static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
void *cbarg);
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
{
return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL);
return ret;
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
{
return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL, nid);
if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
r->meth->finish(r);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
dest->meth->finish(dest);
if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
return 0;
dest->engine = NULL;
dest->libctx = src->libctx;
/* copy the parameters */
if (src->group != NULL) {
- const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
/* clear the old group */
EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
- dest->group = EC_GROUP_new_ex(src->libctx, meth);
+ dest->group = ec_group_new_ex(src->libctx, src->group->meth);
if (dest->group == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
dest->version = src->version;
dest->flags = src->flags;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
return NULL;
#endif
if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
return NULL;
dest->engine = src->engine;
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
-#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
pairwise_test = 1;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
ok = 1;
if (pairwise_test) {
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
goto err;
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_field_type(key->group) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
if (BN_is_negative(x)
|| BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
|| BN_is_negative(y)
/*
* ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
- * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
- * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
- * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
- * NOTES:
- * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
- * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
- * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
*/
-int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
- goto err;
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ return 0;
}
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
order = eckey->group->order;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
+ */
+int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
+ || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
+ * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
+ */
+int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL
+ || eckey->group == NULL
+ || eckey->pub_key == NULL
+ || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
+ * NOTES:
+ * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
+ * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
+ * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
- /*
- * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
- * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
- */
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
- || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey)
+ || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
- * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
- */
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
- NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
}
ok = 1;
- err:
+err:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
return ok;
}
}
+OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->libctx;
+}
+
const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
{
return key->group;
* This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
* propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
* this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
- * the called specifically set it.
+ * the caller specifically set it.
*
* The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
* years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (key->group == NULL)
return 0;
return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
}
+#endif
int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
{
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff