 [7 Feb 2023]
+
+ * Fixed NULL dereference during PKCS7 data verification.
+
+ A NULL pointer can be dereferenced when signatures are being
+ verified on PKCS7 signed or signedAndEnveloped data. In case the hash
+ algorithm used for the signature is known to the OpenSSL library but
+ the implementation of the hash algorithm is not available the digest
+ initialization will fail. There is a missing check for the return
+ value from the initialization function which later leads to invalid
+ usage of the digest API most likely leading to a crash.
+ ([CVE-2023-0401])
+
+ PKCS7 data is processed by the SMIME library calls and also by the
+ time stamp (TS) library calls. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does
+ not call these functions however third party applications would be
+ affected if they call these functions to verify signatures on untrusted
+ data.
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
+
+ There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
+ inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
+ but the public structure definition for GENERAL_NAME incorrectly specified
+ the type of the x400Address field as ASN1_TYPE. This field is subsequently
+ interpreted by the OpenSSL function GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE rather
+ than an ASN1_STRING.
+
+ When CRL checking is enabled (i.e. the application sets the
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK flag), this vulnerability may allow an attacker to
+ pass arbitrary pointers to a memcmp call, enabling them to read memory
+ contents or enact a denial of service.
+ ([CVE-2023-0286])
+
+ *Hugo Landau*
+
+ * Fixed NULL dereference validating DSA public key.
+
+ An invalid pointer dereference on read can be triggered when an
+ application tries to check a malformed DSA public key by the
+ EVP_PKEY_public_check() function. This will most likely lead
+ to an application crash. This function can be called on public
+ keys supplied from untrusted sources which could allow an attacker
+ to cause a denial of service attack.
+
+ The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does not call this function
+ but applications might call the function if there are additional
+ security requirements imposed by standards such as FIPS 140-3.
+ ([CVE-2023-0217])
+
+ *Shane Lontis, Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed Invalid pointer dereference in d2i_PKCS7 functions.
+
+ An invalid pointer dereference on read can be triggered when an
+ application tries to load malformed PKCS7 data with the
+ d2i_PKCS7(), d2i_PKCS7_bio() or d2i_PKCS7_fp() functions.
+
+ The result of the dereference is an application crash which could
+ lead to a denial of service attack. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL
+ does not call this function however third party applications might
+ call these functions on untrusted data.
+ ([CVE-2023-0216])
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
+ * Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
+
+ The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
+ streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
+ to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
+ be called directly by end user applications.
+
+ The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
+ filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
+ the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
+ for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
+ is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
+ However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
+ BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
+ freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
+ then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
+ ([CVE-2023-0215])
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
+
+ The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
+ decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
+ data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
+ arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
+ decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
+ possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
+ In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
+ the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
+ If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
+ will most likely lead to a crash.
+
+ The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
+ PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
+
+ These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
+ functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
+ SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
+ internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
+ not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
+ ([CVE-2022-4450])
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
+
+ A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
+ implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
+ a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
+ decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
+ of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
+ modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
+ ([CVE-2022-4304])
+
+ *Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario*
+
+ * Fixed X.509 Name Constraints Read Buffer Overflow.
+
+ A read buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification,
+ specifically in name constraint checking. The read buffer overrun might
+ result in a crash which could lead to a denial of service attack.
+ In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious
+ server. In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests
+ client authentication and a malicious client connects.
+ ([CVE-2022-4203])
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+ * Fixed X.509 Policy Constraints Double Locking security issue.
+
+ If an X.509 certificate contains a malformed policy constraint and
+ policy processing is enabled, then a write lock will be taken twice
+ recursively. On some operating systems (most widely: Windows) this
+ results in a denial of service when the affected process hangs. Policy
+ processing being enabled on a publicly facing server is not considered
+ to be a common setup.
+ ([CVE-2022-3996])
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Our provider implementations of `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT` and
+ `OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GET_PARAMS` for EC and SM2 keys now honor
+ `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` as set (and
+ default to `POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED`) when exporting
+ `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`, instead of unconditionally using
+ `POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED` as in previous 3.x releases.
+ For symmetry, our implementation of `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD->export_to`
+ for legacy EC and SM2 keys is also changed similarly to honor the
+ equivalent conversion format flag as specified in the underlying
+ `EC_KEY` object being exported to a provider, when this function is
+ called through `EVP_PKEY_export()`.
+
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
+
### Changes between 3.0.6 and 3.0.7 [1 Nov 2022]
* Fixed two buffer overflows in punycode decoding functions.
3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
- have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
+ have to reuse the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
Also applications directly using the low-level API BN_mod_exp may be
affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
([CVE-2019-1551])
* Alternate chains certificate forgery
- During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
- Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
* Add additional DigestInfo checks.
- Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
DigestInfo structures.
*Ralf S. Engelschall*
* Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches
- which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay.
+ which allow to compile an RSA-free SSLeay.
*Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall*
<!-- Links -->
+[CVE-2023-4807]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-4807
+[CVE-2023-3817]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-3817
+[CVE-2023-3446]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-3446
+[CVE-2023-2975]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-2975
+[RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
+[CVE-2023-2650]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-2650
+[CVE-2023-1255]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-1255
+[CVE-2023-0466]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0466
+[CVE-2023-0465]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0465
+[CVE-2023-0464]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0464
+[CVE-2023-0401]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0401
+[CVE-2023-0286]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0286
+[CVE-2023-0217]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0217
+[CVE-2023-0216]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0216
+[CVE-2023-0215]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0215
+[CVE-2022-4450]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4450
+[CVE-2022-4304]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4304
+[CVE-2022-4203]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-4203
+[CVE-2022-3996]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-3996
+[CVE-2022-2274]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-2274
+[CVE-2022-2097]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2022-2097
[CVE-2020-1971]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2020-1971
[CVE-2020-1967]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2020-1967
[CVE-2019-1563]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1563
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff