-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <assert.h>
-# include <openssl/aes.h>
-# include "evp_locl.h"
-# include "modes_lcl.h"
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "modes_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks;
block128_f block;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
int ivlen; /* IV length */
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
+ int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
ccm128_f str;
} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
int ivlen; /* IV length */
int taglen;
} EVP_AES_OCB_CTX;
-# endif
+#endif
-# define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
+#define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
-# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+#ifdef VPAES_ASM
int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
unsigned char *out,
size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_ASM
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_ASM
void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
unsigned char ivec[16], int enc);
void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
-# endif
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+#endif
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
const unsigned char ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-# endif
-# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
-void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+#endif
+#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+void AES_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
const unsigned char iv[16]);
-void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+void AES_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
const unsigned char iv[16]);
-# endif
+#endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
-# include "ppc_arch.h"
-# ifdef VPAES_ASM
-# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)
-# endif
-# define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207)
-# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_p8_set_encrypt_key
-# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_p8_set_decrypt_key
-# define HWAES_encrypt aes_p8_encrypt
-# define HWAES_decrypt aes_p8_decrypt
-# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_p8_cbc_encrypt
-# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
+# include "ppc_arch.h"
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)
# endif
+# define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207)
+# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_p8_set_encrypt_key
+# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_p8_set_decrypt_key
+# define HWAES_encrypt aes_p8_encrypt
+# define HWAES_decrypt aes_p8_decrypt
+# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_p8_cbc_encrypt
+# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+# define HWAES_xts_encrypt aes_p8_xts_encrypt
+# define HWAES_xts_decrypt aes_p8_xts_decrypt
+#endif
-# if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \
+#if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \
((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
- defined(__INTEL__) )
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) )
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-# ifdef VPAES_ASM
-# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_ASM
-# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
-# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
+# ifdef BSAES_ASM
+# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
/*
* AES-NI section
*/
-# define AESNI_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32)))
+# define AESNI_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32)))
int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
const unsigned char ivec[16],
unsigned char cmac[16]);
-# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
+# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
unsigned char *out,
size_t len,
const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi);
-# define AES_gcm_encrypt aesni_gcm_encrypt
+# define AES_gcm_encrypt aesni_gcm_encrypt
size_t aesni_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *in,
unsigned char *out,
size_t len,
const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi);
-# define AES_gcm_decrypt aesni_gcm_decrypt
+# define AES_gcm_decrypt aesni_gcm_decrypt
void gcm_ghash_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *in,
size_t len);
-# define AES_GCM_ASM(gctx) (gctx->ctr==aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks && \
+# define AES_GCM_ASM(gctx) (gctx->ctr==aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks && \
gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx)
-# define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \
+# define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \
gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx)
-# undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */
-# endif
+# undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */
+# endif
static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
- mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc) {
- ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
+ ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else {
- ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
+ ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
+ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
return 1;
}
static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+ size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
if (len < bl)
return 1;
- aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt);
+ aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
return 1;
}
-# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
+# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
+# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
+# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
/*
return 1;
}
-# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
+# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+ * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
} else {
- aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
}
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
if (iv) {
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
}
return 1;
}
-# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &cctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks :
cctx->key_set = 1;
}
if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
cctx->iv_set = 1;
}
return 1;
}
-# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+void aesni_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks, const void *key,
+ size_t start_block_num,
+ unsigned char offset_i[16],
+ const unsigned char L_[][16],
+ unsigned char checksum[16]);
+void aesni_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks, const void *key,
+ size_t start_block_num,
+ unsigned char offset_i[16],
+ const unsigned char L_[][16],
+ unsigned char checksum[16]);
+
static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
*/
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks);
- aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks);
+ aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) aesni_encrypt,
- (block128_f) aesni_decrypt))
+ (block128_f) aesni_decrypt,
+ enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt
+ : aesni_ocb_decrypt))
return 0;
}
while (0);
return 1;
}
-# define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
+# define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# elif defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
+#elif defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
-# include "sparc_arch.h"
+# include "sparc_arch.h"
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
-# define SPARC_AES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_AES)
+/*
+ * Initial Fujitsu SPARC64 X support
+ */
+# define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_FJAESX)
+# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_fx_set_encrypt_key
+# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_fx_set_decrypt_key
+# define HWAES_encrypt aes_fx_encrypt
+# define HWAES_decrypt aes_fx_decrypt
+# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_fx_cbc_encrypt
+# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+
+# define SPARC_AES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_AES)
void aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks);
void aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks);
* non-key-length specific routines would require conditional branches
* either in inner loops or on subroutines' entries. Former is hardly
* acceptable, while latter means code size increase to size occupied
- * by multiple key-length specfic subroutines, so why fight?
