/*
- * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* Originally written by Mike Hamburg
*/
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "curve448_lcl.h"
+#include "curve448_local.h"
#include "word.h"
#include "ed448.h"
-#include <string.h>
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#define COFACTOR 4
-static c448_error_t oneshot_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
+static c448_error_t oneshot_hash(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_MD *shake256 = NULL;
+ c448_error_t ret = C448_FAILURE;
if (hashctx == NULL)
return C448_FAILURE;
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, EVP_shake256(), NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, in, inlen)
- || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, out, outlen)) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
- return C448_FAILURE;
- }
+ shake256 = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHAKE256", NULL);
+ if (shake256 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, shake256, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, in, inlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, out, outlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = C448_SUCCESS;
+ err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
- return C448_SUCCESS;
+ EVP_MD_free(shake256);
+ return ret;
}
-static void clamp(uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+static void clamp(uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
{
- uint8_t hibit = (1 << 0) >> 1;
-
- /* Blarg */
secret_scalar_ser[0] &= -COFACTOR;
- if (hibit == 0) {
- secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] = 0;
- secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 2] |= 0x80;
- } else {
- secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] &= hibit - 1;
- secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] |= hibit;
- }
+ secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] = 0;
+ secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 2] |= 0x80;
}
-static c448_error_t hash_init_with_dom(EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx, uint8_t prehashed,
+static c448_error_t hash_init_with_dom(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx,
+ uint8_t prehashed,
uint8_t for_prehash,
const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len)
{
const char *dom_s = "SigEd448";
uint8_t dom[2];
+ EVP_MD *shake256 = NULL;
- dom[0] = 2 + word_is_zero(prehashed) + word_is_zero(for_prehash);
+ if (context_len > UINT8_MAX)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ dom[0] = (uint8_t)(2 - (prehashed == 0 ? 1 : 0)
+ - (for_prehash == 0 ? 1 : 0));
dom[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
- if (context_len > UINT8_MAX)
+ shake256 = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHAKE256", NULL);
+ if (shake256 == NULL)
return C448_FAILURE;
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, EVP_shake256(), NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom_s, strlen(dom_s))
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom, sizeof(dom))
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, context, context_len))
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, shake256, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom_s, strlen(dom_s))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom, sizeof(dom))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, context, context_len)) {
+ EVP_MD_free(shake256);
return C448_FAILURE;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(shake256);
return C448_SUCCESS;
}
/* In this file because it uses the hash */
c448_error_t c448_ed448_convert_private_key_to_x448(
- uint8_t x[C448_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t ed [C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ uint8_t x[X448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t ed [EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
{
/* pass the private key through oneshot_hash function */
- /* and keep the first C448_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes */
- return oneshot_hash(x, C448_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES, ed,
- C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
+ /* and keep the first X448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes */
+ return oneshot_hash(ctx, x, X448_PRIVATE_BYTES, ed,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
}
c448_error_t c448_ed448_derive_public_key(
- uint8_t pubkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
- const uint8_t privkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])
{
/* only this much used for keygen */
- uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+ uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
curve448_scalar_t secret_scalar;
unsigned int c;
curve448_point_t p;
- if (!oneshot_hash(secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser), privkey,
- C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
+ if (!oneshot_hash(ctx, secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser),
+ privkey,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
return C448_FAILURE;
clamp(secret_scalar_ser);
* converted it effectively picks up a factor of 2 from the isogenies. So
* we might start at 2 instead of 1.
*/
- for (c = 1; c < C448_448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
+ for (c = 1; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
curve448_scalar_halve(secret_scalar, secret_scalar);
curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, curve448_precomputed_base, secret_scalar);
}
c448_error_t c448_ed448_sign(
- uint8_t signature[C448_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t privkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t pubkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len)
EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
c448_error_t ret = C448_FAILURE;
curve448_scalar_t nonce_scalar;
- uint8_t nonce_point[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = { 0 };
+ uint8_t nonce_point[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = { 0 };
unsigned int c;
curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;
return C448_FAILURE;
{
- /* Schedule the secret key */
- struct {
- uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
- uint8_t seed[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
- } __attribute__ ((packed)) expanded;
-
- if (!oneshot_hash((uint8_t *)&expanded, sizeof(expanded), privkey,
- C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
+ /*
+ * Schedule the secret key, First EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES is serialised
+ * secret scalar,next EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes is the seed.
