Many spelling fixes/typo's corrected.

[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / aes / asm / aesni-x86_64.pl

diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
index c5c3614eee2bfe0bcf64c1572ac2d670e3bcfea6..2a202c53e5f841d93e8f6d04b4d8625481a11cb7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 # identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
 # saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
 # interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
-# "straghtforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
+# "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
 # disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
 # limit.
 #
@@ -143,14 +143,14 @@
 # asymptotic, if it can be surpassed, isn't it? What happens there?
 # Rewind to CBC paragraph for the answer. Yes, out-of-order execution
 # magic is responsible for this. Processor overlaps not only the
-# additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instuctions
+# additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instructions
 # processing adjacent triplets of independent blocks. In the 6x case
 # additional instructions  still claim disproportionally small amount
 # of additional cycles, but in 8x case number of instructions must be
 # a tad too high for out-of-order logic to cope with, and AES unit
 # remains underutilized... As you can see 8x interleave is hardly
 # justifiable, so there no need to feel bad that 32-bit aesni-x86.pl
-# utilizies 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity.
+# utilizes 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity.
 #
 # Higher interleave factors do have negative impact on Westmere
 # performance. While for ECB mode it's negligible ~1.5%, other
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
        sub     \$8,$len
        jnc     .Lctr32_loop8                   # loop if $len-=8 didn't borrow
 
-       add     \$8,$len                        # restore real remainig $len
+       add     \$8,$len                        # restore real remaining $len
        jz      .Lctr32_done                    # done if ($len==0)
        lea     -0x80($key),$key
 
@@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
        movups  $inout2,0x20($out)              # $len was 3, stop store
 
 .Lctr32_done:
-       xorps   %xmm0,%xmm0                     # clear regiser bank
+       xorps   %xmm0,%xmm0                     # clear register bank
        xor     $key0,$key0
        pxor    %xmm1,%xmm1
        pxor    %xmm2,%xmm2
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
        lea     `16*6`($inp),$inp
        pxor    $twmask,$inout5
 
-        pxor   $twres,@tweak[0]                # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
+        pxor   $twres,@tweak[0]                # calculate tweaks^round[last]
        aesenc          $rndkey1,$inout4
         pxor   $twres,@tweak[1]
         movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp)          # put aside tweaks^round[last]
@@ -2342,7 +2342,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
        lea     `16*6`($inp),$inp
        pxor    $twmask,$inout5
 
-        pxor   $twres,@tweak[0]                # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
+        pxor   $twres,@tweak[0]                # calculate tweaks^round[last]
        aesdec          $rndkey1,$inout4
         pxor   $twres,@tweak[1]
         movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp)          # put aside tweaks^last round key
@@ -4515,7 +4515,7 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
 
 .align 16
 .L14rounds:
-       movups  16($inp),%xmm2                  # remaning half of *userKey
+       movups  16($inp),%xmm2                  # remaining half of *userKey
        mov     \$13,$bits                      # 14 rounds for 256
        lea     16(%rax),%rax
        cmp     \$`1<<28`,%r10d                 # AVX, but no XOP