+ * by multiple key-length specific subroutines, so why fight?
*/
void aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode, bits;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
- mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
- bits = ctx->key_len * 8;
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
+ bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc) {
ret = 0;
- aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, ctx->cipher_data);
+ aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
switch (bits) {
case 128:
}
} else {
ret = 0;
- aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, ctx->cipher_data);
+ aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
switch (bits) {
case 128:
return 1;
}
-# define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
+# define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher
+# define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher
static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
+# define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
+# define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
+# define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+# define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+# define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- int bits = ctx->key_len * 8;
+ int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
return 1;
}
-# define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
+# define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- int bits = ctx->key_len * 4;
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+ * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
xctx->stream = NULL;
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
return 0;
}
} else {
- aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
switch (bits) {
case 128:
}
}
- aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
if (iv) {
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
}
return 1;
}
-# define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+# define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- int bits = ctx->key_len * 8;
+ int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
cctx->key_set = 1;
}
if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
cctx->iv_set = 1;
}
return 1;
}
-# define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+# define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
*/
- aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks);
- aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt,
- (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt))
+ (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt,
+ NULL))
return 0;
}
while (0);
return 1;
}
-# define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
+# define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# else
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__s390__)
+/*
+ * IBM S390X support
+ */
+# include "s390x_arch.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ /*-
+ * KM-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KM-AES parameter block - end */
+ } km;
+ unsigned int fc;
+} S390X_AES_ECB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ /*-
+ * KMO-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char cv[16];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMO-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kmo;
+ unsigned int fc;
+
+ int res;
+} S390X_AES_OFB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ /*-
+ * KMF-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char cv[16];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kmf;
+ unsigned int fc;
+
+ int res;
+} S390X_AES_CFB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ /*-
+ * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char reserved[12];
+ union {
+ unsigned int w;
+ unsigned char b[4];
+ } cv;
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } t;
+ unsigned char h[16];
+ unsigned long long taadl;
+ unsigned long long tpcl;
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned int w[4];
+ } j0;
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kma;
+ unsigned int fc;
+ int key_set;
+
+ unsigned char *iv;
+ int ivlen;
+ int iv_set;
+ int iv_gen;
+
+ int taglen;
+
+ unsigned char ares[16];
+ unsigned char mres[16];
+ unsigned char kres[16];
+ int areslen;
+ int mreslen;
+ int kreslen;
+
+ int tls_aad_len;
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
+} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ /*-
+ * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and
+ * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's
+ * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key
+ * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected).