+ */
+ uint8_t expanded[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES * 2];
+
+ if (!oneshot_hash(ctx, expanded, sizeof(expanded), privkey,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES))
goto err;
- clamp(expanded.secret_scalar_ser);
- curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, expanded.secret_scalar_ser,
- sizeof(expanded.secret_scalar_ser));
+ clamp(expanded);
+ curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, expanded,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
/* Hash to create the nonce */
- if (!hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, expanded.seed, sizeof(expanded.seed))
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&expanded, sizeof(expanded));
+ if (!hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context,
+ context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx,
+ expanded + EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES,
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));
goto err;
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&expanded, sizeof(expanded));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));
}
/* Decode the nonce */
{
- uint8_t nonce[2 * C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+ uint8_t nonce[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
if (!EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, nonce, sizeof(nonce)))
goto err;
curve448_point_t p;
curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar);
- for (c = 2; c < C448_448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1) {
+ for (c = 2; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar_2);
- }
curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, curve448_precomputed_base,
nonce_scalar_2);
}
{
- uint8_t challenge[2 * C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+ uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
/* Compute the challenge */
- if (!hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point))
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
- || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge)))
+ if (!hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge)))
goto err;
curve448_scalar_decode_long(challenge_scalar, challenge,
curve448_scalar_mul(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, secret_scalar);
curve448_scalar_add(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, nonce_scalar);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(signature, C448_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(signature, EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES);
memcpy(signature, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point));
- curve448_scalar_encode(&signature[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ curve448_scalar_encode(&signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
challenge_scalar);
curve448_scalar_destroy(secret_scalar);
}
c448_error_t c448_ed448_sign_prehash(
- uint8_t signature[C448_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t privkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t pubkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t *context,
size_t context_len)
{
- return c448_ed448_sign(signature, privkey, pubkey, hash, 64, 1, context,
- context_len);
+ return c448_ed448_sign(ctx, signature, privkey, pubkey, hash, 64, 1,
+ context, context_len);
}
c448_error_t c448_ed448_verify(
- const uint8_t signature[C448_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t pubkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,
uint8_t context_len)
{
curve448_point_t pk_point, r_point;
- c448_error_t error =
- curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);
+ c448_error_t error;
curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;
curve448_scalar_t response_scalar;
- unsigned int c;
+ /* Order in little endian format */
+ static const uint8_t order[] = {
+ 0xF3, 0x44, 0x58, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x23, 0x55, 0x8F, 0xC5, 0x8D,
+ 0x72, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x21, 0x90, 0x36, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x4E, 0xC4,
+ 0xE9, 0x23, 0xCA, 0x7C, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x00
+ };
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that s (second 57 bytes of the sig) is less than the order. Both
+ * s and the order are in little-endian format. This can be done in
+ * variable time, since if this is not the case the signature if publicly
+ * invalid.
+ */
+ for (i = EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] > order[i])
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+ if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] < order[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < 0)
+ return C448_FAILURE;
+
+ error =
+ curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);
if (C448_SUCCESS != error)
return error;
{
/* Compute the challenge */
EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- uint8_t challenge[2 * C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
+ uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];
if (hashctx == NULL
- || !hash_init_with_dom(hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, signature,
- C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
- || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge))) {
+ || !hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context,
+ context_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, signature, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge))) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);
return C448_FAILURE;
}
challenge_scalar);
curve448_scalar_decode_long(response_scalar,
- &signature[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
- C448_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
-
- for (c = 1; c < C448_448_EDDSA_DECODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)
- curve448_scalar_add(response_scalar, response_scalar, response_scalar);
+ &signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);
/* pk_point = -c(x(P)) + (cx + k)G = kG */
curve448_base_double_scalarmul_non_secret(pk_point,
}
c448_error_t c448_ed448_verify_prehash(
- const uint8_t signature[C448_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
- const uint8_t pubkey[C448_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+ const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],
const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t *context,
uint8_t context_len)
{
- c448_error_t ret;
-
- ret = c448_ed448_verify(signature, pubkey, hash, 64, 1, context,
- context_len);
-
- return ret;
+ return c448_ed448_verify(ctx, signature, pubkey, hash, 64, 1, context,
+ context_len);
}
-int ED448_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t private_key[57],
- const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
+int ED448_sign(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message,
+ size_t message_len, const uint8_t public_key[57],
+ const uint8_t private_key[57], const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len)
{
-
- return c448_ed448_sign(out_sig, private_key, public_key, message,
+ return c448_ed448_sign(ctx, out_sig, private_key, public_key, message,
message_len, 0, context, context_len)
== C448_SUCCESS;
}
-int ED448_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+int ED448_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const uint8_t signature[114], const uint8_t public_key[57],
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
{
- return c448_ed448_verify(signature, public_key, message, message_len, 0,
- context, context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
+ return c448_ed448_verify(ctx, signature, public_key, message, message_len,
+ 0, context, (uint8_t)context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
}
-int ED448ph_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t hash[64],
+int ED448ph_sign(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t hash[64],
const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t private_key[57],
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
{
- return c448_ed448_sign_prehash(out_sig, private_key, public_key, hash,
+ return c448_ed448_sign_prehash(ctx, out_sig, private_key, public_key, hash,
context, context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
}
-int ED448ph_verify(const uint8_t hash[64], const uint8_t signature[114],
- const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t *context,
- size_t context_len)
+int ED448ph_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t hash[64],
+ const uint8_t signature[114], const uint8_t public_key[57],
+ const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len)
{
- return c448_ed448_verify_prehash(signature, public_key, hash, context,
- context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
+ return c448_ed448_verify_prehash(ctx, signature, public_key, hash, context,
+ (uint8_t)context_len) == C448_SUCCESS;
}
-int ED448_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_key[57],
+int ED448_public_from_private(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t out_public_key[57],
const uint8_t private_key[57])
{
- return c448_ed448_derive_public_key(out_public_key, private_key)
+ return c448_ed448_derive_public_key(ctx, out_public_key, private_key)
== C448_SUCCESS;
}
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