#include <time.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "e_os.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
-#endif
+# endif
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-int rand_fork_count;
-
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
-static int rand_nonce_count;
-
static int rand_inited = 0;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-
/*
* Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
*
pool = drbg->seed_pool;
pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
} else {
- pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
+ pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
}
size_t bytes = 0;
/*
- * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
+ * Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
+ * in order to provide some additional distinction between different
+ * DRBG child instances.
* Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
* generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
* if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
buffer, bytes_needed,
prediction_resistance,
- NULL, 0) != 0)
+ (unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
bytes = bytes_needed;
drbg->reseed_next_counter
= tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
}
} else {
- if (prediction_resistance) {
- /*
- * We don't have any entropy sources that comply with the NIST
- * standard to provide prediction resistance (see NIST SP 800-90C,
- * Section 5.4).
- */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY,
- RAND_R_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto err;
- }
-
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
}
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
}
- err:
if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
-
- struct {
- void * instance;
- int count;
- } data = { NULL, 0 };
-
- pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- data.instance = drbg;
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, rand_nonce_lock);
-
- if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
- rand_pool_free(pool);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
+ if (drbg->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ }
}
/*
rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
}
-void rand_fork(void)
-{
- rand_fork_count++;
-}
-
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_engine_lock == NULL)
return 0;
-#endif
+# endif
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
- goto err1;
-
- rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
- goto err2;
+ goto err;
if (!rand_pool_init())
- goto err3;
+ goto err;
rand_inited = 1;
return 1;
-err3:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
- rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
-err2:
+ err:
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
-err1:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
-#endif
+# endif
return 0;
}
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
rand_pool_cleanup();
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
-#endif
+# endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
- rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
rand_inited = 0;
}
+/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
/*
- * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are
+ * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
* closed after use.
*/
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
int ret = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
-
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
return ret;
} else {
+ RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
+
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
- pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
+ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
if (pool == NULL)
goto err;
ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
}
-err:
- rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+ size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
if (pool == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
pool->min_len = min_len;
pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
+ pool->alloc_len = min_len < min_alloc_size ? min_alloc_size : min_len;
+ if (pool->alloc_len > pool->max_len)
+ pool->alloc_len = pool->max_len;
+
+ if (secure)
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
+ else
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
+ pool->secure = secure;
return pool;
pool->attached = 1;
- pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len;
+ pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->alloc_len = pool->len;
pool->entropy = entropy;
return pool;
* to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
* (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
*/
- if (!pool->attached)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ if (!pool->attached) {
+ if (pool->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(pool);
}
return 0;
}
+/* Increase the allocation size -- not usable for an attached pool */
+static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const size_t limit = pool->max_len / 2;
+ size_t newlen = pool->alloc_len;
+
+ if (pool->attached || len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ do
+ newlen = newlen < limit ? newlen * 2 : pool->max_len;
+ while (len > newlen - pool->len);
+
+ if (pool->secure)
+ p = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(newlen);
+ else
+ p = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, pool->buffer, pool->len);
+ if (pool->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ pool->buffer = p;
+ pool->alloc_len = newlen;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
* the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit.
/* to meet the min_len requirement */
bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
+ /*
+ * Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount
+ * of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where
+ * rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add
+ * are used to collect entropy data without any error handling
+ * whatsoever, continue to be valid.
+ * Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that
+ * we don't fall back to a less secure or even blocking random source,
+ * as that could happen by the existing code patterns.
+ * This is not a concern for additional data, therefore that
+ * is not needed if rand_pool_grow fails in other places.
+ */
+ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, bytes_needed)) {
+ /* persistent error for this pool */
+ pool->max_len = pool->len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return bytes_needed;
}
}
if (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer
+ * returned from rand_pool_add_begin.
+ * The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the
+ * address of the end of the allocated memory to something
+ * different, since that comparison would have an
+ * indeterminate result.
+ */
+ if (pool->alloc_len > pool->len && pool->buffer + pool->len == buffer) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
+ * additional data.
+ * For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within
+ * the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
+ * below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
+ */
+ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
+ return 0;
memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
pool->len += len;
pool->entropy += entropy;
return NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given
+ * by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
+ * to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
+ * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
+ * additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here,
+ * and of course the caller is responsible to check the return
+ * value of this function.
+ */
+ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
+ return NULL;
+
return pool->buffer + pool->len;
}
*/
int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
funct_ref = NULL;
-#endif
+# endif
default_RAND_meth = meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return 1;
}
+#endif
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ return NULL;
+#else
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE *e;
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
-#else
+# else
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
-#endif
+# endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return tmp_meth;
+#endif
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
* sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
*/
-int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int rand_priv_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
int ret;
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
- return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
- drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
+ drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(ctx);
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
return ret;
}
-int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return rand_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
+}
+
+int rand_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ int ret;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth->bytes != NULL)
- return meth->bytes(buf, num);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- return -1;
+ if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(ctx);
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return rand_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
-#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
+#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0 && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();