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char pad[16];
+ AES_KEY k;
+ } key;
+
+ struct {
+ /*-
+ * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } icv;
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } kmac_param;
+ /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */
+
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } nonce;
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } buf;
+
+ unsigned long long blocks;
+ int l;
+ int m;
+ int tls_aad_len;
+ int iv_set;
+ int tag_set;
+ int len_set;
+ int key_set;
+
+ unsigned char pad[140];
+ unsigned int fc;
+ } ccm;
+ } aes;
+} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX;
+
+/* Convert key size to function code: [16,24,32] -> [18,19,20]. */
+# define S390X_AES_FC(keylen) (S390X_AES_128 + ((((keylen) << 3) - 128) >> 6))
+
+/* Most modes of operation need km for partial block processing. */
+# define S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))
+# define S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))
+# define S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))
+
+# define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key
+static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cbc_CAPABLE 1 /* checked by callee */
+# define S390X_aes_192_cbc_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_aes_256_cbc_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
+
+# define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key
+
+# define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
+static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE
+# define S390X_aes_192_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE
+# define S390X_aes_256_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE
+
+static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
+
+ s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen);
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->res = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
+ int n = cctx->res;
+ int rem;
+
+ while (n && len) {
+ *out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ --len;
+ ++in;
+ ++out;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param);
+
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc,
+ cctx->kmo.param.k);
+
+ while (rem--) {
+ out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx->res = n;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ cctx->res = 0;
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int n = cctx->res;
+ int rem;
+ unsigned char tmp;
+
+ while (n && len) {
+ tmp = *in;
+ *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp;
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ --len;
+ ++in;
+ ++out;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv,
+ S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k);
+
+ while (rem--) {
+ tmp = in[n];
+ out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp;
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx->res = n;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
+
+# define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key
+
+# define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_ctr_CAPABLE 1 /* checked by callee */
+# define S390X_aes_192_ctr_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_aes_256_ctr_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
+
+# define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key
+
+# define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_gcm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kma[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_gcm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kma[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_gcm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kma[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+/* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */
+# define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
+
+/*-
+ * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is
+ * big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned long long alen;
+ int n, rem;
+
+ if (ctx->kma.param.tpcl)
+ return -2;
+
+ alen = ctx->kma.param.taadl + len;
+ if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len))
+ return -1;
+ ctx->kma.param.taadl = alen;
+
+ n = ctx->areslen;
+ if (n) {
+ while (n && len) {
+ ctx->ares[n] = *aad;
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ ++aad;
+ --len;
+ }
+ /* ctx->ares contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */
+ if (!n) {
+ s390x_kma(ctx->ares, 16, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
+ ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+ }
+ ctx->areslen = n;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
+ aad += len;
+ ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ ctx->areslen = rem;
+
+ do {
+ --rem;
+ ctx->ares[rem] = aad[rem];
+ } while (rem);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for
+ * success. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *inptr;
+ unsigned long long mlen;
+ union {
+ unsigned int w[4];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } buf;
+ size_t inlen;
+ int n, rem, i;
+
+ mlen = ctx->kma.param.tpcl + len;
+ if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
+ return -1;
+ ctx->kma.param.tpcl = mlen;
+
+ n = ctx->mreslen;
+ if (n) {
+ inptr = in;
+ inlen = len;
+ while (n && inlen) {
+ ctx->mres[n] = *inptr;
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ ++inptr;
+ --inlen;
+ }
+ /* ctx->mres contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */
+ if (!n) {
+ s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, ctx->mres, 16, buf.b,
+ ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
+ ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+ ctx->areslen = 0;
+
+ /* previous call already encrypted/decrypted its remainder,
+ * see comment below */
+ n = ctx->mreslen;
+ while (n) {
+ *out = buf.b[n];
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ ++out;
+ ++in;
+ --len;
+ }
+ ctx->mreslen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out,
+ ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
+ in += len;
+ out += len;
+ ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+ ctx->areslen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * If there is a remainder, it has to be saved such that it can be
+ * processed by kma later. However, we also have to do the for-now
+ * unauthenticated encryption/decryption part here and now...
+ */
+ if (rem) {
+ if (!ctx->mreslen) {
+ buf.w[0] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[0];
+ buf.w[1] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[1];
+ buf.w[2] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[2];
+ buf.w[3] = ctx->kma.param.cv.w + 1;
+ s390x_km(buf.b, 16, ctx->kres, ctx->fc & 0x1f, &ctx->kma.param.k);
+ }
+
+ n = ctx->mreslen;
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) {
+ ctx->mres[n + i] = in[i];
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->kres[n + i];
+ }
+
+ ctx->mreslen += rem;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0;
+ ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0;
+ ctx->kma.param.tpcl = 0;
+ ctx->kma.param.taadl = 0;
+ ctx->mreslen = 0;
+ ctx->areslen = 0;
+ ctx->kreslen = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->ivlen == 12) {
+ memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen);
+ ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1;
+ ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen);
+ s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL,
+ ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
+ ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+
+ ctx->kma.param.j0.g[0] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[0];
+ ctx->kma.param.j0.g[1] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[1];
+ ctx->kma.param.cv.w = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3];
+ ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0;
+ ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
+ * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
+ * Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out;
+ unsigned char *buf, *iv;
+ int ivlen, enc, len;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ gctx->key_set = 0;
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ gctx->ivlen = ivlen;
+ gctx->iv = iv;
+ gctx->taglen = -1;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+ if (arg <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (arg != 12) {
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(arg);
+
+ /* Allocate memory for iv if needed. */
+ if (gctx->ivlen == 12 || len > S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen)) {
+ if (gctx->iv != iv)
+ OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Add padding. */
+ memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8);
+ *((unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + len - 8)) = arg << 3;
+ }
+ gctx->ivlen = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || enc)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ gctx->taglen = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !enc || gctx->taglen < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->kma.param.t.b, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+ /* Special case: -1 length restores whole iv */
+ if (arg == -1) {
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
+ * 8.
+ */
+ if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (arg)
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (enc && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
+
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
+ arg = gctx->ivlen;
+
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
+ /*
+ * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
+ * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
+ */
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || enc)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
+ s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+ /* Save the aad for later use. */
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
+
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
+ /* Correct length for explicit iv. */
+ if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+
+ /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (!enc) {
+ if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ }
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
+ return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ out = ptr;
+ gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, out);
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+
+ if (gctx->iv == iv) {
+ gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
+ } else {
+ len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen);
+
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len);
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
+ int keylen;
+
+ if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
+
+ gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ if (!enc)
+ gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+ iv = gctx->iv;
+
+ if (iv != NULL) {
+ s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ }
+ gctx->key_set = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (gctx->key_set)
+ s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
+ else
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
+ * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
+ : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+
+ gctx->kma.param.taadl = gctx->tls_aad_len << 3;
+ gctx->kma.param.tpcl = len << 3;
+ s390x_kma(buf, gctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out,
+ gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param);
+
+ if (enc) {
+ memcpy(out + len, gctx->kma.param.t.b, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(gctx->kma.param.t.b, in + len,
+ EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rv = len;
+ }
+err:
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
+ * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
+ * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
+ * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
+ unsigned char *buf, tmp[16];
+ int enc;
+
+ if (!gctx->key_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
+ return s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+ if (!gctx->iv_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (in != NULL) {
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ if (s390x_aes_gcm_aad(gctx, in, len))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (s390x_aes_gcm(gctx, in, out, len))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return len;
+ } else {
+ gctx->kma.param.taadl <<= 3;
+ gctx->kma.param.tpcl <<= 3;
+ s390x_kma(gctx->ares, gctx->areslen, gctx->mres, gctx->mreslen, tmp,
+ gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param);
+ /* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres
+ * and returned it to caller... */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ if (enc) {
+ gctx->taglen = 16;
+ } else {
+ if (gctx->taglen < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, gctx->kma.param.t.b, gctx->taglen))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+ S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
+ const unsigned char *iv;
+
+ if (gctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c);
+ if (iv != gctx->iv)
+ OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(gctx, sizeof(*gctx));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX EVP_AES_XTS_CTX
+# define S390X_aes_128_xts_CAPABLE 1 /* checked by callee */
+# define S390X_aes_256_xts_CAPABLE 1
+
+# define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key
+static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+# define s390x_aes_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+# define s390x_aes_xts_ctrl aes_xts_ctrl
+static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+# define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+# define S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG 0x40
+
+/*-
+ * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *nonce,
+ size_t mlen)
+{
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen;
+ memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t alen)
+{
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ int i, rem;
+
+ if (!alen)
+ return;
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
+
+ /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */
+ ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b;
+
+ if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen;
+ i = 2;
+ } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8
+ && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff;
+ *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
+ i = 10;
+ } else {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe;
+ *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
+ i = 6;
+ }
+
+ while (i < 16 && alen) {
+ ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad;
+ ++aad;
+ --alen;
+ ++i;
+ }
+ while (i < 16) {
+ ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0;
+ ++i;
+ }
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0;
+ s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
+
+ rem = alen & 0xf;
+ alen &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (alen) {
+ s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
+ aad += alen;
+ }
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for
+ * success.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc)
+{
+ size_t n, rem;
+ unsigned int i, l, num;
+ unsigned char flags;
+
+ flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0];
+ if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) {
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
+ }
+ l = flags & 0x7;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l;
+
+ /*-
+ * Reconstruct length from encoded length field
+ * and initialize it with counter value.
+ */
+ n = 0;
+ for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) {
+ n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
+ n <<= 8;
+ }
+ n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1;
+
+ if (n != len)
+ return -1; /* length mismatch */
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1;
+ if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61))
+ return -2; /* too much data */
+ }
+
+ num = 0;
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* mac-then-encrypt */
+ if (len)
+ s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
+ &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
+ } else {
+ /* decrypt-then-mac */
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
+ &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
+
+ if (len)
+ s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ }
+ }
+ /* encrypt tag */
+ for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1];
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
+ * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+
+ if (out != in
+ || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */
+ memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ }
+
+ len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ /*-
+ * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv
+ * (server/client_write_iv) here.
+ */
+ memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */
+ s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len);
+
+ in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
+ return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ } else {
+ if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len,
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ unsigned char *ivec;
+ int keylen;
+
+ if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
+
+ /* Store encoded m and l. */
+ cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7)
+ | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3;
+ memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0,
+ sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b));
+ cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (iv != NULL) {
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ memcpy(ivec, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
+ * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
+ * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
+ * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int rv;
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivec;
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0)
+ return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+ /*-
+ * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt
+ * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before
+ * potentially corrupted data is output.
+ */
+ if (in == NULL && out != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ /* Update(): Pass message length. */
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ /* Update(): Process aad. */
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len)
+ return -1;
+
+ s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len);
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ /* Update(): Process message. */
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
+ /*-
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
+ * Update(), set it now.
+ */
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc) {
+ if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
+ return -1;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ } else {
+ rv = -1;
+
+ if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf,
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ rv = len;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == -1)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ return rv;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
+ * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
+ * Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c);
+ unsigned char *buf, *iv;
+ int enc, len;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Save the aad for later use. */
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
+
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
+ if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Correct length for explicit iv. */
+ len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (!enc) {
+ if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Correct length for tag. */
+ len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ }
+
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+
+ /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
+ return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+ if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Copy to first part of the iv. */
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(iv, ptr, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+ arg = 15 - arg;
+ /* fall-through */
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
+ if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
+ return 0;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
+ return 0;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (enc && ptr)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ptr) {
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ }
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+ return 0;
+
+ if(arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+# define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+# define S390X_AES_OCB_CTX EVP_AES_OCB_CTX
+# define S390X_aes_128_ocb_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_192_ocb_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_256_ocb_CAPABLE 0
+
+# define s390x_aes_ocb_init_key aes_ocb_init_key
+static int s390x_aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+# define s390x_aes_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
+static int s390x_aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+# define s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup aes_ocb_cleanup
+static int s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+# define s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl aes_ocb_ctrl
+static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX
+# define S390X_aes_128_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_192_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_256_siv_CAPABLE 0
+
+# define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+# define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+# endif
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode, \
+ MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
+ keylen / 8, \
+ ivlen, \
+ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ NULL, \
+ sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL \
+}; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, \
+ blocksize, \
+ keylen / 8, \
+ ivlen, \
+ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ NULL, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL \
+}; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ \
+ return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \
+ &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \
+}
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags)\
+static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \
+ blocksize, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ ivlen, \
+ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
+ sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_ctrl, \
+ NULL \
+}; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ ivlen, \
+ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_##mode##_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ aes_##mode##_ctrl, \
+ NULL \
+}; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ \
+ return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \
+ &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \
+}
+
+#else
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# endif
+#endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__))
-# include "arm_arch.h"
-# if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
-# if defined(BSAES_ASM)
-# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
-# endif
-# if defined(VPAES_ASM)
-# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
-# endif
-# define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES)
-# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_v8_set_encrypt_key
-# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_v8_set_decrypt_key
-# define HWAES_encrypt aes_v8_encrypt
-# define HWAES_decrypt aes_v8_decrypt
-# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_v8_cbc_encrypt
-# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__))
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+# if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+# if defined(BSAES_ASM)
+# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
+# endif
+# if defined(VPAES_ASM)
+# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON)
# endif
+# define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES)
+# define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_v8_set_encrypt_key
+# define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_v8_set_decrypt_key
+# define HWAES_encrypt aes_v8_encrypt
+# define HWAES_decrypt aes_v8_decrypt
+# define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_v8_cbc_encrypt
+# define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
# endif
+#endif
-# if defined(HWAES_CAPABLE)
+#if defined(HWAES_CAPABLE)
int HWAES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int HWAES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
void HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
const unsigned char ivec[16]);
-# endif
+void HWAES_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+ const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void HWAES_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+ const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#endif
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \
+#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
- mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- && !enc)
-# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+ && !enc) {
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
-# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
+# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
-# endif
- } else
# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else
-# endif
+#endif
{
- ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+ }
} else
-# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
-# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
+# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
else
-# endif
-# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+# endif
+# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
else
-# endif
+# endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
- ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else
-# endif
+#endif
{
- ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks);
+ ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
-# endif
+#endif
}
if (ret < 0) {
static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
if (dat->stream.cbc)
- (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
- else if (ctx->encrypt)
- CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+ (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));
+ else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
else
- CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+ CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block);
return 1;
}
static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+ size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
size_t i;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
if (len < bl)
return 1;
static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
- if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) {
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+ in += MAXBITCHUNK;
}
- if (len)
+ if (len) {
+ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
+ }
return 1;
}
static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- unsigned int num = ctx->num;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+ unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
if (dat->stream.ctr)
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->stream.ctr);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+ &num, dat->stream.ctr);
else
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->block);
- ctx->num = (size_t)num;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
+ dat->block);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
+ if (gctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
- if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
+ if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
return 1;
}
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0)
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt
+ || gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
return 1;
+ case EVP_CTRL_GET_IV:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen != 1 && gctx->iv_gen_rand != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (gctx->ivlen != arg)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv, arg);
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
if (arg == -1) {
return 0;
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
+ if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!c->encrypt)
+ if (!c->encrypt) {
+ if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
+ return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ }
c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out);
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
return 0;
if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
else {
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
do {
-# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
-# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
+# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
-# else
+# else
gctx->ctr = NULL;
-# endif
+# endif
break;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
break;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
gctx->ctr = NULL;
break;
} else
-# endif
+#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
-# else
+#else
gctx->ctr = NULL;
-# endif
+#endif
} while (0);
/*
static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
int rv = -1;
/* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
*/
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ?
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
+ : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Use saved AAD */
/* Encrypt payload */
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
return -1;
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk,
out + bulk,
goto err;
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
return -1;
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
goto err;
/* Decrypt */
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
return -1;
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk,
out + bulk,
goto err;
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
return -1;
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
goto err;
return rv;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+/*
+ * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys"
+ *
+ * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction.
+ * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a
+ * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of
+ * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module).
+ */
+static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset)
+{
+ int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset;
+
+ /* Must be at least 96 bits */
+ if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */
+ if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!gctx->key_set)
return -1;
if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module.
+ * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that
+ * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications
+ * where setting the IV externally is the only option available.
+ */
+ if (!gctx->iv_set) {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0))
+ return -1;
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1;
+ }
+#else
if (!gctx->iv_set)
return -1;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
if (in) {
if (out == NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
} else if (ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk,
out + bulk,
return -1;
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
return -1;
} else {
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk,
out + bulk,
return -1;
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
-# if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
+#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
-# endif
+#endif
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
return -1;
}
-# define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+#define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,c);
if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
if (xctx->xts.key1) {
if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
return 0;
static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
- if (key)
+ if (key) {
do {
-# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
+ * September 2004 paper:
+ *
+ * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
+ * Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+ * (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
+ *
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
+ * that:
+ * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
+ * BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
+ * data with them."
+ */
+ if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
-# else
+#else
xctx->stream = NULL;
-# endif
+#endif
/* key_len is two AES keys */
-# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
+# ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt
+ xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt;
+# endif
} else {
- HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
+# ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt
+ xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt;
+#endif
}
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
break;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
xctx->stream = enc ? bsaes_xts_encrypt : bsaes_xts_decrypt;
else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
} else {
- vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
}
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
break;
} else
-# endif
+#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
if (enc) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
} else {
- AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
}
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
} while (0);
+ }
if (iv) {
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16);
}
return 1;
static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
+ || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || in == NULL
+ || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /*
+ * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specifed by
+ * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
+ * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
+ * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
+ */
+ if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
+ }
+
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
- xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, ctx->iv);
- else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len,
- ctx->encrypt))
+ xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx));
+ else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ in, out, len,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
-# define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
+#define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
-# define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
+#define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
cctx->key_set = 0;
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
- memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
cctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
{
- uint16_t len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
+ uint16_t len =
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
+ | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
+ if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!c->encrypt)
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+ if (len < cctx->M)
+ return 0;
len -= cctx->M;
- c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
- c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return cctx->M;
if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
return 0;
/* Just copy to first part of IV */
- memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
arg = 15 - arg;
+ /* fall thru */
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
return 0;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
return 0;
- if (c->encrypt && ptr)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) && ptr)
return 0;
if (ptr) {
cctx->tag_set = 1;
- memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
}
cctx->M = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (!c->encrypt || !cctx->tag_set)
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set)
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
return 0;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out);
if (cctx->ccm.key) {
if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
return 0;
static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key)
do {
-# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &cctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
cctx->key_set = 1;
break;
} else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+#endif
+#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &cctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
cctx->str = NULL;
cctx->key_set = 1;
break;
}
-# endif
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks.ks);
+#endif
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &cctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
cctx->str = NULL;
cctx->key_set = 1;
} while (0);
if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L);
cctx->iv_set = 1;
}
return 1;
static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
/* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M))
return -1;
/* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- memcpy(out, ctx->buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+ EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
/* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */
- memcpy(ctx->iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx) + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in,
+ EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
/* Correct length value */
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M;
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 15 - cctx->L,
+ len))
return -1;
/* Use saved AAD */
- CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, ctx->buf, cctx->tls_aad_len);
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), cctx->tls_aad_len);
/* Fix buffer to point to payload */
in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!cctx->key_set)
if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+ /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
+ if (in == NULL && out != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
if (!cctx->iv_set)
return -1;
- if (!ctx->encrypt && !cctx->tag_set)
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
return -1;
if (!out) {
if (!in) {
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ 15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
return len;
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
return len;
}
- /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
- if (!in)
- return 0;
/* If not set length yet do it */
if (!cctx->len_set) {
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
+ 15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
}
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
unsigned char tag[16];
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
- if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
+ cctx->M))
rv = len;
}
}
cctx->len_set = 0;
return rv;
}
-
}
-# define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
+#define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks;
/* Indicates if IV has been set */
static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &wctx->ks.ks);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &wctx->ks.ks);
else
- AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &wctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &wctx->ks.ks);
if (!iv)
wctx->iv = NULL;
}
if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
- wctx->iv = ctx->iv;
+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+ wctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
}
return 1;
}
static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
- EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
size_t rv;
/* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */
int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 4;
if (!inlen)
return -1;
/* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */
- if (!ctx->encrypt && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7))
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7))
return -1;
/* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */
if (!pad && inlen & 0x7)
return -1;
+ if (is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!out) {
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
/* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */
if (pad)
inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8;
}
}
if (pad) {
- if (ctx->encrypt)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
out, in, inlen,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
out, in, inlen,
(block128_f) AES_decrypt);
} else {
- if (ctx->encrypt)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
else
return rv ? (int)rv : -1;
}
-# define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \
+#define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
return &aes_256_wrap_pad;
}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc;
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx;
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
octx->key_set = 0;
octx->iv_set = 0;
- octx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
- octx->iv = c->iv;
+ octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+ octx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
octx->taglen = 16;
octx->data_buf_len = 0;
octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
octx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
}
- if (arg != octx->taglen || c->encrypt)
+ if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (arg != octx->taglen || !c->encrypt)
+ if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg);
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
- new_octx = newc->cipher_data;
+ new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,newc);
return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb,
&new_octx->ksenc.ks,
&new_octx->ksdec.ks);
}
}
+# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+# ifdef HWAES_ocb_encrypt
+void HWAES_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks, const void *key,
+ size_t start_block_num,
+ unsigned char offset_i[16],
+ const unsigned char L_[][16],
+ unsigned char checksum[16]);
+# else
+# define HWAES_ocb_encrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL)
+# endif
+# ifdef HWAES_ocb_decrypt
+void HWAES_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks, const void *key,
+ size_t start_block_num,
+ unsigned char offset_i[16],
+ const unsigned char L_[][16],
+ unsigned char checksum[16]);
+# else
+# define HWAES_ocb_decrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL)
+# endif
+# endif
+
static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
*/
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
+ if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks);
+ HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksdec.ks);
+ if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
+ (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt,
+ (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt,
+ enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt
+ : HWAES_ocb_decrypt))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks);
- vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks);
+ vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt,
- (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt))
+ (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt,
+ NULL))
return 0;
break;
}
-# endif
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks);
- AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks);
+# endif
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksenc.ks);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+ &octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt,
- (block128_f) AES_decrypt))
+ (block128_f) AES_decrypt,
+ NULL))
return 0;
}
while (0);
int *buf_len;
int written_len = 0;
size_t trailing_len;
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
/* If IV or Key not set then return error */
if (!octx->iv_set)
if (!octx->key_set)
return -1;
- if (in) {
+ if (in != NULL) {
/*
* Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low level OCB
* routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/
} else {
buf = octx->data_buf;
buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len);
+
+ if (is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/*
* If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then
* use that data first
*/
- if (*buf_len) {
+ if (*buf_len > 0) {
unsigned int remaining;
- remaining = 16 - (*buf_len);
+ remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len);
if (remaining > len) {
memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len);
*(buf_len) += len;
len -= remaining;
in += remaining;
if (out == NULL) {
- if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, 16))
+ if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
return -1;
- } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
- if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, 16))
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
return -1;
} else {
- if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, 16))
+ if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
return -1;
}
- written_len = 16;
+ written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
*buf_len = 0;
+ if (out != NULL)
+ out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
/* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */
- trailing_len = len % 16;
+ trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
/*
* If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first
if (out == NULL) {
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len))
return -1;
- } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt
(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len))
return -1;
}
/* Handle any trailing partial block */
- if (trailing_len) {
+ if (trailing_len > 0) {
memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len);
*buf_len = trailing_len;
}
* First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might
* have been provided - both for data and AAD
*/
- if (octx->data_buf_len) {
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out,
octx->data_buf_len))
return -1;
written_len = octx->data_buf_len;
octx->data_buf_len = 0;
}
- if (octx->aad_buf_len) {
+ if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) {
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad
(&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len))
return -1;
octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
}
/* If decrypting then verify */
- if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (octx->taglen < 0)
return -1;
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb,
static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
{
- EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = c->cipher_data;
+ EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb);
return 1;
}
-BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, CUSTOM_FLAGS)
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+/* AES-SIV mode */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+
+typedef SIV128_CONTEXT EVP_AES_SIV_CTX;
+
+#define aesni_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+static int aes_siv_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ctr;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cbc;
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+ int klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ switch (klen) {
+ case 16:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* klen is the length of the underlying cipher, not the input key,
+ which should be twice as long */
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_init(sctx, key, klen, cbc, ctr);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+static int aes_siv_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+
+ /* EncryptFinal or DecryptFinal */
+ if (in == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_finish(sctx);
+
+ /* Deal with associated data */
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_aad(sctx, in, len);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_encrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_decrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+static int aes_siv_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+}
+
+
+#define aesni_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+static int aes_siv_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx_out;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_SET_SPEED:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_speed(sctx, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_set_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return 0;
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_get_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ sctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, (EVP_CIPHER_CTX*)ptr);
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_copy_ctx(sctx_out, sctx);
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+
+ }
+}
+
+#define SIV_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
#endif